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The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine
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Translated by
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INTRODUCTION
TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

2014 was a year which brought fundamental changes in the situation of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine. Following the Euromaidan Revolution in February, the region saw a surge of pro-Russian unrest and the Crimean crisis in March, leading to an armed conflict with Russia which broke out in April with separatist forces aiming to seize control of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. All these developments resulted in considerable migration from the south-east to other areas of the country or abroad.

This volume presents the results of my studies conducted among Poles and people of Polish origin in eastern Ukraine during the period of six years (2007–2012). In all my interviews with the informants from the oldest age group (seventy and over), I sensed their fear and apprehension: fear of deportations, fear of Siberia, fear of the times of the greatest famine in the world, and fear of the Stalinist era. On the one hand, as a researcher, I understood their feelings. On the other, as a person living in our modern day and age, I did not think of the twenty-first century as a time when we should expect another armed conflict.

However, in an interview conducted in Donetsk in 2008, I heard that ‘these are uncertain times, there’s still going to be a war.’

The informant did not want to tell me about her childhood experiences, when she lost both her parents, or the times when her husband was arrested and transported to Siberia, from where he returned a physically and mentally broken man, unable to deal with the memory of the inhuman experience he had lived through. What my informant did say was that she only had a daughter and a beloved granddaughter, and that she was never going to tell them she was Polish and Roman Catholic in order to protect them from the fate of their ancestors.

The current situation in the Donbas does not involve an ethnic conflict. All ethnic communities in the region are exposed to the harsh reality of the war and entire families have fled the areas controlled by the separatist forces.
Most of those leaving the province make their way to other parts of the country, often to join their relatives in western Ukraine.

There are no full statistics on Poles who have left eastern Ukraine. The only reliable figures are those relating to organized groups which were evacuated to Poland. The first of them arrived on 11 January 2015, when Polish military transport planes with 178 persons on board landed at the airbase in Malbork in the north of the country. Towards the end of the month, a group of almost fifty holders of the Polish Card (Pol. Karta Polaka) from the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol asked Polish authorities for assistance and evacuation. In a follow-up operation, a group of 149 people arrived in Poland on 23 November 2015. At the moment, it is impossible to estimate the number of those who remained in the Donbas or left for Poland and other countries on their own.

In this way, the results of my research conducted in the region in 2007–2012, concerning Polish cultural heritage, the scope of different languages, the functions of Polish, and the indicators of Polish identity, have come to refer to a historical reality. The current situation in the Donetsk region would make it impossible to conduct such extensive field studies today. The developments of the recent period have made the people of the region – members of different ethnic communities, including Poles – change their perspective on identity and language in the context of both their current and historical experience. Under the circumstances, they consider who they are and where they belong, and tend to make more clear-cut choices concerning their self-identification. Those who left the Donbas are becoming aware of the importance of self-identification with an ethnic, linguistic or cultural community. Polish activists who remained in what has now become a war zone are more inclined to openly declare ‘I’m a Pole, I’m a Ukrainian citizen and I want to fight for independent Ukraine.’

This book provides a picture of a world which is now history. Indeed, the awareness of people in eastern Ukraine has changed, as have their attitudes to language and culture, and the social structure of the region. As a result, the study has acquired a historical value.

In the original Polish edition of my study, I relied on materials in Ukrainian, Russian and Polish. The English version of the bibliography includes publications which appeared after the book was published in Polish, as well as secondary sources available in English translation.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to Piotr Styk for his translation of the present volume, which, as I fully realize, has not been an easy task. I am also grateful to all the Editors for their careful work on this book and to Ewa Wróblewska for her organizational effort and contribution to the final version of the publication.

Warsaw, December 2015
INTRODUCTION

Polish cultural heritage in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia\(^1\) oblasts in south-eastern Ukraine, including the current scope and functions of the Polish language and indicators of Polish identity in the region, has never been the subject of academic study. The linguistic enquiry presented in this volume is preceded by an extensive chapter providing the historical background of the region and its ethnic composition, as well as an outline of the legal framework of minority organizations, with a particular focus on its relevance to the situation of the Polish minority after the *perestroika*. Information on the historical and legal issues involved enables a better grasp of the complexity of the language issue in the region under consideration.

The present work is based mainly on empirical field studies and archival records, and includes original unpublished material relating to the temporal and geographical aspects of Polish migration to the south-east.

Selected as the focus of the study, the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts\(^2\) have the Polish population of 4,300 (0.09%) and 1,800 (0.01%), respectively, which brings the number of those in the region declaring themselves as Poles to the total of 6,100.

Poles living in the two oblasts originally come from a number of different regions. Some were born and grew up in the historical Polish territories, while

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1 In works about multicultural countries of Eastern Europe, it is impossible to avoid the problem of which linguistic form to use for personal names and place names. For personal names, spellings are in the language of the nationality with which the person identified. For geographical names, the language used is generally determined by present-day international boundaries (e.g. Lviv, Hrodna), except for names well-established in the English usage (e.g. Kiev, Dnieper). Thus, Zaporozhia for the historical region and Zaporizhzhia for the modern city and province. However, in quotations from interviews and surveys, the form is that used by the informants (e.g. Lwów). Throughout the study, the modified Library of Congress system for transliteration of Ukrainian and Russian names and terms is used (without diacritics and soft signs). The original quotations from the informants are included in the main text as illustration of the varieties of dialects and languages they use, which are impossible to preserve in the English translation. These are rendered by the author in the simplified Polish transcription.

2 *Oblast* (Ukr. область): top-level territorial administrative unit, subdivided into *raions* (Ukr. район), *oblast* districts.
others arrived from various parts of the former Soviet Union. Polish settlement in the south-east can be divided into three types: coercive (e.g., a wave of those deported to the mines of the Donbas in 1945), voluntary and, the most frequent of them, mixed, i.e. not resulting from repressions, but not entirely free either (e.g., military service or mandatory work placement on completion of studies). Although those who settled in the region have shared a common experience of life in the south-east, their sense of identity varies depending on a number of factors. In the case of those who feel Polish, the most important one is their Polish origin. Polish associations, which have been active in the region for over two decades, have provided an opportunity to form an organized Polish community.

The history of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine is presented against the background of the history of the region. The work also considers the role of the social environment dominated by other ethnic and linguistic communities. Indeed, the fact that Poles in the south-east have been immersed in the Russian culture stimulated a rapid decline of Polishness. Another issue addressed here involves socio-political developments conditioning the preservation of the Polish language in the older generation. The presentation of the ‘new kind of Polishness’ (Pol. *nowy rodzaj polskości*),³ and the attendant aspirations to learn Polish among members of the middle and the younger generations, are illustrated by a number of charts and include a large selection of quotations from the informants.

Writing in the early 1990s, Janusz Rieger stressed that

mówiąc o Ukrainie, musimy pamiętać, że jest ona bardzo niejednorodna pod względem etnicznym, świadomości narodowej, języka (we wschodniej Ukrainie przeważa rosyjski), stosunku do Polaków [Rieger 1996b: 111].

(when discussing Ukrainian issues, we have to remember that the country is considerably heterogeneous in terms of its ethnic composition, national identity, language (with the dominant position of Russian in the east) and attitude to Poles.)

However, available publications on the history of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine and their use of Polish is quite general, while those more focused tend to be popular in character [Pawluk 2007].

It is particularly important to note an observation made by Elżbieta Smułkowa, who insists that studies of Poles in the East should not approach them as a uniform national minority:

Doświadczenie wskazuje, że każda praca badawcza na ten temat powinna dotyczyć konkretnego miejsca, czasu i bliżej scharakteryzowanej grupy społecznej w jej powiązaniu z innymi grupami [Smułkowa 2004: 266].

³ I understand the ‘new kind of Polishness’ (Pol. *nowy rodzaj polskości*) as a sense of Polishness which is currently shaped mainly by the activity of Polish minority organizations, spreading the knowledge of contemporary Polish songs, dances, history and culture, i.e. elements borrowed from Poland and not ones stemming from tradition.
Practical experience indicates that each academic work addressing this issue should refer to a particular place and time, and make reference to a particular social group in the context of other groups.

Indeed, in terms of its social composition and the use of language, Poles in the East are a heterogeneous community. What also makes them diverse is their different historical experience.

Writing about Poles in eastern Ukraine, Janusz Rieger observes:

Polacy żyli na tych terenach zawsze w rozproszeniu [...], przez cały czas władzy radzieckiej byli więc pozbawieni kontakту ze szkołą i kulturą polską [Rieger 1996b: 116].

(Poles in this region have always been dispersed [...], and thus throughout the period of Soviet rule they were deprived of contact with Polish education and culture.)

In turn, Henryk Stroński makes the following comment on those who returned to Ukraine from Kazakhstan and settled in the region:

[...] na nowych miejscach zdążyło wyrosnąć kilka pokoleń, którym, co z największym żalem należy odnotować, nie zostało nic z polskości prócz nazwisk przodków [after Rieger 1996b: 116].

(several generations have grown up in the new places; regrettably, there is nothing left of their Polishness except the surnames of their ancestors.)

In response, Rieger notes:

Niemniej jednak badania nad Polakami czy potomkami tamtejszych Polaków powinny być przeprowadzone dla potwierdzenia czy też skorygowania tego sądu [Rieger 1996b: 116].

(Nevertheless, a study of those Poles, or people of Polish descent, should be conducted in order to confirm or reject such a claim.)

It is precisely this comment made by Janusz Rieger that provided me with an impulse to undertake research on Poles living in eastern Ukraine and examine Henryk Stroński’s assumption, of which I was doubtful at the time. What is more, at the current stage of my exploration, I am still convinced it is not entirely true. Most academics focus on Poles living in the old south- or north-eastern Polish borderlands (Kresy), in Kazakhstan, or in Siberia, at the same time overlooking those dispersed between the Dnieper and the Urals. Lech Suchomłynow, a Polish activist from south-eastern Ukraine, points to an urgent need for an investigation of this extensive geographical area [Suchomłynow 2005/2006].

Indeed, only a detailed study of the Polish minority in eastern Ukraine can indicate linguistic and cultural similarities and differences between Poles living

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in the western provinces and those in the east of the country. Also, such research will enable some more general conclusions on the entire Polish community in the region under consideration. What should not be overlooked is the fact that the older generation will soon pass away and a similar project carried out in the next few years would be much more limited in scope.

My assumption is that the results of my research will prove important in the field of linguistics, sociology and theory of language contact. Considering that Poles in the region have had no contact with their homeland for a few generations, the preservation of Polish cultural heritage in this relatively unexplored area of the south-eastern borderlands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is particularly worth documenting. The events and processes shaping the phenomenon deserve to be explored and described.

The present volume provides a description of the most important problems of the Polish minority living far away from Poland. Its members declare their Polish identity on the basis of a number of different factors and have an interest in the everyday life of their compatriots in Poland. They have survived in spite of communist repressions and ethnic cleansing. Indeed, they still feel Polish. What factor was at play here? Although Poles in the region are geographically dispersed, what binds them together is their sense of Polishness.5

The record of their residual Polish, family heirlooms they preserved and, most importantly, information on the Poles deported to Kazakhstan who came to live in eastern Ukraine in the 1970s, and on those who held on to their Polish identity in spite of the passage of time, will make it possible to save this knowledge for future generations and provide the basis for future research in this and related fields.

I hope that my research findings will have practical application in the further study of Poles living outside Poland, and that they will prove useful to specialists in ethnography, sociology, linguistics, cultural studies, political science and history.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to Professor Ewa Wolnicz-Pawłowska and Professor Ewa Dzięgiel for their effort to read this work and for their valuable comments on the text, which has had a considerable influence on the final form of the volume.

5 According to my respondents, their sense of Polishness involves such factors as: Polish origin (i.e. they come from a Polish family, or from a family where some members are/were Polish); knowledge or learning the Polish language; formal entry indicating Polish ethnicity (Ukr. національність, natsional'nist') in official documents; membership in the Roman Catholic Church. Some of them include here the fact that they were born in Poland; others find it important that they are members of Polish organizations.
The Aim and Scope of the Study

The present work aims to establish the temporal and geographical patterns of Polish migration to south-eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) and explore the dilemmas of identity, including the level of the command of Polish and the scope of its use. The chapters below offer a discussion of the following questions:

(a) a historical perspective and social, ethnic and language background of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine;
(b) temporal and geographical patterns of Polish migration to south-eastern Ukraine;
(c) the Polish minority in the context of the legal framework of minority issues and the Ukrainian ethnic policy;
(d) Polish minority organizations currently active in the region and the role of the Polish language in the Roman Catholic Church, education and culture;
(e) the situation of the multi-language Polish community;
(f) the use and function of the Polish language in different domains;
(g) indicators of Polish identity;
(h) selected examples of individual historical memory.

Description of the use of Polish grammar by members of the Polish minority in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts is particularly difficult for a number of reasons. Poles in south-eastern Ukraine originally come from many different regions, mainly those speaking the south- or north-eastern variety of eastern borderland Polish (Pol. polszczyzna kresowa); in addition, the former involves a considerable number of different dialects. While for some of them Polish was the first language, others have acquired it after 1990. There is also the question of a different command of Polish in both groups. I have managed to interview some members of the older generation who are users of eastern borderland Polish and the last bearers of Polish cultural and language tradition in the region. Indeed, Janusz Rieger observes that

(...) nieliczni już przedstawiciele najstarszego pokolenia, jedyni świadców dawnych zdarzeń, opuszczają ten świat (bądź tracą pamięć), poza tym świeżo wyuczone znajomość polskiego, intensywne kontakty z Polską i jej kulturą zacierają stan nie tak jeszcze odległy [Rieger 1996b: 130].

…the last witnesses of the past from the oldest generation are now passing away (or, sometimes, lose their memory); the recent acquisition of the Polish language and intensive contact with Poland and its culture obliterate the form of language that used to exist not long ago.)

There were a number of reasons explaining the choice of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts as the geographical focus of this study:
(a) the Polish minority in the two oblasts had not been the subject of academic study;
(b) members of the Polish minority, as well as the language situation in the two oblasts are slightly different (e.g., while the language of the official administration in the Donetsk oblast is Russian, Ukrainian is beginning to gain some ground in Zaporizhzhia);
(c) considering that I conducted research on my own, exploration of a larger area would not have been possible due to its geographical extent and dispersion of the Polish minority; expanding the area covered in the study would have required setting up a research team;
(d) Poles in the region tend to concentrate in large urban centers, which enables observation of intergenerational differences in the sphere of language use.

The multidimensional and multi-layered nature of the study was dictated by the ethnic diversity (about 120 different ethnic and national communities), as well as the complex historical and socio-economic context. Another issue to be addressed was the question of different bilingual configurations and the selection of factors of national identity. In addition, Poles in the region are geographically dispersed, which made them difficult to locate.

In order to achieve the research objectives, I conducted a number of unstructured interviews aiming to extract information concerning the question of the language used: (a) at home in childhood (in contact with parents and grandparents); (b) following the arrival in the region; (c) in contact with children; (d) currently. It was also important to gather data on family history (including the parents and grandparents, the circumstances of deportation) and on language contact in the previous places of residence of the informants.

Having become familiar with the legal aspects and the actual situation of the Polish minority, I conducted semi-structured interviews leading towards the informants' assessment of such questions as: the national and regional language policy, the actual situation in institutions of secondary and higher education, and the motivation for learning Polish. Another important issue involved their preferences concerning the language of the Roman Catholic services (Polish, Ukrainian or Russian). The dynamic activity of some Polish organizations in the region made me aware of not only their important role but also the fact that their chairpersons need to use different languages in their work, depending on practical considerations (which also dictate the use of language in Polish magazines and websites).

Polish minority organizations are instrumental in providing Poles with a motivation to freely and openly declare their origin. Aiming to revive the Polish heritage and foster Polish culture, their entire activity consolidates an awareness of Polishness among their members. In addition, Polish associations actively promote Poland in the region.

As regards primary materials, the present discussion is based on recordings, surveys and questionnaires, as well as materials collected in the course
Introduction of archival studies and statistical data obtained from different organizations. The fieldwork for the study was conducted between 2007 and 2012.

The Method

A description of such a complex subject matter as the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine today required the use of different methods. The problem which had to be addressed was not only the geographical dispersion of the group (and a variety of localities its members originally came from), but also the character of the region under consideration – a vast, industrial and highly urbanized area. As mentioned above, I chose the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts with a view towards verifying Henryk Stroński's claim about the Poles in the east of the country. Although my initial intention was to include also the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, I abandoned the idea having conducted pilot studies, as it proved physically impossible to accomplish the task of covering such an enormous territory single-handedly.

Apart from field surveys, assembling material for the volume also involved study of records held at the State Archives of the two oblasts. Along with (particularly Ukrainian and Russian) literature on the subject, the materials served to provide the social and historical perspective of issues under consideration (presented in the initial chapter).

In my fieldwork, I relied also on unstructured and semi-structured interviews, well established qualitative methods in the domain of the humanities. The category under consideration reached 'theoretical saturation,' a point whereby the researcher becomes empirically confident that no significant additional data is being found; '[o]ne reaches theoretical saturation by joint collection and analysis of data' [Glaser, Strauss 2012: 61; cf. Kabzińska 1999: 19].

In view of the fact that the informants were considerably dispersed, the sample was selected on the principle of availability, applied in conjunction with 'snowball sampling,' a procedure used in the study of members of special population who are difficult to locate. Earl Babbie explains that '[s]nowball refers to the process of accumulation as each located subject suggests other subjects'; the method is used mainly for exploratory purposes [Babbie 2005: 205].

Pilot interviews concerning the declared level of knowledge of Polish and attitudes towards Russian, Polish and Ukrainian were carried out between 2007 and 2009. The study also aimed to collect information on the use of language (when and in what situations the respondents use languages which remain in contact) and the indicators of Polish identity in south-eastern Ukraine. Conducted in Berdiansk, Donetsk, Makiïvka, Mariupol, Melitopol and Zaporizhzhia, the interviews counted 150 in total and provided the basis for designing several types of surveys.

Although the study sample was not representative, the surveys were conducted in a manner which would secure a reliable picture. For example, in the case of issues relating to religion (the ethnic composition of the Roman
Catholic Church and the preferred language of the liturgy), they were carried out in all Roman Catholic parishes. The questionnaires were designed so that their length would not put the respondents off; they were all in Russian, the language spoken by everyone in the region. As for an example of the content, the survey concerning indicators of identity had two parts, the first of which included questions about the demographics, and the second – about the factors indicating why the respondent declares him- or herself as Polish. The samples of respondents are described in the text in the sections providing analysis of results. I also used open biographical interviews, a method introduced by such authors as Antonina Kłoskowska, and applied in ethnology, sociology and sociolinguistics; it is also employed in the study of cultural and language borderlands, as well as multicultural and multi-ethnic communities. The method relies on analysis of autobiographical accounts against a backdrop of historical and social processes, basing on the assumption that the narratives reveal attitudes both to the immediate environment (neighbors, cultures, languages), as well as to the historical and social developments. In the absence of written records, autobiographical accounts and memory of particular historical events extracted in the course of fieldwork studies can prove to be the only available trace of ‘small history.’ Historical events and social processes are closely related to the narrator’s biography. Writing on the method, Antonina Kłoskowska observes:

Starting from an autobiographical account preceded by a proper introduction should not impose anything on the subject and allow him to place the problems being studied in a context of his choice. This context would be more natural and closer to his ordinary, original way of thinking, experiencing values and manifesting attitudes [Kłoskowska 2001: 106].

Additional data was gathered in the course of participant observation of the Polish community; it also came from direct contact and interviews with

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6 Anna Engelking comments on the use of participant observation in her fieldwork conducted in Belarus as follows:

‘Kiedy podczas kolejnych wyjazdów wracaliśmy do poznanych wcześniej wiosek i osób, nasza rola w rozmowach przesuwała się stopniowo z pozycji obcego czy gościa na pozycję dobrze znajomego, czy wręcz uczestnika życia rodzinnego naszych gospodarzy, a obserwacja uczestnicząca przekształcała się w doświadczenie. Mieśliśmy okazję brać udział w wielu wydarzeniach rodzinnych i obrzędowych. Były wśród nich między innymi: świętowanie prawosławnej Wielkanocy u zaprzyjaźnionej rodziny, wielkanocne kolędowanie (wspólne z hłykalnikami, obchodzącyymi wieś z pieśniami i oracją w zamian za wódkę, jajka i pieniądze) […]’ [Engelking 1996: 179].

(‘When we returned to the same people and places we had visited during our previous field studies, our role in conversations gradually shifted from that of a stranger or a guest to the one of a good acquaintance or even a participant in the life of the host family, and thus participant observation was turning into live experience. We had an opportunity to take part in a number of family and traditional celebrations, including the Orthodox Easter spent with a family who were our hosts’ friends, the ‘Easter kaliada’ (when we were wandering round the village with a group of hłykalnicy, who paid flying visits to different households to give their show of songs and speeches in return for vodka, eggs and cash) […]’.)
members of the Ukrainian, Russian, Bulgarian, German, and Greek communities living in the immediate neighborhood of the Poles. The advantage of the method is that it provides an opportunity to explore the actual reality, and enables the researcher to select the questions and formulate them in a way which is perfectly understandable for the respondents. Another important factor involved in the study was time. Indeed, the extent of the period of fieldwork made it possible to both notice and follow the changes taking place. In this context, it should be noted that the knowledge of Ukrainian and Russian, as well as an awareness of the mentality of the respondents, were considerable assets. Thanks to this, it was easier to make contact and talk on a variety of subjects with those informants who did not know Polish. The materials gathered during fieldwork also include photographic documentation.

My approach to the research hypothesis of the present study relies on the framework of grounded theory, as proposed by Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss. Their basic premise is that the discovery of theory stems from systematically obtained empirical data, which means that hypotheses and concepts are generated while conducting research. In other words: ‘Generating a theory involves a process of research’ [Glaser, Strauss 2012: 6]. Krzysztof Konecki, a pioneer of grounded theory in Polish academia, sums it up by noting that a theory unfolds from empirical data which are directly related to the fragment of social reality under scrutiny. Hypotheses, concepts and their properties are generated, modified and verified in the course of empirical study, thus working out a theory inherently involves a prolonged research process. The method enables the researcher to benefit from the ‘context of discovery’: he or she is in a position to search for and discover previously unsuspected phenomena. The proponents of grounded theory see generating theory as a process, and not as verification of previously formulated hypotheses on the basis of subsequently collected evidence [Konecki 2000: 26–27]. Consequently, they are open to combining qualitative and quantitative research methods [Babbie 2005: 325].

Using the data on the socio-demographic profile of the respondents, I devised a categorization based on age and divided them into three generations: the older (born before the Second World War), middle (born between 1945 and 1975) and younger (born between 1975 and 1990). I made an attempt to

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7 Glaser and Strauss's *Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* was originally published in 1967; the edition quoted here is Glaser, Strauss 2012. The book was published in Polish in 2009.

8 Halina Kurek comments on her application of the method as follows: ‘Głównymi czynnikami powodującymi językowe zróżnicowanie społeczności wiejskich są parametry społeczno-geograficzne ich mieszkańców: wiek, pochodzenie społeczne, wykształcenie, zawód, a niekiedy płeć. Cechy społeczno-demograficzne poszczególnych osób w znacznym stopniu decydują o przyswojeniu przez te jednostki określonego kodu językowego’ [Kurek 1995: 23].

(‘The main factors behind the linguistic differentiation of rural communities are the elements of the socio-demographic profile of their members, such as their age, social background, level of education, occupation, and sometimes also sex. The socio-demographic profile of a particular individual is a major indicator of adopting a particular linguistic code.’)
consider these age groups in conjunction with other factors which have an influence on the objective description of language use, including sex, level of education, religion, and time spent living in the region.

The applied method required the definition of linguistic terms used in the study, such as mother tongue, the second language, bilingualism, multilingualism, language contact, linguistic code, interference, and Surzhyk. In this respect, I relied on the works of a number of authors, including Uriel Weinreich, Leon Zawadowski, Joshua Fishman, Elżbieta Smułkowa, Janusz Rieger, Anna Zielińska, and Ewa Dziegieł.

The description of language use in the group under consideration is based on the language contact theory. The so-called domain theory [Zielińska 1996: 16] proved useful for the discussion of problems involved in the choice of language in multilingual communities, including code-switching. Another important element is that of different bilingual configurations observed in the older, middle and younger generations. The description of language situation also considers the self-declared level of command of Polish and the attitudes of the respondents to Polish, Russian and Ukrainian. Among the questions explored in the study are the patterns of language use in the family domain and in the official domain, including education, religion, the media and the Polish organizations in the region.

The following part of the book provides an empirical analysis of the cultural identity of the respondents. The set of indicators involved in this exploration was devised on the basis of the model described by Jan Błuszkowski [Błuszkowski 2005: 13–14], and modified as dictated by the results of the pilot survey. The analysis of materials obtained during fieldwork in the region makes use of the concept of ‘a sense of belonging to the nation’ (Pol. poczucie przynależności narodowej), operationalized as a set of such criteria as blood ties, religion, culture and the place of birth.

The final chapter draws on cultural memory theory, applied in interdisciplinary studies of cultures of memory in various social and political structures. Individual experience is the subject of ‘oral history,’ which relies exclusively on information acquired in oral interviews [J. Assmann 2008: 67]. Chapter 6 also includes an analysis of some biographical portraits prepared on the basis of secondary sources.

The combined use of historical, ethnological and sociological methods in linguistic study seems entirely justified. Indeed, a combination of such tools made it possible to provide an analysis of the Polish minority in a region with a particularly complex history, achieve the research objectives and draw reliable conclusions.

Selected Works on the Polish Language in Ukraine

The present study forms a part of the body of research on the Polish language in present-day Ukraine. One of the main study problems revealed in the
course of the present exploration was the interpenetration of the south- and north-eastern variety of eastern borderland Polish and the concurrence of different varieties of Polish learned after 1990. While the former have been the subject of intensive study, there have been far fewer publications on Poles living in south-eastern Ukraine.

There are a number of works on the south-eastern variety of eastern borderland Polish published before the Second World War. Władysław Harhala studied the local dialect of Komarno area in the pre-war Lviv (Pol. Lwów) province (Pol. województwo) of the Second Polish Republic, as well as the phonetics and morphology of the local dialect of Peremózne, Tulyholove, Buchaly and Malyniv villages (Pol. Chłopy, Tuligłowy, Buczały, Malinów) [Harhala 1931a, 1931b]. The results of fieldwork in the Ternopil (Pol. Tarnopol) region conducted by Karol Dejna and Stefan Hrabec in the same period were published in the 1950s. While Dejna [Dejna 1956] provided a description of the phonetics and inflection of the local dialect of Mylne (Pol. Milno) village, Hrabec [Hrabec 1955] focused on the phonetics, inflection and lexicon of Duliby village. Other studies to be noted in this context are those on the phonetics, inflection and syntax of the local dialect of Stara Krasnoshora (Pol. Stara Huta) by Michał Lesiów [Lesiów 1957, 1959]; his material was collected in Poland from the respondents born in the area.

Zofia Kurzowa authored a number of works on the Polish language of the south-eastern borderlands (Kresy) focusing on the period prior to 1939 [Kurzowa 1983, 2007]. Her aim was to collect as much source material as possible from the last generation of the people of the region who still remembered the language: ‘We aim to record what is being forgotten, what is dying, what is becoming history’ (‘Dążeniem naszym jest więc zarejestrowanie tego, co ulega zapomnieniu, ginie, staje się historią’) [Kurzowa 1983: 13]. Her monograph on the southern variety of eastern borderland Polish provides an analysis of phonetic, inflectional, word-formation and syntactic patterns of the language of Lviv, as well as a description of the educated speech and local urban dialect of the city. In her work, Kurzowa also analyzed the Polish language in the rural areas of the Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk (formerly Stanisławów) provinces, studied the geographical extent of eastern regionalisms, and offered a review of literature on the Polish language of the south-eastern borderlands [Kurzowa 1983: 39–72].

Another author worth noting here is Wiaczesław Werenicz, who conducted field studies in Sambir and Rokytne area (late 1960s), as well as in Polonne.

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10 The list of works on eastern borderland Polish should also include Jan Zaleski’s studies on phonetics, morphology, word-formation and onomastics in the language of literary works by Aleksander Fredro. First published in the 1960s and 1970s, Zaleski’s articles were edited as a volume of collected studies in 1998 [Zaleski 1998].
Zhytomyr, Kamianets Podilskyi, Khmelnytskyi and Odessa (1970s). The phonetics of Biskovychi village near Sambir was the focus of research carried out by Valentina Cherniak and Teodozii Starak [Cherniak, Starak 1973].

1982 brought the first volume of the series entitled *Studia nad polszczyzną kresową (Studies on Eastern Borderland Dialects of Polish).*\(^{11}\) The twelve volumes published so far include a number of contributions devoted to the Polish language of the south-eastern borderlands, such as studies on the local dialect of Sharovechka and Matskivtsi (phonetics, verbal inflection and other issues) by Natalia Ananeva (publishing in Polish as Natalia Ananiewa) [Ananeva 1983, 1984; Ananiewa 1995]. More recent volumes in the series feature works on the Polish language in Ukraine today, most of them by associates of Janusz Rieger. So far, research in Ukraine has been carried rather selectively, focusing mostly on the western regions of the country. Volume 12 brings an article by Wiaczesław Werenicz on the social situation of the Polish language in the USSR (in Ukraine and Kazakhstan). Written before 1989, the text includes a sociolinguistic description of the Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi and Kamianets Podilskyi regions [Werenicz 2010].

Another series of studies in the field is *Język polski dawnych Kresów Wschodnich (The Polish Language of Old Eastern Borderlands)* [Język 1996–2010]. As intended by the editor, Janusz Rieger, the aim here is to ‘reach a broad readership. This is why there are no articles written in the academic jargon and the samples of local dialects are rendered in simplified transcription’ (’jest do szerszego kręgu odbiorców. Dlatego nie ma tu artykułów pisanych hermetycznym językiem nauki, a teksty gwarowe podano w transkrypcji uproszczonej’) [Rieger 1996d: 7]. The series features the results of fieldwork conducted in Ukraine by Rieger’s associates; the geographical area covered in the volumes stretches eastwards as far as Kiev [Łazarenko 1996, 2006]. The Polish language of Zhytomyr region was also investigated by Julia L. Jaworska and Sergiusz Rudnicki [Iavorskaia 1993; Rudnicki 2000]; Oksana Ostapchuk (publishing in Polish as Ostapczuk) wrote on Poles in the Vinnytsia *oblast* [Ostapczuk 1999]. So far, the series has presented contributions on the Lviv, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vinnytsia and Kiev *oblasts*. In many of his articles, however, Rieger points out that there are still a number of issues which have not been explored:

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\text{O języku polskim na Wschodzie napisano już wiele prac – bibliografia wymienia ponad tysiąc pozycji. Wiemy o nim z jednej strony bardzo dużo, z drugiej zaś – bardzo mało [Rieger 1996a: 11].}
\]

(There is a substantial body of works on the Polish language in the East – the bibliography of the field includes over a thousand entries. On the one hand, we know a lot about it, on the other, still very little.)

\(^{11}\) For a bibliography of the content of the series, see *Studia nad polszczyzną kresową*, vol. 6 and 8 [*Studia 1982–2010*].
Introduction

Empirical studies on the Polish language in Ukraine in the post-war period gained momentum only after 1989. Initiated by Janusz Rieger, with Ewa Dziegiel and Iwona Cechosz as his main associates, they brought a number of monographs, collective volumes and articles, including *Polska gwara Oleszkowiec na Podolu. Fleksja imienna i werbalna (The Local Dialect of Polish in Olyshkivtsi (Podolia Region): Nominal and Verbal Inflection)* [Cechosz 2001] and *Polska gwara wsi Zielonej na Podolu na tle innych gwar południowokresowych. Fleksja imienna i werbalna (The Local Dialect of Polish in Zelena Village (Podolia Region) in the Context of Other Dialects of the Southern Variety of Eastern Borderland Polish: Nominal and Verbal Inflection)* [Dziegiel 2001]. Analyzing the language of the earlier stages of Polish settlement, Dziegiel and Cechosz offer a detailed discussion of their inflectional system, focusing on the influence of Ukrainian on the patterns observed in the local dialects of Polish. Another important study to be noted is *Gwara polska wsi Korczunek koło Żytomierza (The Local Dialect of Polish in Korchunok Village near Zhytomyr)* by Sergiusz Rudnicki [Rudnicki 2000], providing a description of a local rural dialect of Polish transferred to Ukraine by voluntary migrants towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The collection of studies *Język polski na Ukrainie w końcu XX wieku (The Polish Language in Ukraine in the Late Twentieth Century, 2 Vols.)* presents local dialects of the Polish language of the south-eastern borderlands (Lviv, Ternopil and Podolia regions), including their brief linguistic profile and a discussion of issues of the use of Polish in the area under consideration. The authors document the state of preservation of the language, as well as its diversity [Rieger, Cechosz-Felczyk, Dziegiel 2002: 9].

Another valuable study is *Polszczyzna na Ukrainie. Sytuacja językowa w wybranych wsiach chłopskich i szlacheckich (The Polish Language in Ukraine: The Language Situation in Selected Peasant and Petty Nobility Villages)* by Ewa Dziegiel. The author uses sociolinguistic methodology to analyze the features of Polish in several Polish centers in the Lviv, Ternopil and Khmelnytskyi (formerly Proskuriv) oblasts, focusing on historical determinants and bilingual configurations in particular locations [Dziegiel 2003].

The lexicon of the south-eastern variety of eastern borderland Polish is the subject discussed in such publications as: *Słownik gwary przesiedleńców ze wsi Tuligłowy (The Lexicon of the Local Dialect of Persons Displaced from Tuliholove Village)* [Paryl 2004]; *Słownictwo gwary Oleszkowiec i Hrechana (The Lexicon of the Local Dialect of Olyshkivtsi and Hrechana Villages)* [Cechosz-Felczyk 2004]; *Słownictwo kresowe (The Lexicon of Eastern Borderland Polish, ed. J. Rieger)* [Rieger (ed.) 2008]; *Zapożyczenia leksykalne w sytuacji wielojęzyczności (Lexical Borrowings in a Multilingual Environment)* [Krawczyk 2007]; *Słownictwo gwarowe przesiedleńców z Ukrainy (The Local Dialect Lexicon of Persons Displaced from Ukraine)* [Słownictwo 2007]. The works analyze the users of different dialects of Polish in present-day Ukraine in the area between the Polish border and Kiev. Writing several years ago, Wiaczesław Werenicz observed
that 'the local dialects of Polish in the eastern *oblasts* of the Right Bank, as well as those in the Melitopol and Odessa areas, practically have not been studied at all' (‘prawie nie tknięte pozostają gwary kresowe w obwodach wschodnich Ukrainy Prawobrzeżnej, jak również w okolicach Melitopola i Odessy’) [Werenicz 1996: 130]. The author concluded that the material indicated a serious decline of Polish, with its residual form observed in a number of cases [Werenicz 1996: 128].

Indeed, in south-eastern Ukraine I observed Polish in its residual state. It is being overlaid by the language learned in various courses, often taught by teachers from Poland, or acquired while staying in Poland.

Publications on the Polish language in south-eastern Ukraine include a number of articles, such as 'O roli Polaków w Berdiańsku w promocji kultury i języka polskiego' (On the Role of Poles of Berdiansk in the Promotion of Polish Language and Culture) [Krasowska, Suchomłynow 2005/2006]. While conducting my field study in the region, I wrote on the Polish national awareness in the south-east in comparison with Bukovina [Krasowska 2007, 2008b, 2008c]; a brief sociolinguistic profile of the region [Krasowska 2008a]; education and the language used in Roman Catholic religious services: 'Polacy Berdiańska. Wybrane zagadnienia językowe' (Poles in Berdiansk: Selected Linguistic Issues) [Krasowska 2009a]. My article published in *Drobna szlachta dawniej i dziś* (Petty Nobility: Past and Present) is devoted to the Jelski family and their contribution to Polish culture [Krasowska 2009b].


The latter, in which I have been involved, is divided into two parts. Part one, ‘Polska mniejszość nad Morzem Azowskim: studia i opracowania’ (Studies on the Polish Minority on the Sea of Azov), presents results of research on the role and function of the Polish language, and on the indicators of Polish national identity in the region; it also includes contributions on selected aspects of the activity of the Roman Catholic Church. The sections here are as follows: ‘Berdiańsk częścią obwodu zaporoskiego’ (Berdiansk as an Urban Center of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast), ‘Polacy na tle innych mniejszości narodowych na terenie obwodu zaporoskiego’ (Poles in the Context of Other Ethnic Minorities in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast), ‘Stan obecny języka polskiego w regionie’ (The Current State of the Polish Language in the Region), ‘Zarys historii Kościoła katolickiego w kontekście współczesnych tendencji językowych’ (The Roman Catholic Church in the Region: The Current Language Question from a Historical Perspective), ‘Specyfika tożsamości Polaków w Berdiańsku’ (The Specific Nature of Polish Identity in Berdiansk).

Part two, ‘Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo “Odrodzenie” w dokumentach i materiałach’ (Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’:
Introduction

Documents and Source Materials), includes several sections featuring a number of documents each; the sections (with introductions pinpointing the most important issues) are as follows: ‘Prawne aspekty funkcjonowania PKOT “Odrodzenie” w Berdiansku’ (Legal Aspects of the Activity of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ in Berdiansk), ‘Z działalności organizacyjnej i naukowej’ (Organizational and Scientific Activity), ‘Na drogach współpracy’ (Working Together), ‘Na niwie kultury’ (Cultural Activity) [Bonusiak et al. 2011]. The bibliography of works concerning Poles in the region also includes popular biographical accounts [Pawluk 2006; Vishnevskii 2008] and articles by Aleksander Makiejew, Lech Suchomłynow and Igor Lipkiewicz discussing the activity of the Center of Polish Language and Culture in Berdiansk and methods of teaching Polish [Makiejew 2009; Suchomłynow 2009a; Lipkiewicz 2011].
Poland was among the first countries to officially recognize the independence of Ukraine in 1991. As assessed by experts in international affairs, mutual relations between the two countries have developed satisfactorily ever since, bringing them increasingly closer together.

The geographical area covered by the historical-cultural and ethnolinguistic analysis offered in the present study includes the oblasts\(^1\) (provinces) of Donetsk, located on the border with the Russian Federation, and Zaporizhzhia, on the Sea of Azov. Their administrative centers are among the largest Ukrainian cities, along with Kiev, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Lviv, and Kryvyi Rih.

In Polish, the region has been referred to as Dzikie Pola (the Wild Plains), Zaporoże (Zaporozhia) and Kresy (the Borderlands).\(^2\) In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these uninhabited territories became the homeland of the Cossack community, composed of a number of different ethnic groups. After the Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the south-eastern regions of Ukraine were incorporated into Russia, which actively promoted their settlement, inviting Serb, English, Belgian, French and Polish newcomers. Some new rural and urban colonies were dominated by Greek, German or

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1 Ukraine is divided into twenty-four regions, called oblasts (Ukr. області, oblasti); Kiev and Sevastopol have a municipal status equivalent to that of a region, and the Crimea is an autonomous republic.

2 The political map of this part of Europe has changed a number of times. The borders were different than today and so was the meaning of various Polish terms, such as Kresy (the Borderlands) [Wolnicz-Pawłowska, Szulowska 1998: 9]. For example, Wincenty Pol (1807–1872, Polish poet and geographer) gives the following definition: ‘Kresy was thus in fact the term to denote the zone of military borderland with the Cossacks and the Tatars, living on the Dnieper estuary and the lower Dniester River at the time’ ('Kresy oznaczały tedy w istocie linię wojskowego pogranicza od Kozaczyny i Ordy tatarskiej, siedzących podówczas jeszcze na ujściu Dniepru i na Dolnym Dniestrze') [after Kolbuszewski 1995: 18]. There is a considerable body of literature on Kresy [cf. for example Handke (ed.) 1997]. Referring to the area discussed in the present study, I use the term ‘south-eastern Ukraine,’ which is the geographical location of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
Czech communities. In this way, the former ‘Wild East’ became populated by a peculiar mosaic of European nations.

Thanks to considerable natural resources (coal, iron and manganese ore, rock salt deposits) attracting local, Polish, and Western capital, the area developed into an important mining region and a large center of iron and steel, machine, chemical and light industry. Today, its agriculture is dominated by sunflower farming and vine growing.

In 1920, the Bolsheviks seized power in the country; the region, along with the rest of Soviet Ukraine, became part of the Soviet Union in 1922. The new communist system imposed the collectivization of agriculture, which resulted in three major outbreaks of famine (1918–1922, 1930–1933 and 1944–1948); several million people perished in the Great Famine of 1930–1933, orchestrated by the Soviet authorities. Under the Soviet Union, Ukraine experienced a seventy-year period of repressions, involving labor camps, deportations and political persecutions, which particularly affected Ukrainian intelligentsia and ethnic minorities, including the Polish community. In the south-east of the country, a declaration of Polish identity often led to deportation or even a death sentence.

Historically, Poles had settled in the region for various reasons. In the early period, they were driven by a desire for freedom, or ran away from punishment for (often criminal) offenses in their homeland. Later, they came attracted by the prospect of a better quality of life; indeed, the rapid growth of industry stimulated demand for labor force. However, over the course of time it was coercive rather than voluntary resettlement that became a major factor at play. A number of Poles made a substantial contribution to the development of the region, and their impact can be seen until today. Such examples include Andrzej Korwacki, a pioneer of orchard farming in Melitopol area, and Zofia Jelska, who with her husband, Nikolai Blagoveshchenskii, co-founded the Donetsk Medical Institute (today: Donetsk National Medical University).

It was not until the independence of Ukraine that members of the Polish community were able to establish official associations, which became increasingly more effective over the last two decades and attracted public attention in the context of the UEFA Euro 2012 football championship, co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine.

Although they are quite a small and geographically dispersed minority, Poles play a relatively important role in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and make a significant contribution to consolidating Ukrainian identity (one of the major postulates of the Orange Revolution). They are also among the founders of local chambers of commerce and industry, they contribute to the cultural development of the region and to strengthening the position of the Roman Catholic Church. As a result of this social involvement, the opinion of the Polish community is taken into account by the regional and local administration. Polish activity in the region has also been noted in Poland.
1.1. A Historical Outline of the Region

**Early history.** The area of today’s Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts has a long and complex history. Throughout the ages the area was an important communication route, facilitating contact between various peoples and cultures. Among those most important, archaeological evidence confirms the presence of Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, Goths, Avars, and Khazars [Gudz’, Mitiaľ, Popenko 2004: 126–41; Jakowenko 2000: 87–92]. The oldest inhabitants of the Wild Plains known today include such nomads as Pechenegs, Polovtsians and, much later, Tatars.

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3 This section offers a brief outline of the history of the area under consideration and highlights the main elements which are essential for a better grasp of the problems discussed in the study. Those wishing to expand their historical knowledge can consult a considerable body of literature on the subject available in Polish and Ukrainian, for example: Serczyk 2001, 2008, 2009; Wójcik 1961, 1971; Iakovenko 1997; Jakowenko 2000; Hrytsak 1998.
The Wild Plains (Pol. Dzikie Pola), is a historical Polish name given to the steppe on both sides of the lower Dnieper River below the Dnieper Rapids (Ukr. Дніпрові пороги, Dniprovi porohy), which Erich Lassota von Steblau described as follows:

Die Porogen, seindt Strudl, oder felsichte Öhrter, da der Nepr über und über voller Stein und felsen liegt, derer ein Theil unter dem Waßer, ein Theil demselben gleich, Ezlich aber hoch über das Waßer herfür gehn, daruch ist sehr gefährlich zu fahren, sonderlich wen das Waßer klein, undt müßen die leuth an den gefährlichsten öhrten absteigen und theils das schiff mit lang feilen oder stricken zuruckhalten, theils ins waßer steigen, und das schieff über die spizigen stein heben und gemechlich hinüber lassen [...]. Dieser öhrter sein zwöllf, oder wen man den orth Woronowa zabora darzu raitet, drechzehn, innerhalb sieben meilen [...].

(Porohy are whirlpools or rocky places where the Dnieper continuously rolls over rocks and boulders, some of which are under water and others, just even with it. Several boulders are higher than the water level and make travel past them very dangerous, especially when the water is low. The travelers must leave their boats at these extremely dangerous spots. Then, getting into the water, by means of ropes or poles, they lift the boats over the sharp rocks and carefully let them down on the other side. [...] There are twelve of these places, or, if one includes Voronova Zabora, thirteen within the stretch of seven miles [...].)

The stretch of porohy, rugged outcrops of granite running across the river, extended for dozens of kilometers between the present-day cities of Dnipropestrovsk and Zaporizhzhia. All of them, including the largest Nenasytets (‘insatiable,’ over two kilometers in length), were flooded by the waters of the Dnieper Reservoir in 1932. The area beyond the porohy is the Dnieper Lowland.

After the fall of Kievan Rus’, its lands were taken over by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Mongol invasion of 1237–1240 brought a lasting split of the

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4 The Polish term Dzikie Pola (the Wild Plains) is a historical name referring to the lower Dnieper region [Kamler (ed.) 2000: 109] in the Black Sea Lowland, between the lower Dniester River and the north-west corner of the Sea of Azov. In 1223, the vast steppe which had used to be the homeland of the nomadic tribes of Pechenegs and Polovtians (Kumans) was occupied by the Mongols and came under the rule of the Golden Horde. The part of the Wild Plains between the lower Dniester and the lower Dnieper, which since the early fifteenth century had been recognized by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as its territory, was taken over by the Turks and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1526. The territory between the lower Dnieper and the Sea of Azov belonged to the Crimean Khanate, which also became dependent on Turkey in 1475. Located in the Lower Dnieper basin, Zaporozhia was formally part of Lithuania, and as of 1569, officially belonged to the Crown [Europa Wschodnia 1997: 166].

5 The names and descriptions of the Dnieper Rapids were recorded already in the tenth century by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus [Serczyk 2008: 22–23; SSS 1961: vol. 1, 349–350].

6 Erich Lassota von Steblau’s diary, entry for 5 June 1594; English translation, see Wynar (ed.) 1975: 24–25.
former Rus’ into a number of parts, with the region of Zaporozhia coming under control of the Golden Horde. In 1445, the steppe on the left bank of the Dnieper became part of the Crimean Khanate. Over the centuries, the region was the object of rivalry between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and Turkey. It was in this period that the Wild Plains became an area of settlement for members of various ethnic groups. From the fifteenth century, it was a safe haven for peasants who fled from serfdom. Attracted by the prospect of a new life as free men, they made their way there not only from the the Rus’ lands, but also from the west, including ethnically Polish territories (such as the Lublin Region, Mazovia and Greater Poland) and other countries: Muscovy, Moldavia, Vallachia and even Germany [Wójcik 1989: 2]. Over the course of time, the territory became known as the Wild Plains. Indeed, it was a no man’s land beyond the control of any state authority, Lithuanian, Polish or even Crimean [Wójcik 1971: 127].

In terms of its ethnic composition, the region was a mix of Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Vallachians, and Tatars [Serczyk 2001: 56]. Aleksander Jablonowski estimates that the proportion of Poles was about 10%, which made them the second largest ethnic group among Cossacks after the Rus’ peoples [after Franz 2002: 101]. Also, the settlements established in the period were characterized by a Slavic-Turkish ethnic mix of the population [Iakovenko 1997: 119]. In the second half of the fifteenth and the early sixteenth century, all these people came to be referred to as Cossacks.8

7 In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, some of this territory belonged to the Golden Horde; 1427 saw the rise of the Crimean Khanate, which emerged as a result of its breakup. In 1475, the Khanate became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire and played an important role in the history of Central-Eastern Europe: its invasions of Russia and the Commonwealth resulted in military conflicts with Turkey.

8 Encyklopedia staropolska (The Old Polish Encyclopedia) explains: the origins of Cossacks go back to the Tatar period, when a number of borderland towns in Rus’ organized their light cavalry troops called cossacks for protection against Tatars; the term itself is a borrowing from the Tatar-Chagatai word kazak, which meant an unmarried, light-armored voluntary soldier; in the sixteenth century, Alessandro Guagnini (1534–1614, known in Poland as Aleksander Gwagnin, an Italian-born Polish soldier and historian) provided the following explanation: ‘Kozak, Kazak jest słowo tatarskie i wykłada się jakoby chudy pachołek, zdobyczy sobie szukając, nikomu nie jest poddany, a za pieniądze komu chce służy.’ (‘Kozak, Kazak is a Tatar word which refers to a freeman of low birth or wealth who is on the lookout for spoils and serves for money under whomever he wants’);

in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century there were already different names for different Cossacks; Poles have always associated the term with the Ukrainian and Zaporozhian Cossacks; in the Tatar language, Ukraine is called Kazak vilayati [Gloger 1958: 92]. Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich (The Geographical Dictionary of the Kingdom of Poland and Other Slavic Lands) explains: ‘Kozacy, ludność na pograniczu Polski, Rosyi, t.z. Tatary i Turcji żyjąca, między Jaikiem i Dnieprem; dzielila się niegdys na hordy. Kozacy zaporoscy mieszkali około Dniepru, nazwisko swe brali od prądowin tej rzeki, zwanych progi ‘porohy’’ [Słownik geograficzny 1880–1902: vol. 4, 534–535].

(‘Cossacks, the people living in the borderlands of Poland, Russia, Tataria and Turkey, between the laik and Dnieper rivers; they used to be divided into hordes. Zaporozhian Cossacks lived on the Dnieper and took their name from the rapids on that river, called porohy.’)
The process of colonization of south-eastern regions involved not only peasants who had fled from serfdom and exploitation, but also members of the urban underclass seeking their chance for a better future in Ukraine. The Wild Plains also attracted troublemakers and common criminals running away from justice [Tazbir 2007: 235].

Cossacks played a considerable role in the history of Ukraine. They were ‘free people’ taking advantage of the unclear administrative status of the no-man’s-land in the steppe, where they settled and formed independent farming communities, engaged also in raiding and looting the neighboring areas. Most of the population originally came from the territories of Muscovy and the Rus’ provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth [Wilson 2009: 58]. The Wild Plains often attracted those reluctant to obey authority, which over the course of time produced a system of peculiar military democracy. Cossacks engaged in military expeditions, especially against the Turks and Tatars, looting horses, armor and clothing. On such occasions, they were led by an otaman, a military leader elected for each campaign [Serczyk 2001: 56].

Cossacks were organized in a military fashion with a council of elders in charge. In the sixteenth century, they formed the Zaporozhian Sich, a territorial entity in the lower Dnieper basin. The Ukrainian word sich (cіч)\(^9\) referred to

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\(^{9}\) *Sich*: ‘sixteenth–eighteenth century: a fortified camp of the Zaporozhian Cossacks; the Zaporozhian Cossacks’ (‘od XVI do XVIII w.: warowny obóz Kozaków zaporoskich; Kozacy zaporoscy’) [Doroszewski 1966: 193]; or *Kosh* (from ‘a camp’ in Tatar) [Brückner 1970: 260] – the Cossack capital and the principal camp of ‘the famous Lowland Zaporozhian Host,’ a fortified town protected by trenches and palisades, which was built in a series of different locations over the centuries. The last of them was erected at the confluence of the Pidpilna and Dnieper rivers. Surrounded by a market suburb (*kramnyi bazar*) with stalls, shops and inns, the town itself was behind a gate protected by a cannon tower. Inside, along the dyke, there were thirty-eight large

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Orgelbrand's *Encyklopedia powszechna* (*Universal Encyclopedia*) provides an extensive entry on the Cossacks:

‘Pod tą nazwą przywykliśmy ogólnie rozumieć rodzaj zakonu rycerskiego, utworzonego na wybrzeżach Dniepru dla walki z pogaństwem. [...] Przede wszystkim należy pamiętać, iż były dwa rodzaje kozaków: jedni niezależni od Rzeczypospolitej, siedzący na Niżu i stąd Niżowcami zwani (nazwa Zaporożcy powstała w późniejszych czasach); drudzy stanowiący ludność grodzów starościańskich lub magnackich miasteczek ukraińskich, byli właściwie mieszkancami lub rolnikami zwolnionymi od podatków i innych ciężarów w zamian za obowiązek bronienia granicy’ [Orgelbrand 1900: vol. 8, 550–553].

(‘We are generally used to understanding this term as referring to a kind of military order established on the banks of the Dnieper to fight against the pagans. [...] It is important to remember that there were two kinds of Cossacks: those independent from the Commonwealth and living in the Lowlands, hence called Niżowcy [(Pol.) “Lowlanders”], (the name Zaporożcy [(Pol.) “Zaporozhians”] did not appear until a later period), and those living in royal or private towns in Ukraine, who were in fact townspeople or peasants exempted from taxes and other duties in return for their obligation to protect the border’).
a camp protected by wooden fortifications (cf. Pol. zasieki, ‘an abatis’ [Serczyk 2001: 56]), and the word ‘zaporozhian’ (Ukr. запорозька, zaporož‘ka) described its geographical location beyond the Dnieper Rapids (Ukr. за порогами, za porohamy) [Podhorodecki 1978: 27]. Their main headquarters was a military camp located on the Dnieper island of Khortytsia\(^\text{10}\) (cf. Pol. forteca, fort, ‘a fortress,’ ‘a fort’) beyond the rapids, hence they were also referred to as Zaporozhians [Tazbir 2007: 235]. The first permanent Cossack fortifications on Khortytsia were erected in 1553; today, it is within the city of Zaporizhzhia. In 1965, the island (2650 ha, 12 by 2.5 km in size) was declared a national heritage site; it is home to the Historical Museum of Zaporozhian Cossacks [Serczyk 1984: 19–20].

1569 marks an important date in the history of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. The act of union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the Union of Lublin) included provisions for a new territorial division between the two parts of the unified Commonwealth: Podlasia, Volhynia and the provinces of Kiev and Bratslav, which all had been part of the Grand Duchy, were incorporated into the Crown (Poland) [Wójcik 1989: 9]. In the course of time, the transfer produced a number of social, religious and ethnic conflicts.

Cossacks had already become a serious problem within the Grand Duchy in the fifteenth century and the situation exacerbated after 1569, when they found themselves within the Crown. In an attempt to solve the conflict, Polish kings Zygmunt II August and Stefan Batory created the so-called Cossack Register, official military units in the service of the Commonwealth [Wójcik 1971: 128]. Cossacks were often enlisted for the campaigns against Muscovy, Moldavia or the Tatars, and used as a military force to protect the southern borderlands of the Commonwealth; hence, this part of the Cossack population was referred to as the Registered Cossacks\(^\text{11}\) [Tazbir 2007: 235]. Under Zygmunt III Vasa,
the policy towards Cossacks was inadequate and inconsistent. Negotiating from a position of strength, Poland-Lithuania was unwilling to recognize their rights and aspirations. On the other hand, the state made certain concessions and issued, mostly empty, promises whenever their military skills were required [Wójcik 1971: 128]. A certain proportion of Cossacks remained in the service of the Crown administration officials residing in the Ukrainian borderlands [Jakowenko 2000: 147].

Cossack territories in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It seems that in the early seventeenth century Cossacks were ready to cooperate with Poland-Lithuania, but not to accept its rule. The period between 1638 and 1648 was referred to as ‘the Golden Peace’ in Ukraine [Serczyk 2001: 90]. However, persistent Cossack raids into Turkish territories brought the danger of conflict with the Ottoman Empire, which requested that the Commonwealth should punish the perpetrators and bring them under effective control. This, however, the Commonwealth was not strong enough to do [Wójcik 1971: 129]. In addition to a number of Cossacks who had their own personal accounts to settle with the Polish nobility (Pol. szlachta), the majority of the population perceived Polish policy towards Ukraine as hostile. The problems included the status of Orthodoxy, the limitation of the Cossack Register, repressions against former Cossack insurgents (instead of the promised amnesty) and proven intentions to turn members of the Zaporozhian Host into peasant serfs. It was a combination of all these major factors that produced a wave of mass hatred [Serczyk 2001: 92; 2008: 153]. The rebellion of 1648 is sometimes referred to as ‘the Cossack revolution’ [Jakowenko 2000: 215–216] and the person who embodied the spirit of the movement was Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, a chief maker of the Cossack State, which immediately commanded respect among its neighbors. The uprising eventually turned into a bloody war lasting for nearly four decades [Iakovenko 1997: 201]. At an early stage, having secured the support of the Tatar forces, Khmelnytskyi achieved three
victories in the battlefields of Zhovti Vody, Korsun and Pyliavtsi (spring–autumn 1648) [Wójcik 1971: 129–130]. In 1649, he divided the country into sixteen military districts which also performed administrative functions; the organizational structure of Zaporozhia was designed to serve the needs of wartime. In February 1649, after a series of defeats of the Commonwealth forces, King Jan II Kazimierz Vasa granted Khmelnytskyi the official title of Hetman (‘military leader’) and sent him a hetman bulava (‘mace’) as a symbol of his military authority [Serczyk 2001: 97].

In 1654, Khmelnytskyi signed the Pereiaslav Agreement with Muscovy, whereby Ukraine accepted Russian protectorate [Serczyk 2009: 368]. The Left Bank (beyond the Dnieper) was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Muscovy [Wójcik 1971: 140]. The immediate result of the treaty was the outbreak of war between the Commonwealth and Muscovy, and a change in the foreign policy of the Crimean Khanate. The agreement did not give Ukraine independence, and neither did it achieve a unification of its territory. Quite to the contrary, it led to a lasting split of the country into two parts, one ruled by Russia and the other by the Commonwealth [Tazbir 2007: 255].

In the aftermath of Pereiaslav, the Muscovy-controlled territories of the Left Bank, Zaporozhia and Sloboda Ukraine12 began to form an economic entity. Before 1654, each of them had been a different economy governed by different regulations:

Ukraina słobodzka znajdowała się bowiem w granicach Rosji, Lewobrzeże Rzeczypospolitej, a Zaporozhé było jak gdyby samodzielnym terytorium kozackim, chociaż formalnie stanowiło część państwa polskiego [Serczyk 2001: 115].

(Sloboda Ukraine had been within the borders of Muscovy, the Left Bank belonged to the Commonwealth, and Zaporozhia, although formally part of the Polish state, functioned as a quasi-independent Cossack territory.)

With the Ukrainian territories divided between the two powers along the Dnieper, and the Zaporozhian Host thus split into the Left- and the Right Bank, the Cossacks entered what Ukrainian historiography refers to as the Period of Ruin, which saw the consolidation of the country’s division into two parts, controlled by the Commonwealth and Muscovy [Wójcik 1971: 149]. Poland-Lithuania made great efforts to return to the status quo prior to the 1648 conflict and was ready to make concessions. The result was the Union of Hadiach, concluded with Cossack Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi in 1658. The act made provisions for the Grand Duchy of Rus’ as the third autonomous entity within the Commonwealth, along with the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.13

12 Today, Sloboda Ukraine (Ukr: Свобідська Україна, Слобожанщина; Slobidska Ukraina, Slobozhanshchyna) is a historical and geographical region in eastern Ukraine in the southern part of the Sumy oblast, the central and south-eastern part of the Kharkiv oblast and the northern part of the Luhansk oblast.

13 The Union of Hadiach (September 1658) practically meant a break with Muscovy. For more on the issue, see Kroll 2008; Tazbir 2008: 23–34; Franz 2006; also, extensive collections of conference
It was to include the area of Commonwealth palatinates (Pol. województwa, ‘provinces’) of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, ruled by the Hetman and the local administration [Tazbir 2007: 259; Jakowenko 2000: 250]. However, the union turned out to be short-lived: Vyhovskiyi soon faced a popular rebellion at home and a new war over Ukraine between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy broke out in 1659 [Tazbir 2007: 259]. The Chudniv Agreement between the Commonwealth and Cossacks (1660) restored Polish sovereignty over the entire Ukraine [Wójcik 1971: 148].

The Truce of Andrusovo\(^\text{14}\) between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy (1667) divided Ukraine along the Dnieper, and Zaporozhia was placed under their joint protection to form a buffer zone against Tatars and Turks. However, the Commonwealth protectorate was a mere formality since the state was already too weak to exercise its full powers [Wójcik 1971: 170; Jakowenko 2000: 258].

The spring of 1677 saw the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, concluded with the Treaty of Bakhchysarai (1681), which was to secure a twenty-year armistice. As agreed, the line of division between their spheres of influence ran along the Dnieper, with the area between Kiev, Chyhyryn and the Southern Buh River to be left unsettled as a no man’s land buffer zone between them [Jakowenko 2000: 265]; Zaporozhia became a Turkish dominion [Wójcik 1971: 174]. The anti-Turkish Polish–Muscovite ‘Eternal Peace’ of 1686 (the Grzymułtowski Peace) confirmed the 1667 truce line and secured Russia’s possession of all its territorial gains, including Kiev. Although the former Polish-Russian condominium of Zaporozhia still officially remained within the Turkish domain (as agreed in Bakhchysarai), it became a sphere of exclusive Russian interest. The Commonwealth received financial compensation for the loss of Kiev [Wójcik 1971: 175; Podhorodecki 1978: 195].

Zaporozhia was to suffer under the heavy hand of Tsar Peter I. His policy of modernizing Russia involved severe restrictions on the autonomy of the region which had functioned as a state within the state under Poland-Lithuania. In 1710, the tsar introduced a special resident official charged with monitoring the Hetman and responsible for preventing the resettlement of the Sich. In September 1711, Peter I ordered all the Right Bank Cossacks to resettle across the Dnieper and promised to compensate them with land property equal in value to what they would leave behind in the Commonwealth territory. However, those who actually moved to the Left Bank did not receive their expected reward [Serczyk 2001: 140].

Under Russia, Cossacks experienced the reign of terror and violence, including deportations to Siberia and executions [Podhorodecki 1978: 203].

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\(^{14}\) Negotiations began in 1664 and concluded in 1667 with the Truce of Andrusovo, dividing Ukraine between the Commonwealth and Muscovy along the Dnieper, with the Kiev area left under Russia. Poland-Lithuania lost also Chernihiv-Siversk Lands and the province of Smolensk [Tazbir 2008: 259; Wójcik 1971: 150]. The settlement marked the end of an era of the domination of the Commonwealth in the East. See also Wójcik 1959.
Some served as slave labor, building Saint Petersburg, the new imperial capital; others fled for their safety to the Black Sea steppe and sought refuge under the Turkish rule, where they established the Oleshky Sich in the Dnieper estuary. In 1720, the authorities made it illegal for Tatar merchants coming to Russia to bring along Zaporozhians, except those who would be ready to ask the tsar for mercy. As a result, Zaporozhia was gradually turning into a Russian province.

The prospects of Cossack return to Ukraine opened only after the death of Peter I. Although Empress Anna also repeatedly refused their pleas, she avoided taking a firm stand in the hope of securing their support in the future. In 1734, on the eve of a new war with Turkey, she granted Zaporozhia a limited autonomy and allowed Cossacks to establish the New Sich in the Russian-controlled territory [Podhorodecki 1978: 206], on the Pidpilna River, a tributary of the Dnieper. As a territorial entity, the New Sich was subject directly to the Governor-General of Kiev and divided into thirty-eight military and administrative units called kuren. In wartime, its troops served under the Russian chief military commander [Serczyk 2001: 144].

1751 saw the beginning of imperial colonization of the Cossack territory: settlers from the Turkish–Austrian borderland were invited to the area of the upper Inhul and Inhulets rivers west of the Dnieper, which became known as New Serbia (Ukr. Нова Сербія, Nova Serbiia).15 Another wave of colonists from Moldavia formed the Nova Sloboda Cossack Regiment (Ukr. Новослобідський козацький полк, Novoslobids'kyi kozats'kyi polk) to the south of New Serbia. In 1753, the tsarist government allocated land for Serbian settlement on the Left Bank, which was the beginning of Slavic Serbia (Ukr. Славяно-Сербія, Slaviano-Serbiia) [Jakowenko 2000: 365]. In 1764, all these recently colonized territories were joined in a newly established imperial province of New Russia (Rus. Новороссийская губерния, Novorossiiskaia guberniia), whose administration treated the Zaporozhian territory as empty wilderness [Wójcik 1971: 319].

Although the Dnieper Cossacks were loyal Russian allies in the 1768–1774 war with Turkey, they came to be perceived in terms of a threat to the empire once their service was no longer required [Wójcik 1971: 319], especially that the region saw a number of greater and smaller rebellions. In 1775, Catherine II proclaimed a special manifesto which sanctioned the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich and its incorporation into New Russia [Podhorodecki 1978: 228; Makar et al. 1998: 80]. The system of regimental administration

15 In January 1752, Serbs began to settle in the area between the confluence of the Kavarlyk River, the upper Tur River, the confluence of the Kamyanka River, the upper Berezivka River and the confluence of the Omelnyk River. Called New Serbia, their territory of settlement was closed to any other colonists. In mid-May 1764, New Serbia, Slavic Serbia and a part of Zaporozhia in the Syniukha River basin on the border with the Commonwealth became part of a newly established imperial province of New Russia. The province of Sloboda Ukraine was created towards the end of the same year [Serczyk 2001: 146–147].
was abolished. Some Cossacks fled to the Ottoman Empire, where they established the Danubian Sich; others settled on the Kuban River (1792–1793) and on the Sea of Azov [Serczyk 2001: 158; Bazylow 1975: 233]. The land of the Sich was distributed among Russian gentry.

The office of Cossack Hetman was abolished in 1764 and Count Petr Rumiantsev was nominated as the imperial administrator in charge of Ukrainian affairs. Cossack administration (regimental system) was replaced by three newly established Russian provinces based in Chernihiv, Poltava and Kharkiv. To win the support of Ukrainian gentry for the changes, its members were awarded the same rights and liberties as the Russian nobility (Rus. дворянство, dvorianstvo) (1785). The pace of Russification accelerated, which could be noticed for example in the terms ‘Ukraine’\(^{16}\) and ‘Ukrainian’\(^{17}\) being persistently avoided and replaced with ‘Little Russia’ (Rus. Малороссия, Malorossiia) and ‘Little Russians’ (Rus. малороссы, malorossy) [Wójcik 1971: 319].

Zaporozhia was turned into a part of the Russian Empire, with Cossack lands incorporated into the provinces of Azov and New Russia and the Russian administrative and legal system in place. Most Cossacks were forced to join Russian regiments or resettled [Podhorodecki 1978: 229]. In order to consolidate Russian presence on the Black Sea, the government began to settle the new territories, which involved building fortresses and towns, such as Oleksandrivsk (1770, today: the city of Zaporizhzhia) [Serczyk 2001: 160]. The administrative organization kept evolving: in 1802, the province of Katerynoslav was divided into three parts: Mykolaiv (renamed Kherson a year later), Katerynoslav and Taurida. The territory of today’s Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts belonged to Taurida and Katerynoslav provinces, respectively.

The administrative reform of 1802 required the members of the General Court to be approved by the Senate in Petersburg [Serczyk 2001: 165]. However, in the Right Bank the Russian authorities took into account the opinion of the Polish nobility and preserved the pre-Partition land courts (Pol. sqdy

\(^{16}\) The term Ukraine (Ukraine) did not always refer only to the vast territory on both sides of the Dnieper River. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, both in Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ukraina (singular) or Ukrainy (plural) denoted borderland regions and territories in general. In the sixteenth century, Ukraina came to be associated with the region on the Dnieper which was to become the Commonwealth palatinates (województwa) of Kiev and Bratslav; in the seventeenth century, the geographical scope of the term expanded to include also the palatinate of Chernihiv. Although all of them were populated mostly by Rus’ people (Pol. Rusini (plural)), the common term Ukraina did not cover their entire ethnic territory: the regions of Volhynia, Podolia and Red Ruthenia were not included [Wójcik 1989: 1]. Ukraina (noun) and ukraiński (adjective) gained currency in the eighteenth century and ukraiński began to refer also to the language and ethnicity of the people of southern Rus’ (Pol. Rus). The geographical scope of the term Ukraine expanded in the course of the nineteenth century to include the entire Ukrainian ethnic territory. At the same time, the usage of the terms Rus’ (region) Rusini (people) and język ruski (language) slowly declined, to be replaced by Ukraina, Українці and язык український [Wójcik 1972: 6].

\(^{17}\) For a discussion of the etymology of the term Ukrainian to denote ethnicity, including also its geographical origin, see Ułaszyn 1947.
ziemskie) and subcamerarius courts (Pol. sądy podkomorskie); the official language was both Polish and Russian. The Polish nobility received privileges similar to those of the Russian dvorianstvo, including the right to deport their disobedient serfs to Siberia, as the Russian law of peasant serfdom had been extended to the whole of Ukraine in 1796 [Serczyk 2001: 166].

The Russo-Turkish war of 1828–1829, which finished with the treaty of Adrianople, provided the Danubian Cossacks with an opportunity to return to their homeland. They initially settled on the Sea of Azov and were charged with the protection of its eastern shores. The Azov Cossack Host was dissolved by Emperor Alexander II in 1865 [Serczyk 2001: 173].

The legal and administrative order imposed by the Russian empire was not favorable for the population of Ukraine. Having implemented the new regulations concerning peasantry, the authorities went on to introduce the so-called zemstvo institutions (1864), which involved a number of important changes to the local government, court system, municipal councils and the army [Serczyk 2001: 194]. The reforms were first introduced only in the Left Bank, as Petersburg respected the rights and privileges of the local Polish nobility of the Right Bank (a considerable proportion of whom was in fact of Ukrainian descent and had been Polonized following their conversion to Roman Catholicism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) [Hrytsak 1998: 25]. From the Russian perspective, for the most part of the nineteenth century it was the Left Bank (incorporated into Russia in 1667) rather than the Right Bank that was considered ‘Ukraine’ [Snyder 2009].

In Ukraine, the fall of the January Uprising in 1864 was a disaster not only for the Polish national movement; Russification extended to all spheres of life, which meant that any action aiming to promote any ethnicity other than Russian was treated as highly suspicious and provoked repressions.

1917–1921. In 1917, the February Revolution swept away the tsarist monarchy and the Russian Provisional Government took over power in Petrograd. Founded in Kiev in March the same year, the Central Rada (also known as the Central Council of Ukraine) voiced Ukrainian ambitions for political autonomy and eventually followed the path leading to independence. The All-Ukrainian National Congress, convened by the Rada in April, ‘demanded the delimitation of Ukraine’s borders “in agreement with the people’s will” and participation of Ukraine at a future peace conference’ (żądano wyznaczenia granic Ukrainy “zgodnie z wolą ludu” i udziału przedstawiciela ukraińskiego w przyszłej konferencji pokojowej’) [Serczyk 2001: 253]. In June, the First Universal of the Central Rada, invoking the historical tradition of the Cossack Hetmanate, proclaimed Ukrainian autonomy. It was recognized by the Petrograd Provisional Government, but only in five provinces (Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Podolia and Volhynia). After the Bolsheviks seized power in the October Revolution, the Central Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian National Republic, and the Fourth Universal (January 1918) declared it a sovereign state (nine former imperial provinces in total, including five as above and Kharkiv,
Katerynoslav, Kherson and Taurida). Although it was a state with no army or administration, it introduced its own currency (Ukr. гривня, hryvnia), coat of arms (the trident, Ukr. тризуб, tryzub, coat of arms of the刘伊克 dynasty) and the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag (blue sky over cornfields), which was a symbolic link with the traditions of the old Rus’ and the Cossacks [Wilson 2009: 123; Hrytsak 1998: 85].

By late 1918, Ukrainian independence had been declared by four different centers of power, each of them pursuing a different political vision of the future state. The Bolsheviks, who wanted to turn the country into a part of the Soviet federation, captured Kharkiv and the central regions and declared them the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (January 1919) [Hrytsak 1998: 106]. In February, they reorganized the administrative system and divided the country into new provinces (still called Rus. губерния, guberniia): Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernihiv, Donetsk, Katerynoslav, Kremenchuk, Kiev, Odessa, Podolia, Poltava, Taurida and Volhynia. March 1919 saw the proclamation of the first constitution of Soviet Ukraine with the capital in Kharkiv. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had a new coat of arms (the hammer and sickle framed with ears of wheat, with sun rays in the background) and a new red flag with the name of the country inscribed on it [Serczyk 2001: 273].

The provinces of Galicia and Volhynia were incorporated into the re-established Polish state, Transcarpathia became part of Czechoslovakia, Bukovina went to Romania and Crimea had a status of an autonomous republic within the Soviet Russia. All other Ukrainian territories formed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [Wilson 2009: 129].

Like in other parts of the Soviet Union, Ukraine (including the area of present-day Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) experienced the hardships of war communism. It is also worth noting that crime rate was quite high, particularly in the Donbas [Mikheieva 2004]. The Treaty of Riga, signed between Poland, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine in 1921, marked the end of the civil war in all Soviet republics, including Ukraine.

**In the interwar period,** Ukraine was entirely dependent on Russia, with all economic decisions taken in Moscow, including the policy of the so-called dekulakization, whereby more prosperous farmers had their land confiscated. Combined with mandatory quota of farm produce to be delivered by all peasants, it led to the outburst of famine in 1921–1922, with the worst situation reported in Zaporozhzhia and the Crimea [Serczyk 2001: 290]. The total of between one and a half and two million people died of starvation in the period [Hrytsak 1998: 122].

The political reality in Ukraine was quite distant from the official declarations and Soviet principles enacted in 1919, 1929 and 1936 constitutions: civil rights were violated, the number of political prisoners constantly increased, and Ukrainians expressing views and opinions other than those officially approved were deported from the country and resettled in other regions of the Soviet Union [Serczyk 2001: 297]. At the same time, the Soviet propaganda
made every effort to ensure that the society embraced the promoted vision of the new ‘proletarian’ culture [Wilson 2009: 140-141].

In 1923, the Ukrainian authorities reformed the administrative system of the republic, which limited the number of its territorial units: the old 102 districts (Ukr. повіт, povit; Rus. уезд, uezd) consisting of 1096 volosts (Ukr. волость, volost’) were replaced with 53 okrugs (Ukr. округа, okruha) including 706 raions (Ukr. район, raion) [Zbirnyk URSR 1923: no. 18–19, art. 308].

The second half of the 1920s saw the beginning of the mass-scale industrialization of south-eastern Ukraine. As many as twenty-three new coal mines were built in the Donbas area in 1927–1929, and sixteen were modernized [Serczyk 2001: 305]. At the same time, the living conditions of the colliers deteriorated; for example: while the 1926 per capita living space in Donetsk was estimated at 4.4 square meters, the figure was only 3.8 square meters according to other data from 1928 [Kuromiya 1998: 20]. The death of Lenin in 1924 did not bring any relief in the lives of ordinary Ukrainian people. Peasants were forced to join collective farms, the kolkhoz and sovkhoz, and the factory working conditions became even more strenuous. Also, Stalin’s government issued new laws and decrees which increased the level of repression.

From the early 1920s, the Soviet authorities conducted anti-religious policy and persecuted the clergy. Attending services was banned, churches were sealed and priests sent to Gulag camps.

Po opracowaniu planu likwidacji wszystkich dzwonów na początku 1930 roku ogłoszono zakaz ich używania. [...] Dzwony z kościołów i cerkwi – na uprzesmyślenie kraju!... Na Zaporozhu na ten cel zdjęto dzwony ze wszystkich cerkwi [Dzwonkowski 1997: 257].

(After drafting the plan of requisition of all church bells, Catholic and Orthodox alike, in the early 1930 it was made illegal to ring them. [...] [the slogan was] ‘Church bells for industrialization!’... All church bells in all Orthodox churches in Zaporozhia were taken down.)

The Church suffered from persecutions until 1990, and in the areas under consideration even longer.

The Soviet administrative reform of 1930 abolished the okrugs and divided the country into 484 raions subordinated directly to the central administration of the republic. The system proved to be inefficient and required extensive bureaucracy, which prompted the introduction of an intermediate level of administration. In 1932, the raions were grouped into five oblasts (Ukr. область, oblast’): Vinnytsia, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kiev and Kharkiv. Their number was expanded to seven, with the Chernihiv and Donetsk oblasts added later the same year [Serczyk 2001: 310]. In 1938, the Donetsk oblast was divided into two: Stalino and Voroshlyovgrad (renamed Donetsk and Luhansk, respectively, in 1961). In a further development, Zaporizhzhia and other oblasts were created in 1939.
In 1932–1933, the country was struck by another outburst of famine. Worse than ever, in some south-eastern areas it claimed the lives of between 20 and 25 percent of the population and thus came to be known as the Great Famine (Ukr. Голодомор, Holodomor). A number of academics agree that it was a fully conscious act of genocide on the part of the Soviet authorities. Andrew Wilson writes: ‘[t]he famine was deliberate and brutal, but part of an ideological rather than national war’ [Wilson 2009: 145; Hrytsak 1998: 146–149]. Historians and demographers estimate the number of Holodomor victims at about four and a half to five million [see Conquest 1986; Mace 1986; Danilov 1988].

Another act of persecution against Ukraine was the introduction of common Soviet citizenship by the 1936 Soviet constitution [Serczyk 2001: 314]. In this way, the citizens of Ukraine were deprived of their separate status.

Following the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union signed a border agreement with Poland (August 1945). Thus, the new Soviet frontier was at the same time the new western border of Ukraine. Since the present study is focused on the south-eastern part of the country, I do not discuss the administrative and territorial structure of western Ukraine and the Crimea.

**Ukraine after the Second World War.** In 1946–1947, Ukraine was to suffer from famine again. This time, it was caused by a drought, which coincided with the Moscow-imposed, unrealistic and strictly enforced quota of farm produce to be delivered by the republic. The death toll in Ukraine was between 300,000 and 500,000; there were also numerous incidents of cannibalism [Serczyk 2001: 358]. After Stalin's death (1953), the country remained in the firm grip of the communist party. The official propaganda promoted the Russian language as an element of integration of the emergent ‘Soviet nation.’ As a result, the process of Russification of Ukraine intensified [Serczyk 2001: 366]. ‘From the late 1950s onwards this split identity was increasingly regionalized, with schools, universities, media, and other cultural institutions in urban areas of eastern and southern Ukraine converting wholesale to the official Soviet-Russian hybrid’ [Wilson 2009: 148].

Under Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982), Iuri Andropov (1982–1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985), Ukraine went through a period of stagnation. The communist party bureaucracy did not see it fit to introduce any modernizing changes, and the society hardly benefited from the expansion of the industrial sector. However, the signs of a crisis looming over the country were becoming increasingly apparent [Serczyk 2001: 367–371].

In 1991, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the Act of Independence proclaiming Ukraine a sovereign state with indivisible and inviolable territory, where only the constitution and laws of Ukraine apply. Its official symbols are the same as in 1917–1920: the trident (tryzub) and a blue and yellow flag [Wilson 2009: 223-224]. In spite of its declared political unity, the country is
both culturally and linguistically divided. Poland was the first to officially recognize the independence of Ukraine.

Today (2012), Ukraine is divided into twenty-four regions, called oblasts (Ukr. області, oblasti). Kiev and Sevastopol have a special status and the Crimea is an autonomous republic [cf. Europa 2009]. The status of Poles in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in the south-east corner of Ukraine is discussed in further parts of the present study.

Map 1.2. Independent Ukraine after 1991

18 "Każdy, kto miał okazję odwiedzić wysunięte najdalej na wschód i zachód „przyczółki” Ukrainy – odwołać się tu można choćby do dwóch miast, Donecku i Lwowa – nieuchronnie odczuje głębokie różnice między tymi dwoma regionami; może mu się wręcz wydawać, że w rzeczywistości należą one do dwóch różnych państw, światów, cywilizacji" [Riabczuk 2005: 29].

(‘Anyone who has an opportunity to visit the Ukrainian western and eastern ‘outposts’ – suffice it to mention the cities of Donetsk and Lviv – can immediately feel profound differences between the two regions which seem to belong to two different countries, worlds and civilizations.’)

For more on religion, culture and literature, see Kozak 2006; Osadczuk 2000.
1.2. Donetsk Oblast: An Overview

The Donetsk oblast, with the administrative center in the city of Donetsk (formerly Luzivka, Stalino), lies in the Donets Ridge and the Donets Coal Basin, commonly known as the Donbas. With the area of 26.5 thousand square kilometers, it covers about 4.4% of the total area of Ukraine. The Donetsk oblast borders the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts in the west, the Kharkiv oblast in the north-west, the Luhansk oblast in the east, the Rostov oblast of the Russian Federation in the south east, and the Sea of Azov in the south. The province has a population of 4,825,600 (2001), with those declaring themselves as Poles counting 4,300 (0.09%).

Established in 1932 as the Stalino oblast, it was divided into two administrative units in 1938: the Stalino and Voroshylovhrad oblasts (in 1961, renamed Donetsk and Luhansk, respectively). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most of the area of today’s Donetsk oblast formed a part of the imperial province of Katerynoslav (Bakhmut and Mariupol districts), with the remainder administered within the Don Host oblast. In January 1920, the administrative center of the Donetsk province (guberniia) was the city of Luhansk.

Under Soviet rule, the towns and cities of the region rapidly expanded. Along with the rest of the country, the province went through a number of administrative reforms, changing its territorial system, provincial borders, as well as the number of its territorial sub-divisions, volosts and raions. In the second half of the 1920s, names of cities, towns, streets and squares kept changing and were often renamed after the leaders of the communist party. It was only in the 1990s that the old names began to be restored and the process continues to this day.

Dominated by heavy industry, the Donetsk province is the most industrialized and polluted area of Ukraine. It is particularly rich in coal (including coking coal), rock salt and fire clay deposits.

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19 The Donbas is a major center of iron and steel, machine, chemical and construction material industry. Its natural resources include: coking coal, anthracite (in the east and south-east), lignite (in the west), mercury ores, rock salt and fire clay [Europa Wschodnia 1997: 161].

20 The Don Host Lands (Rus. Земли Войска Донского, Zemli Voïska Donskogo), established in 1786, was an autonomous territorial and administrative unit of the Russian Empire settled by the Don Cossacks. It was renamed the Don Host Oblast (province) (Rus. Область Войска Донского, Oblast’ Voïska Donskogo) in 1870, and taken over by the Soviet Russia in 1920.

21 The administrative division of Ukraine into seven oblasts was introduced in 1932. The Donetsk oblast was established in July that year and included seventeen administrative units of the Donbas, thirteen raions from the Kharkiv oblast and five raions from the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Its administrative center was first located in Artemivsk and later moved to Stalino. In 1938, it was divided into two parts: the Stalino and Voroshylovhrad oblasts [Ukaz 1938]. In 1961, both the city and oblast of Stalino were renamed Donetsk. Over the years, there were a number of administrative changes involving new names, new territorial subdivisions and a new status of some growing urban centers. In 1964, the oblast was divided into fifteen raions [Iz Ukaza 1965]. More raions were established at a later date.
In the Donetsk oblast, I conducted my research for the present study in the following urban centers: Donetsk, Artemivsk, Horlivka, Lenakieve, Kramatorsk, Makiivka, Mariupol and Torez. In the descriptions below, I pay particular attention to their Roman Catholic churches, an indication of Polish presence in the area. In a number of cases, the parishes ceased to exist in the early 1920s, when the Soviet Union began to implement its policy of sealing churches in order to abolish religion.

Donetsk (Ukr. Донецьк; population: 1,131,700 in 2004) is located on the Kalmius River, 693 kilometers from Kiev. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the site of the present city was occupied by a Cossack settlement of Oleksandrivka [Kovtun, Stepanenko 1990: 61], which expanded following the discovery of coal deposits in the area (1820). In 1869, a mining settlement of Iuzivka (Rus. Юзовка, iuzovka), 23 the name deriving from its founder, the Welsh entrepreneur John Hughes, was established in the vicinity [Europa Wschodnia 1997: 161]. Iuzivka received the status of a town in 1917 [Kovtun, Stepanenko 1990: 61] and had its name changed a number of times: it became Stalino in 1924 and Donetsk in 1961, with a brief period in the meantime, when it was called Iuzivka again (1941–1943).

The Roman Catholic chapel of St Joseph in Iuzivka was built in 1892 from the funds of the New Russia Company. In 1913, it served a community of 1,800 members and was registered as a filial church of the Taganrog parish. Iuzivka is reported as a curacy in 1914, and an independent parish in 1918–1919 [Schnurr 1980: 288]. Its territory included the New Russia Company works, a number of mines (Frankovo-Russkie, Rykovskie, Karpovskaia, Lidiievskia, Ekaterinenskaia, Bogodukhovskaia, Pastukhovskaia), as well as villages of Marinivka, Kremennoe, Delintrovo, and the railway settlements of Iuzivka, Iasynuvata and Mushketove [Katalog 1913: 35].

In 1919, the parish had 1,890 members [Schnurr 1980: 289], and filial chapels in Marinivka, Kremennoe and Delintrovo. The priests working there were (in chronological order): Josef Graf, Matthäus Walulis (curate since 1911), Ferdinand Pflug (curate (?)24 since 1928 (Stalino parish)). The parish church was built of stone and had no tower [Schnurr 1980: 289].

The records of Iuzivka Catholic parish kept in the State Archives of Donetsk Oblast indicate a relatively large size of the community. There were 38 and 41

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22 For more information and extensive bibliographies, see important studies by Rev. Roman Dzwonkowski SAC [Dzwonkowski 1992, 1997, 1998]; see also Litsenberger 1999, 2001; Peshkovskii 1997. In other parts of the present study, I discuss the question of language used in the Roman Catholic Church in the regions under consideration.

23 Iuzivka (Rus. Юзовка, iuzovka) was described as a 'settlement and iron works in the province of Ekaterinoslav [Ukr. Катеринослав, Katerynoslav] on the border of the Don Host oblast' (nazwa osady i fabryki żelaza w guberni jekaterynoslawskiej, na granicy ziemi Kozaków dońskich) [Słownik geograficzny 1880–1902: vol. 3, 644–645].

24 The exact position held is uncertain [information provided in Schnurr 1980: 289].
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

Marriages reported in the local Catholic church in 1905 and 1909, respectively [RKClu 1904–1915]. The number of children baptized was as follows: 166 (1911), 210 (1912), 159 (1913), 162 (1914), 187 (1915) [RKClu 1911–1915]. Other surviving records include the Marriage Register for 1915–1923 [RKClu 1915–1923] and the Death Register for 1915–1922 [RKClu 1915–1922].

By 1914, the town had expanded to 50,000 people and had as many as four iron and steel works and ten collieries in the immediate vicinity. After the First World War, it developed into a major industrial center of Ukraine. During the Second World War, Donetsk was occupied by the Germans (1941–1943), and heavily destroyed. Rebuilt, it re-emerged as the principal industrial center of the Donbas (coal mining, smelting, machine, metal, chemical, textile, clothing, building material, and food industry). The city was a scene of miner strikes in 1989–1990. With its railway and road links and an airport, Donetsk is a major transport hub. It is also a cultural and academic center training specialists in steel, chemical and power generation industry.

**Artemivsk** (Ukr. Артемівськ; population: 83,000), located on the Bakhmutka River, 81 kilometers from Donetsk, was founded in 1571 as a fortified settlement of Bakhmut (Rus. Бахмут, Bakhmut) on the southern outskirts of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, and granted the city status in 1783 [*Europa Wschodnia* 1997: 83]. In 1703, it became the center of a large administrative district and an important trading point. Known for its salt springs and salt works since the seventeenth century, in 1874 Bakhmut became also a center of rock salt mining and processing. Mercury ore deposits were discovered in the area in 1888 [Orgelbrand 1898: vol. 2, 20–21]. In 1924, Bakhmut was renamed Artemivsk.

The oldest architectural monument of the town is the Orthodox church of St Nicholas. The local Roman Catholic parish was established in 1850 by permission from the Roman Catholic Metropolitan of Mogilev and the Minister of the Interior. At an early stage, it included the districts of Bakhmut, Sloviyanskerbsk and Oleksandrivsk; Joseph Schnurr writes that ‘there were Poles exiled from their homeland living in the area’ [Schnurr 1980: 286].

The exact date when the parish church of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin Mary was erected is unclear. While some Russian sources claim that a Roman Catholic chapel was built in Bakhmut as late as 1902–1903, when the parish had 2,100 members [*Katalog* 1913: 34], I tend to opt for the earlier date (1865), especially that there is a set of parish records to confirm it: the Marriage Register for 1861–1892 and 1903–1909 [RKCB 1861–1892; RKCB 1903–1909], the Death Register for 1861–1890 and 1892–1904 [RKCB 1861–1890; 1892–1904], and the Birth Register for 1893–1912 and 1917, with the most complete records available for 1893–1899 and 1912 [RKCB 1893–1912; RKCB 1917].

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25 According to *Słownik geograficzny...*, published in 1880, the Catholic parish in Bakhmut had 1,348 members and the Catholic chapel was bought by the parishioners in 1865 [*Słownik geograficzny* 1880–1902: vol. 2, 77].
The Bakhmut parish had its filial chapels in Konstantynivka and Druzhkivka; in 1919 it also included the nearby soda factory [Schnurr 1980: 286]. Over the years, it had a number of priests: Paulin Balcewicz from the Bernardine monastery in Saint Petersburg (1850–1860, before the church was erected), and about thirteen priests in 1860–1897, for example Valentin Schamotulski (1887–1889), Boleslaus Andrescheikowitsch (1897–1903), Damian Saakow (1903–1905), George Klass, Doctor of Theology (1904–1914) [Schnurr 1980: 286], and Józef Sowiński (1918) [Dzwonkowski 1998: 450].

Horlivka (Ukr. Горлівка; population: 270 000 [Donetskaia oblast’ 2008: 40]) is a city in the east of the Donetsk oblast, established in 1867, following the development of coal mining in the region. Named after Petr Gorlov, the engineer who built its first colliery [Kovtun, Stepanenko 1990: 66], it received the status of a town in 1932 [Europa Wschodnia 1997: 185; Encyklopedia 1999: vol. 2, 576]. Today, it is one of the main industrial centers of the Donbas (coal mining, iron, metal, chemical, building material, food and textile industry).

Ienakiieve (Ukr. Єнакієве; population: 104,000 (2001)), a city on the Krynka River, fifty kilometers from Donetsk, established in 1883 as an iron-works settlement and named after Fedor Ienakiev, an engineer and an important figure in the iron industry of the Donbas at the time. It was renamed Rykove in 1928 and Ordzhonikidze in 1937, to become Ienakiieve again in 1943 [Europa Wschodnia 1997: 217; Encyklopedia 1999: vol. 3, 169].

The Roman Catholic Church of the Exhalation of the Holy Cross was built in Ienakiieve in 1906, when the estimated size of the parish community was 1,847 [Wiśniewski Materials 2008]. In 1905–1906, the parish priest was Franz Scherger [Schnurr 1980: 289]. Simon Emmanuel, the parish priest from 1915, was arrested in 1926 on the charge of espionage and received a ten-year labor camp sentence. He was reported to have been sent to in the Solovetskii Islands in 1927, never to be heard of again [Dzwonkowski 1998: 433]. In 1928, he was replaced by Michael Fauth [Schnurr 1980: 286]. In 1915, there were about 3,000 Catholics in Ienakiieve, most of them employed in the Russo-Belgian metallurgical works [Kuromiya 1998: 15]. The parish included also the Petrovska factory, the Gorlovskaya, lasinovskaya, Verovskaya, Sofievskaya and Kazankiewicz mines, Davivovo-Orlovka colony, Zhdanov, Frezh, Ternova and Balka settlements (Ukr. хутори, khutory), the railway settlements as far as Debaltseve and Iasynuvata, as well as Zelingorovka colony [Wiśniewski Materials 2008].

Information on local Catholics, some of whom must have been Polish, can be traced in the parish records held in the State Archives of Donetsk Oblast: the Birth Register for 1905–1912 and 1913–1917 [RKClе 1905–1912; RKClе 1913–1917] and the Marriage Register for 1905–1920 [RKClе 1905–1920]. Other registers did not survive and those still existing are difficult to access.
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

Kramatorsk (Ukr. Краматорськ), located on the Kazennyi Torets River, 103 kilometers from Donetsk, was established in the vicinity of Kramatorska railway station in 1868; its name derives from kramovi torhy (Ukr. крамові торги), trade between travelling chumaks and the local population. A Belgian-owned factory was built in the area in 1887, followed by a German-owned machine factory in 1892. The first foreign workers to arrive in Kramatorsk were Poles (1897); there was also a German and Czech community. Documents from the period confirm that Kramatorsk had a Roman Catholic and a Lutheran church [Kotsarenko 2002: 62]. The population of Kramatorsk grew from 12,000 at the beginning of the twentieth century to 205,500 in 2008 [Donetskaja oblast’ 2008: 62; Encyklopedia 1999: vol. 3, 543].

Makiivka (Ukr. Макіївка; population: 390,000 in 2001 [Encyklopedia 1999: vol. 4, 42] lies 14 kilometers north-west of Donetsk and was first mentioned in 1777 as Makiivska Sloboda [Kovtun, Stepanenko 1990: 76]. A small industrial settlement, it expanded after the construction of steel works in 1889, and received the status of a town in 1925.

The Catholic parish in Makiivka is over a hundred years old. The parish chapel of St Joseph was built in 1908 [Katalog 1913: 38] with the assistance of workers from the local steel works. At the time when Makiivka belonged to the Taganrog district of the Don Host oblast, the parish had 774 members [Dynges 1994: 109]. Among the priests working there was Bishop Pie-Éugène Neveu, a member of the Assumptionist Association, a religious congregation established in France for the purpose of serving the Catholics in Russia. In 1906 or 1907(?), he was sent to the newly erected French parish in Makiivka, where he worked as the parish priest until September 1926 [Dzwonkowski 1998: 368–369]. He was assisted by Friar David Mailland, who was ordained a priest in 1926 and worked in Makiivka probably until 1929 [Dzwonkowski 1998: 340]. In 1919, the parish community counted 1,034 members [Schnurr 1980: 289]. The State Archives of Donetsk Oblast hold the Birth, Marriage and Death Register of this parish for 1917 and 1919 [RKCMak 1917, 1919].

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26 Chumak (Ukr. чумак) was a historic occupation in Ukraine involving trade, mainly in salt and grain.

27 ‘Początkowo władze radzieckie miały zamiar ostro rozprawić się z francuskim biskupem i postąpić tak jak z innymi wyświęconymi niedawno biskupami, spotkały się jednak tym razem ze stanowczym protestem i przeciwdziałaniami rządu francuskiego. Minister spraw zagranicznych Francji na początku 1929 r. wezwał do siebie ambasadora radzieckiego w Paryżu i oświadczył mu, że w razie wydalenia biskupa Neveu ze Związku Radzieckiego albo w razie aresztowania go rząd francuski nie zahamował przed wydaleniem z terytorium Francji szefa misji handlowej ZSRR i dwóch jego współpracowników’ [Iwanow 1991: 309].

(‘Initially, the Soviet authorities planned to apply the hard-line tactics in the case of the French bishop and do what they had done with other recently ordained bishops. However, this time they met with a decisive action taken by the French government. In early 1929, the French foreign minister summoned the Russian ambassador in Paris to announce that if Bishop Neveu was expelled from the Soviet Union, the French government would not hesitate to expel the head of the Russian trade mission and his two associates from France.’)
Mariupol (Ukr. Мариуполь; population: 496,200 in 2008 [Donetskaia oblast’ 2008: 72; Encyklopedia 1999: vol. 4, 94]), located 116 kilometers from Donetsk, was established as a port on the Sea of Azov, and received the status of a town in 1779. Throughout its history, it was named Pavlovsk (1778–1780), Mariupol (1780–1948) and Zhdanov (1948–1989). In 1826, the town had a population of 2,998 [Donetskaia oblast’ 2008: 73]; until 1866, it was dominated by the Greek community. Following the development of its industry, the population of Mariupol grew rapidly from 31,520 in 1923 to 241,408 in 1941 [Donetskaia oblast’ 2008: 74]. It is also one of the three principal Ukrainian seaports.

The Roman Catholic Church of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin Mary was built in 1860 from the funds of a local citizen of Italian extraction by the name of Membolli [Słownik geograficzny 1880–1902: vol. 6, 122] and consecrated by Bishop Wincenty Lipski. Constructed mainly by Italian factory workers and located in Italiiska vulytsia (Italy Street), the building is now used by the local police. The parish community had 1,800 members in 1912 [Katalog 1913: 36] and 3,500 in 1919.

Before 1860 the Catholic community of Mariupol had been served by priests from the German-settled colony of Eichwald. The parish included the Mariupol harbor, the factories of Nikipol-Mariupol and Russkii Providans, and the railway settlements between Mariupol and Volnovakha [Wiśniewski Materials 2008].

The priests working in Mariupol, some of them as parish priests, included: Valentin Hartmann (1897–1898), Rudolf Reichert (1898–1903), Johannes Ungemach (1913?), Georg Baier (1911–1912), Adam Wagner (administrator in 1928) [Schnurr 1980: 289]. Roman Dzwonkowski writes that in 1925–1934 the Mariupol parish was administered by Adam Wagner, who was sentenced to death in 1937 [Dzwonkowski 1998: 495]. Józef Sowiński was the administrator of parishes in Mariupol (1911–1917) and Bakhmut (1918) [Dzwonkowski 1998: 450].


Torez (Ukr. Торез), located 65 kilometers from Donetsk, is famous for its collieries. It was established in the 1870s as the settlement of Oleksiivska Sloboda, inhabited by peasants who had fled from Ukraine. It was renamed Oleksiieve-Leonove (1840), Chystiakove (1867) and Torez (1964), after Maurice Thorez, the leader of the French Communist Party. Chystiakove grew from 2,520 in 1897 to 9,000 in 1917 and received the status of a town in 1932. Today, Torez has a population of 64,000 [Donetskaia oblast’ 2008: 99].
Map 1.3. Donetsk oblast urban centers where research for the present study was conducted
1.3. Zaporizhzhia Oblast: An Overview

The Zaporizhzhia oblast, with the administrative center in the city of Zaporizhzhia (until 1921 called Oleksandrivsk), lies in the south-east of Ukraine, on the Dnieper River and the Sea of Azov.28 It borders the Dnipropetrovsk oblast in the north and north-west, the Kherson oblast in the west, and the Donetsk oblast in the east. In the south, the province borders on the Sea of Azov, and the length of its coastline is over three hundred kilometers. With an area of 27,180 square kilometers, about 4.5% of the total area of Ukraine, it is the ninth largest oblast in the country.

The province was established on 10 January 1939 as an administrative unit of Soviet Ukraine. Historically, the area of Zaporizhzhia oblast belonged to the Golden Horde and (from 1554) to the Crimean Khanate. From the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, the northern part of the region was part of the Zaporozhian Sich.

As of 1994, the oblast is divided into twenty raions; it also has five municipalities with district status (Ukr. міста обласного значення, mista oblasnoho znachennia): Zaporizhzhia, Berdiansk, Energodar, Melitopol, Tokmak; and nine municipalities subordinated to raion administration (Ukr. міста районного значення, mista raionnoho znachennia): Vasilivka, Vilniiansk, Huliaipole, Dnipro, Kamianka Dniprovska, Molochansk, Orikhiv, Pologi, Primorsk. There are 22 urban-type settlements (Ukr. селище міського типу, selyshche mis'koho typu), 921 villages, and 263 village councils.

The region’s most important historical monument is the island of Khortitsia, first mentioned in a twelfth century Russian Chronicle (Ukr. Літопис руський, Litopys Rus’kii) as ‘St George’s island.’ The first major hydroelectric power station on the Dnieper was built in Zaporizhzhia in 1927–1932 (Ukr. Дніпро-Енерго). Today, the city is an industrial center, and the oblast has metal, machine, smelting, food, textile and other industries. In terms of Ukraine’s division into economic areas, Zaporizhzhia, together with neighboring Dnipropetrovsk form the Dnieper Economic Region [Zastawnyj, Kusniński 2003: 253].

In the Zaporizhzhia oblast, I conducted research for the present study in four urban centers: Zaporizhzhia, Berdiansk, Melitopol and Tokmak. In 2001, the province had a population of 1,926,800, with those declaring themselves as Poles counting 1,800 (0.1%). According to the latest census, there are members

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28 The Sea of Azov is a large bay connected with the main body of the Black Sea by the narrow Strait of Kerch. It has a number of characteristic spits called kosa (Ukr. коса), the longest of which is Arabat Spit, separating the lagoons of Syvash (Ukr. Сиваш), also called the Rotten Sea (Ukr. Гниле Море, Hnyyle More), from the sea. The most important commercial ports on the Sea of Azov are Taganrog, Mariupol and Berdiansk [Orgelbrand 1898–1912: vol. 1, 644]. Lying between Ukraine and Russia, the Sea of Azov has an area of 38,000 square kilometers and its maximum depth is 13.5 meters; the major rivers flowing into it are the Don and the Kuban [Encyklopedia 1999: vol. 5, 56].
of 130 different ethnic groups living in the region and fifty officially registered ethnic cultural associations [Derkach 2003: 8].

Zaporizhzhia29 (Ukr: Запоріжжя; population: 810,620 in 2001 [Encyclopediа 1999: vol. 6, 985]), 605 kilometers from Kiev, lies on both sides the Dnieper River, with the island of Khortitsia within the city limits [Kovtun, Stepanenko 1990: 99]. It was originally established as a fortress and until 1921 its name was Oleksandriivsk, after Marshal Aleksandr Golitsyn. The 1808 census provides the following report on its population:


(In this number, there are seven merchants (kuptsy) with seven families (19 male and 21 female souls) and fifteen servants from other towns; 118 families of peasantburghers (meshchane-kristiane) (270 male and 248 female souls) with sixty-two servant souls; two families of Austrian-bornburghers (meshchane) exempt from taxes (sostaiashchie na l’gote) (6 people); one female and three male souls from freehold militarysettlers (iz odnodvortsev) and counting as burghers. Jewishburghers: fifteen male and twenty-seven female souls.)

The Roman Catholic parish in Zaporizhzhia first belonged to the deanery of Katerynoslav (Dnipropetrovsk) and the local Catholic community relied on the service of priests from this center or from the towns in the area. An initiative to build a church in Oleksandriivsk itself was launched in 1902 [Delo 1902–1910]. Local authorities smoothly processed the application and the permit was issued on 10 June 1902. A Catholic school was built next to the church a few years later [Delo 1902–1910].

Archival records indicate that the building plot was bought by members of the local Catholic community, who were granted certain concessions for the purpose. (Members of other denominations acquired building plots in a similar way.) The building was completed in 1906. A few years later, with the growth of the town and an increasing number of Catholics, parishioners applied to the town hall for a permit to extend the church and buy another plot of land in the vicinity.

The register of members of religious communities of 29 December 1924 indicates that there were 66 Roman Catholics in the town, including 31 Poles, 27 Germans, one Armenian, and one Russian. The last available data on the local church was recorded in January 1928. Most likely, a period of persecutions

followed. Other documents reveal that Zaporizhzhia became a filial chapel of Georgsburg parish 35 kilometers away, where the local priest was Rev. Franz Kuhn. In 1923, all priests and ministers of all religious communities were required to complete an official registration form with a photo attached [Re-

gistratsionnye kartochki 1923–1924]; (cf. Appendix, Document 1: Rev. Franz

Kuhn’s registration form with a photograph).

Rev. Franz Kuhn worked in the Georgsburg parish from 1903 until at least 1920(?) [Schnurr 1980: 292]. Among other priests serving the local Catholic community was also Rev. Kazimierz Sokołowski [Dzvonkowski 1998: 446]. From 1914, the Oleksandrivsk chapel was temporarily administered by Rev. Wincenty Skwirecki, who also performed a similar function in the Kostiantynivka parish [Dzvonkowski 1998: 439]. Arrested on 25 June 1920 in Oleksandrivsk, he was given a three-year labor camp sentence on the charge of espionage [Dzvonkowski 1998: 588] and executed at a later date [Dzvonkowski 1998: 440]. In 1944, after the liberation of Zaporizhzhia by the Soviet forces, thousands of Polish and German Catholics were hoarded into the church (no exact figures are available), where they were all held for some time and then executed by the Russians; their personal record files were burned.30

30 This information comes from an eyewitness testimony of a woman who, in the line of her professional responsibilities, was actually involved in the burning of personal record files of Catholics.
The population of Zaporizhzhia considerably expanded as a result of the development of its industry and internal migration. It was the only oblast center in Ukraine which had all its churches sealed or destroyed in order to set an example for other towns and cities. In addition, a number of places of worship in the area were flooded by the waters of the Dnieper Reservoir.

**Berdiansk**\(^{31}\) (Ukr. Бердянськ; population: 121,759 in 2001), located 196 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia, is a seaport on the Sea of Azov and the third largest urban center in the region [Suprunenko 2007: 215]. It was established in 1827 and its port opened in 1830. Berdiansk received the status of a town in 1841 and became an administrative center within the imperial province of Taurida a year later. The agricultural machinery factory which opened there towards the end of the nineteenth century was the largest of its kind in this part of Europe. Berdiansk is also famous for its peat pulp baths [Suprunenko 2007: 215]. In 1939–1958, the name of the city was Osypenko, after a famous woman pilot who died in a plane crash in 1939 [Kovtun, Stepanenko 1990: 100]. Berdiansk derives its name from the Berdianka River flowing through the city.

The initiative of building a Roman Catholic church in Berdiansk started in June 1857, when members of the local Catholic community wrote first letters to the governor of the province of Taurida asking for his permission, which they received in 1859. There were 283 Catholics living in Berdiansk at the time [*Arkhiv*: 20]. The construction works on the church of the Nativity of the Holy Virgin Mary were completed with financial assistance from Pope Pius IX in the same year. By 1907, with twelve places of worship belonging to different religious communities, the town had become an important religious center. Berdiansk Deanery of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Tiraspol most likely included a part of the Crimea, the Donbas, and three parishes in the Don Host oblast in present-day Russia: Taganrog, Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk, the capital of the province.\(^{32}\)

At this stage, she cannot provide any estimated figures. She remembers that the building was so cramped that people suffocated, and the executions were extremely brutal. The bodies of those shot were thrown into a hole in the ground which had been dug for the purpose, and buried; all their documents were burned to erase the traces. Referring to the number of victims, the woman talked about ‘thousands.’ Not all of them had their personal record files. They had faced charges because of their ethnicity and religion. The witness stated that the Poles had spoken among themselves in Polish, and the Germans in German, probably so that the executioners would not be able to understand the information they exchanged. Another informant remembers playing in the ruins of the Roman Catholic church as a child, in 1945, after the war. Although the church had suffered severe damage, the walls were still standing and the sacristy was clearly recognizable. Today, there is a factory on the site of the old church, and the new church was built in a different location.


\(^{32}\) The list of Deans of Berdiansk includes: Joseph Matery (1876–1885), Jakob Zerr (1885–1891), Jakob Seelinger (1886–1892), Rudolf Reichert (1898–1903), Valentin Hartman (1903–1910),
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The Berdiansk parish included the settlements of Neu Stuttgart, Neuhoffnungstal, Mykolayivka, Oleksiyivka, the railway settlements of Troiani, Ielyzavetivka, Nelhivka, Verkhnii Tokmak, Kirylivka, Polohy, Huliaipole, Haichur; Mechetna, glass works in Polohy, the settlement of Bergfeld, and the town of Nohaisk. In 1912, the dean was Johannes Ungemach and the deanery included churches and chapels in fifteen administrative districts with the total membership of 27,370 [Katalog 1913: 33–39].

In 1914, Berdiansk deanery included the parishes of Berdiansk, Bakhmut, Luhansk, Eichwald, Göttland, Grosswerder, Taganrog, Rostov, as well as the vicarages of Novocherkassk, Luzivka and Ienakiieve, transformed into parishes in 1919; in the same year, the deanery expanded to include Mariupol, Bergthal, Grüntal and Makivka parishes. Berdiansk also had a Catholic school.

In 1928, the deanery was reported to have been moved to Eichwald; the parishes of Berdiansk, Bakhmut, Grosswerder, Makivka and Novocherkassk were abolished [Schnurr 1980: 286]. The Berdiansk church housed a regional museum until 1957. Like other places of worship, it was later demolished.

Melitopol (Ukr. Мелітополь [cf. Encyklopedia 1999: vol. 4, 160]), 120 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia on the right bank of the Molochna River, was founded in the late eighteenth century as Novoaleksandriivska Sloboda and received the status of a town in 1842. Deriving its name from the Greek words for ‘honey’ (melitos) and ‘town’ (polis), Melitopol is famous for its quality apples and pears, as well as for rare varieties of cherries, first introduced and popularized in the area by Andrzej Korwacki, a local citizen of Polish extraction. The Melitopol district had Catholic colonists, who belonged to the parish of Kherson. Once or twice a year, they traveled between eighty and a hundred verst (a measure slightly longer than a kilometer) to the Dnieper port of Kakhivka and took a boat from there to Kherson, which had the nearest church.

In 2007, Melitopol had the total population of 160,352, including: Ukrainians (88,435), Russians (63,358), Bulgarians (2,908), Armenians (420), Germans (326), Greeks (318), Czechs (172), and Poles (184). There are also members of other ethnic communities living in the city, including: Belarusians, Jews, Tatars, Moldovans, Estonians, Lithuanians, Turks, Georgians, Uzbeks, Chechens, Chuvash, Karaites, Albanians, and Mordvins [Data 2007: interview].

Tokmak (Ukr. Токмак; population: 36,760 in 2001 [cf. Słownik geograficzny 1880–1902: vol. 12, 362]) lies on the Molochna (Tokmak) River, 91 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia. Established in 1784 as Velykii Tokmak (‘Great Tokmak’), it had its name shortened in 1962. In 1861, the town belonged to the imperial province of Taurida, and in 1923 it became the administrative center of Tokmak raion within the Melitopol okruga. Once famous for its factory

Johannes Ungemach (1911–1914, also later?), Michael Hatzenböller (1928?–1930?) [Schnurr 1980: 286].
producing three-wheeled Zaporozhets tractors [Suprunenko 2007: 227], Tokmak received the status of a town in 1938.

Map 1.4. Zaporizhzhia oblast urban centers where research for the present study was conducted

1.4. The Ethnic Composition of the Region

Peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious communities is a precondition for national unity in the political sense. Ever since the declaration of independence in 1991, problems of different ethnic groups forming the democratic Ukrainian state ruled by law have been an increasingly more important issue, particularly in multi-ethnic regions of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia.

The ethnic composition and migratory patterns in the area under consideration have been the subject of a number of historical studies [cf. Krasnonosov 1992; Obyd’onova 1998; Pirko 1992, 2003, 2004]; George Vernadsky observes that:
In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this no man's land became the abode of the Ukrainian and Russian Cossacks, who eventually organized themselves in strong military communes (‘hosts’), of which the Zaporozhie – beyond the Dnieper cataracts – and Don hosts – the latter in the lower Don region – were the most important two [after Kuromiya 1998: 12].

The steppe attracted also all kinds of criminals, as well as those who sought a haven from political or religious persecution, including Protestants, Catholics and Old Believers [Kuromiya 1998: 38]. Intensive colonization of south-eastern Ukraine by such foreign newcomers as Bulgarians, Moldovans, Germans and Russian Old Believers goes back to the second half of the 1680s [Jakovenko 2000: 366]. In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russians, along with Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, Jews and Germans, established their presence in the region. The process of large-scale settlement was motivated by a growing demand for coal and iron in the Russian empire (hence the expansion of Donetsk coal industry) and by promoting the development of agriculture through colonization of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov steppe. The ethnic diversity of south-eastern Ukraine stems also from the policy of planned industrialization of the region during the Soviet period and from the process of migration after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Today, Ukrainians form the majority of the ethnic mosaic in the south-east of the country, with Russians as the second largest group (see Table 1.2). The Polish minority in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts is discussed in section 1.5 below.

The Wild Plains were characterized by ethnic tension:

[b]ecause so many ethnic groups crisscrossed the steppe, it was a battleground for constant ethnic wars. Even after the Russian Empire conquered the south and colonized it mainly with Slavic populations, still the steppe (including the Donbas) retained a multi-ethnic character [Kuromiya 1998: 41].

The first Russian imperial census (1897) included important indicators of ethnicity, such as the native language (which was often equated with a sense of national awareness) and religion. Given the ethnic mix in the area under consideration, there must have been a relatively large proportion of the population with no clear national self-identification, for example bilinguals. Also, the peasant population generally displayed low levels of national awareness. Consequently, the census considerably underestimated the number of Ukrainians and Poles in favor of the Russians:

W sytuacjach wątpliwych, zwłaszcza na obszarach pogranicza, ludność żyjąca na rosyjsko-ukraińskim styku etnicznym częściej zaliczała się do kategorii rosyjsko-, a nie ukraińskojęzycznej. Przy stosowaniu kryterium językowego do narodowości


(In unclear situations, particularly in borderland areas, people living along Russo-Ukrainian ethnic boundary were counted as Russian- rather than Ukrainian-speaking. Using the linguistic criterion, Polish speakers of noble birth, who had a more developed sense their national identity, were automatically recorded as Poles. On the other hand, it was very often the case that Polish Roman Catholic peasants were qualified as Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking.)

Discussing the linguistic pattern of the region, Hiroaki Kuromiya observes:

Many languages were spoken in the Donbas, but the dominant ones were Russian and Ukrainian. The Don Cossacks spoke a ‘Cossack language,’ Russian with Ukrainian and Tatar influences. [...] Some less educated Donbas residents spoke (and to some extent still do) a language that blended Russian and Ukrainian, a ‘Ukraino-Russian dialect.’ Often people in the Ukrainian–Russian borderlands identified neither with Ukraine nor with Russia, calling themselves pereverteni [Ukr. перевертні] or perevertysyi [Rus. перевертыши] (converts) [Kuromiya 1998: 42].

In 1796, Catherine II established the imperial province of Little Russia (Rus. Малороссийская губерния, Malorossiiskaia gubernia), whose inhabitants came to be referred to as Little Russians (Rus. малороссы, malorossy). When I examined records held in the State Archives of Donetsk Oblast in 2008, I came across personal files where the ‘nationality’ column indicating ethnicity featured the entry ‘Little Russian.’

The 1897 Russian census, adopting the linguistic criterion of ethnicity, recorded the total population of Katerynoslav province at 2,113,700, with the breakdown by native language as follows: Ukrainian: 1,456,400 (68.9%), Russian: 365,000 (17.3%), Polish: 12,400 (0.6%), Yiddish: 99,200 (4.7%); other: 180,700 (8.5%). The corresponding figures for Taurida province, including the Berdiansk and Melitopol districts, were: total population: 1,447,800; native language: Ukrainian: 611,100 (42.2%), Russian: 404,500 (28%), Polish: 10,100 (0.7%), Yiddish 55,400 (3.8%); other: 366,700 (25.3%) [Eberhardt 1994: 20].

Considering religion, the 1897 data for Katerynoslav province indicate the Orthodox population at 90.05% of the total, Jews: 4.78%, Roman Catholics: 1.52%, Protestants: 3.06%, Muslims: 0.1%, Old Believers: 0.44%, members of the Armenian-Gregorian Church: 448 and the Armenian Catholic Church: 24 (combined: 0.02%), Karaites: 0.02%, Anglicans: 0.002%. The corresponding figures for Taurida province were: Orthodox: 73.88%, Jews: 8.2%, Roman Catholics: 2.03%, Protestants: 4.73%, Muslims: 13.18%, Old Believers: 0.95% [Belikova 2005].

For example, the ethnic composition of the Bakhmut and Mariupol districts of Katerynoslav province and the Berdiansk and Melitopol districts of Taurida province according to the 1897 census is presented in Table 1.1.
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For centuries, ethnic relations in the region were marked by conflict, a situation entirely different than, for example, in Carpathian Bukovina, where various ethnic and religious communities enjoyed their freedoms and respected their neighbors of different ethnicity or religion [cf. Krasowska 2006]. In the Donbas, Tatars and Muslims were frequent victims of violence [Kuromiya 1998: 42]. Relations between Ukrainians and Russians were also tense and often erupted in conflicts. Terms of verbal abuse were not spared by either side: Russians insulted Ukrainians by calling them khokholy (a lock of hair on a Cossack’s shaven head), and were called katsapy (like a billy goat) in return. There was also growing anti-Semitism; for example, in 1917 the Bolshevik party organization in Iuzivka recognized intra-party anti-Semitism as the second problem on its agenda: ‘some Bolsheviks treated “members of other nationalities” badly, heaping “all kinds of insults” on them’ [Kuromiya 1998: 86].

In 1917–1919, the Donbas population diminished as a result of both the war and atrocious working conditions in the mines of the region. Indeed, this economic center of the Soviet republic was described as ‘having become a cemetery of Donbas miners and metalworkers’ [Kuromiya 1998: 114]. In the Donetsk province, in the first half of April 1922 alone, 1,075 children and 1,038 adults were registered as dead from starvation [Kuromiya 1998: 127]. It was also a period of forced atheization:

In the Donbas, eight churches were closed in Artemivsk (Bakhmut) and its surroundings, five in Petrovskyi (Horlivka), eight in Rykove (Lenakiieve) and its suburbs – altogether at least forty-two (all appeared to be Orthodox churches). In addition, six synagogues, thirty-five chapels (mainly Baptist), two Roman Catholic churches and three monasteries were shut down [Kuromiya 1998: 139].

Table 1.1. Ethnic groups as a percentage of the population in four districts of the area under consideration (1897) [after Chornyĭ 2001]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Katerynoslav province</th>
<th>Taurida province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bakhmut district</td>
<td>Mariupol district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>58.20</td>
<td>46.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>31.19</td>
<td>14.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>7.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>19.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>9.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the process of forced collectivization of agriculture affected all ethnic communities, the rates of the so-called dekulakization among Bulgarians, Germans and Greeks were higher than the average; as many as 10% of the Greek farmers were deported. In the village of Hryshyne, 40% of the German peasants were dekulakized. In Mariupol, there were violent clashes between Greeks and Ukrainians. Many Greeks and Germans tried to emigrate; 30% of Jews were disenfranchized [Kuromiya 1998: 157].

The data of the 1926 census in Soviet Ukraine are examined in Przemiany narodowościowe na Ukrainie w XX wieku (Ethnic changes in Ukraine in the twentieth century) [Eberhardt 1994]. However, as the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts were established later, in 1938 and 1939, it is difficult to estimate the population and ethnic composition in their present borders. Issues relating to the Polish ethnic community in the area are discussed in detail in section 1.5 below.

The 1930s was a decade of massive losses in population. Millions perished in the Great Famine of 1932–1933. Today, it is already clear that among the victims there were tens of thousands of people of different ethnicities; there is an extensive body of literature on the subject. In south-eastern Ukraine, the famine had not been over by 1933 as in other parts of the country, but lingered until 1936, particularly in the Donetsk (Stalino) area [Kuromiya 1998: 174].

Among the ‘non-Soviet’ nationalities, the death toll of a massive wave of repressions in 1937 was exceedingly high, not to forget the deportations. In the Stalino oblast, where ethnic Germans made up 1.5% of the population, at least 4,265 of them were arrested between September 1937 and February 1938 (84.6% of them were executed). Ethnically motivated repressions severely affected also other communities. For example, in 1937 one village lost 600 Greeks, who were shot on charges that they intended to establish a Greek republic; nearly all members of the Greek theater in Mariupol were executed [Kuromiya 1998: 233]. In 1937–1938, an estimated number of cases of political crime in the Stalino oblast was at least 33,774 (some involved more than one person) and between 27,000 and 30,000 of those charged were executed, including a considerable number of ethnic Germans, Poles and Greeks [after Kuromiya 1998: 245]. Obviously, repressions included also the Ukrainian population.

The Second World War also brought severe losses and significantly reduced the total population of Ukraine. As there is already an extensive body of literature on the subject of the war and the genocide of the Jews, I do not address these issues in detail in the present study.

After the war, the population of the Stalino oblast doubled from 1,998,000 in 1945 to 4,262,000 in 1959 [Kuromiya 1998: 325].

Data from Soviet censuses are not entirely reliable or accurate: ‘[t]he next full census in this territory (present-day Ukraine) was carried out as late as 1959, and those held in 1937 and 1939 were not comprehensive. What is more, as the 1939 census was intentionally distorted, these data can be used to present only an estimated approximation of the actual figures’ [Eberhardt 1994: 124–125].
Although the post-1959 censuses were held in a stable administrative environment and thus lend themselves to comparisons, they certainly underestimated the actual figures of ethnic minorities in general, and the Polish community in particular. It should be noted that, generally speaking, the censuses of the Soviet era are not entirely trustworthy and their data should be approached cautiously [cf. Wilson 2009: 218-219].

Table 1.2 presents the ethnic composition of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in 1959, 1989 and 2001 [Eberhardt 1994; Vynnychenko, Loïko (eds.) 2003; Dovidnyk 2001]. It is evident that the national censuses of 1959 and 1989 were carried out in a ‘truly Soviet manner.’ For example, cells marked with a line (–) indicate that while the ethnic group was not recorded in the 1959 census at all, its members were registered in the area under consideration in 1989.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Donetsk oblast</th>
<th>Zaporizhzhia oblast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>2,368.10</td>
<td>2,693.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1,601.30</td>
<td>2,316.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>63.30</td>
<td>76.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>93.20</td>
<td>83.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>42.50</td>
<td>28.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>25.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (incl. other)</td>
<td>4,262.00</td>
<td>5,311.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for 1959 and 1989 indicate a growing number of ethnic Ukrainians in both oblasts. The figures for those declaring themselves as ethnic Russians had increased considerably. Living in the south-eastern borderlands of Ukraine, they did not need to have any command of Ukrainian, as Russian had practically become the official language of administration and education. Piotr Eberhardt stresses that the most important feature of the 1959–1970 period was a dynamically expanding number of the so-called Russified Ukrainians:
in nine oblasts of the country, including Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, the figures soared by at least 50% [Eberhardt 1994: 225]. A substantial increase of Belarusian population in both regions (from 63,300 in 1959 to 76,900 in 1989, and from 9,700 to 18,400, respectively) is hardly surprising. Considering that Donetsk always offered good prospects for job seekers, it could probably be attributed to economic migration across the Soviet republican borders, which did not pose any major problems. The 1959 census did not include Bulgarians, Armenians, Germans and Poles in the Donetsk oblast, or Greeks, Tatars, Armenians, Germans and Poles in the Zaporizhzhia oblast. Both provinces recorded a considerable decline in the number of Jews; in the Donetsk oblast the figure fell by 14,100 between 1959 and 1989. The Donetsk oblast also noted a decline in the numbers of the Greek minority.

Changes in the ethnic composition of the two oblasts between 1989 and 2001 are presented in Table 1.3. It can be observed that the proportion of Russians fell by 5.4 percentage points in the Donetsk oblast and 7.3 percentage points in the Zaporizhzhia oblast. On the other hand, the Ukrainian population recorded a growth of 6.2 and 7.7 percentage points, respectively. In both cases, the change might have resulted from the increasing Ukrainian national awareness. As for other ethnicities, the figures for Bulgarians, Belarusians,

**Table 1.3.** Ethnic groups as a percentage of the population in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (1989, 2001) [after Vynnychenko, Loiko (eds.) 2003]
Jews and Poles declined; in the case of Greeks, Tatars and Germans, the drop was relatively smaller, while the Armenian population increased. It is worrying to note the shrinking size of the Polish community in the two oblasts, which might be attributed both to a low level of their national awareness and a persistent anxiety that the old Soviet order might still return. As a number of my informants reported to have concealed their Polish identity in the latest census (2001), I am convinced that the official statistics do not show the actual figures.

An optimistic conclusion to these data is that the region is still multi-ethnic and multicultural and the trend is evidently growing. In 2001, the population of the two oblasts was composed of as many as 130 ethnic and national communities. It could be expected that in the next census (scheduled to be held in 2012) their members will not be afraid to declare their actual ethnic or national identity rather than the official Ukrainian citizenship they hold.

To sum up, it should be noted that south-eastern Ukraine has long been inhabited by different ethnic groups, with different cultures and traditions, which mixed and influenced one another. Early sixteenth century migrations, when scattered colonies were established by Cossacks and runaway peasants, played an important role in the development of the region. Later, in the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century, the state pursued a policy of planned settlement, involving planting colonists for the protection of the southern borderland against the Tatars. As well as this, particularly from the eighteenth century onwards, the area was colonized also by foreign newcomers. They tended to form compact ethnic communities (villages, settlements), and made a significant contribution to the cultural and industrial development of the surrounding areas and the entire region. The process of industrialization and, at a later date, the Stalinist policy aiming to create a homogenous, Russian-speaking ‘Soviet nation,’ was a blow to ethnic diversity, as some of the communities were liquidated or assimilated. As a result, today the region is quite uniform in terms of language, with the majority of the population using Russian. However, it could be observed that following the post-1991 political changes, south-eastern Ukraine is becoming multicultural again.

1.5. Poles in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts

The Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine has a long tradition going back to the fifteenth century: between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, sparsely populated eastern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became the area of settlement for Polish petty nobility and peasantry. In the course of time, the process came to be interpreted in terms of ‘the civilizing mission,’ which became a core element of Polish ‘borderland mythology.’

Large groups of Polish peasants and factory workers arrived in the region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They were deported from the country
or recruited by landowners and entrepreneurs as workforce for their manufactories, ironworks, sugar mills, distilleries and other industrial establishments. Some examples of the pattern of Polish settlement are presented below.

In 1779, there were thirty Poles living in the Pavlohrad district. In 1843, nineteen Polish families from Podolia province arrived in the village of Husarka in Zaporozhia. They settled in its western part, which came to be known as Polska; the group of newcomers included such names as: Józef Podgorodecki, Choma Szlocki, Piotr Krasewicz, Leon Zelewski, Piotr Protakowski, Jan Terlecki, Henryk Zwardzakowski [Novikov 2007: 275]. In 1863, in one administrative unit of the Bakhmut district alone there were six villages with the total Polish population of 1,126 [Belikova 2005].

Poles were also deported for their involvement in the national uprisings. Following the November Uprising (1830), about five thousand people were deported to the Caucasus. On their way, they passed through the village of Hryshyne in today’s Donetsk oblast, where several dozen families stayed because of an epidemic. The road where they settled came to be called Polichizna (Rus. Полячизна, Pol. Polacczyzna). After the January Uprising (1863), thirty-six Polish families arrived in Serhiivka in today's Donetsk oblast. The local land inspector had a furrow ploughed to mark the site allocated for their houses; the street which was thus established became known as Polska.

In 1868, Poles from the imperial provinces of Kiev and Podolia settled in the Melitopol district [Narody 1997: 12]. They received eight desiatinas of land per each male person in the group and a tax exemption for a period of four years, but no financial assistance was offered [Narody 1997: 17]. The Melitopol entry in Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego (Geographical Dictionary of the Kingdom of Poland) includes the following information:

Lud to z dawnych polskich czynszowników pochodzący, wysiedlony z powiatów ukraińskich, a nawet i berdyczowskiego. Zamieszkuje on wsi: Mikołajówkę, Konstantynówkę, Kosówkę, Targówkę i Petrówkę. Mówią pół po polsku, pół po rusińsku i pamiętają siedziby pierwotne ojców [Słownik geograficzny 1880-1902: vol. 6, 247–248].

(These people are descendants of the old Polish tenant peasants resettled from Ukrainian districts, some from as far as Berdyczów [Ukr. Berdychiv]. They live in Mikołajówka, Konstantynówka, Kosówka, Targówka and Petrówka villages [Ukr. Mykolaivka,

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34 The original quotation is as follows:
‘На рубежі 60–70-х рр. XIX ст. у придніпровській частині Мелітопольського повіту з’явилися представники польського етносу. При переселенні вони не отримали грошової допомоги, а від податків були звільнені тільки на 4 роки. Землі отримали по 8 дес. на особу чоловічої статі’ [Narody 1997: 17].
(‘At the turn of the 1870s, members of Polish ethnic community appeared in the areas of the Melitopol district situated along the Dnieper. They received no financial assistance upon their resettlement, and were only granted four years of tax exemption. They received eight desatinas [of land] for every person of the male sex.’)
Kostiantynivka, Kosakivka(?), Torhaivka, Petrivka]. Their language is half-Polish, half-Ruthenian and they remember where their ancestors came from.)

In the Mariupol district, Polish colonies were to be found in the following locations: Oleksandrivka, Kremennaia, Marianka, Mykolaivsk, Temriuk, Haichur and Huliaipole, counting 670 people in total [Słownik geograficzny 1880–1902: vol. 6, 122]. Recorded in the Slovianoserbsk district of Katerynoslav province, the Polish colony of Józowo (Iuzovo) had the population of one hundred [Słownik geograficzny 1880–1902: vol. 1, 616].

The main destination of Polish migration in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century was not only Siberia, but also major urban and industrial centers, such as Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Riga and the Donbas, which offered considerable employment opportunities [Łukawski 1978: 45].

In 1888–1894, a number of companies co-owned by Belgian, French, English and American bankers and entrepreneurs were established in south-eastern Ukraine [Serczyk 2001: 205]. Russian and Polish industrial workers from Petersburg, Moscow and Warsaw arrived there attracted by rumors about good wages, or were resettled under pressure from entrepreneurs from their regions investing their capital in Ukraine. As a result, a multi-ethnic community of people sharing the same working and living conditions began to form in the region [Serczyk 2001: 205].

The Donbas owes its rise as a major center of metallurgical industry to the Welsh entrepreneur John Hughes, who established the New Russia Coal, Iron and Rail Producing Company (known as the New Russia Company) in 1867, and built steelworks and a rail rolling mill in the Katerynoslav province four years later [Łukawski 1978: 54–55]. It is worth remembering that the discovery of iron ore deposits in Kryvyi Rih in the 1860s came as a result of geological surveys conducted by Oleksandr Pol, working together with Józef Puzyna, a former Polish insurgent released from his exile in Siberia. In the course of time, they were joined by other engineers of Polish origin [Łukawski 1978: 55].

Iron ore production sharply increased once the railway line between Kryvyi Rih and the Donbas had been completed in 1884. Working both as engineers and ordinary industrial workers, Poles made an important contribution to the development of the region. The late 1870s and the early 1880s saw a major transformation of the Dnieper steppe: new steelworks and mines marked the landscape and blast furnaces and factory chimneys rose up high where the Zaporozhian Cossacks had once had their settlements.

The Donbas had a Polish colony since the 1870s. It was composed mostly of former exiles to Siberia; there was also a group of sieve makers who were...
voluntary newcomers from the town of Biłgoraj. In the 1890s, the community counted about four thousand and included mainly industrial workers and craftsmen [Łukawski 1978: 56]. Polish traces can be found in the archival records, such as birth registers kept in the State Archives of Donetsk Oblast. For example, an average of about 220 children a year were baptized in the Roman Catholic church in Urytske, and the corresponding figure for 1879 was 208. Although no ethnicity was indicated, the names of the baptized children would suggest their German and Polish origin [Uritskoe 1879].

In the 1880s, Wilhelm Rau decided to move his Warsaw Steel Factory to Kamianske (today: Dniprodzerzhynsk, Dnipropetrovsk oblast), which involved the relocation of the plant as well as workers and administration, counting six hundred people in total. The local Polish colony was composed of administrative staff, engineers, mechanics and industrial workers [Łukawski 1978: 56].

In 1897, a Kramatorsk factory employed a few Polish carpenters, model makers and one caster [Kotsarenko 2002: 62].

Rich in natural resources, south-eastern Ukraine became a destination for Polish voluntary economic emigration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Donbas attracted a large number of newcomers from the Kingdom of Poland (commonly referred to as the Congress Kingdom). Those who settled there worked not only as qualified industrial staff, but also as managers in mines and steelworks built by Belgian, French, German or British entrepreneurs.

The emigration of Polish workers to the region was mostly an independent and spontaneous process. They often had a limited knowledge about the prospective working conditions or the place of settlement, and made decisions at their own risk. On the other hand, there were also organized ventures, generally when companies from the Congress Kingdom set up their new branches in the Donbas. In such cases, a certain proportion of their staff, usually qualified workers, were relocated at the owner’s expense.

Also Russian entrepreneurs brought Polish workers. For example, in 1897, the Russian Donbas Company sent its agent to Dąbrowa Górnicza, where he recruited 165 miners who were later employed in the Ivan colliery. As it turned out, the working conditions were hard and the pay was very low, which is why nearly all of them returned home, with the exception of ten people who found work in local factories [Łukawski 1978: 64].

In 1899, the Polish community composed of clerks working for the state administration in Mariupol greatly expanded following the arrival of several hundred workers from the Congress Kingdom, who were employed in two local steelworks.

The Russian census of 1897 includes data on ethnicity (based on the criterion of native language) and religion. However, the information on native language (and thus the ethnicity) did not always provide an accurate picture, as there was plenty of scope for distorting the demographic reality [Eberhardt 1994: 15]. Neither can the size of the Polish community be judged on the basis of the figures for religion: among the Roman Catholics
there were also Italians and Slovaks in Mariupol, French and Belgians in Makivka, or Englishmen in Donetsk. It was mainly them who founded Roman Catholic churches in the region. In the present-day territory of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, Poles were members of the multi-ethnic Roman Catholic community, and it was exceptionally rare that they would establish filial chapels themselves.

The territory of today’s Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, which is the focus of my study, was a part of Katerynoslav and Taurida provinces. The former had the Roman Catholic population of 32,200 (1.5%), while the corresponding figure for the latter was 29,400 (2.0%) [Eberhardt 1994: 21]. As for their composition according to the linguistic criterion, Polish was declared as the native language by 12,400 (0.6%) people in the Katerynoslav province and 10,100 (0.7%) in Taurida province. According to historical sources, 60% of Poles in the Katerynoslav province and the neighboring Don Host oblast originally came from the Congress Kingdom [Łukawski 1978: 86].

We should remember that there were also Polish investors in the region, to mention but a few examples. In 1900–1903, the Commercial Bank (Pol. Bank Handlowy) in Warsaw became a major shareholder in the Kramatorsk Metallurgical Company (Russ. Краматорское металлургическое общество, Kramatorskoe metallurgicheske obshchestvo), which was among the most successful enterprises in the Russian Empire; Michał Kurako and Ludwik Gużewski (the executive director in 1908–1916) played a major role in its expansion [Kotsarenko 2002: 64]. Polish engineers Stanisław Siemaszko from Petersburg and Tadeusz Hantke were among the initiators of the Azov Company (Pol. Azowskie Towarzystwo Akcyjne). In 1900, Prince Franciszek Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki and Józef Żółtyński established the Drucki-Żółtyński Mining and Industrial Company (Pol. Towarzystwo Górniczo-Przemysłowe Drucko-Żółtyńskie), engaged in the production of manganese ore in the region. Count Ksawery Branicki was a major investor in the Krynynchna colliery in the Donbas.

In the early twentieth century Polish migration to the territories of south-eastern Ukraine increased. In 1903, the correspondent of the Polish periodical Kraj (The Country) commented on the growing numbers of Poles in the Donbas:

Polaków nie brak tu na wszystkich stanowiskach, poczynając od dyrektorów, kończąc na robotnikach najemnych, nie ma chyba w całym Zagłębiu Donieckim kopalni lub fabryki, gdzie by nie pracowali Polacy, liczby ich jednak nie da się określić nawet w przybliżeniu z powodu absolutnego braku łączności pomiędzy nimi [after Łukawski 1978: 64].

(Poles are to be found in all capacities, from executive directors to industrial workers. Although the entire Donbas does not seem to have any mine or factory without Polish employees working there, no reliable estimates of their actual number can be provided, as there is absolutely no contact between them.)
The population of eastern and southern Ukrainian provinces increased rapidly, as did the number of Poles in the region.

In the mid-1890s, a number of Polish students, as well as Poles deported from the Congress Kingdom for revolutionary activity, engaged in local revolutionary circles [Łukawski 1978: 200]. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the region became a center of the workers’ movement: out of the total of over two hundred strikes in Ukraine, a half were organized in the Katerynoslav province, with the participation of about 120,000 workers [Serczyk 2001: 215]. In January and February 1905, as many as 80,000 workers from fifty mines and factories went on strike in the Donbas alone [Serczyk 2001: 228]. The Katerynoslav province was the fastest growing center of heavy industry, and it was there that qualified industrial workers from the entire Empire arrived in considerable numbers. Since many of them had already been involved in the workers’ movement, the region became an active center of revolutionary activity.

The First World War was a heavy blow to the local economy. A combination of factors including war, hunger, high prices and tsarist despotism resulted in a severe political crisis of the Russian Empire at the turn of 1916 and 1917 [Serczyk 2001: 252], which affected the economic situation in south-eastern Ukraine in general, and the families of the region, including Polish ones, in particular.

Surviving documents concerning Polish presence in the region during the war include registers of those who went missing and whose families presumed they might have been displaced to Oleksandrivsk (Zaporizhzhia); they were originally from the following provinces: Warsaw (eighteen names), Vilnius, Vitebsk, Volhynia, Grodno, Kalisz, Kaunas, Łomża, Lublin, Minsk, Radom, Suwałki, Siedlce, and Chełm.

According to a document dated 1 June 1915, a group of sixty refugees from the west who arrived in Oleksandrivsk received assistance from the local Polish Committee; its meetings to discuss the problem were attended by a representative of the Polish National Committee. Also in 1915, the town council received a letter from the Polish, Jewish, Lithuanian and Russian-Latvian national committees requesting assistance for other refugees: Poles (2,779 people), Jews (300), Lithuanians (450), Russians and Latvians (2,088) [Perepiski 1915–1918]. A document confirming material or financial assistance provided to displaced persons includes such names as: Marfa Krasińska, daughter of Michał (received three roubles on 22 June 1916), Ela Gruszycka, daughter of Roman, Maria Raczkowska, daughter of Stanisław, Katarzyna Staniecka, daughter of Józef, etc. [Vedomosti 1915–1916].

In 1915, the entire industrial facility of Engineering Works Bormann, Szwede & Co. (Pol. Zakłady Mechaniczne Bormann, Szwede i S-ka), employing 1,200 staff at the time, was evacuated from Warsaw to Oleksandrivsk [Dokumenty 1916–1917]. All of its correspondence with different companies in Warsaw, Kharkiv and Moscow was initially handled in Polish [Perepiska 1915–1917]; its warehouse check records include such Polish names as E. Brodecki,
It is difficult to estimate the numbers of Poles in Ukraine after the First World War. The new administrative division introduced in the country in February 1919 (with provinces still called guberniia) entailed new estimates of population in each administrative unit. Moreover, the size of the Polish community in Soviet Russia was greatly influenced by mass wartime migrations [Iwanow 1991: 69].

The repatriation agreement signed between Poland, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine in 1920 made provisions for the return of Polish refugees to Poland. Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia archives hold some records concerning the operation, such as:

Список беженцев Польши 1-го эшелонна Юзовский р-н 31 июля 1921 года, Список польских беженцев зарегистрировано польской комиссией по отправке на родину г. Бахмут — всего семей 1580, Юзовский список 2181 человек; список семей – 2152 [Iuzovskoe upravlenie 1921].

(The Register of Polish Refugees, 1st transport, Iuzivka district, 31 July 1921; The Register of Polish Refugees registered with the Polish commission for repatriation, Bakhmut town, total: 1,580 families; The Iuzivka Register of 2,181 persons; the family register: 2,152.)

By 1924, when repatriation was over, a large number of Poles had been resettled to their homeland. Those who remained in the Soviet Union were forced to join in the process of consolidation of Soviet power in Ukraine [Zahorujko 2001: 7].

The Appendix (Documents 3 and 3a) presents the 1923 census figures for the Polish population in the Donbas with no commentary, since it proved impossible to locate an equivalent set of data for the territory of today's Zaporizhzhia oblast. Archival records, including such documents as applications for Ukrainian citizenship from persons of Polish origin born in Volhynia, Kaunas, Minsk, Kherson and other provinces, provide an opportunity to trace interesting patterns concerning Polish presence in eastern Ukraine. For example, they contain information on the purpose of their arrival (e.g., employment, visiting relatives or friends), occupation and level of education (e.g., a pharmacist, a construction worker 'with low education,' as stated in the document, etc.) [Priniatie 1926]; see also Appendix, Document 4: Ukrainian Residence Permit for a person of Polish origin.

The 1920s were an exceedingly difficult decade for religious communities. It was particularly Catholics who were suspected of maintaining contacts with Poland, considered the main enemy of the Soviet Union among the Western countries. The confiscation of valuables from churches 'for the relief of the starving' began in 1921–1922, following the 'Law on the Separation of the
Church from the State and of the School from the Church.'

Thus, for example, most of the valuables belonging to the Roman Catholic church in Iuzivka were seized. The procedure involved a special commission drafting a list of items, and subsequently proceeding with the requisition. The same practice was applied in the case of Orthodox churches. (See Appendix, Document 2: The list of items confiscated from the Roman Catholic church in Iuzivka.)

In November 1923, the vast majority of Catholics in Makiivka and Iuzivka, particularly those who were in contact with Bishop Neveu, were arrested. His living quarters were searched and he had some of his possessions, including his letters, confiscated [Kuromiya 1998: 140]. Churches were closed and the clergy arrested or deported. In 1928, Bishop Neveu reported from Makiivka that ‘arrests among our Orthodox brethren have multiplied to an alarming extent.’ In 1929, he wrote that ‘even families with whom I used to be very friendly were afraid to show their faces in church in case they should lose their daily bread’ [after Kuromiya 1998: 156]. In 1930, the Catholic church in Makiivka was closed down pending plans of turning it into a cinema, and the crosses and graves in the cemetery had been destroyed in preparation for works on a public park on the site. ‘From April 1929 to April 1930, thirty-six chapels were closed in Artemivs’k okruha, and a synagogue was closed in Rykove’ [Kuromiya 1998: 156].

On the other hand, the 1920s was a decade of liberal ethnic policy in Soviet Ukraine, also in the case of the Polish community, which had its schools and village soviets (councils) [Eberhardt 1994: 83–91; Iwanow 1991: 137–144]. In south-eastern Ukraine, there were settlements where the proportion of the Polish population was as high as 60%, as can be seen in Document 5 enclosed in the Appendix. For example, the Velyka Lepatykha and Nyzhni Sirohozy raions had two schools each where Polish was taught (with three teachers working in each school); in the Melitopol district, there were four Polish schools with 242 students and six teachers. The highest figures for ethnic schools in the district were recorded for the Bulgarian (35 schools, 4,491 students, 108 teachers) and German community (103 schools, 5,463 students) [Svedeniia 1926].

36 Initially, the Bolsheviks concentrated their efforts on suppressing the Orthodox Church.


(The Catholic Church also adopted a compromise approach to the implementation of the two major acts regulating the status of all religious communities in Soviet Russia, i.e. the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars ‘On the Separation of the Church from the State’ (23 January 1918), later incorporated as Article 13 of the first constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Russian Republic), and the Regulation of the People’s Commissar for Justice ‘On the Principles of Implementation of the Decree “On the Separation of the Church from the State”’ (24 August 1918).)

However, in the years to come the Catholic Church was to suffer severe losses among its members and clergy in Soviet Ukraine, see Iwanow 1991.
In the period, the Melitopol district had four Polish and Polish-Ukrainian village soviets. Poles were also represented in Torhai and Mykolaivka (where they formed 60% of the population, but had no Polish schools), as well as Kostiantynivka and Novo-Petrivka (where there were also Polish schools).

The ethnic composition of the territory of today’s Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts according to the census of 1926 is presented in Table 1.4.

Table 1.4. The ethnic composition of the territory of today’s Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, 1926 census [after Chornyï 2001]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemivsk</td>
<td>766,668</td>
<td>555,808</td>
<td>72.50</td>
<td>152,624</td>
<td>19.91</td>
<td>17,622</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>4,070</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>654,941</td>
<td>348,518</td>
<td>53.21</td>
<td>223,825</td>
<td>34.17</td>
<td>12,909</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>415,540</td>
<td>227,443</td>
<td>54.73</td>
<td>76,753</td>
<td>18.47</td>
<td>13,483</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>533,315</td>
<td>429,310</td>
<td>80.50</td>
<td>59,214</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>18,388</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol</td>
<td>736,166</td>
<td>425,280</td>
<td>57.77</td>
<td>184,324</td>
<td>25.04</td>
<td>15,301</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>5,243</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>29,018,187</td>
<td>23,218,860</td>
<td>80.01</td>
<td>2,677,166</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>1,574,391</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>476,435</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1930s were a tragic period for Poles and other national minorities in Ukraine.

‘Ethnic Germans and Poles became politically suspect as potential fifth columns. In 1933, the Soviet secret police uncovered a German espionage organization; in the same year, the Polish Military Organization (Pol. Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, POW) was liquidated on charges of remaining “in the service of Polish landowners and Ukrainian nationalists” scheming to invade and destroy the Soviet Union’ [after Kuromiya 1998: 175].

1935 marked the beginning of mass deportations and coercive resettlement of Polish population from the western borderlands to the eastern regions of Ukraine, which had been most affected by the Great Famine of 1932–1933.38

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37 Polish ethnic village soviets were organized in 1924. Their principal aims included: broadly understood Sovietization of the Polish population, organization of Soviet administrative services for Poles in their native language, propagating the ideology of the Bolshevik party among the Catholic peasants, and providing information on the principles of the Soviet ethnic policy [Iwanow 1991: 137].

38 Considering the scope of the problem, I do not discuss the Great Famine in more detail. There is an extensive body of literature on the subject, including such important publications as Holod 1990; Kolektivizatsiia 1992; Conquest 1986; Kulczycki 2008. Kulczycki’s book was best described by Oleksandr Motsyk, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Poland at the time of its publication: ‘Książka profesora Stanisława Kulczyckiego ukazuje prawdę o zbrodni dokonanej przez totalitarną władzę stalinowską na narodzie ukraińskim. […] Publikacja ta, oparta na dokumentach i zeznaniach naczych świadków, rozszerza naszą wiedzę o Wielkim Głodzie na Ukrainie w latach 1932–1933, który pochłonił prawie dziesięć milionów istnień ludzkich’ [Kulczycki 2008: back cover].
The decision of January 1935 was to deport 8,300 families and replace them with 4,000 selected kolkhoz families from the Kiev and Chernihiv oblasts. 3,130 families were resettled to the Donetsk oblast [Stroński 1998: 178–179]. Those living within the distance of seven kilometers from the border were the first to go. The deportees were dispersed among the local population, which resulted in their rapid assimilation [Stroński 1998: 179]. As of 1936, there were also deportations to Kazakhstan.

The period of 1937–1938 saw the high point of Stalin’s genocidal Great Terror, which had utterly disastrous consequences also for the Polish population in Ukraine, including the south-eastern regions of the country [Stroński 1998: 47]. In the build-up of repressions, Soviet authorities proceeded from eliminating the Roman Catholic Church from public life, abolishing the Polish Autonomous District (the so-called Marchlewszczynzzna), liquidation of Polish schools and cultural institutions, and deportations of ethnic Poles, to the mass extermination of the Polish population. Indeed, the anti-Polish operations of 1937–1938 can be seen as genocide. It was certainly all ethnic communities, Ukrainians, Germans, Lithuanians and others, that were severely affected in the period. However, in the case of Poles, the scale of repressions was unparalleled [Stroński 1998; Iwanow 1991].

On 11 August 1937, the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) issued an order to liquidate Poles. ‘As of 1 November 1937, 19,030 were arrested under the Polish operations; of them, 4,885 were sentenced to be shot’ [Kuromiya 1998: 232]. In 1937–1938 repressions affected nearly 50,000 Poles; in the Stalino (Donetsk) oblast alone, between September 1937 and February 1938 at least 3,777 were arrested; of them, 3,029 (80.2%) were executed [Kuromiya 1998: 232]; 723 were given five- to ten-year labor camp sentences, and twenty-five persons still had their cases tried. Charges against Poles mainly included espionage, treason, terrorist activity, diversion, inflicting damage (Rus. вредительство, vreditel’stvo; Pol. szkodnictwo), counter-revolutionary activity and agitation. In the Appendix (Document 6) I enclose a record of an interrogation of an ethnic Pole by a representative of Stalinist authorities, a copy of an arrest warrant and a decision to charge the suspect.

In the early 1990s, a number of files of those who were subject to repressions were transferred to the state archives of relevant oblasts and special

('Stanisław Kulczycki’s book presents the truth about the atrocity committed by the totalitarian Stalinist state on the Ukrainian nation. [...] Based on documents and eyewitness accounts, the publication expands the state of knowledge about the Great Famine, which claimed the lives of nearly ten million people in Ukraine in 1932–1933.'

39 The Marchlewski Polish Autonomous District was established in Volhynia province of Soviet Ukraine in 1925. Named after Julian Marchlewski, a prominent Polish communist activist, and commonly referred to in Polish as Marchlewszczynzzna, it had a total population of 40,577, including 28,336 ethnic Poles. The region was a political venture of Polish communists aiming to foster ‘socialist awareness’ among Poles living in the Soviet Union. The region was abolished in 1935.

40 Rus. Народный комиссариат внутренних дел (НКВД), Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del (NKVD).
commissions prepared a publication entitled *Reabilitovani istoriieu* (Ukr. Реабілітовані історією, Rehabilitated by History), including brief biographical notes. An analysis of its second volume makes it possible to present the following data concerning the Zaporizhzhia *oblast*: the total number of those repressed was 5,390; the age bracket breakdown of the figure is as follows: below 25 years of age: 710 persons, below 40: 2,717, below 50: 1,288, below 60: 572, below 70: 99, over 70: 4; as for the ethnic groups, the data indicate: Ukrainians (2,405), Germans (1,924), Russians (385), Bulgarians (223), Poles (188), Jews (70), Greeks (60), Czechs (42), as well other ethnicities with the number of victims below 50: Belarusians, Latvians, Albanians, Moldavians, and other [Reabilitovani 2005]. Volume three provides information on cases against 3,259 people, including 135 Poles [Reabilitovani 2006]. The total number of Poles subjected to Stalinist repressions in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia *oblasts* is exceedingly difficult to estimate for two main reasons. Firstly, not all the persons had their record files and their names are impossible to trace. Secondly, not all NKVD files have been transferred to state archives as yet. Also, the prosecution proceeded with the cases at a great pace and the executions were held within a very short time from bringing the charges, often on the same day or within a few days. Repressions were getting more severe by the month. Preliminary estimates for the 1937–1938 surge of repressions in the Stalino *oblast* indicate 9,367 executions of members of three ethnic minorities alone: Germans, Poles, and Greeks⁴¹ [after Kuromiya 1998: 245].

The early days of the Second World War were only a brief interlude in the process of destruction of the people of Ukraine, Poles among them. In 1939–1943, the population of the city of Zaporizhzhia fell from 289,000 to 120,000 [Eberhardt 1994: 166]. Mikołaj Iwanow estimates that in the course of the 1930s the Polish community in Ukraine lost about 30% of its members, as compared to the late 1920s [Iwanow 1991: 377]. The persistent anti-Polish and anti-Catholic hard line in Ukraine was in fact a continuation of the tsarist policy on a mass scale.

Soviet ethnic policy, also towards Poles, should be seen in a broader context. Indeed, it was entire Ukraine which was subject to Sovietization and Russification aiming to suppress the Ukrainian language and identity. As it turned out, the process was to be largely successful in the south-eastern regions of the country. In 2008, one of my informants from Donetsk summed it up as follows: *In the repressions, Stalin could have wiped out the entire population of the steppe, but the industry would have completely collapsed for the lack of manpower (Stalin mógł wykończyć w represjach wszystkich mieszkańców stepu, jednak zniszczyłby całkowicie przemysł, który jednak potrzebował siły roboczej).*

As statistical data concerning the population of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia *oblasts* in the 1940s are both incomplete and purposely distorted, the exact figures of those who suffered from repressions in the Donbas and in the Wild

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⁴¹ On the period of repressions, see Nikol’s’kiĭ 1995a; 1995b.
Plains are impossible to establish. Hiroaki Kuromiya estimates that ‘[i]n the country as a whole, from June 1940 till June 1941 three million people, or approximately 8% of the working population were prosecuted; of them half a million were sentenced to imprisonment’ [Kuromiya 1998: 256]. In a bid to tackle an increasing shortage of manpower in the Donbas, in the second half of 1940 the Soviets deported 38,000 people, including a number of Poles, from Besarabia and northern Bukovina to work in the region.42

The Second World War, which involved a considerable loss in population, was followed by a period of migrations and deportations.43 The industrial centers of the Donbas needed more labor force. I provide only a number of examples of what is a much wider problem, which requires a separate study in its own right. An eyewitness describes a wave of arrests in Lviv in January 194544 as follows:

Od 2 do 8 stycznia aresztowano we Lwowie i najbliżej okolicy 17 300 osób, zapelniając wszystkie więzienia, obozy, lokale milicji i tym podobne miejsca zbiorowego, dobrze strzeżonego bytowania [Kulczyńska 1988: 6].

(Between 2 and 8 January 17,300 people were arrested in Lwów [Ukr: Lviv] and in the immediate area. All the prisons, camps, militia stations and all the places where people could be kept under lock and key were full.)

Most of those arrested were Poles, among them professors, doctors, engineers and artists. The account continues:

Wieziono nas od 4 do 11 lutego. Osób 1760, ponad tysiąc mężczyzn i około siedmiuset kobiet. Ten stan liczebny zmniejszył się już w najbliższych dniach po wyładowaniu [...] Widok, który uderzył moje odwykłe od światła oczy, był następujący: jak daleko wzrok sięgnie, aż do horyzontu, ciągnęła się wokół – we wszystkie strony, groźna i martwa, pokryta czystym śniegiem równina. Na pierwszy rzut oka nie było widać żadnych cech charakterystycznych dla ośrodka kopalniowego. Gdzie niegdzie

42 This information was provided by the children of those who were deported and never returned to their families in Bukovina. On a number of occasions in 1940, in the village of Panka (Bukovina), Russian soldiers made middle-of-the-night arrests of local men. If they were discovered to have gone into hiding, it was their wives and children who were arrested and deported to the Donbas instead. My grandfather, Teodor Pertauzan, a Romanian, the head of the village council, was arrested in 1940 never to be heard of again; my mother was seven years of age at the time. When the father in our neighbors’ family was hiding in the forest, as there was rumor in the village about mass deportations to the Donbas, the mother and their five little children were taken away; only two of them survived. The mother, who worked collecting tar and also survived, talked about the hard conditions, repressions and hunger away from home.

43 For more information on mass deportations, see Ciesielski, Hryciuk, Srebrakowski 2003; Ciesielski 1997; Conquest 1970.

44 In Lviv, another wave of mass arrests and deportations of Poles to the collieries of the Donbas took place in early 1944, before the end of the war. Some of the deportees were later repatriated to Poland. This information was provided by an elderly acquaintance of mine, an academic, whose uncles were arrested and deported to the Donbas immediately after the Soviets re-entered Lviv.
As for the mines themselves,

"Zagłębie Donieckie to rozległy step, a na nim szachty (kopalnie) o niskich drewnianych budynkach nad ziemią. Wewnątrz ziemi prymityw urągający wszystkim pojęciom o wielkim przemyśle. Szereg kopalni nieczynnych zupełnie z powodu zniszczeń wojennych [...] [Kulczyńska 1988: 51]."

(As for the mines themselves, Zagłębie Donieckie was a vast steppe dotted by mine shaft towers with small wooden structures above the ground. Underground, it was all so primitive that it would be ridiculous to even think about it as modern industry. A number of mines did not work at all because they had suffered so much damage in the war [...] [Kulczyńska 1988: 51].)

The post-war reconstruction and subsequent operation of the industrial sector of the Donets-Dnieper Economic Region (including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Stalino, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Voroshlovgrad and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) required a substantial amount of manpower, which could not be provided by Ukraine alone. Thus, the republic’s loss in population was to be compensated by deportations from Central-Eastern Europe [Niedurny 2004: 68]. In April and May 1945, thousands of colliers, Polish citizens from the region of Silesia, were arrested by the NKVD and deported as coercive labor force for the mines of the Donbas. After a decade, only a handful of them were to return to their homeland. The Soviets set up an entire network of filtration camps (for those arrested as ‘hostile element’ in clean-up operations in the frontline areas) and labor battalions in the region, with colliers from Silesia generally sent to the latter (sixty-six in the Stalino and four in the Zaporizhzhia oblasts) [Niedurny 2004: 68]. It is impossible to make any precise estimates of the number of people from Upper Silesia who were deported to south-eastern Ukraine in 1945 [Niedurny 2004: 69]. The current state of research confirms the figure of at least 25,000 deportees from Silesia to labor camps in different parts of the Soviet Union, including the Donbas, Kazakhstan, Chechnia, Turkmenistan, Georgia, the Urals, and Murmansk [Kwieciński 2004: 100–101].

Eyewitness accounts of transport, working and living conditions of those deported include the following comments:

(They filled the train carriage with seventy people and wired the door shut. From what the guards said, we got to know we were going to Russia and we would never return to our families. The journey took about a month, because the train was going along a single-track line and often stopped to let other trains pass. We reached the Donbas. When they got us out of our carriages, we walked about two kilometers to a camp which had brick barracks and was fenced with barbed wire. We slept on bunks and covered ourselves with blankets we had taken with us.)

Or, to quote another example:


(In October 1945 there was a “selection” of people who would be fit for hard work in the collieries. Along with about a hundred other people, I was taken to Camp 6B in Jenakiiweve, where we were assigned to work underground. I worked as a cutter at the face. I worked at the Junkom mine and later at Hidroshakhta, also at the face. They both had vertical coal seams, really dangerous. The camp was international, there were about 1,500 Poles, and later, also Hungarians and other nationalities, about 2,500 people altogether. The numbers kept changing; at some point there were 4,000 people in the camp.)

The Soviet people that Moscow aimed to mould were to be a society of working masses without historically formed social structures, to better enable their control and manipulation: ‘[r]epressions, including deportations, were a means of implementing the policy aiming to destroy natural social structures’ (‘Represje, w tym także deportacje, były instrumentem realizacji polityki destrukcji owych naturalnych struktur społecznych’) [Ciesielski, Hryciuk, Srebrakowski 2003: 10]. For example, between 1941 and 1946, the population of the Donetsk oblast fell from 3,324,000 to 2,507,000, and the corresponding figures for the Zaporizhzhia oblast were 1,443,000 and 1,144,000, respectively. The Second
World War brought a considerable change in the ethnic composition of Ukraine: the Polish, Jewish and German population suffered severe losses and the south-eastern regions of the country were becoming increasingly more Russian-speaking.

In 1946–1947, another outbreak of famine brought death to further millions of people, and was particularly disastrous in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia. While the exact figure of those who perished is not possible to establish, the extent of the disaster can be confirmed by the fact that the number of rural households in the Zaporizhzhia oblast fell by 7,600 in 1947 alone [Reabilitovani 2004: 31].

Many people moved their place of residence: in 1949 in Ukraine 75,134 left their workplaces without authorization, which amounted to a criminal offense; many of those who had run away from the Donbas were arrested [Kuromiya 1998: 308]. The policy of attrition against the population continued after the Second World War until the death of Stalin, as did the struggle against religion, the clergy and believers [Kuromiya 1998: 312-313]. In March 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union declared an amnesty, which included over 223,000 people in Ukraine [Reabilitovani 2004: 32].

As the Donbas still offered attractive pay prospects, the population of the region increased rapidly: as was already mentioned, between 1945 and 1959 the number of inhabitants of the Stalino oblast more than doubled: from 1,998,000 to 4,262,000 [Kuromiya 1998: 325]. According to the 1959 census, Ukraine had the total population of forty-two million, with Ukrainians counting over thirty-two million. Following the deportations to other regions of the Soviet Union and repatriation to Poland, the Polish minority in the whole country was recorded at 0.9%. My assumption is also that a certain proportion of Poles did not reveal their national identity during the census for fear of repressions and deportation. Ethnic Germans had been wiped out almost entirely, and the Jewish community suffered severe losses. On the other hand, the country in general, and the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in particular, had a dynamically increasing proportion of Russians.

A straight line across the cell labelled ‘Polish’ in the ethnicity column of the 1959 census for the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts [Eberhardt 1994: 198–199] indicates that the figure was most likely negligible. The process of Russification steadily increased, with the Soviet rule imposing Russian language and culture in Ukraine. The most dynamic expansion of Russian was observed in the territory under consideration. The Polish population in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions was dispersed and the pace of its assimilation increased under pressure of Sovietization. Poles tended to conceal their national identity and most often declared themselves as Russians or Ukrainians in the hope of securing a better future for their children, who later mostly thought about themselves as Russians. It was quite common for parents to give typical Russian names to their children in order to cover up any links that might openly relate them to Polish identity. (See Chapter 5 for more details.)
Considering that it was mostly the male part of the population who fell victim to repressions, deportations and the war (or had to serve in the army away from the home region), Polish women often married Russians or Ukrainians and rapidly assimilated, also linguistically, as a result. Children from such mixed marriages frequently did not consider themselves as Poles, even more so that in this part of Ukraine it took a lot of courage to openly declare Polish identity.

Although the working conditions in both regions were still very difficult, and the workers were subject to ruthless treatment by Soviet authorities, the labor market absorbed a considerable number of newcomers. Between 1959 and 1970, the total population of Ukraine increased by 5,257,500 people [Eberhardt 1994: 219]. The 1970 census indicated a considerable growth of the Russian population, which was a result of immigration from other Soviet republics and from Russia itself. The newcomers from Russia were mainly members of staff employed in the administration, particularly in the higher echelons. On the other hand, the Polish population declined considerably: from 363,300 in 1959, to 295,100 in 1970 (i.e. the figure was smaller by 68,200), which most likely should be attributed to the progress of Russification.

In the case of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, Poles were dispersed, deprived of access to Catholic churches, Polish schools and organizations, and the proportion of mixed marriages was relatively high, which all facilitated the process of their rapid Russification. In 1970, the total Polish population in the Donetsk oblast was 8,600, with the corresponding figure for Zaporizhzhia at 2,200. In the former oblast, the declared native language breakdown was as follows: Polish: 900, Ukrainian: 1,700, Russian: 5,900; in the latter: Polish: 300, Ukrainian: 1,200, Russian: 700 [Eberhardt 1994: 238].

The 1970s and 1980s were the decades of economic migration within Ukraine and immigration from other Soviet republics. The operating principle of Soviet authorities in the period resembled the Stalinist policy of assimilating minorities in a bid to amalgamate them into a uniform Soviet people, citizens of the Soviet Union. In the process, Russian became the native language of all ethnic and national minorities.

A uniform Soviet nation was shaped mainly by the state, the communist party and the army. While young men from Ukraine were sent to do their military service in other republics of the Soviet Union, conscripts from Kazakhstan, Georgia or Armenia were stationed in Ukraine. Also, although higher education was nominally free, graduates had to complete a mandatory two-year work placement on completion of studies, which involved moving away from their home regions. Consequently, mixed marriages with Russian speakers were quite common. Young people were brought up in the spirit of Leninism, setting up such role models as Pavlik Morozov, a member of the Pioneer Organization who denounced his father to the Bolsheviks. The aim of this propaganda was to foster positive attitudes to informers, and to destroy family bonds. From an early age, children were taught that the good of the Soviet...
state was the most important value,\textsuperscript{45} and membership in the Little Octobrists (Ukr. Жовтенията, Zhovteniata)\textsuperscript{46} and, in due course, the Pioneer Organization was mandatory. In order to pursue higher education, candidates had to join the Komsomol, and become members of the communist party while at university. Needless to say, the region was dominated by official hostility to Catholicism and religion as such.

With their growing industry and permanent shortage of manpower, the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions were a destination for economic migrants. For example, adolescents (including Poles) from western Ukraine were often sent to work on the farms in the south-east. Young girls frequently settled there, married and adapted to the new Russian-speaking environment.

In the early 1970s, Poles who had been deported to Kazakhstan from the Zhytomyr (Pol. Żytomierz) region in 1937 were allowed to return to Ukraine. It was not an officially organized action, but one pursued by the people themselves: those who managed to come back helped others to follow them.\textsuperscript{47} Some settled in new regions, including the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, where, as reported by my informants, they concealed their national identity in an attempt to fit in. With the number of schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction progressively reduced (and no Polish schools in the period in either region at all), the proportion of children attending Russian schools in Donetsk was as high as 90\% [Eberhardt 1994: 248]. A good command of Russian coupled with membership in the communist party ensured good prospects of social advancement and a successful career. As a result, a large proportion of Poles in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia concealed their ethnic background and made use of the opportunities.\textsuperscript{48} On the other hand, there were those who chose not to join the party and to preserve their Polish identity and Catholic faith. This, however, meant that they had to keep a low profile and accept worse-paid jobs.

The number of those willing to work in the collieries increased despite the hard working conditions. However, there were also a number of strikes, which were suppressed by the authorities. ‘In September 1979, as if to punish the Donbas, the government exploded a nuclear bomb in the Iunkom mine in Lenakieve’ [Kuromiya 1998: 331].

\textsuperscript{45} As a pupil attending Soviet schools in 1980–1990, I had personal experience of role models and authority figures proposed to Soviet children in the course of their education.

\textsuperscript{46} The Ukrainian term \textit{zhovteniatko} (жовтенятко) derives from the name of the month of October (Ukr. жовтень, zhovten’), associated with the October Revolution of 1917. The Soviet Union had a framework of ideological organizations with obligatory membership from an early age: Zhovteniata at primary school level, the Pioneer Organization at secondary schools, the Komsomol for those aged 14–28, and the communist party.

\textsuperscript{47} For example, a person who went to visit distant relatives in the village of Bohatyrivka near Zaporizhzhia settled there and brought over other members of the family. Having built a house, the family encouraged the neighbors from the place they had been deported together to join them and move to the area.

\textsuperscript{48} While conducting my interviews, I noticed that my informants tended to omit this period in their biographies and conceal their membership in the communist party.
By 1989, the Donetsk _oblast_ had become more Russian than Ukrainian, with most of its population originally coming from other regions of the country and from Russia [Eberhardt 1994: 271]. Statistical records indicate a considerable growth of the region between 1959 and 1989. In 1989, the Donetsk _oblast_ had the population of 5,311,300 and Zaporizhzhia – 2,074,000, which means that in the period of four decades they had grown by 1,049,733 and 610,169, respectively. As for the Poles, the records indicated their number at 6,897 (0.13%) in the Donetsk region, while the figure for the Zaporizhzhia _oblast_ was 2,512 (0.12%). Countrywide, the total Polish population fell from 295,100 in 1970, through 258,000 in 1979, to 219,200 in 1989. Detailed statistics for the Donetsk _oblast_ were published by the _Polacy Donbasu_ (_The Poles of the Donbas_) magazine:


(The history of Donbas Poles resembles the history of Poles living in other regions of the Soviet Union, with the only difference being that our compatriots were deported to live here in order to become assimilated ‘Soviet people.’ If the authorities were not successful in these attempts, Poles faced deportation to Siberia or Kazakhstan. According to the records of the 1989 census of population, the number of people with Polish ethnicity recorded in their [Soviet internal] passports was as follows: the Donetsk _oblast_: 6,897, Donetsk city: 1,724, Mariupol: 889, Makivka: 659, Jenakiiewe: 254, Kramatorsk: 226, Konstantynówka: 177, Siedłowo: 176, Szackirosk: 156, Słowiańsk: 154, Torez: 132, Sniżenne: 114, Marinka: 101, Wolnowa: 96, Telmanowe: 85, Artymowsk: 137, Dymytrov: 66, Starobieszewo: 63.)

I am convinced that these low figures stem from the fact that a number of respondents concealed their Polish background as they did not trust Soviet authorities.

However, it should be noticed that the recorded number of Poles slightly increased in the case of both _oblasts_. The pattern can be attributed to a number of reasons, such as migration within Ukraine, migration within the Soviet Union and, last but not least, a rising level of Polish national awareness on the eve of Ukrainian independence [Kuromiya 1998: 332].

After 1991, the independent Ukrainian state made it possible for national minorities to openly claim their rights and liberties and form their organizations.
The beginnings of the Polish movement go back to the late 1980s and early 1990s; it originated in Lviv and western Ukraine, followed by central and south-eastern regions of the country, with the number of organizations rapidly increasing. The first Polish organization in the Zaporizhzhia oblast was the Adam Mickiewicz Polish Cultural Association (Pol. Stowarzyszenie Kultury Polskiej im. Adama Mickiewicza) founded by Jerzy Rozenbaum. Polish associations in Ukraine, their legal status and people involved in the development of Polish culture are discussed in Chapter 2.

The first census in independent Ukraine was held in 2001. As it turned out, the population of the country decreased by 2,995,000, with the sharpest fall recorded for the Donbas, where the Donetsk oblast alone lost 97,000; the corresponding figure for the Zaporizhzhia oblast was 66,000 [Eberhardt 2003: 744–745].

In a bid to convince ethnic Poles to reveal their national identity in the census, all Polish organizations in Ukraine organized meetings of their members and prepared articles for the Polish press in Ukraine. For example, the Polacy Donbasu (The Poles of the Donbas) magazine published the following appeal:

Rodacy!
Od 5 grudnia na Ukrainie zostanie przeprowadzony spis ludności. Ukraina jest młodym, wolnym i demokratycznym państwem. Jesteśmy obywatelami tego kraju i ziemia ta jest nam również drogą, jak i Ukraińcom i ludziom innych narodowości zamieszkałym na niej.

Od tego, jaką przynależność zadeklarujemy, będzie zależała polityka narodowościowa państwa ukraińskiego dotycząca oświaty i kultury polskiej na Ukrainie.

Nie wstydźcie się, że większość z was nie mówi poprawną polszczyzną – w tym nie ma Waszej winy! Najważniejsze, że macie polskie serca!

Według wstępnych badań przeprowadzonych w Organizacjach Polonijnych i danych parafii katolickich jest nas około 2 milionów.

Dlatego podczas spisu ludności powiedz z dumą:
JESTEM POLAKIEM, OBYWATELEM UKRAINY

[Polacy 2001: 1]

(Compatriots!
5 December is the first day of the census of population. Ukraine is a young, free and democratic state. We are citizens of this country and this land is as dear to us as it is to Ukrainians and to other ethnic communities living here. The ethnic policy of the Ukrainian state towards Polish education and culture will depend on our declaration in the census. Do not be ashamed that most of you do not speak correct Polish – this is not your fault! You have Polish hearts and this is what matters! Polish organizations and [Roman] Catholic parishes estimate that there are as many as about two million of us.
This is why when asked in the census, say:
I AM A POLE AND I AM A UKRAINIAN CITIZEN)
In the Donetsk oblast, Polish identity was declared by 4,300 people (0.09%) and the figure for the Zaporizhzhia oblast was 1,800 (0.1%). Drawing on my studies and experience, I am convinced that a number of respondents concealed their Polish national identity and the actual total is higher than indicated in the 2001 census. The memory of Stalinist policy and the attendant fear of disclosing ethnic origin is still present today, particularly among the numerous members of the older generation, who experienced deportations and the rule of terror. The middle and younger generation, in turn, often do not give a thought to their ethnic background and frequently confuse national identity with citizenship. However, the introduction of the so-called Polish Card (Karta Polaka: a document issued by the Polish state, granting certain rights to persons of Polish descent who are citizens of the former Soviet republics) introduced in 2008 brought a revival of interest in Polish roots, with public and family archives being searched for proof of Polish ancestry.

It needs to be stressed that, in the European context, the death toll in Ukraine was exceedingly high. The principal factors involved were the Bolshevik revolution, three major outbreaks of famine, two World Wars, deportations and Stalinist terror [Eberhardt 1994: 184]. The twentieth century was particularly cruel to the territory under consideration in the present volume: while all those arriving in the region came in search of freedom, what they actually experienced was the rule of terror. The overall size of the Polish population in south-eastern Ukraine was also affected by the policy of Russification and natural demographic phenomena, such as mixed marriages.

Summing up the relatively short period of Polish presence in the region, it can be divided into the following stages:

- voluntary economic migration,
- coercive resettlement and deportation,
- migrations in the 1960s–1980s enforced by Soviet policy (military service, mandatory work placement on completion of studies),
- Polish national revival after 1991.

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49 Piotr Eberhardt writes:


(‘Traditionally, Polish had been the established language of Roman Catholic liturgy in Ukraine. However, the last decade saw an increasing process of its Ukrainization. This must have played a major role in the lives of Polish Catholics, who lost their last and only opportunity to maintain their contact with the language.’)

This is the case mainly in western Ukraine. On the other hand, in the eastern regions of the country, where Roman Catholic churches had been closed in the 1930s and the revival of the Church dates back only to the early 1990s, it is mainly Russian that is used as the language of liturgy. See other chapters of the present study for more details.

50 For a discussion of the historical context and sociological aspects of the Polish Card (Karta Polaka), see for example Bonusiak 2008.
As can be seen from the above account, Poles were not the native population of south-eastern Ukraine and neither did they form ethnic settlements. Therefore the Polish community cannot be said to have been deeply rooted in any particular area. After the Bolshevik revolution, the traces of their presence in the region were purposely obliterated. Eventually, there were no Polish organizations, and the repressions and deportations brought fear of disclosing the Polish background, much as in the case of the German and Jewish minority.

The revival of national minorities was possible after 1991, which is when Poles began to form their associations and started to learn Polish. Unfortunately, the gradual departure of the older generation means also the demise of the Polish borderland dialect as a living speech.
Following the political changes of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Ukraine developed its own institutions and legislation on national, ethnic and religious minority issues, including the question of minority languages used in the country. Soviet authorities had not been entirely successful in developing a common Soviet identity among the Ukrainians and the country’s independence brought a change of policy towards national minorities. As a result, the people of Ukraine were free to search for their own identity and take action to shape the legal framework to ensure its protection.

Despite the efforts of Ukrainian authorities, legal regulations concerning national minorities still do not match European standards. Minority legislation has a number of loopholes (particularly in the case of the Law on Languages in Ukraine) and practice shows that, owing to the inconsistencies of regulations, it is not always implemented. Another factor at play is the attitude of the state and local administration towards a particular minority. In general, it is the implementation of law rather than the law-making process itself that is a problem in Ukraine; for example, the Executive Order of the President of Ukraine on the Restitution of Religious Property to Religious Organizations (Ukr. Розпорядження Президента України «Про повернення релігійним організаціям культового майна», Rozporiadzhennia Prezydenta Ukrainy ‘Pro povernennia relihiĭnym orhanizatsiam kul’tovoho maina’) has been implemented only in some regions of the country.

In the course of more than two decades of independence, Ukraine has seen different political options in power. The Orange Revolution proved that Ukrainian citizens of different ethnic backgrounds, including Poles, are ready to stand up for their rights and interests.

At an early stage of the Polish revival in Ukraine, Polish associations faced a number of formal problems created by public administration officials, an experience typically shared also by the emergent organizations of other minorities.
Often, members of such organizations became friends and provided mutual support in pursuing their activity.

Poles living in Ukraine receive important support from the Polish state across the border; there are bilateral agreements concerning minority issues between the two countries, which are implemented to a greater or lesser extent. Although Polish associations generally faced considerable difficulties in their formative period, their activity has been effective, as can be seen from their fifteenth or twentieth anniversary celebrations.

In the present work, I do not analyze all the laws, decrees and executive orders concerning national minority issues. Rather, I focus only on the most important ones, which have an influence on the scope and functions of minority languages, in order to provide the context for a further discussion of linguistic problems. In the subsequent sub-chapters, I describe the principles underlying Ukrainian ethnic policy and present selected examples of how Poles in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts function in the current legal framework. While each of the problems I mention and the places where I conducted my research could be described in more detail, for reasons of space, I limit my discussion to the examples I consider most illustrative.¹

2.1. The Legal Status of the Polish Minority in Ukraine

The rights of national minorities in Ukraine are governed by Ukrainian law. The key document providing the general framework in this respect is the Constitution of Ukraine (enacted in June 1996), while more specific regulations are to be found in a number of acts and orders introduced after 1990. The Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine (Ukr. Декларація прав національностей України, Deklaratsiia prav natsional’nostei Ukraïny)² adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament (Ukr. Верховна Рада, Verkhovna Rada) on 1 November 1991 proclaims that:

Українська держава гарантує всім народам, національним групам, громадянам, які проживають на її території, рівні політичні, економічні, соціальні та культурні права (Стаття 1) [Deklaratsiia prav 1991].

(The Ukrainian state guarantees equal political, economic, social and cultural rights to all the nations, ethnic groups and citizens living on its territory (Article 1).)

Article 6 of the Declaration states:

Українська держава гарантує всім національностям право створювати свої культурні центри, товариства, земляцтва, об’єднання [Deklaratsiia prav 1991].

¹ For more on the legal situation of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, see Jabłoński (ed.) 2000.
The Ukrainian state guarantees to all nationalities the right to establish cultural centers, societies, landsman associations [zemliatstva], unions.

Another document concerning the issue is the Law on National Minorities in Ukraine (Ukr. Закон України «Про національні меншини в Україні», Zakon України ‘Pro natsional’ni menshyny v Україні,’ 25 June 1992),³ where article 3 defines national minorities as those citizens of Ukraine who are not ethnic Ukrainians, but who display a sense of national self-identification and unity among themselves [Jabłoński (ed.) 2000: 21].

Article 5 makes provisions for standing committees on national minorities in the Verkhovna Rada and, if the need arises, in the local councils; the central executive organ of the state in the field of relations among the nationalities of Ukraine is the Ministry for Nationality Affairs of Ukraine,⁴ with the Council of Representatives for Public Associations of National Minorities of Ukraine as its consultative body.

Article 6 provides as follows:

The state guarantees to all national minorities the rights to national-cultural autonomy: the using and learning of their native languages and the using and learning of their native languages in state educational establishments or at national-cultural societies; development of national-cultural traditions, use of national symbols, celebration of their national holidays, practice of their religions, satisfying their needs for literature, art, mass media, establishing their national-cultural and educational institutions and engaging in any activity that does not contradict legislation in force. The historical and cultural heritage of national minorities on the territory of Ukraine is protected by law [Law on National Minorities 1992].

Associations of citizens, including organizations of ethnic Poles, function on the basis of the Law on Civic Associations (Ukr. Закон України «Про об’єднання громадян», Zakon України ‘Pro ob’iednannia hromadian,’ 16 June 1992)⁵ containing thirty-four articles in six chapters. According to Article 3:

A civic organization is an association of citizens, founded to satisfy and to protect their legitimate social, economic, creative, age, national, cultural, sports and other common interests [Law on Civic Associations 1992].


⁴ Reorganized as the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, which was abolished by the Presidential Decree of 15 December 1999; its functions were taken over by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Culture.

The legal status of civic associations and the principles of pursuing their activity are defined in the second chapter, where Article 9 provides as follows:

Civic associations are founded and act, having all-Ukrainian, local, or international status.
All-Ukrainian civic associations are associations whose activities extend to the whole territory of Ukraine and which have local centers in the majority of its regions (oblasts).
Local associations are associations whose activities extend to the territory of a corresponding administrative-and-territorial unit or region.
A civic association itself determines the territory of its activities.
A civic organization has an international status if its activities extend to the territory of Ukraine and at least one other state [...] [Law on Civic Associations 1992].

Today, Polish minority associations have two umbrella organizations whose tradition goes back over two decades. Poles in Ukraine began to organize themselves and form their associations immediately after the perestroika. Among the first ones was the Polish Cultural and Educational Association in Ukraine (Pol. Polskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalno-Oświatowe na Ukrainie), established in the second half of 1988 in Kiev on the initiative of Polish activists from Zhytomyr, Lviv, Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi [Jabłoński 2004: 16], who received support from Polish citizens working in Kiev at the time, including Jerzy Szymaniski from Warsaw. Stanisław Szalałcki, who played an important role in the organizational effort, became the chairman and a figure bringing together the most courageous Polish activists from the country.6 The executive committee and members of the organization set the tone and pace of Polish activity in Ukraine. The First Congress of Poles in Ukraine, held in May 1990 in Kiev, was attended by as many as about five hundred people, including participants from Poland interested in the situation of their compatriots in the East [Kupczak 1992: 251–262].7

After two years, in view of the expanding scope of activity, the Second Congress of Poles decided to reorganize the Polish Cultural and Educational Association in Ukraine into an independent Union of Poles in Ukraine (Pol. Związek Polaków na Ukrainie, ZPU).8 Regrettably, early during the Congress, a number of delegates discontented with the current running of the organization formed an opposition group disturbing the proceedings. In December 1992, Stanisław Szalałcki resigned as the chairman and Stanisław Kostecki

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6 For more on Stanisław Szalałcki, see Ustrzycki 2004: 212–215.
7 Janusz Kupczak gives a detailed account of the early days of the Union of Poles in Ukraine, describes the activity of the Polish movement since the 1940s, and encloses the following documents in the appendix: the Appeal of the First Congress of Poles in Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (May 1990), the Resolution of the First Congress of Poles in Ukraine (selected fragments, May 1990) [Kupczak 1992: 260–262].
8 For a detailed account of the foundation and activity of the Union of Poles in Ukraine, see Kościuk-Kułgawczyk 2004.
was elected to the office, which he held until December 2011, when he was succeeded by Antoni Stefanowicz.

Towards the end of 1991, opponents of the Union of Poles in Ukraine assembled in Lviv to establish the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine (Pol. *Federacja Organizacji Polskich na Ukrainie*, FOPU), registered in July 1992. Emilia Chmielowa was elected as the chairperson and has held the function until today (2012). It was a difficult period not only for the young Ukrainian state, but also for the Polish movement.

Stosunki pomiędzy Związkem Polaków na Ukrainie a Federacją Organizacji Polskich na Ukrainie od samego początku, wbrew szczytnym hasłom, nie układały się dobrze. Przede wszystkim brakowało pomiędzy nimi codziennej łączności i koordynacji działań. Przeciągano nawzajem w swe szeregi poszczególnych działaczy i całe ich grupy (w szczególności celowała w tym Federacja) [Jabłoński 2004: 25].

(Whatever the lofty slogans, relations between the Union of Poles in Ukraine and the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine were strained right from the very beginning. The main problem was a lack of contact and coordination between them on a daily basis. Both individual activists and entire groups were being persuaded to change their affiliation (particularly by the Federation.))

Personal rivalry and ambition of their chairpersons have resulted in a prolonged split and animosity within the Polish movement. There is also an element of rivalry for funds from institutional sources in Poland to finance their statutory activity. This situation has a negative impact on relations with Ukrainian authorities. In addition, there is no loud and clear voice to represent the interests of the Polish minority in the country [Baluk 2002: 229].

Conflicts between the two organizational centers have also directly influenced the activity of their local branches. Since it is not my role to make any judgment on the conflict, I will keep to the main focus of the present study and present the origins and activity of Polish organizations in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. A number of them are independent local associations which are not affiliated with any all-Ukrainian Polish umbrella organization.

All associations, including Polish ones, operate on the basis of the Law on Civic Associations (16 June 1992), where Chapter Three specifies the procedures for the formation and termination of such organizations. It also contains regulations concerning founders, membership and the statute (constitution), which has to be drafted in Ukrainian and is subject to mandatory registration with the local authorities. An example of such a document is enclosed in the Appendix [see Document 7: The Statute (constitution) of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’].

Polish associations in south-eastern Ukraine (see Table 2.1) are mostly cultural and educational in character. Owing to changes in legislation, they had to complete the registration procedure more than once (or, in some cases,
even a number of times). The level of intensity and the scope of their activity vary and generally depend on the involvement of their chairpersons and executive committees rather than their affiliation with the Union of Poles in Ukraine (ZPU) or the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine (FOPU).

Table 2.1. Polish associations in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (2011)\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/town</th>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>ZPU or FOPU</th>
<th>Registration date*</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo 'Odrodzenie'</td>
<td>FOPU</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>Lech Aleksy Suchomłynow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Polish Cultural and Educational Society 'Revival')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Towarzystwo Polaków Doniecka</td>
<td>ZPU</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Anatol Terlecki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Polish Society in Donetsk)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kramatorsk</td>
<td>Stowarzyszenie Kultury Polskiej Miasta Kramatorsk</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Wiktoria Skiarowa(^10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Kramatorsk City Polish Cultural Association)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makiivka</td>
<td>Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej 'Polonia'</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Leonid Erdman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Polish Cultural Society 'Polonia')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serhiivka Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Leonid Erdman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>Polsko-Ukraїskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalne</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Andrzej Iwaszko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol</td>
<td>Melitopolskie Ukraїnsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Kulturalno-Oświatowe 'Polonia'</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Aleksander Nikitin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Melitopol Ukrainian-Polish Cultural and Educational Society 'Polonia')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Adam Mickiewicz Polish Cultural Association)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>Związek Polaków 'Polonia'</td>
<td>ZPU</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Lidia Jegorowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Polish Union 'Polonia')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>Towarzystwo Języka i Kultury Polskiej</td>
<td>FOPU</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ołena Lytowka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Polish Language and Culture Society)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu (TKPD)</td>
<td>FOPU</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Walentyna Staruszko(^11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas) (branches below)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) Data provided by the chairpersons of the organizations.
\(^10\) Chairperson until 2010.
\(^11\) Chairman until February 2008: Ryszard Zieliński.
The Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu) is an important organization with local branches in different parts of the region. Chairman Ryszard Zieliński made the following comments about their local rival, the Polish Society in Donetsk (Pol. Towarzystwo Polaków Doniecka):

*Bardzo pragnę, aby nastąpiło zjednoczenie Polaków tutaj, w Donbasie. Prezes Terlecki początkowo należał do naszego stowarzyszenia, ale pochodzi z Chmielnickiego, podobnie jak Stanisław Kostecki, dlatego zarejestrował inne stowarzyszenie. Moim marzeniem jest, abyśmy应该工作 together: I made him an offer to be- come our vice-chairman, but he refused. We could organize all the larger projects together. My point is not only that Poles here should be united, but also that we should not disturb each other’s activity."

(I would really like to see Poles around here, in the Donbas, united. Chairman Terlecki was initially a member of our organization, but he is originally from Chmielnicki [Ukr. Khmelnytskyi], just like Stanisław Kostecki, and this is why he registered a different association. My dream is that we should work together: I made him an offer to become our vice-chairman, but he refused. We could organize all the larger projects together. My point is not only that Poles here should be united, but also that we should not disturb each other’s activity.)

Writing on the split between Polish organizations in Donetsk, Ryszard Zieliński comments:

*Bardzo pragnąłbym, żeby ból rozłamów w ruchu polonijnym Ukrainy został prawidłowo zrozumiany przez naszych rodaków działających pięknie w niektórych*
regionach, zrzeszonych w ZPU, gdyż nie wiedzą, co wyrabia ich szanowny prezes wraz ze swym Zarządem. Tym, którzy rąwią się do Kijowa, żeby kierować diasporą polską na Ukrainie ze stolicy, można podać wiele przykładów, jak np. piękną diasporę Greków na Ukrainie. [...] My wszyscy widzimy i rozumiemy, że dla Polaków był i będzie takim miastem Lwów [Zieliński 2002a: 4].

(I really do wish that our compatriots affiliated with the ZPU who are doing fantastic work in some regions would understand the reasons behind the painful divisions within the Polish movement in Ukraine. They are obviously not aware of the kind of activity their chairman and his executive committee are pursuing. Those who cannot wait to move the center of the Polish diaspora to Kiev, so that they can preside over it from the capital, should consider such examples as the successful Greek community in Ukraine. [...] We all know and understand that it is Lwów [Ukr. Lviv] that has always been and will always remain the center of the Polish diaspora.)

Divisions within the Polish movement in Ukraine, which go back to the early 1990s, have resulted in a lasting split between Polish organizations in the whole country. Still, knowing the mentality of Poles living on the Left Bank, and having conducted a great number of interviews there, I find it a positive phenomenon that new organizations are being established to pursue their goals. Considering that democratic Ukraine sets no limits to the number of associations, and in 2001 over four thousand people in the Donetsk oblast declared their Polish identity (the figure clearly being underestimated), it is certain that each new organization will find its niche to pursue its statutory aims and objectives.

For example, although there are three Polish organizations in the Zaporizhzhia oblast, their activists still have not reached a number of locations which have a Polish minority. Out there, there are still Poles left to fend for themselves, like the people of Bohatyrivka near Zaporizhzhia, who talked about themselves as Poles who ‘don’t have any state at all.’

Nikomu nie jesteśmy potrzebni. Wywieźli nas z Żytomierskiej oblasti do Kazachstanu. Tam nas nikt nie traktował dobrze, ruscy nad nami znuszczali się, potem Kazachi też, obywali nas i dawali nam ciężkie roboty nawet już po Stalinie. No my pomołu przyjechali do Bogatyriwki, jest nas cała ulica, ściągali jeden drugiego i pomagali my tak sobie jak w Kazachstanie. Tam w Kazachstanie nam mówili: Wy Polaki, idźcie sobie do Polski! Nu, a jak my sobie pójdziemy do Polski, jak granice. Teraz na Ukrainie nikt nami się nie interesuje, bo też mówią, że wy Polaki, to co wy chcecie od nas. A Polska nas nie chce i nikt z Polski nami się nie interesuje. Jedynie to, co mamy księdza Pawła z Polski, i on jest z nami. A tak to my nie mamy nikakiego państwa, bo my Polaki i tak umrzemy bez tego państwa [Bohatyrivka 2007: interview].

(No one needs us. We were taken away from the Żytomierz [Ukr. Zhytomyr] oblast to Kazakhstan. There, we were treated badly by everyone: Ruscy [Russkis, the Russians, derogatory] bullied us, and later the Kazakhs weren’t any better; we were insulted and given hard work, even after Stalin. Then, we slowly came to Bogatyriwka [Ukr: Bohatyriwka]; there’s a whole street of us here; one helped the other to come over and we
helped one another here, like in Kazakhstan. There, in Kazakhstan, they used to say to us: ‘You Poles, go away to Poland!’ But how could we go away to Poland with all the borders? Now, in Ukraine, no one cares; they also say ‘You’re Poles, so what do you want from us?’ And Poland doesn’t want us either and no one from Poland cares. The one thing is that we’ve got Father Paweł from Poland and he’s with us. This way, we don’t have any state at all; we, Poles, we’ll die without one, anyway.)

In the course of my interviews with the chairpersons of Polish associations, I was told that they established their societies so that every member would be involved in fostering Polish culture through creating community spirit (aby każdy członek mógł krzewić kulturę polską poprzez poczucie wspólnoty) [Berdiansk 2007: survey12].

(I think the Polish association in the Donbas is really important. There are many people of Polish origin living here: descendants of Polish deportees to the Donbas who had been involved in Polish patriotic movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, skilled industrial workers, founders of steelworks and branches of engineering companies from Poland, Poles from western Ukraine (Polish borderlands) who came here in the twentieth century in search of employment. Today, the descendants of these people live here dispersed and the Polish association makes it possible for them to have some contact with the others, to keep their Polish identity and a sense of bond with Poland.)

In order to illustrate the activity of Polish associations, I enclose the list of aims and objectives of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society (Pol. Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo) in Berdiansk, which includes such elements as:13

– preserving Polish national identity,
– representing the interests of the Polish community in contacts with Ukrainian and Polish authorities,
– inspiring, coordinating, and engaging in wide-ranging cooperation with the Polish community in Ukraine, Poland and around the world,
– fostering the process of bringing the Polish and Ukrainian nations closer together,
– proliferating knowledge about Polish history, culture and life in the country today,

12 Surveys conducted by the author of the present study in September and October 2007.
- developing cultural activity, fostering the Polish language, Polish customs and traditions,
- upholding the good name of Poland and Poles.

Założyliśmy Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu celem odrodzenia kultury polskiej w rodzinach pochodzenia polskiego, odrodzenia języka naszych rodziców i przodków, wiary katolickiej. Zamierzaliśmy zapoznać przede wszystkim dzieci i młodzież pochodzenia polskiego z ojczystym krajem ich przodków, ale także - zapoznać ludność naszego regionu z bogatą i piękną kulturą polską, sprzyjać rozwijaniu współpracy między Donbasem i regionami w Polsce, tworzyć pozytywny wizerunek Polski i Polaków na wschodzie Ukrainy. Bardzo ważnym celem zostaje zawsze współpraca z kościołem, szkolenie języka polskiego, pomoc osobom starszym i samotnym [Donetsk 2007: survey].

(We established the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas [Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu] with the intention of reviving Polish culture in the families of Polish descent, and of reviving the language of our parents and ancestors, as well as the Catholic faith. Our plan was that the children and young people of Polish descent would get to know the country of their ancestors. On the other hand, we also wanted to share the richness and beauty of Polish culture with the people of our region, to foster cooperation between the Donbas and different regions in Poland, and to create a positive image of Poles and Poland in eastern Ukraine. Our crucial aims include cooperation with the Church, teaching Polish, providing support to the elderly and the lonely.)

The activities of Polish organizations are mainly focused on organizing Polish language courses, cultural and educational events, running folk dance and song groups, organizing educational visits to Poland (language courses for the younger generation, summer camps for children), restitution of, or setting up, Polish Roman Catholic parishes, cooperating with non-governmental organizations in Poland, securing funding for their activity, providing support to the elderly and the veterans, and preparing documents required for obtaining the Polish Card (Pol. Karta Polaka).

It is important to notice that the chairpersons or founders of Polish associations in the two oblasts include people born in such places as Lviv, Sudova Vyshnia, Horodok (western Ukraine) and even Piotrków Trybunalski in Poland. They had previous knowledge of the Polish language and a strongly consolidated Polish identity, coupled with models from their original region on which they could rely.

Ukrainian regulations do not limit the number of ethnic organizations in one location. For example, the population of Melitopol (160,352) is composed of about thirty ethnic communities, with eighteen ethnic cultural associations registered in the city alone (see Appendix, Document 8, A list of ethnic cultural associations registered in the city of Melitopol). Although a growing number of such associations is a sign of democracy, their unification and cooperation would bring better results and enable them to exert more effective influence
on Ukrainian authorities. As it is, administration officials often ignore the demands of Polish organizations; their excuse is that Poles themselves cannot live in peace with one another.

2.2. Legal Regulations Concerning Education and Polish Language Teaching

Article 53 of the Ukrainian Constitution (Українська Конституція, Konstytutsiia Ukrainy, 1996)\(^{14}\) provides:

Everyone has the right to education.
Complete general secondary education is compulsory.
The State ensures accessible and free pre-school, complete general secondary, vocational and higher education in state and communal educational establishments; the development of pre-school, complete general secondary, extra-curricular, vocational, higher and post-graduate education, various forms of instruction; the provision of state scholarships and privileges to pupils and students.
Citizens have the right to obtain free higher education in state and communal educational establishments on a competitive basis.
Citizens who belong to national minorities are guaranteed in accordance with the law the right to receive instruction in their native language, or to study their native language in state and communal educational establishments and through national cultural societies [Constitution 1996].

These constitutional principles were implemented in parliamentary legislation, including the Law of Ukraine on Education (Український Закон Про освіту, 1991),\(^{15}\) the Law on Pre-school Education (Український Закон Про дошкільну освіту, 2001), the Law on General Secondary Education (Український Закон Про загальну середню освіту, 1999), the Law on Out-of-school Education (Український Закон Про позашкільну освіту, 1998), and the Law on Higher Education (Український Закон Про вищу освіту, 2002).

The introductory section of the Law of Ukraine on Education (1991 with later amendments) includes the main aims and objectives of the educational policy of the state and the principles of the reforms of the educational system:


Education is the basis of the intellectual, cultural, spiritual, social, economic development of the society and state. The goal of education is the comprehensive development of an individual as a person and as the highest value of society, developing his/her talents and mental and physical abilities, instilling high moral qualities, educating citizens able to make a deliberate choice, and thus enriching the intellectual, artistic and cultural potential of the people, improving the educational level of the people, and providing the national economy with qualified specialists.

Education in Ukraine shall be grounded on the principles of humanism, democracy, national consciousness, mutual respect among nations and nationalities [Law on Education 1991].

The right of Ukrainian citizens to education is guaranteed in Article 3, providing that they shall have the right to free education in all public educational institutions regardless of their gender, race, nationality, social and economic status, type and nature of their activities, world views, membership in political parties, attitude towards religion, religious conscience, state of health, place of residence and other circumstances [...] [Law on Education 1991].

The principles of the use of language in the educational system are specified in the Ukrainian constitution and the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Закон Української Радянської Соціалістичної Республіки «Про мови в Українській РСР» (Zakon Ukraїns’koї Radians’koї Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky 'Pro movy v Ukraїns’kiй RSR,' 28 October 1989, amended 28 February 1995),16 which declares that Ukraine acknowledges the vital and societal value of all national languages and guarantees the national cultural and linguistic rights to its citizens without reservation, assuming that only the free development and equal standing of national languages, the high linguistic culture are the basis of the mutual spiritual understanding, reciprocal cultural enrichment and strengthening of the friendship between people [...] [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

Article 2 states:

According to the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian language is the state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic shall ensure the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life [...] [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

Article 3 provides:

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic shall create the conditions required for the development and use of languages of other nations in the Republic. The national languages may be used together with the Ukrainian language in activities of the state, party, public bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations located in places of residence of the majority of citizens of other nationalities (towns, districts, village and settlement councils, villages).

If the citizens of another nationality constituting the majority of the population of the said administrative and territorial units or populated areas are not sufficiently fluent in the national language or if several nationalities reside within boundaries of such administrative and territorial units or populated areas and none of such nationalities forms the majority of the population of the locality in question, the Ukrainian language or the language acceptable for the whole population may be used in the work of the said bodies and organizations [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

According to Article 5, Ukrainian citizens shall have the guaranteed right to use their national or any other languages. A citizen shall be entitled to address the state, party, public bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations in Ukrainian or another language of their work, in Russian or in a language acceptable for the parties [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

The Law includes also provisions for the protection of

the stock and monuments of the Ukrainian language and other national languages in scientific research institutions, archives, libraries, museums, as well as their protection and use (Article 7) [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

According to Article 11,

The Ukrainian language shall be the language of activities, records and documents, as well as the relations of the state, party, public bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In cases covered by part two of Article 3 hereof, a national language of the majority of the population of a certain area or, in cases covered by part three of the said Article, a language acceptable for the population of such area may be the language of activities, records and documentation together with the Ukrainian language [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

As specified in Article 25 of the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the state shall guarantee the right of each child to upbringing and education in the national language. This right is protected by the establishment of a network of pre-school
establishments and schools with upbringing and teaching in the Ukrainian and other national languages [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

What is more, Article 27 provides that

the educational and upbringing work in the general education schools shall be conducted in Ukrainian.
In places of the compact residence of citizens of other nationalities, the general education schools may be set up with education and upbringing to be conducted in their national or another language.
In cases covered by part three of Article 3 hereof, schools may be set up with the language of education and upbringing to be jointly chosen by parents of schoolchildren.
In general education schools, separate classes may be set up with education and upbringing to be conducted in the Ukrainian language or the language of the population of another nationality respectively [...] [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

In addition, the Law makes provisions regarding transcription of names, and states that the citizens ‘shall enjoy the right to be named according to the national traditions’ (Article 39) [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Languages 1989].

The question of teaching in minority languages, including Polish, was regulated by the Ministry of Education. However, regional and local educational authorities, headmasters of secondary schools, parents and social organizations sent their complaints about the cases of liquidation of classes and groups with minority languages as the language of instruction on the grounds of raising the minimum number of pupils required to form them.

Polish educational centers have operated ever since the independence of Ukraine. Following the political changes in the country in the post-1989 period, Polish associations began to organize courses of Polish. There is also an official agreement between the Polish Ministry of Higher Education and its Ukrainian counterpart on sending teachers of Polish from Poland to work in Ukraine.17 The number of Polish teachers working in Ukraine was as follows: 1993/1994: 28, 1999/2000: 37, 2000/2001: 42, 2001/2002: 44, 2002/2003: 40, 2003/2004: 39. In 2003/2004, Polish was taught in thirty-two locations and the total number of students was 3,991 [Staroń 2004: 383].18

In the area which is the focus of the present study the Polish language is taught in:19

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17 I consider only the area of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, which are the focus of the present study; for information on Polish language teaching in Ukraine, see for example Borzęcki 2000; Staroń 2001, 2004.
18 The figure does not include students at higher educational institutions and children taught by teachers who are Ukrainian citizens.
19 For an extensive presentation of the forms of Polish language teaching in Bukovina, a discussion of functions of the Polish language in various spheres of life, and maps showing locations of villages where children and teenagers are taught Polish in the region, see Krasowska 2006.
- institutions of higher education
  - as a compulsory subject
  - as an optional (foreign language) course
  - as an extended language course, along with other subjects taught in Polish
- eleven-year general secondary schools (Ukrainian or Russian)
  - as a compulsory subject
  - as an optional course
  - as a foreign language
- the so-called Saturday and Sunday schools for children, teenagers and adults
- courses run by cultural and educational associations
- Roman Catholic parishes
- other forms, such as:
  - Polish for children in foster care institutions
  - Polish for homeless children.

It is not only people of Polish descent who take an interest in Polish culture and learn the language, but also Russians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and members of other ethnic communities in the country. What greatly helps to promote Polish culture and language is the involvement of organizations based in Poland, which organize Polish courses in Poland for children, teenagers and teachers from Ukraine. In this context, it is important to mention the activity of such organizations as the Polish Community Association (Pol. Stowarzyszenie ‘Wspólnota Polska’) and the Foundation for Aid to Poles in the East (Pol. Fundacja ‘Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie’), as well as the Polish Consulate in Kharkiv.

Apart from teaching the language itself, teachers of Polish are also engaged in other activity, including such elements as:
- preparing students for school competitions,
- preparing secondary school students to study in Poland,
- teaching folk dance and songs,
- editing newspapers, preparing radio and television programs,
- organizing patriotic events.

Teachers of Polish help children and teenagers to develop their interests and to find their place in society and the local community. They often send applications for financial assistance from non-governmental organizations in Poland and deal with the accounts. As such, they do their best to raise the level of Polish language and culture in their local communities.

Officially registered organizations of the Polish minority include the Union of Polish Teachers in Ukraine (Pol. Zjednoczenie Nauczycieli Polskich na Ukrainie, ZNPU) and the Association of Polish Academics in Ukraine (Pol. Stowarzyszenie Uczonych Polskich na Ukrainie, SUPU), which play an important role in the

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20 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a document called the Government program for cooperation with Polonia [Polish pre-1989 emigration, mainly to Western Europe and North America] and Poles abroad (Rządowy program współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą, Warszawa 2002, 19 pp.).
### Table 2.2. Teaching of Polish in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Teacher from Ukraine (UA) from Poland (PL)</th>
<th>Number of groups</th>
<th>Number of students in 2011/12</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions of higher education</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Berdiansk University of Business and Management</td>
<td>Lech Suchomłynow (UA) Olga Popowa (UA) Piotr Sihieda (UA)</td>
<td>2 2 2</td>
<td>150 150 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Donetsk University of Management</td>
<td>Walentyna Staruszko (UA)</td>
<td>3 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Donetsk Technical University</td>
<td>Beata Gawlik (PL)</td>
<td>5 ca 200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Donetsk National University</td>
<td>Aleksander Makiejew (UA) Inesa Korecka (UA) Walentyna Staruszko (UA) Ludmila Michnina (UA)</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
<td>ca 50 1 1 1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Donetsk National Medical University</td>
<td>Roza Berdychanowa (UA)</td>
<td>1 14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Gorkii Palace of Culture</td>
<td>Beata Gawlik (PL)</td>
<td>1 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>Azov State Technical University</td>
<td>Andrzej Iwaszko (UA)</td>
<td>9 122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Mariupol University of Humanities</td>
<td>Aneta Pawłowicz (PL)</td>
<td>8 90</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol</td>
<td>Khmelnytskyl State Pedagogical University</td>
<td>Irena Okopna (UA)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
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<td>Olga Pawluk (UA)</td>
<td>2 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>University of Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>Igor Lipkiewicz (UA)</td>
<td>5 70</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>784</td>
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<td><strong>Secondary schools</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Secondary School no. 15, Polish as a foreign language</td>
<td>Teresa Krasnokucka (UA) Irena Wysocka (UA)</td>
<td>2 22</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>35 35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Lyceum no. 71</td>
<td>Beata Gawlik (PL)</td>
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<td>25 25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Lyceum</td>
<td>Konstanty Czerech (UA)</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>25 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kramatorsk</td>
<td>Secondary school (Polish language club)</td>
<td>Different teachers</td>
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<td>20 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makiivka</td>
<td>Secondary School no. 16</td>
<td>Irena Erdman (UA)</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>30 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makiivka</td>
<td>Secondary School no. 93</td>
<td>Irena Erdman (UA)</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>30 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>Secondary School no. 65</td>
<td>Helena Jegorowa (UA)</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>19 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Teacher from Ukraine (UA)</td>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>Number of students in 2011/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Saturday and Sunday schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>St Jadwiga’s School</td>
<td>Tatiana Gubienko (UA)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Polish for teenagers</td>
<td>Olga Popowa (UA)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ca 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Polish for children</td>
<td>Inna Babenko (UA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Makiivka</td>
<td>Polish for children</td>
<td>Ludmila Winnicka (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>School no. 37</td>
<td>Irena Erdman (UA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>Saturday school</td>
<td>Maria Drąg (PL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polish for children</td>
<td>Helena Jegorowa (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polish for beginners</td>
<td>Helena Iwaszko (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polish Card exam course</td>
<td>Andrzej Iwaszko (UA)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meltopol</td>
<td>Polish language course</td>
<td>Irena Okopna (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>‘Lech’ Sunday school</td>
<td>Igor Lipkiewicz (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Olga Pawluk (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Polish for beginners</td>
<td>Beata Gawlik (PL)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ca 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polish (advanced)</td>
<td>Beata Gawlik (PL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horlivka</td>
<td>Polish for children and teenagers</td>
<td>Andrzej Wejnbergs (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kramatorsk</td>
<td>Polish for children and teenagers</td>
<td>Different teachers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makiivka</td>
<td>Polish for children and teenagers</td>
<td>Ludmila Winnicka (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meltopol</td>
<td>Polish for adults</td>
<td>Rev. Adam Gąsior (PL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Foster care institution</td>
<td>Teresa Krasnokucka (UA)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ca 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>Senior citizens club</td>
<td>Olga Pawluk (UA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

The ZNPU publishes the *Głos Nauczyciela (The Teacher’s Voice)*, a newsletter providing methodological support for teachers. The periodical offers information about Poland and about the life and work of teachers of Polish in different parts of Ukraine, tips on linguistic problems, information about poetry interpretation contests and other events, Polish language and literature teaching programs for different types of educational establishments, and information about changes in official regulations relating to national minorities. In this way, teachers working in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions have access to information concerning their professional field and can share their views on the effective teaching of Polish; (see Appendix, Document 9: The front page of an issue of the *Głos Nauczyciela*).

The Association of Polish Academics in Ukraine includes people who are professionally involved with different cultural and academic institutions [Stawska 2004: 353–356]. The organization is based in Kiev and has branches in different regions of the country, including the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The aims and objectives of the association are focused on fostering cooperation between Ukrainian and Polish academic institutions, organizing centers of Polish language and culture, teaching and promotion of Polish language and culture, promoting Poland in Ukraine, organizing conferences, seminars and debates, preparing academic projects, conducting research concerning the Polish community, representing the Ukrainian Polish community in Poland.

For example, the official inauguration of the academic year in the Berdiansk University of Business and Management in September 2006 included the opening of the Center of Polish Language and Culture, financed by the Senate (the upper chamber of Polish parliament) and the Foundation for Aid to Poles in the East. It is a research and teaching center pursuing a broad range of activity directed mainly at the local Polish community, but targeting also students of other ethnic backgrounds. The center is the editor of *Rosyjsko–polsko–ukraiński słownik leksyki biznesu* (*A Russian–Polish–Ukrainian dictionary of business vocabulary*) for the Russian-speaking community, and, in cooperation with Polish academics, *Podręcznik socjolingwistyki dla studentów* (*A coursebook of sociolinguistics for students*). In recent years, institutions of higher education in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions have hosted academic conferences on borderland issues, ethnic communities and homelands, with their proceedings held in Polish. It is also worth mentioning that since 2000 the Berdiansk University of Business and Management has organized open lectures under the title ‘Ukraine on the Path to the European Union,’ and a series of conferences entitled ‘Current Issues in Slavic Philology,’ with considerable attention devoted to Polish studies. In Mariupol, the fifth conference in a series called ‘Poland and Poles in the Research of Young Scholars’ was held in June 2010 (see Appendix, Document 10: Call for papers: Poland and Poles in the research of young scholars, an international conference, Mariupol, 2010).
There is an increasing interest in learning Polish in south-eastern Ukraine, particularly among members of the younger generation, who often perceive it in terms of an asset which will enable them to study in Poland. The same is true for Polish history, literature and culture. Until recently, the overall picture was characterized as follows: ‘[t]he further east, the less command of Polish and less access to information about Poland’ (‘Im dalej na wschód, tym znajomość języka polskiego jest mniejsza, a dostępność wiedzy o Polsce trudniejsza’) [Jabłoński 2002: 12], However, the activity of Polish cultural associations coupled with easier access to the Polish mass media and the Internet have certainly improved the situation.

2.3. The Legal Framework of Cultural Activity

Ukraine is a multicultural state, with each ethnic and national minority making a contribution to the cultural richness of the country in such fields as theater, cinema, the arts and folklore. The Law on Fundamentals of the Ukrainian Legislation on Culture (Основи законодавства України «Про культуру», Osnovy zakonodavstva Ukraїny 'Pro kul'turu,' 14 February 1992)\(^{21}\) declares the principles of cultural policy:

Держава у пріоритетному порядку створює умови для: розвитку культури української нації та культур національних меншин (Стаття 3) [Osnovy 1992].

(The state prioritizes the creation of conditions for: the development of the culture of the Ukrainian nation as well as the cultures of national minorities (Article 3).)

Each national minority has the right to express, present and promote its cultural heritage.

Громадяни у сфері культури мають право на: свободу творчості; […] об’єднання у творчі спілки, національно-культурні товариства, фонди, асоціації, інші громадські об’єднання, які діють у сфері культури; збереження і розвиток національно-культурної самобутності, народних традицій та звичаїв (Стаття 5) [Osnovy 1992].

(In the sphere of culture, citizens have the right: to freedom of expression; […] to form artistic partnerships, national and cultural societies, foundations, associations and other civic organizations active in the sphere of culture; to preserve and develop their national and cultural identity, traditions and customs (Article 5).)

The provision stresses the fact that national minorities have the right to present their culture in their own languages.

Article 8 states as follows:

(The state provides conditions for the development of culture of citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities and fosters their involvement in the collective process of creation of cultural values. Citizens of any nationality have the right to: preserve, develop and promote their culture, language, traditions, customs and rites; found national-cultural associations, centers, cultural institutions and conduct any other activity in the sphere of culture, and establish educational institutions, mass media outlets and publishing houses.)

Article 11 lists the duties of citizens in the sphere of culture:

(Obligations of citizens in the sphere of culture [...] [include] fostering the preservation of cultural heritage, traditions of national culture, supporting the protection of historical and cultural monuments; respecting the culture, language, customs and traditions of national minorities living in the territory of Ukraine.)

Thus, as provided by the above legislation, national minorities, including Poles living in Ukraine, have the right to develop their own culture, organize various projects and publish newspapers in Polish.

Another document important for the cultural activity of the Polish minority in Ukraine is the Intergovernmental Agreement between Ukraine and Poland on Cooperation in the Matters of Culture, Science and Education (Pol. Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Ukrainy o współpracy w dziedzinie kultury, nauki i oświaty; Kiev, 20 May 1997), whose provisions important for the issues discussed in the present study are presented below.

According to the document,

Umawiające się Strony będą rozwijać wzajemną wszechstronną współpracę w dziedzinach kultury, nauki, oświaty i innych objętych postanowieniami niniejszej umowy (Article 1) [Umowa 1997].

The Polish Minority and Ukrainian Ethnic Policy

(The Parties to this Agreement shall develop mutual comprehensive cooperation in the field of culture, science, education and other fields which are subject to the present Agreement (Article 1).)

As specified,

Umawiające się Strony, w oparciu zarówno o powiązania historyczne i bliskość obu narodów i ich kultur, a także ich wkład do cywilizacji światowej, będą promować rozwój dwustronnej współpracy kulturalnej i wymiany na wzajemnie korzystnych zasadach. Każda ze Stron będzie podejmować wysiłki mające na celu popularyzację wartości artystycznych i kulturalnych drugiej Strony, zapewniając szeroki dostęp do nich swoim obywatelom, rozwijając kontakty państwowe, społeczne i prywatne, udzielając wsparcia w organizowanych przez oba kraje przedsięwzięciach artystycznych: występach zespołów operowych, baletowych, teatralnych i innych grup artystycznych, wymianie wystaw pomiędzy muzeami, galeriami, bibliotekami, archiwami [...] (Article 3) [Umowa 1997].

(The Parties to this Agreement, basing both on the historical links and proximity between the two nations and their cultures, and on their contribution to the world’s civilization, shall promote the development of their mutual cultural cooperation and exchange along mutually beneficial principles. Each of the Parties shall make efforts aiming to popularize artistic and cultural values of the other Party, provide access to them to its citizens, develop official, social and private contacts, provide support to cultural projects organized in both countries, such as: opera, theater, ballet and other artistic group performances, exchange of exhibitions between museums, galleries, libraries, archives [...] (Article 3).)

Poland and Ukraine

będą sprzyjać: wymianie doświadczeń w dziedzinie rozwoju kultury, sztuki i literatury, kultury ludowej i ruchu amatorskiego poprzez organizowanie konferencji i innych spotkań oraz przez wzajemną wymianę specjalistów i wspólną działalność naukowo-badawczą [...] (Article 5) [Umowa 1997].

(shall foster the exchange of experience in the field of development of culture, the arts and literature, folk art and amateur cultural movement by organizing conferences and other meetings, and by mutual exchange of specialists and joint research and development activity [...] (Article 5).)

Both countries commit themselves to promoting readership and cultural exchange (Article 5).

Article 10 provides as follows:

Umawiające się Strony będą sprzyjały rozwijawi nauczania języka ukraińskiego, literatury i ukraiinstyki w uczelniach wyższych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz języka polskiego, literatury i polonistyki w uczelniach wyższych Ukrainy, jak również
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

proszę o prowadzenie badań naukowych w tych dziedzinach. Prowadzona też będzie wymiana wykładowców i lektorów zgodnie z zapotrzebowaniem obu Umawiających się Stron [Umowa 1997].

(The Parties to this Agreement shall support the development of Ukrainian language teaching, Ukrainian literature and Ukrainian studies in the institutions of higher education in the Republic of Poland, and Polish language teaching, Polish literature and Polish studies in the institutions of higher education in Ukraine, as well as academic research in these fields. There shall also be exchange of lecturers and teachers as dictated by the needs of the Parties to this Agreement.)

As specified in Article 12, Poland and Ukraine

zobowiązują się zapewnić osobom należącym do mniejszości ukraińskiej zamieszkającej na terenie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i osobom należącym do mniejszości polskiej zamieszkałej na terenie Ukrainy warunki sprzyjające zachowaniu, rozwojowi i wyrażaniu ich tożsamości narodowej, religijnej, kulturowej i językowej, bez jakiejkolwiek dyskryminacji i na warunkach pełnej równości. Każda z Umawiających się Stron będzie na swoim terytorium państwowym wszechstronnie wspierać działalność towarzystw narodowo-kulturalnych wyżej wymienionych osób, zapewnić możliwość uzyskiwania przez nie pomocy materialnej z ich etnicznej ojczyzny, a także będzie sprzyjać zachowaniu więzi kulturowych tych osób z rodakami zamieszkałymi na terytorium państwowym drugiej Strony [Umowa 1997].

(commit themselves to ensuring to members of the Ukrainian minority living in the territory of the Republic of Poland and to members of the Polish minority living in the territory of Ukraine conditions conducive to preserving, developing and expressing their national, religious, cultural and linguistic identity without any discrimination and on conditions of full equality. Each Party to this Agreement shall comprehensively support the activity of national-cultural associations of persons mentioned hereinabove in its state territory, ensure the possibility of receiving material support from their ethnic homeland, and shall be conducive to the preservation of cultural bonds of these persons with their compatriots living in the state territory of the other Party.)

On the basis of the document, Poland and Ukraine

będą wspierać współpracę w zakresie telewizji i radia, która będzie prowadzona w ramach porozumień zawartych między właściwymi instytucjami obu krajów, a także wspierać wymianę materiałów i informacji, zachowując przy tym normy prawa autorskiego, tworzenie programów i ich emisję dla mniejszości narodowych, które zamieszkują na terytorium drugiej Umawiającej się Strony (Article 23) [Umowa 1997].

(shall support cooperation in the field of radio and television, to be conducted within the framework of agreements concluded between the competent institutions of the two states, the exchange of materials and information, observing all copyright
regulations in the process, and the production and broadcasting of programs for national minorities living in the territory of the other Party to this Agreement (Article 23).

The principal aims of Polish associations in Ukraine include the promotion of Polish culture by means of organizing folk dance and song groups and holding large cultural events, such as the ‘Polish Autumn in the Donbas’ (Polska Jesień w Donbasie). The names of Polish associations frequently make reference to culture, for example: the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu, TKPD), the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ (Pol. Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo ‘Odrodzenie’), the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association (Pol. Polsko-Ukraińskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalne). The promotion, fostering and revival of broadly understood Polish culture are regularly listed as the main priorities of such organizations.

The Polish–Ukrainian agreement of 1997 opens a number of opportunities for Poles living in Ukraine. They often receive financial assistance from the Polish and Ukrainian administration, which makes it possible to organize larger events, such as the ‘Polish Culture Festival in the Donbas’ (Dni Kultury Polskiej w Donbasie).


(We put our stakes on Polish language and culture. We take part in different festivals in Poland and Ukraine every year. In Ukraine, it’s recently become trendy to present cultures of different nations and we present Polish culture in this melting pot. It would be too much to say that we revive it in the region contaminated by communism, but we get to know it, learn it and present it. We’re known all over the region; when there’s a cultural event, we get invited by the oblast authorities and by the Berdiansk local authorities. We’re very proud of this.)
Song and dance groups (see Table 2.3) are an important form of cultural activity. They present Polish organizations to a broader public, taking part in national minority festivals in different towns of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia provinces, in regional festivals and other ethnic events, which have become popular in Ukraine in recent years.

Zawsze bierzemy udział w festywale ‘My – Ukrajinci’ – tam wszystkie zespoły: i Grecy, i Bułgarzy, i Niemcy, i Białorusy, i my, a także dużo innych w swoich narodowych strojach biorą udział [Zaporizhzhia 2011: interview].

(We always take part in the ‘We – Ukrainians’ festival; there are all the [folk] groups: Greeks, and Bulgarians, and Germans, and Belarusians, and us, and also many others, [all] wearing their national costumes.)

It should be noted that members of such groups include young people of other ethnic backgrounds who want to learn about Polish language and culture; they often sing Polish songs and have a very good Polish pronunciation. The groups promote Polish culture mainly in their own regions, but also in other parts of the country and in Poland. For example, ‘Piernacz’ (The Mace) folk group from Zaporizhzhia appeared in the 12th Borderland Culture Festival (Pol. Festiwal Kultury Kresowej) in Mrągowo (Poland) in 2007, where it won the Mayor of Mrągowo Award and received an honorable mention from the Chancellery of the Senate of the Republic of Poland [Pawluk 2007: 5].

The activity of the Polish Cultural Center ‘The Feast’ (Pol. Centrum Kultury Polskiej ‘Biesiada’), the main organizer of all cultural events held by the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ (Pol. Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo ‘Odrodzenie’) in Berdiansk, sets an example to other minority organizations in the region. Representing Polish culture, the center has a number of sections, such as a group of circus performers and a children’s dance group called ‘Wodospad’ (The Waterfall), which has appeared in Kiev, Lviv, and Rzeszów (Poland). Unlike most other groups of this kind, apart from folk dances (mainly from the regions of southern Poland), ‘Wodospad’ performs also modern choreography. Using her artistic imagination, the group leader, Lilia Kuzniecowa, transposes impressions of historical events or works of literature into the language of dance. A notable example of such work is a performance based on Gody jesienne (Autumn Feast), a short story by the Polish writer Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, combining the elements of Polish and Ukrainian folklore and reflecting the cultural peculiarity of south-eastern Borderlands. The show involves an important episode of the summer solstice, merging local pagan rituals and classical Dionysian motifs; in this way, the dance reflects the writer’s vision of multicultural Ukraine.
### Table 2.3. Polish song and dance groups in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Group leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Zespół taneczny ‘Wodospad’ ('The Waterfall' dance group)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Lilia Kuzniecowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chór ‘Dzwon’ ('The Bell' choir)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lilia Asaczowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trio wokalne (A vocal trio)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Irena Szara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Zespół taneczny ‘Radość’ ('The Joy' dance group)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Irena Popowa-Faburowska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zespół wokalny ‘Lee’ ('Lee' song group)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Anżelika Kubat, Ina Sokołowska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zespół wokalno-instrumentalny ‘Beregina’ ('Beregina' song and music group)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jelena Simonowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duet ‘Remeta’ ('Remeta' duo)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tatiana Lichodied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zespół wokalny ‘Marzenie’ ('The Dream' song group)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Paweł Dobrowolski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zespół taneczny ‘Tosi Łapci’ ('Tosi Łapci' dance group)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aleksandr Mukosiejew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zespół wokalny ‘Ziarenka’ ('The Grains' song group)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Irena Śluszczyńska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zespół wokalny ‘Elospromt’ ('Elospromt' song group)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Helena Matwijenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wiktoria Charczenko-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Soczyńska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makiivka</td>
<td>Zespół taneczny ‘Niespodzianka’ ('The Surprise' dance group)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Irena Erdman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol</td>
<td>Zespół taneczny ‘Polonia’ ('Polonia' dance group)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tatiana Okrużnaja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>Zespół folklorystyczny ‘Piernacz’ ('The Mace' folk group)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Grzegorz Wierzbicki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zespół muzyczno-artystyczny ‘Kwiaty Polskie’ ('Polish Flowers' art and music group)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ludmiła Gornago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>236</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also worth noting the activity of ‘Kurtyna’ (The Curtain) theater group from Berdiansk, formed by members of the Union of Polish Youth (Pol. Związek Młodzieży Polskiej). Presenting small shows during concerts and official events,  

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23 Data provided by the chairpersons of the organizations.
the troupe popularizes the Polish sense of humor. The group uses the Internet to access the latest Polish comedy shows and sketches, and present them to the public in the region. Their performances are very enjoyable for the actors and audience alike.

There are certain practical problems when it comes to traditional folk dancing. Just as in other centers of the Polish community in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, Poles in Berdiansk are a mixed community, composed of members from different regions, and strongly assimilated with Russian and Ukrainian culture. This is why choreographers have to select typical elements of Polish dances and incorporate them into their own performances.

The General Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv is the organizer and patron of a number of cultural projects in the region, such as art exhibitions in Berdiansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, for example: 'Młoda polska grafika' ('Polish Young Graphics'), Zaporizhzhia (21.05–30.06.2007), Berdiansk (30.07–19.08.2007), 'Kultura materialna i sztuka ludowa regionu łowickiego na przełomie XIX i XX wieku' ('Material culture and folk art of the Łowicz region at the turn of the twentieth century'), Donetsk (1.06–31.07.2007), Zaporizhzhia (28.09–28.10.2007); there were also exhibitions of works by Alfred Łucjan Fedeczki (April 2010) and paintings by Ludwik Godlewski (May 2011), to commemorate the artist’s 120th birth anniversary.

The Polish Consulate in Kharkiv is also directly involved in providing regular assistance to Poles in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Dr Grzegorz Serochyński, the Polish Consul General for cultural affairs of the Polish community, observes: Poles in this region are important both to Poland and Ukraine. They enrich the cultural mosaic of Ukraine and promote Polish culture (Polacy na tym terenie ważni są dla Polski, ale także dla Ukrainy. Oni właśnie wzbogacają obraz kulturowy Ukrainy, promując polską kulturę) [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

Apart from the activity of organizations, it is also important to notice the contribution of individuals who play a role in the promotion of Polish culture, such as Olga Pawluk from Zaporizhzhia, who writes poetry, paints and runs a painters club for ten members. Her works have been exhibited in Warsaw, Cracow, Zaporizhzhia and other cities in Poland and Ukraine.

The Festivals of Polish Culture and Chopin Concerts in Donetsk, Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol were particularly significant events for the promotion of Polish culture in Ukraine. In October 2011, Lech Suchomłynow, the chairman of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society 'Revival', was honored with a certificate of merit from the Minister of Culture and National Heritage of the Republic of Poland, Bogdan Zdrojewski, for his outstanding achievement in the promotion of the works of the great Polish composer Fryderyk Chopin. Suchomłynow also received the Honorary Badge of Merit for Polish Culture (Pol. odznaka honorowa Zasłużony dla Kultury Polskiej), awarded by the Polish Minister of Culture and National Heritage in 2011.

The regional Polish-language mass media play an important cultural role in the community. The media in question include: the press: the Polacy Donbasu
(The Poles of the Donbas), a magazine of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas, the Źródło (The Spring) a magazine of the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association (Pol. Polsko-Ukraińskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalne) in Mariupol; radio and television programs: ‘Polska fala Donbasu’ (Polish Waves in the Donbas) and ‘TV-Polaków Donbasu’ (Poles of the Donbas TV); websites, the first of which was set up by the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ in Berdiansk. More detailed information on the regional Polish-language mass media is to be found in Chapter 4.4 below.

Ukrainian law offers various opportunities to develop and promote Polish culture. The regional administration has special offices dealing with national minority issues, including organization of their celebrations and festivals, which are attended also by members of the Polish community.

Polish associations face a number of problems, the most common one being that they do not have their own venues for rehearsals and events. In this situation, they rely on rented space and the courtesy of their Ukrainian or Russian neighbors. The only Polish Center (Pol. Dom Polski) in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts is located in Berdiansk; it is a major center of the Polish community in the region.

2.4. The Legal Status of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine

Traditionally Christian, Ukraine is a multi-religious state, with Orthodox Christianity as the main religious denomination; in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts religious life also concentrates in officially recognized Christian communities. The status of religion is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine (Articles 11, 24, 35, 37), the laws of Ukraine and international law. Article 11 of the Ukrainian constitution provides:

The State promotes the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, of its historical consciousness, traditions and culture, and also the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine [Constitution 1996].

From the perspective of both the international and domestic policy, it is important to note Article 35, which states as follows:

Everyone has the right to freedom of personal philosophy and religion. This right includes the freedom to profess or not to profess any religion, to perform alone or collectively and without constraint religious rites and ceremonial rituals, and to conduct religious activity. [...] The Church and religious organizations in Ukraine are separated from the State, and the school – from the Church. No religion shall be recognized by the State as mandatory.
No one shall be relieved of his or her duties before the State or refuse to perform the laws for reasons of religious beliefs. In the event that the performance of military duty is contrary to the religious beliefs of a citizen, the performance of this duty shall be replaced by alternative (non-military) service [Constitution 1996].

The framework of regulations concerning religion is specified also in the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (Ukr. Закон України «Про свободу совісті та релігійні організації» (Zakon Ukraїny ’Pro svobodu sovisti ta relihiĭni orhanizatsii,’ 23 April 1991), which provides that:

Every citizen in Ukraine is guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience. This right includes the freedom to have, adopt and change religion or convictions by one’s own choice and the freedom to practice any or no religion individually or jointly with others, to celebrate religious worship, to openly express and freely disseminate his or her religious or atheistic convictions.
No one may define obligatory convictions and world outlook.
The citizen shall not be forced in determination of his or her attitude to religion, professing or refusal to profess religion, in participation or non-participation in divine service, devotions and religious ceremonies, teaching religion.
Parents or persons acting in loco parentis shall be entitled, subject to mutual consent, to rear their children in accordance with their own convictions and attitude towards religion.
The exercise of the freedom of religion or convictions is subject to only those restrictions that are necessary to protect public security and order, the life, health and morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of other citizens established by law and complying with international obligations of Ukraine.
No one shall be entitled to require clergymen to disclose information received by them in the course of confessions by believers [Law on Freedom 2004: 312].

Article 4 declares that citizens regardless of their attitude towards religion enjoy equal rights:

Citizens of Ukraine shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy equal rights in all spheres of economic, political, social and cultural life regardless of their attitude towards religion. A citizen’s attitude towards religion shall not be indicated in official documents.
Any direct or indirect limitation of rights, any establishment of direct or indirect preferences for citizens depending on their attitude towards religion, as well as incitement of enmity and hate related thereto or the offense of citizen's feelings shall result in the liability established by law.
No one may evade the performance of constitutional duties for the reason of religious convictions. The substitution of one’s duty for another duty for the reason of convictions shall be allowed only in the cases provided for by the legislation of Ukraine [Law on Freedom 2004: 313].

Article 5 provides as follows:

In Ukraine, the implementation of state policy towards religion falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of Ukraine.
Church (religious organizations) in Ukraine shall be separated from state.
State shall protect the rights and lawful interests of religious organizations; shall foster the establishment of the relations of mutual religious and ideological tolerance and respect among the citizens who practice a religion or do not practice it, among the believers of different denominations and their different organizations; shall acknowledge and respect the traditions and internal regulations of religious organizations unless they contradict the effective legislation.
State shall not interfere with the operation of religious organizations exercised within the bounds of law, and shall not finance the operation of any organizations established on the basis of a religious affiliation.
All the religions, denominations and religious organizations shall be equal before the law. The establishment of any preferences or restrictions for any religion, denomination or religious organization with respect to others shall not be allowed.
Religious organizations shall not perform governmental functions.
Religious organizations shall have the right to take part in public life and to use the mass media on an equal basis with other nongovernment associations.
Religious organizations shall not participate in the operation of political parties, they shall not provide political parties with financial assistance, shall not nominate candidates to government bodies, shall not campaign for nor finance election campaigns of candidates to such government bodies. The clergy shall enjoy the right to participate in political life on an equal basis with all citizens.
A religious organization shall not interfere with the operation of other religious organizations, shall not in any form advocate enmity, intolerance towards the nonbelievers and members of other denominations.
A religious organization shall abide by the requirements of the effective law and order [Law on Freedom 2004: 313–314].

Article 6 reads:

The government educational system in Ukraine is separated from church and has a secular character. Access to various types and levels of education shall be granted to all citizens regardless of their attitude towards religion. [...] Citizens may study religious doctrine and receive religious education either individually or jointly with others with a free choice of the language of instruction.
Religious organizations shall be entitled to establish, in accordance with their internal procedures, educational institutions and groups for religious education of children and adults, as well as to conduct religious instruction in other forms using for this purpose the facilities that they own or that are granted them for use.
Instructors of religious doctrines and religious preachers shall educate their students in the spirit of tolerance and respect towards the citizens that do not worship any religion, and of members of other denominations [Law on Freedom 2004: 314].

The law under consideration covers also the rights and obligations of religious organizations, as well as the procedure of their registration, activity and
liquidation. The statute (constitution) of a religious organization has to comply with the current legislation and is subject to registration as specified in Article 14. Approved at the general meeting of the founder members, or a convention or congress of a religious organization, the statute (constitution) should include data on:

- the type of the religious organization, its denominational affiliation, and location,
- property,
- the rights to establish enterprises, mass media, other religious organizations and educational institutions,
- the procedure for the introduction of changes and amendments to the statute (constitution),
- the procedure for the settlement of property and other issues in case of the cessation of operation of the religious organization.

As specified,

The statute may also contain other information related to special features in operation of the given religious organization. The statute of the religious organization shall not contradict the effective legislation. The documents that determine ecclesiastical activities and resolve other internal issues of the religious organization shall not be subject to registration by government authorities [Law on Freedom 2004: 312–328].

In order to obtain the status of a legal entity, a group of minimum ten citizens aged eighteen or over should file an application for the registration of the statute (constitution) with the oblast administration. Religious centers, monasteries, fraternities, missions and theological educational institutions submit their statutes to the organ of state administration in charge of religious affairs. The organ in charge of registration considers the application and the statute and makes a relevant decision within a month; the applicants are notified about it in writing within ten days.

Chapter 3 of the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations regulates the property status of such organizations, granting them the right to use for their needs the buildings and property provided to them on a contractual basis by the state, public organizations or citizens. Ecclesiastical buildings and other religious property owned by the state are transferred to religious organizations to be used, or their ownership is restored, free of charge, on the basis of decisions of oblast, Kiev and Sevastopol city state administrations, and in the Republic of Crimea – by the decision of the government of the republic of Crimea.

Ownership rights of religious organizations are specified in Article 18: they may 'own, use and dispose of the property which they own,' ‘own buildings, cult objects, industrial, social and charitable facilities, transport, money and other property required to support their activities' and they 'have the title to the property acquired or created by them at the expense of own funds, funds
donated by individuals, organizations or handed over by the state, as well as acquired on other grounds provided for by law’ [Law on Freedom 2004: 312–328]. Furthermore,

Religious organizations shall construct ecclesiastical and other buildings according to the procedure established by the effective law for civil-purpose projects. Restoration and repairs of ecclesiastical buildings that are historical and cultural monuments shall be performed in compliance with the established rules for preservation and use of historical and cultural monuments [Law on Freedom 2004: 312–328].

As for religious objects and literature, the Law specifies as follows:

Citizens and religious organizations shall be entitled to acquire, own and use religious literature in the language of their choice. Religious organizations shall be entitled to manufacture, export, import and disseminate religious objects, literature and other information materials of religious content. Religious organizations shall enjoy the exclusive right to establish enterprises for the issue of liturgical literature and the manufacture of cult objects [Law on Freedom 2004: 324].

Article 23 provides:

Different societies, fraternities, associations and other unions of citizens may be established under religious organizations in order to engage in charitable, educational and cultural activity and dissemination of religious literature. They may have their own statutes, which shall be registered according to the procedure for citizens associations. Religious organizations shall be entitled to engage in charitable activities both independently and via public funds. The monies spent on this purpose shall not be subject to taxation [Law on Freedom 2004: 324].

In the sphere of international contacts, Article 24 states:

The clergy, religious preachers, preceptors, other representatives of foreign organizations, who are foreign citizens temporarily staying in Ukraine, may engage in the preaching of religious doctrines, the performance of religious rites and other canonical activities only in those religious organizations that invited them, and subject to an official approval of the government authority that registered the statute of the relevant religious organization [Law on Freedom 2004: 325].

Apart from the above mentioned Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, important regulations in this domain also include the Decree of the President of Ukraine on Measures Concerning the Restitution of Religious Property to Religious Organizations (Ukr. Указ Президента України «Про заходи, щодо повернення релігійним організаціям культового майна», Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy ‘Pro zakhody shchodo povernennia relihiynym
orhanizatsiiam kul’tovoho maĭna,’4 March 1992) and the Executive Order of the President of Ukraine on the Restitution of Religious Property to Religious Organizations (Ukr. Розпорядження Президента України «Про повернення релігійним організаціям культового майна», Rozporiadzhennia Prezydenta Ukrainy ‘Pro povernennia relihiĭnym orhanizatsiiam kul’tovoho maĭna,’ N 53/94-pn, 22 June 1994), which provides as follows:

На виконання статті 17 Закону України ‘Про свободу совісті та релігійні організації’ (987-12): Місцевим органам державної виконавчої влади забезпечити до 1 грудня 1997 року передачу у безоплатне користування або повернення безоплатно у власність релігійних організацій культових будівель і майна, які перебувають у державній власності та використовуються не за призначенням.25

(With a view to implementing the regulations of Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (987-12), it is hereby ordered that, by 1 December 1997, the local organs of state administration shall transfer to religious organizations, free of charge, the use of, or restore the ownership of, buildings and other religious property which is in the possession of the state and is currently used for purposes other than religious.)

Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine is represented by three different Churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. The three major Catholic Churches in the country include the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Church (headed by the Archbishop of Lviv, Mieczysław Mokrzycki) and the Armenian Catholic Church.

The first Roman Catholic diocese in Ukraine was established in 1321 in Kiev. In the late sixteenth century, Jesuits organized their schools, which were open to members of the Orthodox Church; at a later date, the country also had centers of Franciscan, Carmelite, Capuchin, Pauline and other religious orders. After a period of severe restrictions against the Roman Catholic Church under the Soviet Union, Pope John Paul II re-established the Catholic dioceses and ordained their bishops (16 January 1991); the Apostolic Nunciature in Ukraine was opened in 1992.26

In 2012, the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine had seven dioceses: Lviv, Kiev and Zhytomyr, Kamianets Podilskyi, Lutsk, Mukacheve, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, Odessa and Simferopol, counting in total 804 parishes, eight bishops and three higher seminaries: Lviv (Briukhovychi), Kiev and Zhytomyr (Vorzel), Kamianets Podilskyi (Horodok).

The Diocese of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, covering the area of the Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhanski, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, was established on 4 May 2002 by Pope John Paul II and

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(has about 60,000 members, with the total number of officially registered parishes at fifty-two. The Holy Mass and other religious services are held in sixteen churches, twenty-two chapels and thirty-eight religious community centers. There are fifty-six sisters of different religious orders working in the diocese.)

The dates of official registration indicated in Table 2.4 are an approximation, since the official procedure can take as long as over a year:

Czy jest kościół, czy nie ma, rejestruje się gromadę. Dopiero władze tego miasta oddają kościół lub ewentualnie pozwalają na budowę. [...] Przez rok czasu otrzymano ziemię na budowę i dokumenty z projektem kościoła do zatwierdzenia przez Radę Miasta. Później oni wydają dokument, tzn. dają mi prawo do budowy. Za rok czasu, że tak długo te dokumenty załatwiają, straciłem dużo czasu i pieniędzy... Ja tracę. Trzeba około 16 różnych podpisów, żeby można było budowę zacząć, jedni podpisują, inni nie podpisują, i muszę chodzić, i prosić dalej, aby podpisali [Melitopol 2007: interview].

(Whether there is a local church or not, what is officially registered is the [parish] community. It is only then that the local authorities proceed with the restitution of the church or issue a permit to build a new one. [...] It took a year to get the building plot and draft the technical project of the church to be approved by the local council. Then they issued a document, a building permit. A year is a really long time to process such documents; I lost a lot of time and money... You need sixteen different signatures to start working on the site; some officials sign [the documents], and others don’t, so I have to go there again and again and ask them to do it.)

Parishes need to be registered with the local authorities, which also often proves a challenge:

Najpierw to była diecezja kamieniecko-podolska. Od momentu utworzenia diecezji charkowsko-zaporoskiej musielibyśmy wszystkie parafie przerejestrowywać w miejscowych władzach [Zaporizhzhia 2011: interview].

(At first, this was the Diocese of Kamieniec Podolski [Ukr. Kamianets Podilskyi], and when the Charkowsko-Zaporoska [Ukr. Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia] diocese was established, we had to re-register all the parishes with the local authorities all over again.)

There are a number of parishes which as yet have not been registered, but which will probably receive official status in the future (e.g., Shakhtarsk: six members, Zhdanivka: four, Kirovsk: three, Dzherzhynsk: about fifteen).
Table 2.4. Roman Catholic churches, chapels and religious community centers in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (2012)²⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City / town</th>
<th>Church / Chapel / Religious community center</th>
<th>Registration date</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Priests²⁸ from Austria (A) from Poland (PL) from Russia (RU) from Ukraine (UA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemivsk</td>
<td>Church of Our Lady of the Rosary</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Jefrem Besaga (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Church of the Nativity of the Holy Virgin</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Zdzisław Zając (PL) Rafał Szkopowiec (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohatyrivka and Lutserna</td>
<td>Church of St Faustyna</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Jan Starucha (PL) Jerzy Cyrl (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Church of St Joseph</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Ryszard Karapuda (PL) Wiktor Abelmazow (UA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk (Budonivka)</td>
<td>Parish of Christ the Good Shepherd</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ryszard Karapuda (PL) Wiktor Abelmazow (UA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk (Petrivka)</td>
<td>Chapel of St Michael the Archangel</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ryszard Karapuda (PL) Wiktor Abelmazow (UA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horlivka</td>
<td>Chapel of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Wiktor Wąsowicz (UA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ienakiieve</td>
<td>Parish of the Blessed Teresa of Calcutta</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Wiktor Wąsowicz (UA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kramatorsk</td>
<td>Parish of the Holy Spirit</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Ryszard Karapuda (PL) Wiktor Abelmazow (UA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoarmiisk</td>
<td>Parish of the Divine Mercy</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Maciej Burszewski (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makivka</td>
<td>Chapel of St Joseph</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Grzegorz Wieczorek (PL) Taras Ciechocki (RU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol</td>
<td>Community of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin Mary</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Adam Gąsior (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapel of SS Cyril and Methodius</td>
<td>1999/2003</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Adam Gąsior (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melitopol (Chekhohrad)</td>
<td>Church of the Holy Trinity²⁶</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Adam Gąsior (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaviansk</td>
<td>Community of SS Cyril and Methodius</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jefrem Besaga (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokmak</td>
<td>No church; the Holy Mass celebrated in a private house or the local Center of Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Zdzisław Zając (PL) Rafał Szkopowiec (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torez</td>
<td>Chapel of St Teresa</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Grzegorz Wieczorek (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>Concathedral of God the Merciful Father; Sanctuary of God the Father</td>
<td>1992/1999</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Jan Sobilo, the Auxiliary Bishop of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia (PL) Andrzej Pępow (UA) Oleg Kowinow (UA) Tomasz Nadberezny (PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia (Baburka)</td>
<td>Chapel of St Padre Pio</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Jan Starucha (PL) Jerzy Cyrl (PL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁷ Data provided by parish priests. I am very grateful to Bishop Jan Sobiło, the Auxiliary Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, for all his assistance in collecting materials for the present study and for his kind permission to conduct surveys which are discussed in the following chapters.

²⁸ Information on priests after Informator 2011; updated information provided by Olga Oleszko in January 2012.

²⁹ The Church of Our Lady of Częstochowa is under construction; the local authorities allocated a site in the city center for the first sanctuary of St Mary’s in the Roman Catholic Diocese of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia.

³⁰ Members of this parish community are Czech.
Considering that south-eastern Ukraine is characterized by the lowest level of religious awareness in the entire country, the situation of the Roman Catholic Church in the region is particularly difficult:

Donbas, zatrudany bezlitośnie do dziś, nie potrafi zachować tradycji prawosławnej ani katolickiej. Najliczniejsza grupa wyznawców to “praktykujący ateiści”, którzy czasami nazywają siebie prawosławnymi lub po prostu chrześcijanami, bez jakiejs refleksji nad tym, co to dokładnie znaczy [Wiśniewski 2004: 50].

(With the hearts of its people ruthlessly poisoned until this very day, the Donbas is not able to uphold any religious tradition, either Orthodox, or Catholic. The largest group of believers are 'practising atheists,' who sometimes call themselves Orthodox, or simply Christians, without any particular reflection on what it actually means.)

Although militant, aggressive atheism is a norm in the region, there are obviously a considerable number of people who feel a strong need of religion in their everyday life. It is often the case that children and members of the younger generation convert their parents and grandparents. A priest working in Zaporizhzhia makes the following observations:


(Certainly [the most important thing is] to restore what has been destroyed in a person. These people suffer greatly; they have been exposed to moral deprivation. In many cases, we have to start from scratch: sometimes [university] students who, out of interest, join our meetings or come to talk, have no idea of the simplest things that children in Poland know when they take their First Communion. The family is in the worst situation; it has been almost entirely destroyed: cohabitation, civil marriage, divorce, children left without parents and suffering from psychological damage; such wounds take long years to heal (you can often hear that “my mum

and dad didn’t want me”). There is also the curse of widespread alcoholism and drug addiction, which we can witness on a daily basis. In this situation, the first thing to do is to give these people some real help. Beautiful words become meaningful when they involve the [right] attitude and are followed by some real action. In all this, there is something that I always find fascinating: in spite of all this great effort to destroy man, the spirit of something that we could call “longing for God” has survived; it can’t be erased by any political system or any ideology. Sometimes people aren’t fully aware of it, but they keep searching in the dark, they long for it and when they realise they have found it, you can see happiness in their faces right away.

The Reverend Jarosław Wiśniewski writes:

Niestety, jest to ludność najbardziej pasywna religijnie. Są to tereny dogłębnie zateizowane i zrusyfikowane. Niełatwo się tu żyje katolikom, jeszcze gorszy los mają tu grekokatolicy. Jedni i drudzy jednak czynią pewne wysiłki, by przypominać o sobie. W żadnym wypadku działalność diecezji ani egzarchatu nie sposób nazwać misyjną czy tym bardziej prozelicką. To właśnie katolicy na tych terenach rozwijani w diasporze bez najmniejszej możliwości praktykowania swej wiary byli ofiarami aktywnego prozelityzmu ze strony moskiewskiego prawosławia, co najbardziej okrutne formy przybierały w czasach stalinowskich i czego kluczowym przykładem jest likwidacja siedmiu diecezji grekokatolickich w Galicji i na Zakarpaciu i pełna likwidacja kleru rzymskokatolickiego jeszcze w latach trzydziestych. Żadnego kapłana katolickiego nie było w tym czasie ani na Krymie, ani w żadnym z 7-miu obwodów tworzących terytorium diecezji. Losy tych parafii lekko można prześledzić, studiując życiorysy biskupów, dziekanów i prostego kleru z lat trzydziestych zeszłego stulecia. Żaden z kościołów na opisanym terytorium nie ocalał w pełni. Większość zburzono, resztę w wyrafinowany sposób zrujnowano, zmieniając przeznaczenie i wygląd. W latach Niezależności na lewym brzegu Dniepru zwrócono zaledwie siedem świątyń. Ostatni wypadek wandalizmu w postaci zrujnowania kaplicy miał miejsce na przedmieściach Dniepropetrowska Anno Domini 2007. Na zwrot czekają świątynie w tak wielkich miastach krymskich, jak Symferopol, Sewastopol czy na terenie diecezji Dniepropetrowsk i Mariupol [Wiśniewski 2007:7].

(Unfortunately, the region is thoroughly atheist, Russified and its population is the most passive in religious terms. Although Roman Catholics have a very difficult life here, and the situation of Greek Catholics is even worse, both religious communities have been making an effort to make their presence visible. Under no circumstances can the activity of the [Roman Catholic] diocese or the [Greek Catholic] exarchate be regarded as missionary or proselytic. Quite on the contrary, it was the members of the local Catholic diaspora who were deprived of any opportunity to practice their religion and became the victims of active proselytism pursued by the Orthodox Church run from Moscow. The process was most severe in the Stalinist period, when it involved such steps as the abolition of seven Greek Catholic dioceses in Galicia and Transcarpathia and a full liquidation of the Roman Catholic clergy in the 1930s. In the period, there was not a single Roman Catholic priest in the Crimea or any of the seven oblasts in the [present-day Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia] diocese.
The history of its Catholic parishes can be easily traced by studying the fate of the bishops, deans and the parish clergy in the 1930s. There was not a single church building in the region which would have survived intact: most of them were demolished and the rest were purposefully damaged by adapting them for different uses. Since the independence, only seven churches in the Left Bank have been restored [to their owners]. The latest case of vandalism, involving the demolition of a chapel in the suburbs of Dnipropetrovsk, was recorded as late as 2007. In great cities such as Simferopol and Sevastopol in the Crimea, and Dnipropetrovsk and Mariupol in our diocese, there are still churches that have not been returned.)

Although historically the number of Roman Catholic churches in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts was relatively high, hardly any of them survived. Those still in existence today had been converted to serve various purposes (such as warehouses or factory workshops) and are often a sad display of bare walls. Even though the Ukrainian legal regulations make provisions for the restitution of religious property and construction of new churches in locations which once had a parish, the practice is, regrettably, different. For example, after long negotiations with the local authorities, it was only in 2005 that the Catholic community of Artemivsk recovered the possession of the parish church built in 1861 and sealed in 1923, following the regulations on the separation of Church and state [Sirenko, Strashuk 2007: 4]. In Makiivka, where the church was located on the grounds of steelworks, the local priest still has not even been allowed to inspect the site. The Catholic community in Kramatorsk has long been waiting for a decision of the local city council on the allocation of an appropriate site for the construction of a church. In one of the meetings, the head of the Kramatorsk City Council declared: ‘There won’t be another Vatican here’ (Rus. Здесь второго Ватикана не будет, Zdes’ vtorogo Vatikana ne budet; see Appendix, Document 11).

The registration of a particular parish or community depends on the local authorities; hence securing the support of a member of the local council, or a person involved in other public institutions, can facilitate the process. This was the case in Berdiansk, where the local Roman Catholic parish was allocated an attractive site overlooking the Sea of Azov.

In a similar development, the Roman Catholic parish in Zaporizhzhia was first allocated a building in Verbova vulytsia (Ukr. Вербова вулиця, Willow Street), which was turned into a chapel, and then a site in the city center, now occupied by a large concathedral, declared the Sanctuary of God the Father in 2011; the old chapel (along the one in Bohatyrivka) was transferred to the Greek Catholic Church. Archival records confirm a sizeable Roman Catholic community and a parish church in the city as of 1902; today the site belongs to an industrial estate. In Mariupol, a city of particular significance to the believers, the local authorities allocated a site in the city center for the first sanctuary of St Mary’s in the Roman Catholic Diocese of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia; there are organized pilgrimages from Donetsk to Mariupol [Berent 2007: 120].
Although the Roman Catholic clergy working in south-eastern Ukraine come mainly from Poland, there have also been priests from Romania, Italy, Russia, Slovakia and Austria. They are sent to particular parishes as approved in decrees issued by the Bishop of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia (see Appendix, Document 12).

It should also be mentioned that in eastern Ukraine, dominated by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the Roman Catholic Church suffers from discriminating practices such as:
- stirring animosity against Roman Catholics among members of the Orthodox Church,
- organizing protest marches against building new Catholic churches,
- forbidding members of the Orthodox Church to visit Catholic churches to get to know Catholic rites and doctrine,
- threatening that entering a Roman Catholic church is a mortal sin.

***

I have been inspired to include a chapter on national minority rights in Ukraine by Jennifer Jackson Preece’s Minority Rights. Between Diversity and Community. Writing about the complex problems of national, ethnic, language, racial and religious minorities in the Western world, Preece observes:

The ‘problem of minorities’ is both intellectually created and historically situated. In its current form, it is a consequence of the fundamental shift in political thinking with regard to the appropriate relationship between legitimacy and community which took place in Europe from the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century and by 1945 had become the basis of a global international order. Whereas previously authority came from above (the ruler, the divine), today we believe that it originates from below (the people) [Preece 2007: 17].

In Ukraine, the situation is rather different. Under the Soviet Union, until 1991, society was seemingly more homogenous: all of its members shared the same citizenship, had to speak the same language, i.e., Russian, and belong to the same organizations according to their age (the Pioneer Organization, the Komsomol, the communist party), subject to official regulations. As of 1990, Ukraine has developed its own legal framework, including the constitution as a guarantee of the system. As is the case in any young state, the process has been a difficult one, and even today there are considerable loopholes and inconsistencies in particular decrees, laws and orders. However, what seems most important is that Ukrainian authorities take notice of the role and significance of national and ethnic minorities living in the country and appreciate their cultural, linguistic and religious heritage. The institution in charge of minority affairs is the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration; there
are also departments dealing with minority issues at the level of oblast and raion administration. In the academia, minorities are a focus of research at the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; there is also an increasing number of academic and popular publications on the subject.

The present chapter has described the framework of Ukrainian legal regulations concerning national minorities and provided a brief outline of the most important documents in this domain (including the constitution), defining what groups of citizens are considered a minority, what rights they have and what principles and procedures apply in the process of forming officially registered minority associations. The discussion has focused on the Polish minority in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

Considering the geographical extent of the region, the number of Polish organizations is quite low: ten independent associations with local branches and the total membership of over two thousand (the figure includes those who declared their membership in writing; see Table 2.1, data provided by the chairpersons of the organizations). Not all the members are Poles: some have Polish roots, others feel the need to belong to a community, or they join in motivated by their interest in Poland in general, and Polish language and culture in particular. As tends to be the case with registration procedures, there were often some problems with formalities; for example, it took months to have documents signed by one particular official in charge (as explained, she's on a leave and we don't know when she's coming back (jest na urlopie, i nie wiadomo, kiedy wróci) [Donetsk 2007: interview]).

As regards the legal framework of minority languages in education, all minorities have the right to form school classes with their own language as the language of instruction and to organize language courses. Poles living in Ukraine can learn the language by attending courses at schools and institutions of higher education, Saturday and Sunday schools, or in Roman Catholic parishes; all of them are free of charge. It is worth stressing that not all the learners are Polish and the language enjoys a high prestige at secondary schools and institutions of higher education in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. As reported by the teachers, the number of those learning Polish is increasing every year.

According to legal regulations, national and ethnic minorities have the right to protect, express, promote and develop their cultural heritage. Poles in south-eastern Ukraine are quite well-organized and make full use of the opportunities offered in the legislative framework. There is a considerable number of Polish folk, song, dance and music groups with the total of over 230 members, who are actively engaged in promoting Polish culture. It should be noted that not all those involved in such activity are of Polish extraction. Local authorities support exhibitions of Polish art and presentations of culture of different regions of the country; there are also Polish magazines, poetry interpretation contests, open air painting workshops and concerts. Polish cultural activity in the Ukrainian melting pot is also noted for its quality.
Considering the questions to be discussed in further chapters, particular attention needs to be devoted to the activity of the Roman Catholic Church, which functions within the framework specified in the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and other regulations. The present work does not focus on the history of the Church in the region, an important area which most certainly deserves extensive study in its own right.

The parishes in the area under consideration belong to the Diocese of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia (Table 2.4 above presents only those in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and not in the entire diocese; membership figures should be treated as estimates). Although the laws declare freedom of religion, life is more complex and does not spare problems, such as ones connected with the allocation of building sites for churches, construction permits, or official approval of documentation, not to mention the return of Church property. They should be attributed to ‘the way things are done’ in the country rather than to legal regulations. Indeed, the mentality of officials in charge of important decisions is still marked by vestiges of the Soviet era, corruption is still widespread even today, and decisions are still often postponed without good reason. Thus, it could be said that although Ukrainian regulations are up to the EU standards, their implementation is sometimes problematic.
3
THE POLISH LANGUAGE
IN SOUTH-EASTERN
UKRAINE TODAY

The linguistic situation of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine is highly complex and the region is characterized by different varieties of spoken Polish influenced by language contact with Ukrainian and Russian. In the present study, the community under consideration is discussed in three age groups: the older, middle and younger generations. As revealed in the course of research, members of all these generations originally come from a number of different regions and there is a substantial inter- and intra-generational differentiation of their command of Polish, with the place of birth as an important factor.

Informants from the older generation (born between 1919 and 1945) originally come from Poland, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Belarus and different parts of Russia.¹ In the majority of cases, Polish was their first language and a certain proportion of this age group completed a few grades of their education in Polish schools. Since their arrival in the region, Russian has become their language of everyday communication, also in the family domain. The middle generation (born between 1945 and 1975) includes respondents born mainly in different regions of Ukraine and some informants originally coming from Belarus, Russia and Poland. Most members of the younger generation (born between 1975 and 1990) included in the study were born in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts; a relatively small number declared other regions of the country or, in a few cases, Belarus as their place of origin.

For the majority of the respondents, their motivation for settling in south-eastern Ukraine was mainly economic, as the industrialization of the region, especially after the Second World War, involved a high demand for

¹ As used in the text, the names of the countries refer to the political map of the period under consideration.
labor force. Other frequently reported reasons included mandatory work placement on completion of studies, military service and marriage.

The above information is essential for the consideration of circumstances which were important for the language of the informants and varied in the case of each generation. For example, the level of proficiency in Polish largely depends on the place of birth, and the resettlement factor indicates the period and duration of language contact. In one of the cases, a female informant born in Odessa studied in Moscow and then, as the wife of a member of the military forces, moved to a different city every five years (including Omsk, Samara, Kuibyshev, Kislovodsk and Tallinn), before finally coming to live with her daughter in Zaporizhzhia in the early 1990s. The linguistic situation was also influenced by historical and political developments, especially deportations and difficult returns, not always to the original home region. For example, some Poles born in Zhytomyr region and deported to Kazakhstan came back to Ukraine to settle in Zaporizhzhia city area.

The eventful biographies of members of the older generation are reflected in the shape and form of their language. I focus on the informants who have known Polish since their childhood and, regrettably, use it today only exceptionally. Some of them have a very good command of the language although they have never been to Poland (e.g., a female informant born in Odessa and living in Zaporizhzhia), others can hardly use it anymore. A number of respondents from the middle and the younger generation do not know Polish from home, but learned it elsewhere, which means that they are not native speakers of the language.

3.1. The Command of Polish: A Self-Assessment Survey

The criteria of the respondents’ self-assessment of their command of Polish emerged in the course of unstructured interviews conducted from 2007. A member of the older generation from Donetsk remarked:

*W domu rozmawiali my po polsku, z mamą i z tatą, potem szkoła polska. Język polski był na pierwszym miejscu. Dobrze rozmawiam po polsku i dobrze piszę, też wszystko rozumiem, co się do mnie mówi. To ja mogę nazwać, że to jest mój język pierwszy czy jak tam rodziny. Na ulicy po ukraińsku, z dziećmi tam, a od kiedy na Donbasie tylko po rosyjsku* [Donetsk 2008: interview].

(*We spoke Polish at home with mum and dad, and then there was Polish school. Polish has always been first. I’m a good Polish speaker and I can write well; I can also understand everything I hear. So, I can say it’s my first language, or, well, my family language. When I went out, I spoke Ukrainian, with other kids, you know, and ever since I moved to the Donbas, it’s been only Russian.*)
An informant born in Jarosław (Poland) and living in Berdiansk recalled:

I can speak Polish very well; I used to speak Polish to my mum there, in Grodno [Bel. Hrodna]. There were many of us, Poles, and everybody spoke Polish then. It was always Polish at home and among the neighbors, and here, we’ve had to speak Russian like everyone else around.

However, most informants from the older generation declare that they only know prayers and they cannot speak or write in Polish:
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

Nu szczto ja magu skazat', ja uże nie znaju polskogo jazyka, nas uczili doma malitsia, nu i my tak molimisza, ja uczila swojich dietiej tože na polskom jazykie molitsia. Nu my znajem Ojczy Nasz, Zdrowaśku, Anieli Boże no i tam Wierze w Boga Ojca, to szczto nas uczili, nu ja znaju jeszcze Dziesieńć przekazań boskich, dietiej etogo uže nie uczila, zacziem im tak mnogo znat’ [Mariupol 2010: interview].

(Well, what can I say; I can no longer speak Polish. We were taught to pray [in Polish] at home and that’s how we pray; I also taught my children to pray in Polish. Well, we know ‘Our Father,’ ‘Hail Mary,’ ‘Angel of God’ and ‘I believe in God the Father,’ that’s what we were taught; I also know the Ten Commandments [in Polish], but I didn’t teach them to my children, they don’t really need to know so much.

There are also those who can neither speak nor write, and their Polish does not go beyond songs, patriotic, religious or folk. In these cases, they most often recited the lyrics or sang the choruses of the songs or the first verse and the chorus. A Ukrainian-speaking informant born in Khmelnytskyi remembered a number of Polish songs she had learned at home and sung with the neighbors as a child:

Nu ja Antonina z Chmielnicka, w Doniecku żywu uże 35 liet, u mene żył tut diadia, mój rodnyj diad’ka, můj rodnyj diad’ka, muža ja broušila, przyjichała w Donieck, robotała w aeroportu. Mniej bylo sorok dwa goda, jak ja siuda prijechała.

Święty Antoni, cudownyj patronie; pjastujesz Pana Jezusa, tak pjastuj dusze moj, jak Matka Boska Pana Jezusa pjastowała, pod krzyżem stała, Synu můj najmiliejszy jesteś skrzyżowany, kliencysz w Ogrójcu, krowom i potem złany, być cierniem koronowany, ciężki krzyż dźwigał na góry kalwaryjskiej, jeszcze do krzyża tymi tymi gwoździami przykuwany, chodziła Matka Boska, tensknęła, płakała, za swoim synom płakała, liegła spać, przyszli sun, dziwny sun, dziwny sun, Żydzi Pana Jezusa złapali’ [Donetsk 2008: interview].

(Well, I’m Antonina from Khmelnytsk [Ukr. Khmelnytskyi], I’ve already been living in Donetsk for thirty-five years now. I had an uncle here, my real uncle; I dumped my husband and I came to Donetsk; I worked at the airport. I was forty-two when I came over here [a fragment of a Polish hymn to St Anthony follows].)

On the basis of the the criteria of the declared command of Polish which emerged from the interviews, I conducted a survey among members of the Polish community in six cities (2010): Berdiansk, Melitopol, Makiivka, Mariupol (60 questionnaires distributed and returned in each of them), Donetsk (105) and Zaporizhzhia (90). My analysis involved 430 out of the total of 435 completed questionnaires; in five cases, the respondents declared their national identity as other than Polish. The survey included 254 women (59% of the total) and 176 men (41%), with 216 respondents from the older generation (born between 1919 and 1945), 150 from the middle generation (1945–1975), and 64 from the younger generation (1975–1990). The findings on the respondents’ self-assessment of their command of Polish are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. A self-assessment survey of the command of Polish in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command of Polish</th>
<th>Donetsk</th>
<th>Mariupol</th>
<th>Makiivka</th>
<th>Zaporizhzhia</th>
<th>Berdiansk</th>
<th>Melitopol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can speak and write well</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can speak well, but I can’t write</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m an average speaker, but I can’t write</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t speak or write</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I only know Polish prayers, I can’t speak or write</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I only know Polish songs, I can’t speak or write</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The age group breakdown of the declared command of Polish in different skills was as follows: 15 members of the older generation, 10 of the middle generation and 5 of the younger generation assessed their level of spoken and written Polish as good; those who ‘can speak well, but can’t write’ counted 24, 13 and 7, respectively; the total of 72 respondents rated themselves as ‘average’ speakers with no writing skills (43, 17 and 12 in each generation, respectively). By far the largest number of those questioned (142) cannot speak Polish or use it in writing (49, 66 and 27, respectively). There was also a group of respondents who know and remember only Polish prayers (92 in total, 58, 30 and 4 in each generation, respectively) or songs (17, 13 and 2, respectively). While in the older and middle generation the songs in question were religious or patriotic, the respondents of the younger generation declared they knew folk songs.

*No molusia ja molusia toliko na polskom, polskaja u mienia krow, to na polskom molusia, bolsze nieczewo ja nie znaju, no wot tak mnie w dietstwie nauczili molitsia na polskom, uje i na ruskom umieju, no na polskom mnie kazhetsia czto ja bliżej Boga, a na ruskom kak-to mnie kazhetsia czto dalej, no w kastiolie na ruskom, a ja doma siebie na polskom malsusia [Donetsk 2010: interview].*
(I say my prayers only in Polish; I have Polish blood in me, so I pray in Polish, but I know nothing more than that. Well, I was taught to pray in Polish when I was a child; I can already pray in Russian as well, but it seems to me that when I use Polish I’m closer to God, and when I pray in Russian, it somehow seems more distant; in church, I pray in Russian, and at home I say my prayers in Polish.)

As established, in the area under consideration there are currently no persons using Polish in the family or neighborhood: it is Russian and/or Ukrainian that is the medium of everyday communication in the family, and the language which they use with the neighbors is mainly Russian.

3.2. The Language of Everyday Communication in the Family Domain: A Survey

As revealed in replies to one of the survey questions, the most widespread language of everyday communication in the family domain among Poles in south-eastern Ukraine is Russian (see Figures 3.1–3.3). In the case of the older generation, the pattern involves linguistic discontinuity, as the language they had once used at home in their places of origin was Polish. Unstructured interviews included comments on this issue, for example:

*Dawno w dietstwie ja nie znała ruskowo, tylko polskij, a teraz uže i polskij zabyła, tołko ruskij, tołko ruskij, da i s diet’mi i s wnukami, nu czto dielat’ takije wriemiena* [Kramatorsk 2010: interview].

*(A long time ago, in my childhood, I didn’t know Russian, only Polish, but I’ve forgotten it all now; it’s only Russian all the time, also with children and grandchildren, but what can you do, such are the times.)*

*Figure 3.1. The language of everyday communication of the older generation of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine*
Out of the total of 216 members of the older generation taking part in the survey, 83 declared Russian as their language of everyday communication; the number of those speaking Ukrainian at home was recorded at 98, and the users of both languages counted 35 (see Figure 3.1).

Doma my tak po ukraińśki, tam my żyli w Chmielnicku tam pa ukraińśki my howoryły, no tut, my kak, wot my doma pa ukraińśki, a wot na ulice tam w magazynie nu pa ruski, tak kak wsie, a doma mieżdu soboj wot na ukraińśkim jazykie, nu wy znajetie, cej ukraińśkyj win ne takyj czystyj win pomiszanyj [Mariupol 2011: interview].

(At home, we spoke Ukrainian; we lived in Khmelnytsk [Ukr. Khmelnytskyi] and we spoke Ukrainian there. But here, well, we speak Ukrainian at home and Russian in the street and in shops, just like everyone else; and at home, among ourselves, we speak Ukrainian. But, you know, this Ukrainian isn’t really proper, it’s mixed.)

The language shift to Russian occurred in the context of migration from the country to the city, from urban centers where Polish was the language of everyday communication (e.g., Lviv) to the cities of south-eastern Ukraine; and from other Soviet republics (e.g., Belarus, Lithuania) to Ukraine. The switch was motivated by the need to adapt to the new Russian-speaking environment and involved the expansion of this language to the family sphere.

In the case of the older generation, their primary language was Polish or its eastern borderland variety (south- or north-eastern). Having arrived in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, they had to learn Russian, which then became their language of everyday communication. Thus, they abandoned Polish in favor of Russian. Today, this age group uses Polish only in exceptional situations, such as conversations with visitors from Poland and local priests, or Catholic confession. For their children, it was already Russian and not Polish that was the language of the family domain. It has to be stressed that the language shift from Polish to Russian stemmed also from the historical context and political developments of the period.

Writing about western Ukraine, Janusz Rieger aptly stresses:

Można przyjąć, że cała polska ludność na Ukrainie [tu: Zachodniej] włada dziś w większym lub mniejszym stopniu językiem ukraińskim (w jego postaci literackiej i/lub gwarowej) oraz rosyjskim, obydwoma w mowie i (lepiej lub gorzej) w piśmie. Nie zawsze tak było [Rieger 2007: 188].

(It could be assumed that the entire Polish population in [Western] Ukraine has a certain level of proficiency in Ukrainian (standard or local dialect) and Russian, both of them in speech and (to various extent) in writing. However, this situation has not always been the case.)

The survey was completed also by 150 representatives of the middle generation (see Figure 3.2). Among those living in the Donetsk oblast, the majority
(60) declared that they used Russian as the language of everyday communication, ten people used Ukrainian and three stated that they used both languages to the same extent. None of the respondents mentioned Polish and those who know the language use it only exceptionally. The results from Makiivka illustrate a general pattern, whereby the older respondents know Polish from their childhood, while the middle and the younger generation learned it in language courses, organized for example by their local Roman Catholic parishes.

The corresponding findings for the middle generation in the Zaporizhzhia oblast were as follows: Russian: 25, both Russian and Ukrainian: 11, Ukrainian: 5. Apart from this, 30 respondents declared the use of ‘a mixed language’ (i.e., a mix of Russian and Ukrainian), which was not included in the questionnaire and was added to the list by those surveyed themselves. Mixing Ukrainian with Russian is a well-known phenomenon broadly discussed in academic studies and referred to as Surzhyk (see section 3.7 below). In the course of

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2 A similar phenomenon of mixing Russian with Belarusian is observed in Belarus, particularly in the eastern regions of the country, and referred to as trasianka.
interviews, some informants specified that they speak ‘a mixed language’ which is ‘neither Ukrainian, nor Russian’; they were aware that it is not the correct use of either language.

We speak a kind of mixed language, it isn’t Russian and it isn’t Ukrainian either; we speak what we’ve learned, I don’t know the proper kind. I also have a little bit of Polish, but I can’t write; I’m already old and if I need something, my children write it for me. You know, it’s neither Russian, nor Ukrainian. I’ve heard Russian in Moscow, it’s proper there and it’s kind of mixed here. And you know yourself what good Ukrainian is like, but we don’t speak it properly either.

One of the informants made the following comment:

When I think about my first kiss, I think about it only in Polish; this boy was also Polish. I don’t even know if I’d be able to find the right words for these memories in Ukrainian or Russian, it’s something that can only be said in Polish. And these days, it’s Russian and Russian all the time; I speak Polish with our priest sometimes when I go to church.

Figure 3.3. The language of everyday communication of the younger generation of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine
Among the 60 members of the younger generation taking part in the survey, 46 declared Russian as their language of everyday communication, followed by both Russian and Ukrainian (9) and Ukrainian (5); (see Figure 3.3).

Considering the findings across the three age groups, the majority of the younger (77%) and the middle generation (57%) use Russian as the language of their everyday communication; the corresponding proportion for the older generation is 39%, with those declaring themselves as speaking Ukrainian at 45%. The pattern revealed in the survey was confirmed by interview findings: for the informants born in western regions of the country Ukrainian (or rather its local dialect) is one of the languages spoken at home.

A description of the language of everyday communication in the family domain should also take into consideration the fact that the Polish community has been living among other ethnic groups bound together by the Russian language, and its linguistic situation has been shaped by such important factors as:

– geographical dispersion of the community,
– mixed marriages,
– Russian-speaking environment.

Nataliya Shumarova writes:

zmiana języka komunikacji zmusza człowieka w wieku dorosłym (w większości wypadków) do przejścia okresu «wrastania» w inne środowisko językowe ze stratą przy tym na dostatecznie długi okres własnego językowego oblicza i często rozerwania psychologicznego związku z duchem języka ojczystego [Shumarova 2004: 58].

(in most cases, the change of one's language of communication in adult life requires a period of 'rooting' in a different language community. The process involves the loss of an own language for a considerable period of time, which often leads to breaking a psychological bond with its spirit.)

Such a situation can be observed in the case of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine, where they abandoned their Polish in favor of Russian. This can be attributed not only to the ethnic composition of the region, but also to the language policy imposed by the authorities, which determined the functions of each language along with their prestige and scope of usage.

3.3. Multilingualism and the Order of Language Acquisition

As revealed in the course of research, members of the Polish community in south-eastern Ukraine are active users of two languages, Ukrainian and Russian. Since the informants also have a command of Polish, even though they use it only exceptionally, they might be described as trilingual rather than bilingual. The different models of becoming, and functioning as, a multilingual person in different age groups are discussed below.
Most informants from the older generation were Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Belarusian bilinguals from birth, who became trilingual once they had settled in the region and acquired Russian. This is particularly the case of those born in the Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr and Lviv oblasts in today’s Ukraine, and the Hrodna and Vitsebsk oblasts in today’s Belarus. They come from mixed Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Belarusian families; some had a few years of education with Ukrainian as the language of instruction; some acquired Ukrainian at an early age when they played with Ukrainian-speaking children.


(I used to speak both Ukrainian and Polish; I did a few grades at school in Ukrainian. I talked to my mum in whatever (po wsiakomu); she prayed in Polish and sang Polish songs. We were deported in 1933; I had already been working in the kolkhoz, I took care of the cows, I was about thirteen when I started. My dad left us, he was also Polish… We were deported and it was really hard, I’m scared to even think about it. And then we spoke Russian everywhere and it’s been like this ever since.)

The informants who were deported from their home region of Zhytomyr to Kazakhstan and those born there were also Polish-Ukrainian bilinguals. As reported, once in Kazakhstan, they initially spoke Polish at home; in the course of time, they turned to Ukrainian and, finally, Russian. Over the years, Polish had eventually become only the language of religious devotion. After the deportation, a considerable number of mixed families whose language of everyday communication with the neighbors had been Ukrainian gradually abandoned Polish for Russian; the move was motivated by a higher social status of Russian, which gave its speakers a political and economic advantage.


(When I was a child, I only spoke Polish and Ukrainian, just as we are speaking now. Later, in Kazakhstan, it was forbidden. I can read Polish, I can understand everything, but speaking is really hard. I can speak Russian well. The prayers, that’s in Polish; we’ve learned them in Russian now, but we still pray in Polish. And in everyday situations, we speak a kind of our own language.)

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No i byli Ukraińcy. No Ukraińcy jakie były te od Przemyśla i te przywiezione od Polski i z nimi po ukraińsku rozmawialiśmy i my trzymali kupy z Ukraińcami, bo z tym narodem nie było można wytrzymać [tzn. z rosyjskim]. No na roboty na dwa–trzy miesiące. A tu wszyscy potem po rusku na robotach. Komandujuszczyzne wszyscy potem po rusku. Z mamą tylko po polsku, dopóki mama żyła, z mężem po ukraińsku i po rusku, a w pracy po rusku. W pracy była jedna Polka, ona była z Litwy, ale rozmawialiśmy po rusku. Jej muž był w KGB i nic nie można było, my rozmawiali, ale nie po polsku. To można było już po pieriestrojce [Melitopol 2007: interview].

(I was born in 1939 near Sambor [Ukr. Sambir]. We used to speak Polish at home; when we talked among ourselves, it was proper Polish. We, young people, we went away to pick cotton; we went by train and there were Ukrainians there too, you know, those from Przemyśl and those brought over from Poland, and we spoke Ukrainian with them and we stuck together, because we couldn’t stand those people [i.e. Russians]. Well, we went to work for two or three months and everyone spoke Russian there; all the foremen spoke Russian. With my mum, I always spoke Polish, until she died; with my husband, Ukrainian and Russian; at work, it was Russian. There was a Polish woman where I worked, she was from Lithuania, but we spoke Russian. Her husband was in the KGB and we couldn’t do anything else; we talked, but not in Polish. We could speak Polish only after the perestroika.)

Another group of the older generation includes informants born in pre-war Poland whose primary language was Polish and who settled in the region in various periods and for various reasons. Having arrived in the former Soviet Union, they acquired Russian in a number of different ways; some received their secondary or higher education in Russian, others learned the language on their own. In recent years, this group has turned to Ukrainian, which, as sometimes observed, is easier for them to learn because of its similarity to Polish.

Ja rudzona w Jarosławiu, no Polska w 1930 roku. Tak się stało, że moi rodzice wyjechali do Rosji, bo tak to się mówiło. W dzieciństwie tylko po polsku mówiło my, potem szkoła, studia, praca i tylko po rusku, tu nie ma z kim mówić po polsku. Dobrze, teraz jest Towarzystwo, poznaliśmy się, ale i zapomnieli niektórzy, nawet w Towarzystwie to więcej po rusku rozmawiamy, jak się zbieramy [Berdiansk 2010: interview].

(I was born in Jarosław, in Poland, in 1930. It so happened that my parents went to Russia, that’s what used to be said about all this [a euphemism for deportation]. When I was a child, we spoke only Polish; then there was school, studies, work, it was all in Russian only. There’s no one to talk to in Polish here. It’s good there’s this Society now, we’ve found one another, but some people have forgotten [the language] and even our meetings are mostly in Russian.)

W domu z rodzicami ja rozmawiałem po polsku, pochodzimy nawet z rodziny szlacheckiej. Jak znalazłem się tu w Rosji, trzeba było mówić po rosyjsku, szybko mi to przyszło i nie miałem żadnych kłopotów. Na studiach też mówiłem po rosyjsku i po tem w pracy. Po polsku tu nie było z kim rozmawiać. Wszyscy się bali, jeżeli nawet się
wiedziało, że ktoś jest Polakiem, to bał się odezwać po polsku, żeby potem nie było kłopotów. Tylko po rosyjsku. No ukraiński też znam, czytam i rozumiem, mogę też mówić [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

(I spoke Polish with my parents at home; we even come from a noble family. When I found myself here, in Russia, I had to speak Russian; I learned it really fast and it wasn’t any problem at all. I also spoke Russian when I was a student and later, at work. There was no one to talk to in Polish here. Everyone was afraid, even if you knew that someone was Polish, they were afraid to speak Polish in case they’d run into trouble. It was Russian only. And I know Ukrainian as well, I can read and understand it, I can also speak it.)

The middle generation can generally be regarded as trilingual. This age group includes informants originally coming from western Ukraine (Lviv, Khmelnytskyi,3 Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts), whose language spoken at home was Polish; some of them, particularly those from Lviv, graduated from Polish schools. Polish-Ukrainian bilinguals from birth, they generally arrived in the south-east to do their work placement on completion of studies, or in search of employment in the industrial centers of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts. They were young, well-educated people who spent a few years in the region and eventually settled there and started their families, most of them mixed.

(I was born in Lwów [Ukr. Lviv], I graduated from an excellent Polish school there, number ten, St Mary Magdalene’s. Polish is my favorite language, that’s the language in which I first learned to speak. In Lwów, I also learned Ukrainian well, I have very good Ukrainian. I edit our newspaper both in Polish and Ukrainian. Here in the Donbas, even Ukrainian papers are an exception. I also had Russian and ever since I moved to Makiejewka [Ukr. Makiivka] I’ve practically spoken only Russian. These days, it depends; there’s no one to talk to in Polish here, except the priest; more and more people are beginning to speak Ukrainian, but it’s Russian that’s the everyday language here.)

Od dzieciństwa rozmawiam po polsku i po ukraińsku. Po polsku nauczyli mnie rodzice w domu, sąsiedzi też mówili po polsku i po ukraińsku. Od kiedy siebie pamiętam, to te dwa języki znam dobrze. Tak, szkoła była ukraińska, ale wtedy w Związku Radzieckim było dużo lekcji języka rosyjskiego. Prasa i wszystkie media były w języku rosyjskim,

3 Until 1954, the name of the city was Proskuriv.
więc znam go dobrze. Teraz mieszkam tutaj i wszyscy mówią po rosyjsku, ja też dobrze mówię. Języka polskiego używam w różnych sytuacjach, na co dzień nie mam z kim mówić. Po ukraińsku już tutaj coraz więcej osób chce mówić, choć z trudem im się to udaje [Mariupol 2007: interview].

(I’ve spoken Polish and Ukrainian ever since I was a child. I learned Polish from my parents at home and the neighbors spoke Polish and Ukrainian as well. I’ve spoken these two languages well ever since I can remember. Yes, school was in Ukrainian, but back then, in the Soviet Union, there were a lot of Russian lessons. The newspapers and all the media were in Russian, so I know it well. I live here now, everyone speaks Russian and I’m a good Russian speaker, too. I use Polish in various situations, but I have no one to talk to every day. There are already more and more people who want to speak Ukrainian, but it isn’t easy around here.)

The second group of the middle generation includes persons born in Poland. Because they have not yet acquired a command of Ukrainian which would enable them to satisfactorily express their ideas, they tend to consider themselves Polish-Russian bilinguals.

Ja się urodził w krakowskim województwie, Nowy Sącz, a mieszkał ja w gorzowskim województwie. Tam ja uczył się do piątego klasa, i my przyjechali tu do Rosji w tym czasie. Mama u mienia Russkaja. Tam my rozmawiali po polsku w domu, a tu przyjechali i wszystko po rusku. Tak się połucziło, że czterdzieści lat było pusto. Nie było kościoła... No i ukraiński znam, znam, ale ciężko mówić [Mariupol 2007: interview].

(I was born in the Cracow province, in Nowy Sącz [Poland], and I lived in the Gorzów Wielkopolski province [Poland]. I went to school there and we came here, to Russia, when I was in the fifth grade. My mum is Russian. There, we spoke Polish at home, but it’s been only Russian since we came here and so I spoke no Polish for forty years. There was no church... And, well, I know Ukrainian, I do, but I find it hard to speak.)

Other representatives of the middle generation were born in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and have always used Russian as their first language. Since 1990, they have started taking Polish language courses in their home region or in Poland. In addition, the requirements of their career have recently come to include a good Ukrainian, which prompted them to learn it on their own or to take language courses for different professions. Consequently, having started to learn both Polish and Ukrainian, they have become trilingual.

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(We’ve always spoken Russian at home, same at school. I was born in Krasnyi Luch, everyone there spoke Russian and they still do. Then I graduated in Ukrainian philology; I’d taken different courses when I was a student, I also did my PhD studies in Poland. I know all these languages very well, I can both speak and write. Poles in Poland often say poszłem [‘I goed,’ masc.] instead of poszedłem [‘I went,’ masc.]. I’ve no idea how they can’t see it’s wrong. And it’s the same with Ukrainians in western Ukraine; they don’t speak standard Ukrainian but their own dialect.)

One of the informants comments on her acquisition of Polish and Ukrainian as follows:


(My dad is Polish and he has very good Polish, my mum is Russian. We’ve always spoken Russian at home, at school and among the neighbors. It was only after 1990 that I started to learn Polish, taking different courses in Poland, and now I know it very well. I still speak Russian to my dad at home, that’s how it’s always been. I use my Polish mostly in Poland or here, when someone I talk to speaks Polish. I read a lot in Polish to expand my vocabulary. I also have good Ukrainian; it’s just like my Polish.)

It is hardly possible to talk about multilingualism in the younger generation, which is mostly Russian-speaking and is learning Ukrainian and Polish as second languages. In this age group, Russian is the language of both social communication and the family sphere. The ongoing process of acquisition of Ukrainian takes place in the educational system, but pupils still use Russian among themselves during school breaks. Although Polish speakers in this generation are rare, the language is quite popular to learn. The exceptional cases of young people studying in Poland are not included in the present discussion.

Bilingualism is a frequent subject of studies on ethnic minorities both in Poland and around the world. According to the classic approach of Uriel Weinreich, it is ‘[t]he practice of alternately using two languages,’ with the persons involved accordingly called bilingual [Weinreich 1970: 1; cf. also Mackey 1987; Romaine 1989; Miodunka 2003; Lipińska 2003; Grucca (ed.) 1981]. The author suggests that the phenomenon can also occur in the case of two related linguistic systems, as well as subsystems of the same language [Weinreich 1970: 1–2].

In his description of the bilingual individual, Einar Haugen considers such factors as:

– the level of proficiency in the second language,
– the degree of difference between the linguistic systems in contact,
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– the environment in which the two languages are used,
– the extent of resulting interference [Haugen 1953, after Smułkowa 2002: 308].

All of them are interdependent and all have to be taken into account in the study of bilingualism, including the type of bilingualism which stems from territorial contact between languages and their dialects [Smułkowa 2002: 308].

Three types of bilingualism can be distinguished:
– territorial (coexistence of different languages in the same territory),
– social (different languages used in the same community),
– institutional (occurring in the setting of international organizations) [cf. Dzięgiel 2003: 65].

Each of them can involve equal or hierarchical status of the languages involved. Charles A. Ferguson introduced the term ‘diglossia,’ which he used with reference to hierarchical and institutionalized social bilingualism, whereby two registers (high and low) of the same language are used in different social contexts across the population. While the high register is used in the official, literary and religious contexts, the low one is the means of everyday and unofficial communication. The two functions can equally be served by two different languages [Bednarczuk 1987: 3–4].

A discussion of bilingualism should consider the social context of bilingual individuals and larger groups. Ewa Lipińska observes:

O bilingwizmie społecznym mówi się, mając na myśli dwie grupy relatywnie samo-rzędne, pozostające w kontakcie na wspólnym terytorium działania. Tu ważną rolę odgrywają takie czynniki, jak: liczba ludności, warunki ekonomiczne, społeczne, wyznaniowe, kulturowe, psychiczne, a także polityka językowa prowadząca do wytworzenia sytuacji zbliżonej do stanu równowagi [Lipińska 2003: 100].

(Social bilingualism refers to a situation in which two relatively independent groups remain in contact in a shared territory. In such cases, important factors include the size of the groups and their economic, social, religious, cultural and psychological characteristics, as well as language policy aiming to create a balance between them.)

A discussion of individual bilingualism should also take into account the following factors: origin, competence, function (use) and attitude in terms of

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4 In her discussion of the linguistic situation in north-eastern Poland (Polish-Lithuanian borderland), Elżbieta Smułkowa observes:

‘w przypadku używania dialektów tego samego języka nie można mówić o bilingwizmie, ponieważ obydwa znajdujące się w kontakcie dialekty, będąc różnymi systemami, równocześnie realizują ogólny system języka, do którego należą. Ażeby mówiący dialekt A rozumiał dialekt B, nie musi opanowywać całkiem nowego systemu semiotycznego’ [Smułkowa 2002: 313].

(‘the users of two dialects of the same language cannot be identified as bilinguals: while both dialects which are in contact are two different systems, they implement the same general pattern of the language they are parts of. A speaker of Dialect A does not have to become familiar with an entirely new semiotic system to understand a speaker of Dialect B.’)
internal and external identification [Lipińska 2003: 100]. In natural conditions, individual and group bilingualism are interdependent, as the existence and communicative functioning of a bilingual community is conditioned by individual bilingualism of its members, which, in turn, is indispensable for an individual who wants to effectively engage in communication within such a community [Woźniakowski 1982: 5].

The focus of my interest is both social (group) and individual bilingualism. A bilingual can be characterized as a person using two languages to the same extent, and with the same level of competence, in a formal and informal environment, i.e. a person who has the ability to speak two languages automatically and fluently on any subject in any situation and to make an impression of having a native command of both of them [Mindak 1983: 206].

The present study adopts a working definition of bilingualism put forward by Józef Porayski-Pomsta and Björn Wiemer in their research proposal for a project on multilingualism in Polish communities in the countries of the former Soviet Union; the authors interpret the concept as

umiejętność, w której zakładane jest jako minimum posługiwanie się dwoma языками на ко дней в таки способ, aby używająca ich osoba X potrafia w sytuacjach wymagających języka potocznego porozumieć się w każdym z tych dwóch języków z innymi osobami znającymi tylko jeden z tych dwóch języków, w sposób dla tych osób zrozumiały i bez szczególnej pomocy gestów, mimiki lub środków paralingwalnych, a także aby potrafia odbierać wszystko, co do niej mówią owe inne osoby, ze słuchu [Porayski-Pomsta, Wiemer 1994: 119].

(the ability to use two languages as a means of everyday communication at least at a level that enables their user to communicate in any of them with speakers of just one of them in everyday situations in such a way as to make him- or herself understood without an excessive use of gestures, mimics, or paralanguage, and to fully understand the message of their interlocutors.)

As discussed above, the multilingualism of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine results from a number of factors. The decision to learn another language or other languages and become bilingual or multilingual was stimulated mainly by the historical and political context, such as coercive or voluntary settlement in the region and the state language policy. What played an important role was also the demographic characteristics of the Polish minority, its dispersed pattern of settlement and a considerable geographical distance from the Polish border. The present contribution does not exhaust the question of bi- and trilingualism of Poles living in south-eastern Ukraine and the problem needs further detailed study.
3.4. Polish and East Slavic Languages in Contact

According to the approach proposed by Uriel Weinreich, one of the founding fathers of modern contact linguistics, \(^5\) ‘two or more languages [are] said to be in contact if they are used alternately by the same persons’ [Weinreich 1970: 1]. The author identifies ‘the language-using individuals’ as ‘the locus of the contact’ and explains its mechanism considering the principal factors: interference as deviation from the norm occurring in the speech of bilinguals as a result of language contact, the phenomenon of bilingualism, and the socio-cultural setting of language contact.

Both in Poland and Ukraine, theory of language contact has been discussed extensively, \(^6\) including various interpretations of the concept itself. For example, Olga Akhmanova defines it as

\[
\text{соприкосновение языков, возникающее вследствие особых географических, исторических и социальных условий, приводящих к необходимости языкового общения человеческих коллективов, говорящих на разных языках [Akhmanova 1966: 535].}
\]

(interaction between languages resulting from specific geographical, historical and social conditions necessitating linguistic communication between communities speaking different languages.)

Likewise, Viktor Rozentsveig treats it as ‘verbal communication between two language communities’ (‘Речевое общение между двумя языковыми коллективами’) [Rozentsveĭg 1972: 3]. On the other hand, in her discussion of lexical interference in spoken Romanian in Ukraine, Liubov Lazarenko adopts a perspective which is closer to Weinreich and perceives language contact in broader terms than Akhmanova or Rozentsveig:

\[
\text{Мовний контакт – це міжмовний зв’язок, який реалізується в процесі попере-}
\]

\[
\text{мінного використання двох або декількох мов однією і тією ж особою, що зумов-}
\]

\[
\text{люється необхідністю мовного спілкування через певні географічні, історичні,}
\]

\[
\text{політичні, соціокультурні тощо умови та чинники [Lazarenko 2001: 11–12].}
\]

(It is contact between languages which occurs in the process of alternate use of two or more languages by the same person, resulting from the necessity of verbal communication produced by geographical, historical, political and socio-cultural factors.)

Polish studies of language contact include, for example, works by Kazimierz Feleszko describing the multicultural and multi-ethnic community in

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\(^5\) The problems of language contact have been a focus of attention particularly in American linguistics, see Geerts 1987; Oksaar 1997.

\(^6\) For example, on promising applications of the areal method in the study of language contact, see Wolnicz-Pawłówiska 2001.
the Chernivtsi region in Ukraine [e.g. Feleszko 2002: 87–128]. The problem of the Polish-Belarusian-Lithuanian interference in north-eastern Poland has been discussed by Elżbieta Smułkowa, who provides an assessment of general patterns and principal mechanisms of multiple language contact [Smułkowa 2002: 306–331]. In her study of the Polish minority in the so-called Kaunas Lithuania (the part of Lithuania which was an independent state in 1918–1940), Anna Zielińska stresses the social aspect of multilingualism: whether acquired in the process of social interaction or in the educational setting, the use of different languages as a means of everyday communication is an essential element involved.

According to Weinreich, language contact can involve two different languages, dialects of the same language or varieties of the same dialect; the degree of similarity between the two systems is immaterial, as the mechanisms of deviation from the norms of the language (i.e. interference) under the conditions of stable language contact (i.e. consistent use of more than one language by members of a community) are essentially the same.

Weinreich also distinguishes the type of language contact resulting from bilingualism. This type of language contact can occur between related systems, i.e. varieties of the same language (dialects, local dialects) or closely related languages (as in the case of bilingualism or multilingualism of the population of Polish origin in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts); or different systems (as in the case of Ukrainian and Romanian, or bilingualism of Polish population in the Romanian-speaking environment).

Language contact which does not involve bilingualism consists in geographical contact between different language systems and can occur both between varieties of the same language (dialects or local dialects), and different languages characterized by various degrees of relatedness (as in the case of the neighboring south-eastern local dialects of Polish and local dialects of Ukrainian). There may also be non-territorial contact which takes place at the cultural level, for example between literary languages (e.g. English borrowings in the field of information and communication technology).

Using the term proposed by Elżbieta Smułkowa [2002: 307], the type of language contact involving bilingualism unrelated to territorial contact is referred to as ‘individual’ (Pol. osobniczy), with the resulting linguistic features functioning as variants within the system (i.e. interference as both the process and the result). Such contact can manifest itself in code-switching (i.e. alternating between languages within the text depending on the situational context) and inconsistent diffusion of elements from one language to the other [cf. Zielińska 1996: 19].

The present discussion is focused on the bilingual Polish population in south-eastern Ukraine, where the informants use systems developed as a result of contact between the following Slavic languages:

– Polish and Russian or Surzhyk,
– Polish, Ukrainian and Russian,
– Russian, Ukrainian and Polish currently being learned by a certain proportion of the population under consideration,
– Ukrainian, Russian and Polish learned as a foreign language.

In the case of the population under consideration, language contact has been greatly influenced by social and historical processes and occurred at different levels of communication. What cannot remain unnoticed is the psychological factor of the phenomenon, particularly important in the older generation, including people arrested in and around Lviv in 1945 and deported to the mines of the Donbas.


(In the mines, everybody spoke Russian; everyone was afraid to speak Polish. Poles often informed on one another if someone spoke Polish; they did it to make their life easier, but then the informers were also killed. These were hard times; then [we] all mixed up here, found husbands, Ukrainians or Russians, and spoke only Russian.)

As generally known, nearly all managerial positions in the region were taken by the Russians and Russian was the official language:

Było też kilkanaście Rosjanek, te od pierwszych chwil objęły funkcje kierownicze jako komendantki, kierowniczki kuchni, pralni, magazynu [Kulczyńska 1988: 18].

(There were also several Russian women, who were immediately put in charge as commanders and kitchen, laundry and warehouse managers.)

In another group of the older generation (informants born in the Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Vinnytsia oblasts), language contact involves also Ukrainian. As reported, their first language was Polish, which they had still used at home after their deportation to Kazakhstan. Today, their means of everyday communication is not Polish but Ukrainian, or rather a dialect variety of the language.

My w Kazachstanie w domu z rodzicami i z ciołkami tylko po polsku, ale po cichu, bo jak ktoś przyszedł cudzy, to już po rusku. Zawsze my też modlili się po cichutku w domu, my po polsku [Bohatyrivka 2007: interview].

(In Kazakhstan, we always spoke Polish with our parents and aunts at home, but very quietly; when someone else came round, we spoke Russian. We also always prayed at home in Polish, really quietly.)

Among the informants born in Poland (e.g., Piotrków Trybunalski and Warsaw), language contact resulted from their migration and intensified in the course of their lives, initially involving Polish and Russian, and later also Ukrainian.
Considering the nature of contact, the middle generation can be subdivided into two groups: those originally coming from the eastern Polish borderlands, where Polish was the primary language (however, not in the case of the entire Polish population of the region), and those born already in the Donbas or Zaporizhzhia who learned it. The former category includes also informants who received their education in Polish schools in Lviv and people from Polish families where Polish was the primary language; it should be noted that in their home region Polish was in constant contact with Ukrainian.

Kontaktowaliśmy potem już tutaj [w Doniecku] po rosyjsku, jak było nam ciężko, to nikt nie wie, ale trzeba było wszystko to, co polskie zabyć. Plątało mi się wszystko najpierw, a potem trzeba było się przyzwyczaić. No tu wszystko po rusku i męża sobie ruskiego znaszła i tak już zostało. Nu ja wim, czy on Ruski, po rusku rozmawiamy, ale on nie wie kto [Donetsk 2007: interview].

(Then we spoke Russian here [in Donetsk]; it’s difficult to imagine how hard it was for us, but we had to forget anything Polish altogether. I mixed it all up at first, and then I had to get used to it. Well, it’s all in Russian here; I found a Russian husband and it’s always been Russian. But how do I know if he’s Russian, we speak Russian, but he doesn’t really know who he is.)

In the second group, language contact has been more complex; these informants have learned Polish at language courses organized as of 1990 in Poland or in their home region:

Oj, ja bardzo dobrze po polsku mówię, nu nigdy z dzieciństwa po polsku nie rozważaliśmy, ale za tyle lat można było się nauczyć, ja co roku do Polski jeżdżę i na kursy i tam uczę się wszystkiego [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

(Me, I speak Polish really well; we never spoke Polish when I was a child, but there was a lot of time to learn it; I go to Poland every year, I take courses and that’s where I learn everything.)

Zawsze po rosyjsku rozmawiamy tutaj, ukraińskiego też się nauczyłem, mało kto w języku literackim ukraińskim u nas mówi. Po polsku uważam też, że bardzo dobrze mówię i piszę. Trochę studiowałem w Polsce, często tam jestem, czasami Polacy w Polsce nie wyczuwają nawet akcentu [Berdiansk 2007: interview].

(We always speak Russian here; I’ve also learned Ukrainian; there are very few people who speak standard Ukrainian around here. I also think that I have very good Polish, I can speak and write very well. I studied in Poland a bit, I go over there quite often; sometimes Poles in Poland don’t even notice my accent.)

7 The definition of the term as proposed by Leon Zawadowski: ‘out of two or more languages used by an individual, the principal or primary language is that one which he uses for the basic range of subjects […] (every day talking). More specially: it is the language used for home and family intercourse; it is also the language which is transmitted to the children directly (without the medium of another language […]’) [Zawadowski 1961: 14].
The pattern of language contact is particularly complex in the case of the younger generation. It has to be stressed that what plays a major role in this age group is the environment of language use (home, school, official institutions). Young informants are faster learners, have a certain command of both Russian and Ukrainian and can distinguish between the two systems; their Polish is learned rather than acquired.

A description of language contact of the Polish minority in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts cannot overlook the geographical location of the region or the fact that various ethnic groups living there are migrant communities which adopted Russian as a result of Soviet policy. In addition, Russian was also the language of high culture and prestige for a considerable period of time. Indeed, the informants are very well acquainted with Russian rather than Ukrainian cultural heritage. The domination of the Russian language stemmed also from the geographical dispersion of the Polish community, mixed marriages and the fragmented ethnic composition of the region, with Russian (influenced by phonetic, morphological and lexical features of other languages with which it was in contact) used as the means of everyday communication. While the present study is focused mainly on the urban population, it could be added that there is also a relatively very small number of Poles still living in some rural settlements in south-eastern Ukraine (which are entirely different from those in the western part of the country).

Informants who arrived in the region quickly adopted Russian as their means of communication:

Po polsku nie można było z nikim, po ukraińsku jak mówiłam, wszyscy się śmiali, że jestem chochołkom i ze wsi i nawet nie mogłam się wykłócić. Jak się tylko nauczyłam po rosyjsku, to zaraz się bali w pracy na zawodzie, że mogę wydać i miałam spokój. A teraz tak mi zostało. Po polsku nie mam z kim tutaj (Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview).

(I couldn't make myself understood in Polish and when I spoke Ukrainian, everybody laughed at me, I was a khokholok [derogatory] from the country; I couldn't even put up an argument. As soon as I learned Russian, people I worked with at the factory were afraid that I could inform on them and they left me alone. And I still speak Russian. There's no one to talk to in Polish here.)

Language contact can result in language shift (a process observed among the members of the older generation of Polish speakers in south-eastern Ukraine) and the eventual extinction of a language once it has lost all its speakers. Language shift can be complete or partial, i.e. limited only to some domains (such as work, education or contact with the administration). However, even in cases of complete language shift, the users of the new language generally tend to preserve certain features of their previous system (such as articulation, syntactic structures, lexical elements, or the onomastic system) for a considerable period of time; the phenomenon is referred to as 'substratum
influence’ [Bednarczuk 1987: 3]. In the case of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine there are also extra-linguistic factors which need to be taken into consideration (e.g., geographical location, the size and characteristics of the community and the type of its culture).

To conclude, ever since the early nineteenth century, Polish speakers in south-eastern Ukraine have been exposed to language contact involving Polish-Ukrainian/Belarusian, Polish-Russian bilingualism or Polish-Ukrainian/Belarusian-Russian trilingualism.

3.5. Attitudes towards Languages

Informants from the older generation of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine have a very positive attitude to the Polish language, which some of them characterize as ‘nice’ (Pol. ładny), ‘the language of prayer’ (Pol. język modlitwy), ‘a cultured language’ (Pol. język kulturalny):

To mój język rodzimy, ale stracony, bo tutaj nie ma z kim po polsku rozmawiać, a taki ładny [Donetsk 2012: interview].

(It’s my family language, but I’ve lost it because there’s no one to talk to in Polish here, and it’s such a nice language.)

According to some respondents, Polish played a major role in their childhood spent in their home region; it was also the language of their education (mainly in Lviv):

W tym języku uczyłem się, chodziłem do szkoły, świetni profesorowie, piękną polszczyzną mówili, czytali, wykładali. To była klasa. Zachwycałem się polskim językiem po takich lekcjach, przychodziłem do domu i starałem się wdrożyć ten piękny język w domu z rodzicami, w domu nieco inną polszczyzną mówiono. A w tej naszej dziesiątce, oj, tam to naprawdę uczono pięknego polskiego języka [Donetsk 2007: interview].

(That was the language of my education; I went to school [which had] fantastic teachers; they spoke, read aloud, lectured in beautiful Polish. They had class. After such lessons,

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8 The concept of substratum was systematically analyzed by Walther von Wartburg; in his view, the conquest of a territory inhabited by speakers of a different language results in a period of bilingualism lasting for a number of generations, with one language eventually prevailing over the other. If the dominant language is that of the newcomers, the language of the native population becomes the substratum; if the case is opposite and the indigenous language prevails, the language of the newcomers becomes the superstratum [after Bednarczuk 1987: 5]. Indirect manifestations of substratum influence include: (1) elimination (levelling) of certain linguistic features which are difficult to imitate for new speakers of the language; (2) accelerated evolution of language by developing both inherited and new tendencies; (3) differentiation of the language imposed over a large area under the influence of different substrata; (4) convergence of different languages under the influence of their common substratum [Bednarczuk 1987: 6].
I was enchanted with the language, I used to come back home and try to use it with my parents; our Polish that we spoke at home was a bit different. And in our school, number ten, yes, they really taught us beautiful Polish there.

Those members of the older generation who did not have an opportunity to learn Polish at school are also very positive about the language, which they refer to as ‘beautiful’ (Rus. красивый, krasivyy), ‘nice’ (Rus. приятный, prizнатный), ‘warm’ (Rus. душевный, dushevnyy), ‘gentle’ (Rus. нежный, nezhnyy); for example:


(I really like Polish, that’s the language of my granny and grandpa. They spoke it very gently; I always liked to listen to it. It was only in Polish that they told they loved each other; it was so nice to listen to this. And then it all changed, my parents were afraid to speak Polish and I can’t anymore, but I really like it. I’m already seventy, maybe I’m still going to hear someone tell me in Polish that they love me; but I’m too old now.)

Likewise, the middle generation of those questioned shares the same attitude to Polish. They are happy that they can attend Polish courses in their region, but they also find it important to have an opportunity to learn Polish in Poland.

Polskij jazyk ja oczień lublu, ja oczień rada, chto u nas pripadajetsia polskij jazyk, ja chožu tuda i dietiej wysyłaju. Jeszczio oczeń ważnoje jest to, chto nas Polsza prigłasza-jet na kursy w Polszu, my możem uwidiet’ wsu kulturu naszewo polskowo naroda, my že czastica tože polskogo naroda. Jazyk polskij mnie oczień i oczień nrawitsia. Mnogo słuszaju i czitaju w Internetie [Berdiansk 2011: interview].

(I like Polish a lot and I’m really happy that it’s taught here; I come here myself and send my children as well. It’s also important that we get invited to courses in Poland, we can see the culture of our Polish nation; we’re also a part of the Polish nation. I really like Polish very much. I read and I listen to it a lot on the Internet.)

Those who know Polish from their childhood also have a positive attitude to the language. As they explain, it is good to know one’s own native tongue, even though it is not always possible to use it in practice.

Da nu polskij ja lublu, daże oczień lublu, to jest taki piękny język. Ja dobrze znaju pol-skij, mogłaby daże być tłumaczem, no ale komu i co ja tu będę tłumaczyć. Do Polski daleko, ludzi u nas nie robią takich biznesów, jak ludzi ze Lwowa. Do nas daleko i to bardzo daleko. A ja tak wspominam ten polskij język i až płakać się chce. Doma tak
nie mam z kim rozmawiać, no tylko z księdzem i to czasami, bo bolsze u nas po rusku rozmawiają [Zaporizhzhia 2011: interview].

(Yes, I like Polish, I love it even; it’s such a beautiful language. I have good Polish, I could even be a translator, but who would I translate for around here, and what? It’s far from Poland and there’s no such business with Poland as in Lvów [Ukr. Lviv]. We’re far, really far. And I really miss the Polish language, I feel like crying when I think about it. I have no one to talk to at home, there’s only the priest, and it’s only sometimes; it’s mostly Russian around here.)

Informants from the younger generation who are learning Polish also have a favorable view of the language; some of them learn it with an intention to study in Poland and improve their career prospects. Members of this age group think it is good to know Polish as it is the language of a neighboring country; they also have a keen interest in life in Poland.


(Well, a friend of mine studied in Poland, she got a good job in a bank. And those who study here won’t get such a job. But she has Polish and I’m only learning; I like it a lot; I want to go to Poland. I’m a fan of Poland.)

When it comes to the Russian language, members of the older generation express different opinions. Those with a positive attitude explain it, for example, as follows:

Tut żywiom i tak nado kak wsie razgawariwat’; nu czto ja sdielaju. Wot jazyk charoszyj, multiki kakije charoszyje i woobszcze jazyk russkij nu mieżdunarodnyj [Donetsk 2009: interview].

(That’s where we live and we have to speak just like everyone, there’s nothing much I can do about it. It’s a good language, Russian cartoons are great and the language is everywhere, I mean it’s international.)

There were also those who had a negative attitude to Russian, stemming mainly from their experience: coercive settlement and the economic hardship of life in south-eastern Ukraine.

Tak, ja byłam młoda, jak nas siuda wysłali. W Samborze nie było pracy, dużo dzieci, ciężko było w domu. Nu, mnie było trzynaście lat i brali na zbieranie bawełny i ja pojechałam. No co rozmawiałam ja zawsze po polsku i po ukraińsku. No wywieźli nas tutaj w stepy, a tu wsie komandujuszczije na ruskom, a poszła ja dale i tam po rusku i potem nawet zabraniali nam po ukraińsku rozmawiać i tak nauczyła się ja tego ruskiego, ale ja nie lubię tego języka, choćby nie wiem co [Melitopol 2011: interview].
(Well, I was young when I was sent here. There was no work in Sambor [Ukr. Sambir], a lot of kids, it was hard at home. I was thirteen, they looked for people to pick cotton and so I went. I’d always spoken Polish and Ukrainian. And they brought us here to the steppe, and all the foremen spoke Russian; I went further and it was the same, and later we were even forbidden to speak Ukrainian, so I learned Russian, but I don’t like this language, I don’t like it, no way.)

The middle generation displays a positive attitude to Russian, which has always been the language of everyday communication in this age group in the domain of family, neighborhood, work and in contacts with the administration. Its widespread use resulted also from the political propaganda under the Soviet Union. As explained by one of the informants, Russian is considered a ‘more cultured’ language, in which they can express themselves best:


(I like that it’s all in Russian here, I can understand everything, even if it’s a Polish festival. This language is, you know, more cultured, it’s so beautiful and everyone can understand everything. I like Russian; and I also like Polish, but you can put things so well in Russian, I mean I can, and I can’t do it so well in Polish.)

In this group, Russian is the primary language. While it is still considered international, the informants are aware that they use a different variety than that spoken in Moscow or St Petersburg and sometimes refer to it as ‘our Donbas Russian’:

Konieczno nasz russkij, eto nie tot maskowskij ili pitierskij akcent, ani tam po swo-jemu razgawariawajut, a my dzieś wot tak po-donbasku. Tak wot i doma i w szkolie, nu wiezie wot my razgawariwajem naszym donbashkim [Donetsk 2009: interview].

(Surely our Russian is not the same as the Moscow or Petersburg accent; they speak it their own way there, and us, here, we speak it the Donbas way. So, we speak our Donbas Russian at home and at school and, well, everywhere.)

The younger generation displays various attitudes to Russian, with both positive and negative opinions expressed in the interviews. A positive view of the language was manifested in such comments as ‘everybody knows Russian,’ ‘it used to be an international language,’ or ‘everyone here in the Donbas speaks the language.’ Those who are against it declared for example:

(We don’t need Russian here; it’s Ukraine and I don’t want Russian to be spoken here. I really think it should be Ukrainian. Wretched politics and wretched language; no Russian, no way.)

As far as Ukrainian is concerned, the older generation has a positive attitude to the language; for some informants, it was the language of their childhood and early school education:

Ukrainskij jazyk jest podobny do polskoho i ja oczień lublu, on taki fajnyj, i ja daże w szkolu chadiła i tam ucziłaś w Tiernopoli na Ukrainskom. Uże troche zabała, ale znaju, znaju i lublu jego, oj kak lublu [Donetsk 2010: interview].

(Ukrainian is similar to Polish and I like it a lot, it’s so nice. I even did my school in Ukrainian there, in Ternopol [Ukr. Ternopil]. I’ve already forgotten it a bit, but I know it, yes, and I like it, I really like it a lot.)

Those who do not know Ukrainian also share this view of the language:

Tak tut dołżno byt’ na ukrainskom, dzierżawa to ukrainskaja i tak dołżno byt’, tie Ruskije mnogo uže nam płochowo sδielali, a wot puskaj budiet Ukraina. Ja nie znaju ukrainskogo, no etot jazyk ja oczień lublu [Zaporizhzhia 2010: interview].

(It should be Ukrainian around here; it’s the Ukrainian state, and that’s what it should be like. These Russians, they’ve done us so much harm already, so let there be Ukraine. I don’t speak Ukrainian, but I like this language a lot.)

Some negative opinions in the middle generation stem mostly from the fact that members of this age group generally do not know the language:

Oj ukrainskij, nu kakoj ukrainskij, tut wsie na ruskom, a zacziem ukrainskij, nado nauczitsia snaczała, a kto siejczas budiet uczitsia ukrainskogo i zacziem, niet eto nie dla mienia [Donetsk 2010: interview].

(Ukrainian, what Ukrainian; everyone here speaks Russian, so what’s it for; you have to learn it from scratch and who’s going to learn Ukrainian now and what for; no, that’s not for me.)

The informants are aware that hardly anybody in the region speaks standard Ukrainian; they refer to the local variety as ‘mixed’ (Ukr. мішаний, mishanyï; Rus. смешанный, smeshannyï), ‘not proper Ukrainian’ (Rus. не чистый украинский, ne chystyĭ ukrainskiĭ), or ‘a mixture’ (Rus. смесь, smes’):

Nu my po ukrajiński, da nu my choczem, nu kakoj on nasz ukrainśki, wot takoj mieszanyj jazyk, nito ukrainśki ni to ruskij, wso wmiestie. Wot tam wo Lwowie ani na ukrainском i rozmowłąjut’, nu a my tut, eto, że kakaja to smieś jazykow, nikto dzieś czisty ukrainśkim nie razmawlaje [Zaporizhzhia 2011: interview].
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(Well, us, yes, we want to speak Ukrainian; what we speak isn’t really Ukrainian, well, it’s a mixed language, neither Ukrainian, nor Russian; it’s all mixed together. There, in Lwów [Ukr. Lviv], there they speak Ukrainian; and us, here, it’s something like a mixture of languages; no one speaks proper Ukrainian here.)

The younger generation has a very positive attitude to the Ukrainian language. In their opinion, Ukraine, which has been an independent state for two decades, should protect Ukrainian and strive to promote it on a large scale. It is also stressed that a widespread use of the official language makes it easier for all the citizens to define their own national identity, including Ukrainians themselves, who do not always have a clearly developed sense of national self-identification.

Ukraińskij musi być, to jest fajny język i musi, musi każdy nim rozmawiać, jak ma paszport ukraiński. Nu sami Ukraińcy, nam Polakam pomaga język ukraiński i to, że państwo ukraińskie, że my możemy swobodnie powiedzieć, że my Polacy, tak i drugi nacjonalności, toże im to łatwiej pójdzie. Muszą znać ukraiński [Berdiansk 2011: interview].

(It’s got to be Ukrainian, it’s a nice language and everyone really has to speak it if they have a Ukrainian passport, also Ukrainians themselves. With the Ukrainian language, and the Ukrainian state, it easier for us, Poles; we can openly say we’re Polish, and it’s the same with other nationalities, it’s going to be easier for them as well. They’ve got to speak Ukrainian.)

Żeby było państwo silne, to musi być język państwowy wszędzie, głównie w urzędach, w administracji. Prezydent i rząd ukraiński powinni tylko używać ukraińskiego, a nie rosyjskiego, jak teraz. No i inteligencja jest nośnikiem wysokiej kultury ukraińskiej, ja zdecydowanie jestem za ukraińskim. Rosyjski niech sobie odpocznie. Obywatele Ukrainy muszą znać dobrze ukraiński, jak można żyć w państwie i nie znać swojego języka? To zadanie należy przede wszystkim do młodych ludzi, bo starsi już nie nauczą się [Donetsk 2011: interview].

(If the state is to be strong, the official language has to be used everywhere, especially in the administration and offices. The president and the government should only speak Ukrainian and not Russian as they do now; and it’s the same about intelligentsia, they’re the bearers of Ukrainian high culture. I’m all for Ukrainian myself. We need to give Russian a break. Ukrainian citizens have to know Ukrainian; how can you live in a state if you don’t know the language? That’s the task for the young, because the elderly won’t learn it anymore.)

The following Tables (3.2, 3.3, 3.4) show the patterns of language use in the family domain among the older, middle and younger generations of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine.
The Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine is generally trilingual, particularly in the case of the older generation, which once used Polish in the family and neighborhood domains, and sometimes also in the domain of education (see Table 3.2). The language shift in the family domain can be attributed to a number of reasons, such as the change of social environment (the neighborhood domain), an increasing proportion of mixed marriages, the Soviet language policy, both at the republican and the regional level, and the fact that there were no Roman Catholic churches or Polish organizations, and no opportunity for contact with Polish. The situation in the family domain also changed as a result of the domination of Russian in education in the post-war period. Today, members of the Polish minority use Polish only exceptionally, i.e. in contact with Catholic priests from Poland working in the region, visitors from Poland, and, quite rarely, in the meetings of Polish associations.

**Table 3.2.** The patterns of language use in the family domain in the older generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Ukrainian/Belarusian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Childhood</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today</td>
<td>Very seldom</td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The middle generation is bi- or trilingual, with some members of the age group having acquired Polish at home in their childhood (see Table 3.3). Since it was Russian that dominated the domains of neighborhood, education, work and administration, it easily expanded also in the family domain. It should be noted that as a result of the language policy imposed by Moscow, informants from this age group were the ones most exposed to Russian, with Polish eventually pushed

**Table 3.3.** The patterns of language use in the family domain in the middle generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Ukrainian/Belarusian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Childhood</td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
out of the family domain. Today, even those who try to use Polish do it only exceptionally, i.e. in contact with visitors or Catholic priests from Poland, in Polish language classes, or during their visits to Poland, rather than in the family.

**Table 3.4. The patterns of language use in the family domain in the younger generation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Ukrainian/Belarusian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Childhood</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today</td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of the younger generation of Poles in the region, their language in the family domain has always been Russian (see Table 3.4). This situation stems from the way they were brought up by the older and the middle generations, who (for reasons discussed above) abandoned Polish in favor of Russian.

### 3.6. Observations on Interference Phenomena in Polish

According to the definition proposed by Uriel Weinreich, interference phenomena are ‘instances of deviation from the norms of either language which occur in the speech of bilinguals as a result of their familiarity with more than one language, i.e. as a result of language contact’ [Weinreich 1970: 1].

Stanisław Dubisz observes:

Odchylenia te mogą pozostać tylko odchyleniami (co zwykle prowadzi do ich zaniku) albo – po uzyskaniu statusu interferencji zbiorowej i powszechnej – mogą wejść na stałe w obręb zespołu środków językowych akceptowanych przez uzus i normę językową [Dubisz (ed.) 1997: 330].

(Such deviations can remain nothing more than they are (and eventually become obsolete), or – having become a collectively and commonly shared interference – establish themselves as linguistic means of expression whose usage is accepted, also by the norm of the language.)

In her discussion of interference phenomena in the colloquial speech of the Silesia region in Poland, Urszula Żydek-Bednarczuk applies Einar Haugen’s definition of interference, identified as

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9 There is a considerable body of studies on interference phenomena in Slavic languages, e.g. Warchoł (ed.) 1989; Umińska-Tytoń (ed.) 1997; Kość 2000.
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(One of the stages in the process of diffusion of elements from one linguistic system to another, characterized by code-switching or their full integration. Interference, i.e. the overlapping of the two systems, is the intermediate phase of the process.)

Analyzing the Polish language in Bukovina, Kazimierz Feleszko stresses that

(intensity of interference depends on a number of factors, including also extra-linguistic ones, such as 'the gaps in the system' of the language which become apparent in contact and vary across different levels.)

Likewise, Elżbieta Smułkowa observes:

(Following the introduction of new elements to a given system, interference implies the reorganization of linguistic patterns, as each instance of addition to, or exclusion from, the system stimulates the need of rearrangement of its distinctive oppositions. In this perspective, interference is interpreted both as 'the process' and 'the result'.

The result stems from territorial language contact; the process and the result are attributed to 'individual' (Pol. osobniczy) language contact involving bilingualism.

Stanisław Dubisz [1997: 329] identifies six major factors of interference in the language of Polish communities abroad, which operate also in the case of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine:

(1) use of language in a bilingual or multilingual environment,
(2) necessity to expand vocabulary to include the names of new designates,
(3) influence of the lexicon of the official language of the country of residence,
(4) influence of the grammatical system of the official language of the country of residence,
(5) influence of the prestige of culture of the country of residence,
(6) motivation to increase the prestige of the language of an own ethnic community.)
In the geographical area under consideration, language contact between Polish and Ukrainian and between Polish and Russian resulted in a set of repetitive patterns. The material collected in the region reveals that different varieties of eastern borderland Polish (south- and north-eastern) are mixed with various elements and features of Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian. The Polish language used by the informants is not uniform and is characterized by a number of features depending on their place of birth, age and type of bilingualism. This is particularly the case of the older and, to a certain extent, the middle generation. The most salient features observed in the Polish speech of my informants include such elements as:

**in the phonetic system:**
- the reduction of the vowel o to a in unstressed positions (Pol. a妇科; Ukr. акання, akannia; Rus. аканье,akan’e), under the influence of Russian, e.g. pa ruski ‘in Russian,’ pa polski ‘in Polish,’ arganistka ‘an organ player’ (fem.), radzina ‘a family,’ ana ‘she’ (nom., voc.);
- the semi-soft č’, as in Russian, e.g. čkolada ‘chocolate,’ čas ‘an hour,’ čvartek ‘Thursday,’ citać ‘to read’;
- the c’, s’, z’, dz’ in all positions, under the influence of Ukrainian and Russian, e.g. kos’c’oł ‘a church,’ pujs’c’ (orth. pójśc’) ‘to go,’ povidz’eli ‘said’ (past, the third person plural), dz’en’ ‘a day’;
- the soft ś following the soft ń in the -śk- cluster in the suffix, under the influence of Ukrainian, e.g. rumuńśki ‘Romanian,’ ukraińśki ‘Ukrainian’;
- the dental lateral [l] instead of the standard Polish bilabial [w], as in eastern borderland Polish, Ukrainian and Russian, e.g. szkoła ‘a school,’ ładnie ‘nice’ (adv.), prawostawnaja ‘Orthodox’ (adj., fem.), kościół ‘a church’;
- the palatal l’ instead of the standard Polish l, as in eastern borderland Polish, Ukrainian and Russian, e.g. l’ato ‘summer,’ konsułat ‘a consulate,’ pokol’en’e, ‘a generation,’ l’ekcji ‘lessons,’ łwuv (orth. Pol. ‘Lwów,’ i.e. Ukr. Lviv), Pol’aki ‘Poles’;
- the voiced laryngeal fricative h, as in eastern borderland Polish, Ukrainian and Russian, e.g. bahato ‘many, a lot,’ Hel’ena, Honorata (female given names);

**in the inflectional system:**
- the -u ending in the accusative singular of feminine nouns, as in East Slavic languages, e.g. my zwiedzali wyspu Chortycu (cf. Standard Polish zwiedzaliśmy wyspę Chortycę) ‘we visited Khortytsia island’; polsku mowu znamy z dzieciństwa (cf. St. Pol. znam polską mowę z dzieciństwa) ‘I know Polish from my childhood’;
- the -u ending in the dative singular of masculine nouns, as in East Slavic languages, e.g. ja dała synu wszystko, co tam u nas było (cf. St. Pol. dałam synowi…) ‘I gave my son whatever we had;’ ja zaniosła Janu ten obraz i pozostawiła (cf. St. Pol. zaniósłam Janowi ten obraz i [mu] zostawiłam) ‘I took this picture to Jan and left it [with him]’;
- the -am ending in the dative plural of feminine nouns (as in the masculine declension), as in East Slavic languages, e.g. dałam takie mucham, co się kliejom
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na to i zdychają (cf. St. Pol. dałam muchom takie coś, one się do tego przyklejają i zdychają) ‘I gave the flies this thingy, the stuff they get stuck to and die’; dawno dawali babam wszystko i otpusk i gdzieś wyjazd, a teraz nic nie dają (cf. St. Pol. kiedyś kobietom dawali wszystko, i urlop, i gdzieś wyjazd, a teraz nic nie dają) ‘they used to give women everything, time off and a holiday away, and now they get nothing’;

– the -iw [-iv] and -ow [-ov] endings in the genitive plural of masculine nouns, as in Russian and Ukrainian, respectively, e.g. Poliakiw uže dawno tu je mało, bardzo mało je Polakiw (cf. St. Pol. tu już od dawna jest mało Polaków, bardzo mało) ‘there’ve been very few Poles around here for a long time now, very few’; u nas Polakow żyje tak mało, bo najwięcej to tam u Lwowi, Ternopolu (cf. St. Pol. u nas Polaków mieszka bardzo mało, bo najwięcej to tam we Lwowie, Tarnopolu) ‘there are very few Poles living here, most of them live there, in Lvo [Ukr. Lviv, Pol. Lwów], Ternopol [Ukr. Ternopil, Pol. Tarnopol]; dawno tu Niemcow było, oni pracowali na kopalniach (cf. St. Pol. dawno tu [dużo?] Niemców było, pracowali w kopalniach) ‘there used to be Germans around here, they worked in the mines’;

– the -yj [-ij] ending used along the -i and -y endings in the plural of masculine and neuter adjectives, as in East Slavic languages, e.g. tam był narysowany zielonyj listek (cf. St. Pol. tam był narysowany zielony listek) ‘there was a green leaf drawn there’; chłopiec choroszyj i uczy się dobrze, nie pije (cf. St. Pol. dobry chłopiec, i uczy się dobrze, nie piję) ‘he’s a good boy and a good student, he doesn’t drink’; dobryj chlieb teraz u nas je (cf. St. Pol. teraz tu mamy dobry chleb) ‘we have good bread around here these days’; pięknyj koncert wczoraj był w Domie młodzieży (cf. St. Pol. piękny koncert wczoraj był w domu młodzieży) ‘there was a beautiful concert at the youth center yesterday’; polskij jazyk jest ciężki (cf. St. Pol. Polski to ciężki język) ‘Polish is a difficult language’;

– the construction of past tense verb forms using personal pronouns, under the influence of Russian, Ukrainian or Belarusian, e.g. ja chciał/ ja chciała jechać do Polski (cf. St. Pol. chciałem/ chciałam jechać do Polski) ‘I wanted [masc./fem.] to go to Poland’; my poszli do ksiedzów (cf. St. Pol. poszliśmy do księży) ‘we went to see the priests’;

– no gender distinction of verb endings in the past tense plural, e.g. same kobiety jechali w pociągu (cf. St. Pol. same kobiety jechały w pociągu) ‘there were only women on the train’; latom dzieci zagrali u nas na morzu (cf. St. Pol. latem dzieci opalały się u nas nad morzem) ‘in the summer, the children sun-bathed on the sea’;

in the syntactic system: Russian or Ukrainian constructions

– the Russian construction u menia est’ (у меня есть) instead of the Polish mieć ‘to have’ + accusative., e.g. u mnie jest książka (cf. St. Pol. mam książkę) ‘I have a book’; u mnie byli dawno dokumenty polski (cf. St. Pol. kiedyś dawno miałam polskie dokumenty) ‘I used to have Polish documents [ID] a long time ago’;
jechać na czym ('to go' + 'on' + a means of transport in the locative) instead of the standard Polish jechać czym ('to go' + a means of transport in the instrumental), e.g. jechać na busie (cf. St. Pol. jechać busem) 'to go by minibus';

pracować kim ('to work' + instrumental) instead of the standard Polish analytical construction pracować jako kto ('to work' + 'as' + nominative), e.g. pracowała sprzedawczynią (cf. St. Pol. pracowała jako sprzedawczyni) 'she worked as a shopkeeper'; pracował szachtiorom (cf. St. Pol. pracował jako górnik) 'he worked as a miner';

a different choice of preposition instead of the standard Polish o (in this context: 'than'), e.g. na dziesięć lat mnie był starszyj (cf. St. Pol. był ode mnie o dziesięć lat starszy) 'he was ten years older than me'; brat młodszy na dwa liata (cf. St. Pol. brat młodszy o dwa lata) 'a two-year-younger brother';

the Ukrainian/Russian construction rozmawiam na instead of the standard Polish rozmawiam/mówię po ('I (can) speak' + a language), e.g. rozmawiam też na ukraińskim języku i na rosyjskim i na polskim (cf. St. Pol. rozmawiam/mówię też po ukraińsku i po rosyjsku i po polsku) 'I can also speak Ukrainian and Russian and Polish';

extension of the function of the preposition za used instead of the standard Polish o (here: 'about') under the influence of Ukrainian, e.g. nic za niego nie znamy (cf. St. Pol. nic o nim nie wiemy) 'we know nothing about him'; zabrali i on tam siedział, a potem przepadł i za niego nam nie skazali (cf. St. Pol. zabrali go i tam siedział, a potem przepadł i nic nam o nim nie powiedzieli) 'they took him away and he was locked up there; then he disappeared and they told us nothing about him';

prepositional constructions with dla 'for' + genetive instead of the standard Polish constructions using the dative with no preposition [cf. Dzięgiel 2009: 96], e.g. dawali my dla kołchozów (cf. St. Pol. dawaliśmy kołchozom) 'we gave [context missing] to the kolkhozes'; dla was to mówię wszystko (cf. St. Pol. wam to mówię wszystko) 'I’m telling you everything';

in the lexical system: selected examples
• borrowings from Ukrainian, such as:
  – nam było zabroniono bałakać pa polski (Ukr. балакати, bałakaty ‘to speak’; cf. St. Pol. nie wolno nam było mówić po polsku) ‘we weren’t allowed to speak Polish’;
  – nu co wam skazać, było bardzo ciężko (Ukr. сказати, skazaty ‘to tell’; cf. St. Pol. no co Panu/Pani/wam powiedzieć, było bardzo ciężko) ‘well, what can I tell you, it was really hard’;
  – teraz można sztukować a tam w Sybiri to nie (Ukr. шуткувати, shutkuvaty ‘to joke’; cf. St. Pol. teraz można żartować, a tam na Syberii, to nie) ‘we can joke now, but there, in Siberia, we weren’t allowed to’;
  – świekrucha u mnie dobra była, Polka ona była z Chmielnickiego (свекруха, svekruka ‘a mother-in-law’; cf. St. Pol. miałem dobrą teściową,
to była Polka z Chmielnickiego) ‘my mother-in-law was a good woman, she was Polish from Chmielnicki [Ukr. Khmelnytskyi]’

• borrowings from Russian, such as:
  – *my pisali zaiavljenije* (Rus. заявление, zaiavlenie ‘an application’; cf. St. Pol. napisałaśmy podanie) ‘we wrote an application’;
  – *nacjonalnik* pociągu nas zabrał i my uciekli na Ukrainę (Rus. начальник, nachal’nik ‘a manager’; cf. St. Pol. kierownik pociągu nas zabrał i uciekliśmy na Ukrainę) ‘the train manager took us and we ran away to Ukraine’;
  – *jak zamknęli nas na sutki, to kazaloś, że to cały rok* (Rus. сутки, sutki ‘twenty-four hours’; Rus. казалось, kazalos’ ‘it turned out’, inf. Rus. казаться, kazat’sia; cf. St. Pol. jak zamknęli nas na dobę, to się okazało, że to cały rok) ‘when they locked us up for twenty-four hours, it turned out to be the whole year’;
  – *ziemlietriasienie* było, ja była mała i pamiętam to (Rus. землетрясение, zemletriasenie ‘an earthquake’; cf. St. Pol. było trzęsienie ziemi, byłam mała i to pamiętam) ‘there was an earthquake when I was a little girl and I can remember that’;
  – *na otпуск* ja w Polsku jadę zawsze, tam pobywam trochę i wracam (Rus. отпуск, otpusk ‘a holiday’; cf. St. Pol. na urlop zawsze jadę do Polski, tam trochę pobędę i wracam) ‘I always go on holiday to Poland, stay there for a bit and come back’

• semantic calques, such as:
  – *na kopercie nado pisać indeks* (cf. St Pol. na kopercie trzeba pisać kod pocztowy) ‘you need to write the postcode on the envelope’ (Rus. индекс, indeks ‘a postcode’; Pol. indeks ‘an index’);
  – *moja córka postąpiła do Kijowa i tam się uczy* (cf. St. Pol. moja córka doszła się do Kijowa i tam się uczy) ‘my daughter got into university in Kiev and she studies there’ (Rus. поступить [в университет], postupit’ [v universitet] ‘to get into university,’ Pol. postąpić ‘to act/ behave in a certain way’);
  – *daj mi drugi obrazek, ten nie podoba się* (cf. St. Pol. daj mi inny obrazek, ten [mi?] się nie podoba) ‘give me another picture, [I?] don’t like this one’ (Rus. другой, drugoi ‘another’; Pol. drugi ‘the other’);
The above overview of interference phenomena in the spoken Polish in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts is by no means exhaustive. A detailed analysis of the problem, including the frequency of particular features, would require a separate study of the language of particular groups and individual informants (taking into account their place of origin).

Interference phenomena appear at all linguistic levels of Polish spoken in the region, with the lexicon most exposed to the process. Indeed, the highest frequency of interference was observed in the case of nominal and verbal borrowings, which can be explained by a number of factors, such as parallel contact between the languages and cultures in question, the multilingualism of the speakers, and the environmental context which required new names to denote new objects and actions (lexical gaps which became apparent in the new situation of the speakers had to be filled). Russian borrowings generally refer to designates which the informant had not come across in their original home region and became acquainted with only once they had found themselves in south-eastern Ukraine.

As observed, interference phenomena are volatile, inconsistent and vary between particular individuals, families or local communities. The findings concerning different Polish regions, e.g. Western Pomerania, apply also to the interviewed members of the Polish minority: ‘under similar environmental conditions interference phenomena in the language of members of the same generation advance at a various pace, depending on the level of education and contact with the outside world; this is also the case of members of the same family, depending on the generation and the level of participation in culture’ [Rzetelska-Feleszko 1989: 262]. Russian interference in Ukrainian, and vice versa, in south-eastern Ukraine is the subject of interest particularly among Ukrainian academics [cf. for example: Lazarenko 2001; Cherems’ka 2006; Syheda 2007].

The speech of the informants is a result of combined interference factors, such as the size of the group, the frequency and type of contact with the standard variety of Polish, and the extent of economic and cultural contact with Ukrainian and Russian centers. The spoken Polish in south-eastern Ukraine is a distinctive system developed in multi-dimensional language contact of standard Polish, its eastern borderland variety (south- and north-eastern) and local dialects with Ukrainian (including local dialects) and different varieties of Russian (literary, colloquial, local dialects).

Studies on interference between closely related systems, as is the case of spoken Polish in the region, reveal their interpenetration. The causes of Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian interference in the speech of the informants are to be found in their bilingual environment. In the course of time, they faced the need to expand their lexicon to include both Ukrainian and Russian names of the new designates (Ukrainian replaced Russian as the official language of the country in 1990); there was also an impact of the grammatical systems of the two languages. At the same time, it should be stressed that
a considerable extent of interference from Russian has resulted also from its traditional position as the language of high culture. The types and intensification of interference would require further detailed study.

### 3.7. *Surzhyk* as a Sociolinguistic Phenomenon

The older and the middle generation of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine frequently rely on *Surzhyk* as a means of oral communication. It is also used by members of the younger generation, even though they make a clear distinction between literary Ukrainian and Russian. *Surzhyk* is particularly common among Poles born in Kazakhstan and currently living in Bohatyryivka near Zaporizhzhia city. It is also quite widespread among those born in western Ukraine who used to speak Ukrainian (or its local dialect) as their first language and acquired Russian only when they had settled in the south-east of the country. It is also worth noting that *Surzhyk* is more frequent among the lower social strata rather than the intelligentsia, people working in the civil service, schools or institutions of higher education. This is the case also in other ethnic communities, including Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speaking Russians.

Popularized by Ukrainian and Russian linguists, especially in the last decade, *Surzhyk* is a relatively new addition to the sociolinguistic terminology and denotes a mix of Ukrainian and Russian. In Ukraine, it has been the focus of a number of studies of greater or lesser academic value, as well as a frequent subject of comments on Ukrainian- and Russian-language websites. *Surzhyk* has also attracted attention in Poland, where it was described and analyzed in an extensive study by Artur Bracki [Bracki 2009].

As recorded by Borys Hrinchenko in his Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language, the word *surzhyk* (Ukr. суржик) originally referred to ‘mixed grain bread or flour, for example wheat with rye, rye with barley, barley with oats,
and other' (‘смешанный зерновой хлеб или мука из него, напр. пшеница с ржой, ржь с ячменем, ячмень с овсом и др.’) or ‘man of mixed race’ (‘человек смешанной расы’) [Hrinchenko 1909: IV, 231].

Max Vasmer’s Russian etymological dictionary explains it as follows:

суржанка, суржанец, суржик «нечистая пшеница с примесью ржи», орл. (Даль), польск. са́рзьца, са́жыца – то же, чеш. souržice, souréž. Из *sǫ- и *rъžь (см. ржь) [Fasmer 1971, III: 806].

(surzhanka, surzhanets, surzhyk: ‘not pure wheat grain with an admixture of rye’ and quotes also Polish sąrżyca, sążyca and Czech souržice, sourež, which have the same meaning; etymology: from *sǫ- and *rъžь.)

Aleksander Brückner’s Polish etymological dictionary includes an entry for sąrżyca, sążyca, defined as ‘wheat with rye’ (‘pszenica ze rżą (żytem)’) [Brückner 1970: 482]. Wiesław Boryś discusses this word in a short paragraph:

*sǫrъžica ‘ziarna pomieszane z żytem, zboże zawierające żyto,’ polskie dialektalne od XVI wieku – sążyca, sąrżyca ‘żyto (siane) na wpół z pszenicą, czeskie souržice, dial. suržica jako ‘zboże (zwłaszcza pszenica) siane razem z żytem,’ słowackie souržica ‘mieszanka pszenicy i żyta lub owsa i jęczmienia,’ słowiańskie i serbsko-chorwackie ‘mieszanka zbożowa, zwłaszcza żyta i pszenicy,’ ‘wysiana mieszanka żyta i pszenicy,’ a także ukraińskie ‘ts’ [Boryś 1975: 122].

(*sǫrъžica ‘grain mixed with rye, corn with rye’; dialectal Polish, since the sixteenth century: sążyca, sąrżyca ‘rye (sown) half-and-half with wheat’; Czech: souržice, dialectal suržica ‘corn (especially wheat) sown with rye’; Slovak: suržica ‘a mix of wheat and rye, or oats and barley’; Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian: ‘a mix of corn, especially rye and wheat,’ ‘a sown mix of rye and wheat’; also: Ukrainian, the same.)

As can be seen, the original meaning of surzhik is associated with the farming lexicon. However, as early as 1909 Hrinchenko also noted another use of the word with reference to ‘man of mixed race.’ In the course of time, it was adopted as a linguistic term and gained currency with reference to a sociolinguistic phenomenon. Some Ukrainian and Russian specialists in the field regard the speech known as Surzhik, Ukrainian and Russian mixed together, as a case of semilingualism11 resulting from contact of two similar languages [Trub 2000; Belikov, Krysin 2001: 58]. In Belarus, its functional

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11 Hakan Ringbom identifies semilingualism as an intermediate phase leading to the eventual abandonment of the mother tongue for the language of the country of residence; as proposed by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, ‘the person who had not yet reached the level of a monolingual speaker in either of her two languages would be a double semilingual, even if her or his command of the two languages taken together amounted in quantity to something much more than the monolingual’s linguistic command’ [Skutnabb-Kangas 1981: 36]; semilingualism, or double semilingualism, is a phenomenon in need of further study and its status in linguistics is often questioned [after Lipińska 2003: 124–125].
equivalent is a Belarusian-Russian mix referred to as *Trasianka* [Smułkowa 2002: 415].

An Encyclopedia of the Ukrainian language [2000] provides the following definition:

(Šurzhyk (literally, a mix of rye and wheat, barley and oats, etc. and flour made of such a mix) – a language in which elements of different languages are artificially put together with no literary standard. The term refers especially to Ukrainian vernacular contaminated (засміченій, zasmichenii) with redundant borrowings from Russian (resulting from Ukrainian-Russian interference), [e.g.] самольот, síchas, tormozyty, строїти, кидатися в очі, займатися в школі, гостра біль [samol’ot ‘a plane,’ síchas ‘now, soon,’ tormozyty ‘to slow down,’ строїти ‘to build,’ kydatsya v ochi ‘to be striking,’ lit. ‘to strike the eye,’ zaimyatysia v shkoli ‘learn/study sth at school,’ gostra bil’ ‘sharp pain’]. Surzhyk is an impoverished language, deprived of national color, beauty and expressiveness; most common in everyday speech, from where it penetrates into newspapers, magazines, books and booklets.)

Some Ukrainian linguists trace the origins of Surzhyk to the urban environment of the nineteenth-century Kiev, where the local population was Ukrainian- or Polish-speaking and literary Russian was not in frequent use in the period [Makarov 2002: 192]; as of the 1860s, the intelligentsia of the city began to turn to Ukrainian as their everyday language. The overall result involved mixing Russian and Ukrainian, with Surzhyk as the vernacular of a city which was no longer Ukrainian, but not yet Russian, the speech that was seen as a tumor and frowned upon by ‘the true Rus’ people.’ Though the language of Kiev became

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12 Another linguistic term used in similar contexts is ‘the mixed language’: ‘a language developed as a result of mutual borrowings between two or more different languages stemming from long-term intensive contact between ethnic groups; for example, creoles, pidgins, sabirs’ (‘Jest to język powstały wskutek wzajemnych zapożyczeń z dwóch lub więcej różnych języków w efekcie długich i bliskich kontaktów grup etnicznych. Przykładem są języki kreolskie, pidginy, sabiry’) [Polanski (ed.) 1993: 242]. Surzhyk and Trasianka are not included here owing to their different linguistic nature. A pidgin is a language with a considerably limited vocabulary and simplified grammar; the term originally referred to a mix of English and Chinese or Melanesian languages. A sabir is also a mixed language developed, mainly in seaports, as a result of contact between two or more languages. A creole can be defined as a pidgin which has become the native language of a given community [Polanski (ed.) 1993: 393, 467; Lipińska 2003: 94–96].
closer to standard Russian in the mid-nineteenth century, it has never evolved that far. In turn, Ukrainian fell into disuse in the city and was spoken mainly in the country [Makarov 2002: 193–194]. Other authors stress the long-term Russification of Ukrainian rural areas, which became Surzhyk-speaking as a result [Stavyts’ka 2005: 261–263], particularly in the eastern regions.

Today, forms of Surzhyk vary depending on the region and individual preferences of the speakers. A survey study of its use conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology in 2003 reveals that it is spoken by 11–18% of the population (5.1–8.3 million), with the proportion for each macro-region as follows: western: 2.5%, central: 14.6%, central-eastern: 21.7%, eastern: 9.6%, southern: 12.4%. Surzhyk has no official status and the authorities regard it as Ukrainian ‘corrupted’ with Russian borrowings, although it emerged in the same period as the literary Ukrainian. It was first introduced in literature by Ivan Kotliarevskii in his play Natalka Poltavka (Natalka from Poltava, 1819), and was used also in later works by other authors.

Hence, it could be assumed that we can speak of Surzhyk when Russian and Ukrainian elements are mixed to such a degree that they become a new kind of language, but with no norms or standards. It is quite commonly used by the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine, particularly among the informants born in the western regions of the country.


(We ended up in Kazakhstan, Stalin sent us, our fathers, away from Ukraine in 1936. I lived there for forty one years, in northern Kazakhstan; it used to be Kochetanskaia oblast, now it’s North Kazakhstan. I came here in 1977, my daughter lived here. It was all really strict there. Nobody knew what religion we were, it was forbidden; God forbid to mention Easter eggs at school. My wife was a communist, but I had holy pictures at home; they came round to tell me to take them down and I did.)

The informants are aware that the language they speak is ‘neither Ukrainian, nor Russian’ rather than a literary standard:

My razgawariwajem nie czisto po ukraiński, to i pa ruski nie czisto, nasz jazyk jest mieszannyj. Nu możet nado było ucztsia wsio prawelno, a wot ne buło gdzie, ucztsia

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14 Ivan Kotliarevskii (Іван Петрович Котляревський), (1769–1838), a Ukrainian poet and playwright who introduced the local vernacular into Ukrainian literature.
nado buło rabotat’, dietoczka – nam tiażeło oczeń buło. Chto piereżył eto to i znajet. Uże siejczas uczitsia można w szkole, a my jak sami uczilisia i potomu nasz jazyk takoj смieszanyj [Bohatyrivka 2007: interview].

(We don’t speak proper Ukrainian, and it isn’t proper Russian either. Our language is mixed. Well, maybe we should’ve learned it properly and all, but where would we have done it? We had to work, my girl, our life was really hard. Those who’ve been through it know all about it. Now you can already learn it at school, but we learned it on our own and that’s why it’s so mixed.)

In reply to the question ‘What language do you speak every day?’ (Rus. На каком языке Вы общаетесь каждый день? Na kakom iazyke vy obshchaetes’ kazhdyĭ den’?), 24% of the informants from the middle generation declared ‘a mixed language, something between Russian and Ukrainian’ as the means of their everyday communication. However, there were no such replies recorded in the Donetsk oblast and the number of interviewees speaking Surżyk there was considerably lower. They also paid attention to the correct use of Ukrainian or Russian and their speech included instances of code-switching between Russian and Ukrainian or Polish. As for their Polish itself, it was characterized by extensive interference. While the older generation is not at all familiar with the term Surzyk, the middle one knows it as a mix of Ukrainian and Russian, or even Polish, Ukrainian and Russian:

Surżyk eto jeśli kto-to razgawiariwajet na ruskom jazykie i dajet mnogo ukraińskich słow. Toże ja dumaju, jeśli kto-to gawarit pa polsku i mnogo ruskich i ukraińskich słow [Makiivka 2010: interview].

(Surzhyk, that’s when someone uses a lot of Ukrainian words when they speak Russian. That’s also when someone uses a lot of Russian and Ukrainian words when they speak Polish, I think.)

The term Surzyk is widely known among the younger generation, particularly students. Indeed, joking remarks on its usage among their friends can be heard even on public transport:

– Ona rozmawia z nami surżykiem.
– A co to jest?
– Niepoprawność języka ukraińskiego i nieznajomość języka rosyjskiego – to razem jest surżyk [Donetsk 2010: participant observation].

(– She speaks Surzhyk to us.
– And what’s that?
– It’s bad Ukrainian and poor Russian put together, that’s what it is.)

From my own observations, the number of people speaking Surzhyk on public transport, in the street or shops is higher in Zaporizhzhia than in Donetsk.
The use and increasing number of functions served by this hybrid is an increasingly frequent subject of discussion among Ukrainian linguists. Such disputes can also be seen on national forums, with academics considering the methods which should be used in order to limit the use of Surzhyk as far as possible. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the issue is addressed by the institutions of higher education in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, particularly in classes on the culture of language:

(We try to explain to young people that speaking Surzhyk is incorrect. We make them aware that they should try to speak correctly among their friends and in their families, to use the spoken language which is close to the literary standard, Ukrainian or, if not, Russian. We can’t influence the older generation and we shouldn’t bother them, but the young people are the future of the country. They’re going to represent it abroad, so they should speak the standard language.)

The linguistic, social and psychological aspects of Surzhyk as a sociolinguistic phenomenon should be the subject of extensive study. Since it is detrimental to all the levels of the Ukrainian language, a matter of concern in the Ukrainian academia, one of the principal aims should be to develop teaching methods which would be able to check its progress and growing influence [Masenko: 2004].

As I see it, it would also seem worthwhile to compare the extent of the phenomenon in different regions of Ukraine, in the regions of Russia which have the Ukrainian population and in the entire Ukrainian-Russian borderland. Another focus of attention should be the use of Surzhyk in other ethnolinguistic groups which speak their own language even though they have a command of both Ukrainian and Russian. The present study considers the examples of Surzhyk only in the speech of the Polish minority in the region.

Some prospects for the improvement of the situation, i.e. the limitation of the use of Surzhyk, open in the younger generation able to learn standard languages and distinguish between Slavic linguistic systems. As can be seen from the above comment made by a Polish and Ukrainian language teacher from Berdiansk, the accuracy of language use, whatever the language in question, is an important issue addressed by academic staff in their courses. However, it is not only the linguists but also other members of the intelligentsia who face the task of spreading the awareness of the problem.
The current linguistic situation in Ukraine is characterized by a conflict between two literary languages, Ukrainian and Russian, with the former declared in the constitution as ‘the state language’ (Russian has the status of an official language in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). It is widely known that the language issue is a major problem in the country in general, and in the Russian-speaking region of the Donbas in particular: Through the legislative framework and other means, Ukrainian authorities make an effort to provide adequate conditions for the development of culture and language of all minorities in the region, and for raising the awareness of their ethnic descent. Both the extent to which Polish has been preserved, and the teaching and learning of the language today, are conditioned by the political situation and legal regulations.

The level of proficiency in Ukrainian, Russian and Polish depends on the national language policy, which has a considerable impact on the choice and use of language in the official domain, civil service, education and work environment. In a sense, the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine does not stand a chance of changing the situation, as it functions in a predominantly Russian-speaking social environment; in the region under consideration, Polish has never been used in the public administration.

4.1. The National and Regional Language Policy

The problem of Polish language policy has been raised at a number of conferences and in academic publications, e.g. *Socjolingwistyka. Polityka językowa* (Sociolinguistics: Language Policy) [Lubaś (ed.) 1977]; *Język a kultura. Język polityki a współczesna kultura polityczna* (Language and Culture: The Language of Politics and Political Culture Today) [Anusiewicz, Siciński (eds.) 1994]; *Polska polityka językowa na przełomie tysiącleci* (Polish Language Policy at the Turn of the Millennium) [Mazur (ed.) 1999]; *Polska polityka komunikacyjno-językowa wobec wyzwań*
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

XXI wieku (Polish Communication and Language Policy: Facing the Challenge of the Twenty-First Century) [Gajda, Makowski, Porayski-Pomsta (eds.) 2005].

Likewise, language policy has been the subject addressed in the context of the European Union. For example, the German sociolinguist Ulrich Ammon observes: ‘EU language policy has to find a balance for the complex and chaotic mix of national and regional official and working languages – also including the languages of migrants and minorities – to support rather than jeopardize cohesion within the European Community’ [Ammon 2007b: 178].

The present discussion adopts Halina Kurkowska’s definition of the term ‘language policy’:

Polityka językowa to zespół dyrektyw dotyczących kształtowania stosunku społeczeństwa do języka. Aby te dyrektywy ustalać sensownie, trzeba znać sytuację socjolingwistyczną w kraju oraz teorię i metody działalności kulturalnojęzykowej [Kurkowska 1977: 17].

(Language policy is a set of directives concerning the shaping of social attitude towards language. Drafting sensible directives in this respect requires an awareness of the sociolinguistic situation in the country and a knowledge of theory and praxis in the domain of language and culture.)

Władysław Lubaś observes that the description of language policy cannot overlook the importance of ‘the political situation,’ which includes: (1) the external and internal conditions under which a given policy is planned, (2) the entities formulating and implementing the policy, (3) the objects of the policy, (4) its immediate and ultimate aims and objectives, (5) the methods of its implementation. To implement a policy means to exercise power; hence legal enforcement plays a decisive role in the process [Lubaś 2003: 36].

The questions of language policy in independent Ukraine are far more complex than in Poland. It should be stressed that although Ukrainian had an official status under the Soviet Union, the official language of the republic was de facto Russian. For a number of years, Ukrainian academics have been calling for the introduction of a Ukrainian-oriented language policy [see Trybushnyi 1997; Taranenko 2001; Nahorna 2005] and the issue has received increasing coverage in the Ukrainian media.

Concerned about the situation of the Ukrainian language, academics urged the government to establish a special committee for language policy. In 1997, President Leonid Kuchma established the Council on Language Policy, which was to draft proposals for the legislative framework on the question (it was dissolved in 2001).1 It is worth noting that the first years of independence saw a considerable improvement in the status of Ukrainian in such areas as civil service or education; there was also a growing number of Ukrainian-language newspapers and magazines.

1 Укр. Рада з питань мовної політики (Rada z pytanj movnoi polityky); established: decree no. 164/97; dissolved: decree no. N 1071/2001 (accessed 13.11.2001).
Article 10 of the Ukrainian constitution adopted by the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) in June 1996 provides as follows:

Державною мовою в Україні є українська мова. Держава забезпечує всебічний розвиток і функціонування української мови в усіх сферах суспільного життя на всій території України. В Україні гарантується вільний розвиток, використання і захист російської, інших мов національних меншин України. Держава сприяє вивченню мов міжнародного спілкування. Застосування мов в Україні гарантується Конституцією України та визначається законом [Konstytutsiia 1996].

(The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed. The State promotes the learning of languages of international communication. The use of languages in Ukraine is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine and is determined by law [Constitution 1996].)

The scope of functions of the Ukrainian language has been expanding in different domains of public life, which does not mean that the process remains unchallenged by the pro-Russian community in Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas. Indeed, the current linguistic situation in the country is characterized by a conflict between two literary languages, Ukrainian and Russian, which can be noticed also in the media. Larysa Masenko observes that

asymilacja znacznej części ludności ukraińskiej, która spowodowała osłabienie poczucia świadomości narodowej Ukraińców, wyparcie języka ukraińskiego przez język rosyjski we wschodnich, południowych i częściowo centralnych obwodach Ukrainy, a przede wszystkim w wielkich centrach przemysłowych, stanowi jedną z głównych przeszkód w budowie państwa narodowego, niezależnego od dawnej imperialnej metropolii [Masenko 2008: 131].

(the assimilation of a considerable proportion of the Ukrainian population, a process that undermined the Ukrainian national awareness, pushed out the Ukrainian language in the eastern, southern and, to a certain extent, central oblasts of Ukraine, and – most importantly – the main industrial centers of the country, is a major obstacle on the way to a nation state independent from the imperial metropolis of the past.)

Ukraine signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and ratified it in 2003 (the first ratification bill was proposed in 1999). The document aims to protect and promote minority languages, which in the case of Ukraine are: Belarusian, Bulgarian, Crimean Tatar, Gagauz, German, Greek, Hungarian, Moldovan, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, and Yiddish. In May 2010, the parliament proposed another bill of amendments to the act of
ratification. Since the principal concepts of the Charter are ‘the regional language’ and ‘the linguistic group,’ the document is in conflict with the Ukrainian constitution, which uses the terms ‘the state language’ and ‘languages of national minorities,’ with Russian as the only specifically mentioned minority language.

Russians are the second largest ethnic community in the country (after Ukrainians). According to the latest census (2001), their total number is 8,334,000, which makes it 17.3% of the population. While it is obviously Russian that is the mother tongue of the vast majority of Russians, 3.8% of them declared their native language to be Ukrainian. Russian is also the mother tongue of a considerable proportion of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Poles and other ethnic communities.

Only 12.9% of the Polish minority in Ukraine consider Polish their native language and other languages declared as their mother tongue are Ukrainian (71%) and Russian (15.6%) (other: 0.5%). Russian is the native language of not only the Russian minority, but also other ethnic communities in the country. Larysa Masenko concludes that

The last two decades have been a period of an increasing position of ethnic Ukrainians at the expense of Russians. Piotr Eberhardt assumes that the process is bound to continue in the future and pave the way for a Ukrainian nation state, with Russians as merely a large ethnic minority. This will certainly take a long time, given that the legacy of prolonged Russian domination is not easily overcome, particularly in the case of relations between the Russian and Ukrainian language [Eberhardt 2003: 750]. In addition, both of them are East Slavic languages, which frequently are not perceived in terms of two distinct systems by their mass users. The situation in the Ukrainian–Hungarian and Ukrainian–Romanian borderlands is different, as language contact in these regions involves systems from two different language groups (and even families).

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2 The Bill of amendments to the Law of Ukraine on the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (05.05.2010); Ukr. Проект Закону про внесення змін до Закону України «Про ратифікацію Європейської Хартії регіональних мов або мов меншин», 1071 від 05.05.2010, Proekt Zakonu pro vnesennia zmih do Zakonu Ukrainy ‘Pro ratyfikatsiiu I Evropeiskoi Kharti rehional'nykh mov abo mov menshin,’ 1071 bid 05.05.2010 [http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_1?pf3511=3083 (accessed 02.02.2011)].

3 The issue has been extensively covered on Ukrainian websites.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below present the 2001 census data on languages considered as a mother tongue in different ethnic communities of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts [cf. State Statistics Service of Ukraine].

**Table 4.1. Languages used as mother tongues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic community</th>
<th>Own language of the community</th>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovan</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data presented in Table 4.1 indicates that Russian is the mother tongue for over 80% of the population of the Donetsk oblast. Considering the figures for different ethnic groups in the province, Russian is the native language of not only Russians (98.6%; Ukrainian: 1.3%), but also clearly dominates in this role in other communities: Ukrainian (58.7%; Ukrainian: only 41.2%), Greek, Belarusian, Tatar, Georgian, Moldovan (over 70%), German, Bulgarian (over 80%) and Jewish (95%). As for the Polish minority, 75.7% of its members living in the Donetsk oblast consider Russian their mother tongue and those who declare Polish amount only to 4.1% of the total. At the same time, it is Ukrainian (native to 19.3%) which enjoys higher prestige among the Polish community in the region.

A number of surveys on issues related to the official language, the Ukrainian language and bilingualism conducted among students at institutions of higher

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4 The 2001 census of the population was conducted in Ukrainian; the term used in the questionnaire was 'mother tongue' (Укр. рідна мова, *ridna mova*).
education in Donetsk reveal that they mostly choose classes in Ukrainian. In addition, a command of the language is seen as an asset in their future career. The process has been observed since the early 1990s and survey results indicate that the use of Ukrainian instead of Russian by students and academic staff is a growing trend:

Це є процес. Він триватиме ще довго. Тішимося тим, що молоді люди, студенти, вибирають лекції українською мовою. Незважаючи на те, що російська широко використовується у масовому вживанні, то все ж таки, молодь охоче вибирає українську. Треба звернути увагу, що це Донецьк, Донбас це дуже специфічний регіон, тут русифікація пройшла і вникла в кожну галузь її вживань. Починаючи від дитинства потім школа, вищі заклади, аж по рівень державного забезпечення. Це регіон відрізняється і мовно і менталітетно від інших регіонів України, це перед усім треба брати до уваги. Процес заміни російської українською мовою тут буде триватиме ще довго, найважливіше, що він триває [Donetsk 2010: interview].

(It's a process; it will take a long time. We're happy that young people, students, choose lectures in Ukrainian. Even though Russian is widely used everywhere, all the same, young people willingly choose Ukrainian. We have to remember that Donetsk, the Donbas, is a very specific region: here, Russification took its course and affected every aspect of life, starting from childhood, then school, higher education, up until retirement. Both the language and mentality of this region is different than in other regions of Ukraine, and that's the first thing to take into account. The process of replacing Russian with Ukrainian will take a long time; the most important thing is that it's under way.)

The proportion of the Russian population in the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts, which had a Russian majority before 1989, declined following the process of intensive re-Ukrainization of those regions [Eberhardt 2003: 748–749].

In Ukraine, the language question also plays a political role. The current president of the country, Viktor Ianukovych (born in Ienakiieve), until recently used only Russian in his official appearances. Regional authorities of the Donetsk oblast have made appeals to the makers of the Ukrainian constitution and have tried to use the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages to win the status of a regional language for Russian. Their motivation was in fact to secure the position of the language in business and public administration.
As can be seen in Table 4.2, the language situation in the Zaporizhzhia oblast (65% Russian-speaking) is slightly different than in the Donetsk region, even though the position of Russian as the mother tongue in different ethnic communities is high in both cases. In Zaporizhzhia, the proportion of Ukrainians considering Russian as their native language is lower (30.9%, Donetsk: 58.7%) and the position of Ukrainian in this role in different minorities is higher. In the Polish minority, the figures for languages considered as mother tongue are as follows: Polish: 4.0%; Ukrainian: 38.0%; Russian: 56.8%.

Until 1990, the official language in Ukraine was Russian, which was promoted as the language of friendship, brotherhood and unity of all the Soviet nations in the entire country. In fact, this aim was achieved in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts: today, the most industrialized regions of Ukraine have a population composed of about 130 Russian-speaking ethnic communities. According to Piotr Eberhardt, who has long been closely following the ethnic and demographic trends in Ukraine, the situation can be traced back to historical, economic and even psychological factors [Eberhardt 2003: 751]. What I would add to the list is the planned Soviet language policy aiming to create a bilingual society, which would then gradually abandon the use of Ukrainian, finally turning uniformly Russian-speaking. Linguistic assimilation was the initial stage of losing the bond with the national community, particularly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic community</th>
<th>Language considered as mother tongue (%)</th>
<th>Own language of the community</th>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeri</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovan</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2. Languages used as mother tongues in the Zaporizhzhia oblast
in the case of Ukrainians. The process was a long-term and voluntary one, as Russian acquired the status of the language of high culture. Migration of Ukrainian-speaking population to the south-east of the country was conducive to its rapid Russification once in the region. Since Ukrainian speakers turning to spoken Russian often lacked sufficient knowledge of the rules of the language, the situation also fostered the growth of Surzhyk in urban areas. As observed in a number of interviews with the informants, the dominating position of Russian in various spheres of their lives was coupled with a petrifcation of their level of Ukrainian.

Before 1990, Russian was the language of all the official records and, as reported by the informants, all kinds of meetings. Today, while official documents are handled in Ukrainian (although it is a challenge for civil servants, who do not have an adequate command of the language), all other communication in civil service is Russian-only. For example, when I tried to speak Ukrainian with the person in charge of the department of national minority and religious affairs in Melitopol, he excused himself for speaking Russian and suggested that we should continue our conversation in both languages, i.e., he was going to use Russian and I was to speak Ukrainian, as he was able to understand the language. In Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, public administration staff speak Russian among themselves; Ukrainian can occasionally be heard in Zaporizhzhia but, as yet, not in Donetsk. While Poles employed in the public administration use Russian, they also know Ukrainian, which is not the case among members of other ethnic minorities.

Prawnie powinny dwa języki na jednym szczeblu funkcjonować. Nie możemy tak szybko nauczyć się ukraińskiego, przecież tu wszyscy mówią po rosyjsku, tak było i tak jeszcze bardzo długo będzie. Nikomu to nie przeszkadzało i teraz wszyscy chcą po rosyjsku, żeby było. Język ukraiński dopiero młodzi zaczynają się uczyć i może za 25 lat można będzie w tym języku w urzędach pracować [Donetsk 2007: interview].

(There should be two official languages with the same status. We can’t learn Ukrainian so fast, everyone here speaks Russian, it’s been like that and it’s still going to be the same for a very long time. It’s never been a problem; also now everybody wants it to be Russian. It’s only the young ones that are beginning to learn Ukrainian and maybe in twenty-five years it will be possible to use this language in public administration.)

A member of academic staff in an institution of higher education in Donetsk comments on the language question in the region as follows:

Bardzo dobrze, że Konstytucja Ukrainy za język państwowy uznaje tylko język ukraiński. Tu mieszka wielu ludzi, którzy nie potrafią się określić, kim są, nawet sami Ukraińcy.

5 Over the decades, Russification brought about the dissemination of Russian, which came to replace Ukrainian in a number of regions, particularly in the urbanized industrial areas of eastern Ukraine, where the language retreated completely. The evolution can be seen in the results of censuses held by the Soviets; the process was promoted with a view to the linguistic assimilation of the country [Eberhardt 2003: 751].
Dla Ukrainy to jest tragedia. Jeżeli chcemy mieć silne państwo ukraińskie, to przede wszystkim językiem państwowym, a także urzędów, językiem oficjalnym powinien być język ukraiński. Wstyd jest, kiedy premier Ukrainy, wygłaszając swoje przemówienia, mówi po rosyjsku do narodu ukraińskiego [chodziło o Wiktora Janukowycza]. Jest to dla nas obraźliwe. Po rosyjsku może mówić w sytuacjach nieoficjalnych: na ulicy, w domu, na działce. Sytuacja ta jest trudna, ponieważ są to ludzie w średnim wieku, którym jest ciężko nauczyć się reguł języka ukraińskiego, a przy takim podobieństwie językowym nie jest to łatwe [Donetsk 2007: interview].

(It’s very good that the Ukrainian constitution recognizes only Ukrainian as the official language. There are many people here who can’t decide who they are, even Ukrainians themselves. It’s a tragedy for Ukraine. If we want to have a strong Ukrainian state, the first thing is that Ukrainian should be the language of the state, also in public administration; Ukrainian should be the official language. It’s a shame the Ukrainian Prime Minister [Viktor Ianukovych] addresses the Ukrainian nation in Russian. We find it insulting. He can speak Russian in unofficial situations: in the street, at home, in his summer cottage. It’s a difficult situation because these are middle-aged people and they find it difficult to learn the rules of the Ukrainian language; and with the two languages being so similar, it isn’t easy.)

In Zaporizhzhia, comments on language policy include the following opinions:


(Our state policy decides which language is more important. I’m very happy that in such a Russified region it’s more and more often that public administration officers speak Ukrainian. Of course, it’s difficult for them to adjust, but it’s already been seventeen years we’ve had the Ukrainian state. Zaporoże [Ukr. Zaporozhia] is the historical cradle of Ukrainian statehood and national awareness, but today, as we can see, the reality is different. Why should we, by using his language, support our neighbor that didn’t leave us in peace for centuries?)

As is known, the population of the Ukrainian–Russian borderlands, particularly in the cities of eastern Ukraine, has never had a clearly developed sense of national awareness. A considerable proportion of the inhabitants of the region is of Ukrainian ethnic descent, but has become, and still is, Russified.

Ukrainian language policy remains under close scrutiny from Russian sociologists and political scientists, who express their negative opinion about the attitude to the Russian minority:

Na Ukrainie jednym z podstawowych środków oddziaływania na ludność rosyjskojęzyczną – zwłaszcza w Donbasie, gdzie jej udział wynosi 50–75% – był atak na
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

rosyjską kulturę i język rosyjski. Trzeba to traktować jako państwową politykę Ukrainy w rejonie o szczególnej historii, kulturze, realnej dwujęzyczności. Starano się, różnymi dostępnymi środkami, wyrównywać sytuację narodowo-kulturalną w zachodniej części Ukrainy i w Donbasie... [Krząstek 2002: 47].

(In Ukraine, one of the basic methods of influencing the Russian-speaking population – particularly in the Donbas, where it makes up 50–75% of the region – has been to attack Russian culture and language. This has to be treated as state policy applied in a truly bilingual region with a unique history and culture. Using various available means, it aimed to reshape the ethnic and cultural situation in the Donbas along the patterns of western Ukraine.)

As the legal status of minority languages in Ukraine has not been adequately regulated, Russian is used in many different situations, and its social prestige varies. It is worth noting that official openings of Polish exhibitions organized in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk in 2006–2010, and attended by the Polish Consul General in Kharkiv, Dr Grzegorz Seroczyński, were also held in Russian. Such events are attended not only by Poles, but in fact mostly by Russian-speaking members of the public of different ethnic backgrounds. Apart from this, all Poles in the region obviously speak Russian.

Although it is not recognized as an official language, in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts Russian has greater prestige than Ukrainian. Also, the representatives of political circles in Russia and the local left-wing parties in the Donbas increasingly urge Ukrainian authorities to grant Russian the status of an official language. In doing so, they often quote the language policy in Belarus, where Russian is an official language along Belarusian. The Polish minority in the region is also in favor of the idea.


(We’ve always spoken Russian here, in Donetsk. It isn’t so easy to change attitudes. Russian is the language of the soul, but also the language in which you can express a lot. Ukrainian is poor; it lacks adequate vocabulary in the field of judiciary, accountancy, business, and so on. Although I feel Polish, I really do think that everything should be in Russian. I speak Polish only when I’m in Poland, and I don’t go there often, once or twice a year.)

As can be seen, language policy of the Ukrainian state is a cause of greater and smaller language conflicts. Respecting the European standards in this sphere, while at the same time maintaining the specific nature of Ukrainian tradition and culture, would certainly improve the situation. The task of drafting
a language policy, at least in such areas as the norms of language use and education, could be successfully accomplished by a commission composed of renowned specialists, including linguists. For, as Stanisław Gajda aptly observes, ‘each language is a document of a long history of trying to understand the world’ (‘każdy język to wytwór długiej historii na drodze poznania świata’) [Gajda 2003: 8].

4.2. Polish in Education

In the region under consideration, the question of the language of instruction in the educational system is quite complex. Schools using Ukrainian began to appear as of 1990. For example, the figure for Ukrainian-speaking schools in the Donetsk oblast in 1990 was only 103 out of 1,399, with the remaining ones using Russian. Recently, there has been a considerable growth in the number of schools with Ukrainian instruction; local authorities have not tried to counteract the process by closing them down, as they did in 2011 in Donetsk.\(^6\)

*Dzieci moi uczą się już języka ukraińskiego w szkole. Są wszystkie przedmioty po ukraińsku, ale one mówią po rosyjsku. Jest im bardzo ciężko, że wszystko po ukraińsku* [Donetsk 2009: interview].

*(My children already learn Ukrainian at school. All subjects are taught in Ukrainian, but they speak Russian. It’s really hard for them to learn everything in Ukrainian.)*

The use of Ukrainian in education creates certain problems also for teachers. For example, in Makiivka they developed their own Russian–Ukrainian dictionary to help them explain the topics covered in classes to their students more efficiently. In view of the situation, the local education authority runs courses and seminars on successful methods of teaching Ukrainian.


*(The parents have to give their written permission saying that they want their child to learn in a school with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. If they don’t do that, the child goes to a Russian school.)*

The language of instruction is a question attracting considerable interest among journalists and academics, both Ukrainian and foreign:

*Powstają nierówne warunki w sferze oświaty. Liczba uczniów w klasach z językiem ukraińskim jest 3–5-krotnie mniejsza niż w klasach z językiem rosyjskim. Obowiązek*

\(^6\) For more on this issue, see http://tyzhden.ua/News/20765 (accessed 29.10.2011).
The situation in education is beginning to create inequality. The number of pupils in classes with Ukrainian as the language of instruction is three to five times lower than in those using Russian. A foreign language is taught as a compulsory subject from the first grade only in ‘Ukrainian’ classes. Likewise, they are the only ones with modernized teaching programs. The newly created gymnasiums [secondary schools] specializing in humanities open classes with Ukrainian. Teachers are under psychological pressure: those who teach their subject in Ukrainian are rewarded. Consequently, there is a decline in the number of specialists speaking Russian.)

The educational system of the young Ukrainian state has its share of problems with the language question and there is a considerable body of literature on the use of Ukrainian and Russian in this domain; different opinions on the issue expressed by journalists and academics are also available on the Internet. The situation began to change mainly as a result of the involvement on the part of the intelligentsia and students: in institutions of higher education, courses in Ukrainian are becoming increasingly popular.

Chapter 2.2 above provides information on the legal regulations concerning education and Polish language teaching; the present discussion is focused on Polish in the educational system, including higher education, and also on other forms of teaching Polish, both as a native and a foreign language. Amidst the Russian–Ukrainian language problem in education, it can be noticed that Polish enjoys a high status among the younger generation, with the involvement of Polish minority organizations as an important factor contributing to its position. Indeed, the teaching and promotion of Polish, as well as spreading knowledge about Poland’s past and present, is a major part of their activity. Information about Polish language courses run by these organizations is available on their websites, in Polish magazines issued in Donetsk, and sometimes also in Polish Roman Catholic churches (see Appendix, Documents 13, 14, 15).

In secondary schools in Berdiansk, Donetsk, Makiivka, and Mariupol, Polish is taught both as a compulsory subject and an optional course. The Secondary School no. 15 in Berdiansk has a special Polish language classroom; the Polish Cultural Society ‘Polonia’ (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej ‘Polonia’) has an office in one of the schools in Makiivka, and there is also a study room for classes of Polish language and culture. Courses of Polish are attended by children from different ethnic communities. As most of them come from mixed families, they often do not have a well-developed sense of national self-awareness, or a clear idea of the national identity of their parents.
Lubię język polski i często chodzę na lekcje. Język polski jest taki miły w głosie. Chcę pojechać do Polski, zobaczyć ten kraj. Mój tata jest Rosjaninem, mama Ukrainką, a ja chyba będę Polką, bo mnie się tak podoba i język, i piosenki, i tańce [Makiivka 2009: interview].

(I like Polish and I often come to the lessons. Polish sounds so nice. I want to go to Poland to see that country. My dad’s Russian, my mum’s Ukrainian and I’m going to be Polish, I think, because I really like the language, songs and dances.)

In Zaporizhzhia, teenagers learn Polish at a secondary school with Ukrainian as the language of instruction (the school headmaster, Vadim Komisarov, is not Polish) and children and adults attend Polish classes at the weekends. The Polish teacher working at the school comments:

Wśród społeczności wschodniej chętnie uczą się języka polskiego Rosjanie, Ukraińcy, Czesi i w małym stopniu, niestety, ludzie polskiego pochodzenia. Miałam wypadek w swej praktyce, kiedy ojciec Polak nie chciał, żeby jego córka uczyła się języka polskiego... A córka tego pana potajemnie uczy się języka polskiego w naszej szkole, bo tego bardzo chce i czuje się Polką [Zaporizhzhia 2009: interview].

(Among the people in the east, learning Polish is popular among the Russians, Ukrainians, Czechs, but, unfortunately, not so much among the people of Polish extraction. In my career, I remember a situation when a Polish father didn’t want his daughter to learn Polish... And that man’s daughter secretly learns Polish at our school, because she feels Polish and she really wants to learn.)

In a survey conducted among secondary school students aged 15, the most frequently mentioned comments concerning their motivation for learning Polish were:

- jest to język ojca i dziadka, zawsze on mi się podobał;
- w mojej genealogii są polskie korzenie. Oprócz tego język polski jest interesujący i wyjątkowy;
- mnie interesuje polska kultura;
- najlepiej kulturę państwa reprezentuje język;
- cenię Polaków za patriotyzm, demokrację i religię;
- interesuje mnie polska historia i kultura;
- chcę opanować większą liczbę języków [Zaporizhzhia 2009: surveys].

(- it’s the language of my father and grandfather, I’ve always liked it;
- I have Polish roots; apart from this, Polish is interesting and unique;
- I’m interested in Polish culture;
- language is what represents the country’s culture best;
- I respect Poles for their patriotism, democracy and religion;
- I’m interested in Polish history and culture;
- I want to know more languages.)
The younger pupils (aged 13) explained their motivation as follows:

– jest to interesujące, chcę znać więcej języków obcych; bardzo mi się podoba ten język; wiedzieć jeszcze jednym językiem obcym jest nieszkodliwe;
– polski, dlatego że Polska jest naszym sąsiadem, w przyszłości mam nadzieję bywać w Polsce;
– babcia moja była Polką, podoba mi się państwo polskie, w przyszłości chciałbym tam zamieszkać [Zaporizhzhia 2009: surveys].

(– it’s interesting, I want to know more foreign languages; I really like this language; it doesn’t do any harm to know one more foreign language;
– because Poland’s our neighbor and I hope to go to Poland in the future;
– my granny was Polish, I like Poland, I’d like to live there in the future.)

There has been a steady increase in the number of teenagers and young adults attending Polish classes. Their parents often enquire if they are eligible for Polish classes. For example, an informant from Donetsk asked ‘Can my child go to Polish classes? There’s been a Polish grandfather in our distant family’; another commented in Russian:

U nas niet korniej polskich, no polskij jazyk mnie oczeń nrawitsia, choczu swoju docz otdat’ na uroki polskowo jazyka. My kupili samoucztel i uže czitajem po polski, np. ja chaczcu cztob ona wsio taki chodiła na polskij. Ona mienia każdyj dień spraszywajet: mama ty razgawiariwała z uczitielnicoy, ja choczu uczitsia [Donetsk 2008: interview].

(We don’t have Polish roots, but I like the language very much; I want to send my daughter to Polish classes. We’ve bought a self-study book and we can already read Polish. I really want her to go to Polish classes. She keeps asking me every day ‘Mummy, did you talk to the teacher? I want to learn.’)

Officers of Polish organizations comment on the increasing popularity of Polish as follows:

Język polski posiada bardzo wysoki prestiż, babcie coraz częściej zaczynają mówić o swoich korzeniach, powstaje zatem „swoistość” i pytanie „kim jestem”, jakiego języka chcę się uczyć [Berdiansk 2009: interview].

(Polish is a highly prestigious language and now that grannies are more and more often beginning to talk about their roots, there’s this ‘familiarity’ and the question arises ‘Who am I?’, ‘What language do I want to learn?’)

Another informant observes:

Przychodzą dzieci różne z chęcią, że chcę się uczyć polskiego, my ich nie odganiamy i dajemy tę możliwość. Każde dziecko ma prawo uczyć się u nas języka polskiego, jeżeli nawet nie ma polskich korzeni. Takich uczniów jest coraz więcej, często mamy problemy z nauczycielami [Donetsk 2009: interview].
(There are all kinds of children who come here and want to learn Polish. We don’t
discourage them and we give them the opportunity. Every child can learn Polish here,
even if he or she doesn’t have Polish roots. There are more and more pupils like that
and we often have problems to find teachers.)

Polish is becoming increasingly popular also among students attending
public and private institutions of higher education in Berdiansk, Donetsk,
Mariupol and Zaporizhzhia. At this level of education, Polish is taught as an
optional foreign language course, a compulsory subject, or an extended language
course with components devoted to history, geography and tourist industry
in Poland. Some institutions have signed cooperation agreements to send
their students to language courses in Poland; the Polish-Ukrainian Faculty of
Political and Social Sciences at the Berdiansk University of Business and Man-
agement sends their students to attend undergraduate and postgraduate
courses at the College of Social and Economic Sciences (Pol. Wyższa Szkoła
Społeczno-Gospodarcza) in Tyczyn and the University of Rzeszów. A lecturer
teaching Polish in Zaporizhzhia observes:

Potrzeba nauczenia się języka polskiego to przede wszystkim pierwszy krok do re-
alizacji planów życiowych ludzi z Ukrainy, które są związane z Polską, np.: zamiar
studiowania na jednej z polskich uczelni i zdobycie tytułu magistra, znalezienie
pracy, rozwinięcie interesów biznesowych, planowanie podróży do Polski w celu
odwiedzenia swojej rodziny, chęć dowiedzenia się czegoś więcej o kraju i swobod-
nego rozmawiania ze swoimi polskimi krewnymi [Lipkiewicz 2011: 165].

(For people from Ukraine learning Polish comes as the essential first step to fulfil
their plans and ambitions which are connected with Poland, e.g. to study for a degree
in a Polish academic institution, to find employment, to develop business connec-
tions, to go to Poland to visit their relatives, to get to know more about the country,
to be able to freely communicate with their Polish relatives.)

Mieszkam w Doniecku. Po ukończeniu w 2002 roku Politechniki Donieckiej dosta-
łem skierowanie na staż naukowy w Akademii Górniczo-Hutniczej im. Stanisława
Staszica w Krakowie. [...] obecnie studenci Politechniki Donieckiej mogą studiować
język polski, zapoznać się z historią i kulturą najbliższego sąsiada Ukrainy. Właśnie
dzięki ich aktywności mieliśmy wszystko konieczne dla skutecznych zajęć na pol-
skim wydziale naszej uczelni [Polacy 2003, nr 7: 6].

(I live in Donetsk. When I graduated from the Donetsk Technical University in 2002,
I was offered an academic internship at the AGH University of Science and Technol-
ygy in Cracow [Poland]. [...] Donetsk Technical University students can currently
learn Polish and get to know the history and culture of Ukraine’s closest neighbor.
Thanks to this, we had everything that was required to satisfactorily pursue cours-
es in the Polish Technical Faculty of our home university.)

Replies from the students of the Berdiansk University of Business and Man-
agement and the Donetsk Technical University to a survey question ‘Why are
you learning Polish?’ indicate that they find the language attractive mainly for cognitive and economic reasons:

– bardzo lubię języki obce. Język polski uczę dlatego, aby poznać kolejny język obcy, bardzo chciałabym pojechać do Polski, tam pracować, ewentualnie zamieszkać;
– myślę, że język polski jest piękny i bardzo podobny do ukraińskiego. W przyszłości chcę współpracować z firmami polskimi, stąd też chcę nauczyć się polskiego;
– po pierwsze bardzo chcę opanować większość liczbę języków, dziś jest to bardzo ważne;
– polski dlatego, że Polska jest naszym sąsiadem, państwo szybko się rozwija i jest w Unii Europejskiej; chcę znać kolejny język obcy, ile języków obcych znasz, tyle razy jesteś człowiekiem;
– uczę się języka polskiego, aby w przyszłości w tym kierunku pracować; pragnę współpracować z partnerami polskimi w zakresie turystyki [Donetsk 2009: surveys].

(– I really like foreign languages; I learn Polish because I want to know another foreign language, I’d really like to go to Poland, to work and perhaps to live there;
– I think that Polish is beautiful and really similar to Ukrainian; in the future, I want to cooperate with Polish companies, so this is why I want to learn Polish;
– the first thing is that I want to know more languages, it’s really important today;
– because Poland is our neighbor, the country is growing fast and is in the European Union; I want to know another foreign language, because the more languages you know, the more human you are;
– I learn Polish so that I can use it at work in the future; I want to cooperate with Polish partners in the tourist industry.)

– uczę się polskiego, bo pojedę na studia do Polski;
– polski jest językiem unijnym i jak się zdaje międzynarodowowym;
– chcę pracować w Polsce; mam Kartę Polaka, pojedę kończyć studia i tam pracować;
– z językiem polskim znajdę pracę na miejscu i będę pracować w zakresie wymiany z Polską [Berdiansk 2010: surveys].

(– I’m learning Polish because I’m going to study in Poland;
– Polish is a language of the European Union and an international language, I think;
– I want to work in Poland; I have the Polish Card [Pol. Karta Polaka], I’m going to finish my studies in Poland and find work there;
– if I have Polish, I will be able to find work here doing business with Poland.)

A lecturer teaching Polish at Donetsk University comments on the level of interest in Polish classes among the students as follows:

TheScopeandFunctionsofPolish

(Students always come to their Polish classes prepared and are eager to attend them. I’m surprised how fast they learn and how very interested they are. They are very happy to take out books to read; I always have a 100% turnout in classes. I’m really happy about that; it gives me motivation to work; I’m far away from Poland, from home. When I see their attitude and motivation to learn Polish, I have more energy and motivation to do my work.)

The level of interest in Polish classes among students was reported in the Polish media in Ukraine – websites and magazines edited by the chairpersons of Polish organizations:

Ze względu na duże zainteresowanie polską kulturą wśród młodzieży akademickiej Zarząd Towarzystwa „Odrodzenie” i władze Berdiańskiego Instytutu Przedsiębiorczości zawarły umowę o powołaniu Centrum Języka i Kultury Polskiej. Podkreślmy, że w tej chwili w Katedrze Języków Obcych i Filologii Słowiańskiej pracuje trzech nauczycieli polonistów, a naukę języka polskiego pobiera ponad 150 studentów. Centrum będzie się mieściło w nowym budynku uczelni. Umowa przewiduje utworzenie wyposażonej w sprzęt audiowizualny auli i biblioteki polskiej.7

(Given considerable interest in Polish culture among students at institutions of higher education, the Board of ‘Odrodzenie’ Society and the authorities of the Berdiansk Institute of Management concluded an agreement to establish the Center of Polish Language and Culture [Pol. Centrum Języka i Kultury Polskiej]. The Department of Foreign Languages and Slavic Studies currently employs three lecturers of Polish, who teach the language to over 150 students. The Center is going to be located in the new building of the Institute and, as specified in the agreement, will include a lecture theater with audio-visual equipment, as well as a library.)

The total number of students learning Polish in the institutions of higher education in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts is over eight hundred. As can be seen from information provided during interviews with the chairpersons of Polish organizations, there is a growing interest in learning Polish: the heads of departments of different academic institutions in Donetsk often ask them for assistance in organizing and running Polish language courses.

Courses run by Polish associations and Roman Catholic parishes are also a popular form of learning the language. Held mostly at the weekends, the classes have nearly a full turnout all year round. Such courses are a reasonable solution if there is rivalry between different Polish societies in the same area. For example, younger and older learners from both Polish organizations in Donetsk attend the same classes run by a teacher from Poland in a building which belongs to the parish. It is also Roman Catholic priests sent from Poland to work in the region who give their support and assistance to teaching Polish: they provide premises (e.g. in Donetsk) or teach the language themselves (e.g. Rev. Adam Gaśior in Melitopol).

It is also worth mentioning that a group of about thirty children, mostly of Polish extraction, from the foster care institution in Berdiansk, take a Polish course in the local Polish Center (Pol. Dom Polski). They come to their classes two or three times a week and, apart from learning the language, songs and dances, they also receive material and psychological support from volunteers working in the center; sometimes they are quite reluctant to go back to where they live.

Zaporizhzhia has a Polish senior citizens club, whose members are also eager participants of Polish language and culture classes. Some of those learning Polish know it from their mothers and grandmothers; their Polish represents different varieties of the eastern borderland speech, as they were born mostly in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi and Zhytomyr regions, and some originally come from Lithuania, Belarus and Latvia. Others have forgotten the language and are attending the classes to revive it or learn from scratch:

Tata mój w 1938 roku był w polskiej armii, a we wrześniu 1939 roku walczył z Niemcami, trafił do niewoli. Tam w 1945 roku ożenił się z Ukrainką, moją mamą z Zaporóżza, tutaj przyjechali. Jesteśmy członkami stowarzyszenia, gdzie się uczę polskiego [Zaporizhzhia 2009: survey].

(My dad was in the Polish army in 1938; he fought against the Germans in September 1939 and was taken a prisoner of war. There, in 1945, he married a Ukrainian from Zaporizhzhia, my mum, and they came here. We’re members of the Polish society, where I learn Polish.)

When asked why they learn Polish, members of the older generation from Zaporizhzhia replied as follows:

– moja babća Polka; państwo mi się bardzo podoba, chciałbym mieszkać w Polsce;
– jest to język mojego ojca i dziadka, zawsze mi się podobał;
– w mojej genealogii są Polacy; oprócz tego język polski jest bardzo interesujący;
– jest to język i kultura moich rodziców, chcę przekazać dzieciom;
– jest to język moich przodków;
– chcę poznać język, którym posługiwali się moi przodkowie, bardzo mi się podoba ten język;
– jest to język mojej babki i dziadka, a także ojca, odczuwam łączność z przodkami;
– mnie interesuje polska kultura, najlepiej o kulturze mówi język; cenię Polaków za patriotyzm, demokrację i religijność, są dla mnie wzorem [Zaporizhzhia 2009: surveys].

(– my granny was Polish; I like that country a lot; I’d like to live in Poland;
– it’s the language of my father and grandfather, I’ve always liked it;
– I have Polish ancestors; apart from this, Polish is very interesting;
– that’s the language and culture of my parents, I want to pass it on to my children;
– that’s the language of my ancestors;
– I want to get to know the language of my ancestors, I really like it a lot;
– that’s the language of my granny and grandad, and my father, too; I feel this bond with my ancestors;
I’m interested in Polish culture and it’s the language that can tell you most about culture; I respect Poles for their patriotism, democracy and being religious, they’re an example for me.)

As can be seen from the above comments, in the case of this age group the main factor in their motivation to learn Polish is their descent, getting to know the heritage of their ancestors and a wish to pass it on to the next generation. Above all, they repeat: I want to speak the language of my ancestors (Chcę rozmawiać językiem przodków) [Melitopol 2009: interview].

As established in the course of research, in 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 there were only two Polish language teachers from Poland in the region (working in Donetsk and Mariupol); before 2007, such teachers had taught also in Zaporizhzhia, Makivka and Donetsk. They are sent to the region mostly by the National In-Service Teacher Training Center (Pol. Centralny Ośrodek Doskonalenia Nauczycieli, CODN) in Warsaw and rotate every few years. Given the level of interest in learning the language, their number is far from sufficient, hence the chairpersons of Polish associations have to solve the problem on their own and often ask different organizations in Poland for teachers to be sent to work in the region.

A survey of preferences concerning teachers of Polish, conducted for the present study among the students at institutions of higher education in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Berdiansk, asked the question: ‘Do you want to be taught Polish by a teacher: (a) from Poland, (b) from Ukraine, (c) it doesn’t matter?’

Among those surveyed in Donetsk (90 questionnaires in total), 70 preferred to be taught by a teacher from Poland, 14 selected the option ‘it doesn’t matter,’ and six opted for a teacher from Ukraine. In Zaporizhzhia and Berdiansk (90 and 60 questionnaires, respectively), student preferences were as follows: ‘a teacher from Poland’: 112, ‘it doesn’t matter’: 15, ‘a teacher from Ukraine’: 23.

The respondents often had also a number of comments on their teachers’ command of Polish. They were aware that those from Ukraine had not received the same level of training, and that their Polish was not the current literary variety of the language. The students who opted for a teacher from Poland explained their preferences as follows:

– nauczyciel z Polski mówi bez akcentu i łatwiej się nauczyć;
– nauczyciel z Polski nie robi błędów tak jak nauczyciel z Ukrainy;
– ci z Ukrainy to mówią po ukraińsku, a im wydaje się, że po polsku;
– nauczyciel z Polski zna dobrze język i kulturę, i historię polską, nauczyciel z Ukrainy nie ma takiej wiedzy;
– nauczyciel z Polski ma dobre materiały dydaktyczne i potrafi nimi się postępować;
– nauczyciel z Polski jest kulturalny, taki elegancki, mówi na wysokim poziomie kulturalnym;

8 In January 2010, reorganized as the Center for the Development of Education (Pol. Ośrodek Rozwoju Edukacji, ORE).
– nauczyciel z Polski na wszystkie pytania odpowiada, ponieważ wszystko wie [Donetsk 2009: survey].

(– a teacher from Poland has no accent and it’s easier to learn; 
– a teacher from Poland doesn’t make mistakes like a teacher from Ukraine; 
– those from Ukraine speak Ukrainian and think it’s Polish; 
– a teacher from Poland has a good knowledge of the language, culture and history; a teacher from Ukraine doesn’t know so much; 
– a teacher from Poland has good teaching materials and knows how to use them; 
– a teacher from Poland is well-mannered, so elegant and speaks really cultured Polish; 
– a teacher from Poland answers all the questions because he or she knows everything.)

Similar opinions were also expressed in Zaporizhzhia, for example:

Ten, co z Polski nas uczył, to było tak łagodnie i dobrze, on wszystko nam opowiadał i wszystko wiedział, a teraz ten z Ukrainy tak trochę nami się zajmuje [Zaporizhzhia 2009: surveys].

(That one from Poland that used to teach us, he was so nice and so good; he told us everything and he knew everything; and now this one from Ukraine doesn’t take care of us so much.)

Those who preferred a Polish teacher from Ukraine explained their choice as follows:

– nauczyciel z Ukrainy wie, jak trzeba tłumaczyć, i pokazuje porównania z ukraińskim, z rosyjskim; 
– nauczyciel z Ukrainy bardzo dobrze uczy ortografii polskiej, bo wymienia wszystko, tam, gdzie w rosyjskim r, to w polskim rz; 
– nauczyciel z Ukrainy tłumaczy nam to, co my nie rozumiemy, nauczyciel z Polski nie ma takiego porównania [Donetsk 2009: survey].

(– a teacher from Ukraine knows how to explain things and compares them to Ukrainian and Russian; 
– a teacher from Ukraine is very good at teaching Polish spelling because he or she can tell us where exactly Russian has the ‘r’ and Polish will have the ‘rz’ [spelling]; 
– a teacher from Ukraine explains to us things we don’t understand, and a teacher from Poland can’t compare them so well)

Some replies in Berdiansk were:

– nauczyciel z Ukrainy zna zasady pisowni ukraińskiej i polskiej i daje dobre porównania; 
– nauczyciel z Ukrainy wybiera lepsze przykłady do rozwiązywania zadań; 
– nauczyciel z Ukrainy ma taką mentalność jak my i tak wymawia jak my, i wszystko rozumiemy [Berdiansk 2009: interview].

(– a teacher from Ukraine knows Ukrainian and Polish spelling and gives good examples to compare them;
– a teacher from Ukraine chooses better examples for practice exercises;
– a teacher from Ukraine has the same mentality and pronunciation as us and we can understand everything.)

As can be seen from the comments, there is a strong preference for teachers from Poland. If there is no such opportunity, those interested are very happy to attend Polish classes run by a teacher from Ukraine to get to know at least a bit more on the subjects which are generally related to Poland (żeby chociaż trochę zgłębić swoją wiedzę na tematy, które ogólnie wiążą się z tym, co polskie) [Makiivka 2009: interview].

The question of teaching resources for different age groups is also worth mentioning. Such materials, mainly course books, works of literature and films, are sent to Ukraine mostly with the support and assistance from the Center for Polish Teachers Abroad (Pol. Polonijne Centrum Nauczycielskie) in Lublin, the Goniewicz Foundation for Aid to Polish Schools in the East (Pol. Fundacja Pomocy Szkolom Polskim na Wschodzie im. Tadeusza Goniewicza), the Polish Community Association (Pol. Stowarzyszenie 'Wspólnota Polska'), the Foundation for Aid to the Poles in the East (Pol. Fundacja 'Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie'), and the General Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv. After the initial period when teaching resources were difficult to obtain, they are now generally available.

It should be remembered that in the region it is mainly books that function as a key medium of spreading the Polish language, culture and national tradition. The first Polish library in eastern Ukraine, officially opened in Berdiansk in 2008, has a collection of over five thousand volumes, which is a promising start for developing large-scale academic and educational activity. Initiated by the Board of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ (Pol. Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo ‘Odrodzenie’), the library functions at the Center of Polish Language and Culture, established in 2006 at the Berdiansk University of Business and Management. The books were brought from Poland with the assistance from the Polish Consul General in Kharkiv, Dr Grzegorz Seroczyński, and the university co-financed the bookshelves for the collection. An important educational center, the library is open to the Polish community, local students and all those interested in Polish culture.9

Surveys and interviews reveal that pupils and students from Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia learning Polish aim to become proficient users of the language in speech and writing, and to read works of literature in Polish to enable them to study in Poland. Some learners have been successful in such plans and are students in different departments of Polish institutions of higher education.

Informants from the older generation also want to have a good command of Polish in speech and writing so that they can trace their family in Poland and keep in contact with them. They often declared that at least one of their

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parents or grandparents had spoken Polish. Language as a factor of national identity is discussed in Chapter 5.4 below.

Teachers and pupils often share their excitement about having an opportunity to learn Polish with readers of Polish magazines, for example:


(A Polish language club was opened at School no. 11 in September. The children who attend it are eleven to twelve years old and are mostly of Polish descent. We received course books from Poland and we just could not put them down, they are so nice and colorful. The kids learn to read, write and speak Polish; they also get to know rhymes and songs...)

4.3. The Language of Polish Minority Organizations

The legal framework and the current situation of Polish minority organizations are discussed in Chapter 2.1 above. The present section is focused on the languages used by their chairpersons and board members in the course of their activity. As already mentioned, the official language of the country is Ukrainian, which means that all registration documents, including the statute (constitution), have to be submitted in this language. Documents issued by appropriate institutions, also in Ukrainian, include a number of certificates, such as a certificate of registration with the social insurance, a certificate of registration as a non-profit organization, a certificate of registration with the statistical office, a certificate of official registration (see Appendix, Document 18). Although Ukrainian is the official language, it is used mainly in writing; the medium of spoken communication in public administration is Russian:

\[Jak \ chodzę \ coś \ załatwiać \ do \ urzędu, \ muszę \ po \ rosyjsku \ do \ nich \ mówić, \ bo \ po \ polsku \ jasne, \ że \ nie \ rozumieją, \ a \ po \ ukraińsku \ też \ mają \ kłopoty. \ Ja \ im \ wyjaśniam \ wszystko \ po \ rosyjsku, \ a \ potem \ jak \ trzeba \ pismo, \ czy \ co \ tam, \ to \ już \ oficjalnie \ po \ ukraińsku\ [Donetsk 2007: interview].\]

(When I go to get something sorted out with a public administration office, I have to speak Russian, because they obviously don’t understand Polish and find it hard to deal with Ukrainian as well. I explain everything in Russian, and then, when I need to have something in writing, it’s all done officially, in Ukrainian.)

Correspondence between Polish organizations and the local public administration in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts is handled in Ukrainian or
Russian, depending on the required degree of formality. The written materials in question include mostly letters concerning particular projects, formal and financial matters, as well as posters, leaflets, invitations, etc.; the latter are frequently bilingual, i.e. in Polish and Ukrainian or Polish and Russian. Although, as required by law, all official records have to be kept in Ukrainian, some letters and applications are sometimes written in Russian (never in Polish).

As for internal documents, there is no single pattern and the languages used are Polish, Russian and, rarely, Ukrainian. For example, the annual activity program of the Polish Union ‘Polonia’ (Pol. Związek Polaków ‘Polonia’) in Zaporizhzhia for 2007 was written in Russian (cf. Appendix, Document 19), and a similar program of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu) for 2010 was published in the Polacy Donbasu (The Poles of the Donbas) magazine in Polish and Russian (cf. Appendix, Document 20).

W gorodskom sowietie my piszemy wszystko po ukraińsku, trochę to i problem, bo trzeba znać język ukraiński, dobrze, że są litery takie same jak w rosyjskim, ale i tak dobrze, tam też trochę nam pomagają i jakoś idzie [Makiivka 2007: interview].

(In the town hall, we do all the writing in Ukrainian; it's a bit of a problem, because you have to know Ukrainian, but it's good that it's got the same letters as Russian; they help us a bit there, and we get it sorted, somehow.)

Official correspondence between the boards of Polish associations and the Polish General Consulate in Kharkiv (applications, projects, letters of congratulation, etc.) is handled in Polish. Telephone calls with the consulate are both in Polish and Russian, as not all members of the staff are Polish. Dr Grzegorz Seroczyński, the Polish Consul General in 2006–2010, knew Russian very well and used it in contacts with the representatives of the local Polish community who had no Polish, or whose command of the language was too limited.

Polish organizations in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are in official contact with different organizations in Poland, such as the Polish Community Association (Pol. Stowarzyszenie ’Wspólnota Polska’) and the Foundation for Aid to the Poles in the East (Pol. Fundacja ’Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie’), including exchange of projects, reports, invitations, etc. written in Polish. Headed paper of the organizations in the region is often bilingual, Russian and Polish or Ukrainian and Polish, as it is used in contact with institutions in both Ukraine and Poland (cf. Appendix, Document 21).

Generally, letters in Polish are written by the chairpersons, most of whom have completed a number of Polish courses in various academic institutions in Poland. Sometimes, they also seek assistance from Polish teachers, especially in cases involving official correspondence with organizations and institutions in Poland. For example, until recently, the chairperson of the Polish association in Melitopol did not know Polish; she even expressed her surprise at the fact that all letters to Poland should be written in Polish:
(And why can’t read Russian there? It’s an international language, everyone should know it. And what am I going to do now; I need a computer with Office and all that; and they in Warszawa [Warsaw] can’t read anything. I’ve got to find someone to translate these letters for me.)

Such cases, however, are incidental: the people who founded Polish organizations in the region in the early 1990s had a certain level of both spoken and written Polish. One of the first Polish societies was established in Zaporizhzhia in 1992 by Jerzy Rozenbaum, a professor of linguistics and a specialist in foreign language teaching methodology. Born in Warsaw, and a proficient Russian speaker, he was able to handle official contacts both in Poland and Ukraine; it was not a coincidence that it was him who laid the foundations for the organization. Another association was founded in Berdiansk in 1994 by Lech Aleksy Suchomłynow, a specialist in Slavic studies, who was twenty-two years of age at the time. A fluent Russian, Ukrainian and Polish speaker and an efficient organizer, he dealt with the registration procedure and contacts with official institutions.

The working language of the formal meetings of Polish organizations in the region is Russian:

Zawsze wszystko u nas w języku rosyjskim. Zbieramy się, podejmujemy ważne decyzje, podpisujemy protokoły i to wszystko sprawnie jest robione. Po polsku nie wszyscy w zarządzie rozumieją, trzeba byłoby tłumaczyć [Makiivka 2007: interview].

(It’s all in Russian here. We meet, we make important decisions, we sign the minutes, and it’s all really smooth. Not all the people on the board know Polish, we’d have to translate.)

From my own experience, I know that the situation in Lviv is different and it is only Polish that is used in all kinds of meetings. On the other hand, members of the board in Chernivtsi often switch from Polish to Ukrainian.

In the south-east, the language of cultural events (concerts, exhibitions, etc.) is Russian:

Na nasze imprezy przychodzą przedstawiciele władz obwodowych, władz miasta, nie możemy mówić tylko po polsku, ponieważ oni tego języka nie znają. Poza tym każdy, kto ma ochotę, może przyjść na imprezy przez nas organizowane, nie tylko Polacy, dlatego nie ograniczamy się językowo, chcemy, aby nas rozumięło. W języku zrozumiałym musimy mówić o swojej polskiej kulturze, jest to także pewien rodzaj promocji Polski tutaj, na czym nam też bardzo zależy [Berdiansk 2007: interview].
Our events are attended by representatives of regional authorities, the city hall; we can’t speak only Polish, because they don’t know the language. Apart from this, anyone who wants can come to the events we organize, not only Poles, that’s why we don’t have restrictions about the language, we want to be understood. We have to use the language people understand to talk about our culture, it’s also some kind of promotion of Poland here, and it’s something we find really important.

Among themselves, chairpersons of Polish organizations in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts speak Russian more often than Polish. Ukrainian is used only incidentally, mostly by those who originally come from western Ukraine; those from the east certainly prefer to communicate in Russian:

Nam łuczsze pa ruski razgawariwat’, wsio panimajesz, można wsio raskazat’ [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

(For us, it’s better to speak Russian. You can understand everything; you can say what you want to say.)

Among us, sure we speak Russian; it wouldn’t work in Polish; we’ve got things to do, we need to sort them out and not wait until someone can manage to say something in Polish. With the chairman from Mariupol, yes we speak only Polish, and there’s the chairman from Donetsk as well, but we don’t meet very often. And in Zaporozhé [Ukr. Zaporizhzhia], well, it wouldn’t work in Polish; I prefer to speak Russian, because when they start speaking Polish, I just can’t be bothered to listen.)

In one of the meetings in Zaporizhzhia, Jerzy Pawluk, the chairman of a local Polish association, made the following comment on the command of Polish among the officers of such organizations:

Kto jak kto, ale prezesi muszą po polsku mówić. Oni reprezentują tutejsze polskie środowiska, oni się kontaktują z władzami w Polsce. Jeżeli prezes nie zna polskiego, to co to za prezes polskiego stowarzyszenia, tak być nie może. Każdy prezes musi znać język polski, inaczej co to za prezes [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

(Others, well, but the chairpersons, they’ve got to speak Polish. They represent the Polish people here; they’re in touch with Polish officials. What kind of chairperson of a Polish association is it if they can’t speak Polish? No, it won’t do. Each chairperson has to speak Polish, what kind of chairperson is it otherwise?)
Events attended by guests from Poland are generally held in Polish, although it depends on the city and rank of the occasion. For example, at the Polish Center in Berdiansk, all events are held in Polish (meetings with invited guests, book promotions, awarding honorary membership, etc.), even though the level of the language among the board and members of the local association varies considerably.

Depending on the situation, the languages used in Polish organizations in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are Polish, Russian and Ukrainian. On official occasions, the chairpersons rely on Ukrainian as the official language, which, owing to this status, is more prestigious; used mostly as a spoken medium of communication in the region, Russian has a somewhat lower standing.

The chairpersons and officers of Polish associations in the region are mostly trilingual users of Ukrainian, Russian and Polish. They are responsible for running their organizations smoothly, representing them in official contacts, including those with the high-level public administration in Poland and Ukraine; they are also in charge of official correspondence with their partners at home and abroad. Most importantly, they represent the interests of the Polish minority in the region. Polish and Ukrainian language policies are certainly an important factor of their organizational activity.

4.4. The Polish Language Media

The Polish press issued in Ukraine in different periods has not so far featured as the subject of a more extensive linguistic study.¹⁰ Jan Bujak’s volume [Bujak 1989] provides an overview of coverage of books and newspapers in weekly magazines of the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. Before 1918, one of the major centers of Polish culture was Lviv (Pol. Lwów), with as many as 951 Polish newspapers and magazines published in the city in 1864–1918 [after Sliesariewa 2005: 146]. In central Ukraine, Polish periodicals began to appear only after 1905; the number of Polish press titles issued in Kiev in 1906–1918 is estimated at thirty-two, including the Dziennik Kijowski (The Kiev Daily), Głos Kijowski (The Kiev Voice), Świt (The Dawn), Goniec Kijowski (The Kiev Messenger), Kresy (The Borderlands), Nasza Przyszłość (Our Future), Lud Boży (God’s People). The quality of journalism was generally high and they included a rich and varied content [Daszkiewicz 1966]. It is worth noting that Polish magazines were issued also in Odessa: Życie Polskie (Polish Life), for two years; Tygodnik Odeski (The Odessa Weekly), from 1915; and in Kharkiv.

The content of Polish-language journals and magazines in Ukraine changed radically after the October Revolution of 1917, when the press was turned into

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¹⁰ Among linguistic studies in this field, it is particularly worth noting works by Jolanta Mędelska, who has been investigating the language of the Polish press in Lithuania for several years [e.g. Mędelska 2000, 2001, 2004].
an instrument of Soviet propaganda. Indeed, ideological bias is evident even from the titles themselves, including such examples as Jedność Robotnicza (Workers’ Unity), Sierp (The Sickle), Głos Radziecki (The Soviet Voice), Prawda Bolszewicka (The Bolshevik Truth), Czerwony Sztandar (The Red Flag), Szturm Bolszewicki (The Bolshevik Storm), Trybuna Radziecka (The Soviet Tribune), Radziecka Marchlewsczyzna (The Soviet Marchlewsczyzna). A linguistic investigation of the Polish press in Ukraine is currently pursued by a research team at the Institute of the Polish Language at the Polish Academy of Sciences (Pol. Instytut Języka Polskiego Polskiej Akademii Nauk).

More extensive linguistic studies are available for the Polish press in Soviet Belarus in the interwar period, and for Latvia [Grek-Pabisowa et al. 2008]. The authors of Język polski na Białorusi Radzieckiej w okresie międzywojen-nym. Polszczyzna pisana (The Polish Language in Soviet Belarus in the Interwar Period: Written Language) observe:


(1990 was a turning point: the breakaway of a number of former Soviet republics provided new opportunities for the press issued in minority languages. It is to be assumed that new linguistic relations have an impact on linguistic changes, which should be reflected in the press. However, the language of Polish newspapers and magazines in the countries of the former Soviet Union has not so far been the subject of linguistic study.)

The present section aims to offer an outline of the current situation of the Polish media in south-eastern Ukraine, rather than a linguistic discussion of their content, which deserves a study in its own right. As stressed in the previous

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12 The Polish language as used in the press and other written sources in the early days of the Sovietization of Ukraine (in the 1920s and 1930s) is the focus of the project no. 11H 11 00588, currently (2012–2015) pursued by a research team at the Institute of the Polish Language at the Polish Academy of Sciences (Pol. Instytut Języka Polskiego Polskiej Akademii Nauk), led by Professor Ewa Dzięgiel.

13 For a detailed discussion of research on the Polish press across the eastern Polish border, in Lithuania, Latvia and Soviet Belarus, see Grek-Pabisowa, Ostrówka, Biesiadowska-Magdziarz 2008. The language of Polish press in Latvia is the subject of a forthcoming study by Iweta Rucka.

14 For a discussion of the Polish press in nineteenth-century Bukovina, see Bujak 2006; the local press titles presented in the study were issued thanks to the efforts of local Polish activists; the periodicals were short-lived and are now forgotten.
chapters, the Polish language enjoys a high social status in the region. Among the factors contributing to this position is the availability of the Polish language media. Indeed, Jadwiga Zieniukowa observes that ‘the written form of the language is a precondition of its higher status’ (warunkiem wyższego prestiżu jest istnienie formy pisanej języka) [Zieniukowa 2006: 72].

Having established their organizations, Poles living in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts began to publish newspapers and newsletters, set up websites, and produce radio and television programs:

Niemal w każdym środowisku jak grzyby po deszczu zaczęły powstawać polskie gazety, gdzie polskie organizacje i Polacy swobodnie zaczęli przypominać o swoich potrzebach, inicjatywach kulturalnych, akcjach na rzecz odrodzenia narodowego, gdzie mogli też wyrazić swoje nadzieje na kontakt z Macierzą. Polskie media to także prograny radiowe i telewizyjne emitowane w różnym zakresie, często zaledwie dwugodzinne na miesiąc, także Internet, który coraz szerzej wkraca jako pomoc w upowszechnianiu polonijnej rzeczywistości [Witter 2003].

(Polish newspapers sprung up like mushrooms in nearly every local Polish community, providing a forum where their members and organizations could freely articulate their needs, report their cultural activity, pursue their national revival initiatives, and express their hopes for more contacts with Poland. The Polish media also include radio and television programs, broadcast more or less frequently (sometimes only for two hours a month), as well as the Internet, which is becoming an increasingly more common medium of popularizing local Polish issues.)

Liudmila Slesareva (Ludmiła Slesariewa) observes that

polskie periodyki w dzisiejszej Ukrainie są jednym z instrumentów odzyskania społeczno-kulturowej tożsamości Polaków, w dużej mierze zatraconej po przejściach totalitaryzmu. Niewątpliwą wartością omawianych wydań jest już to, że ukazują się w języku polskim, gdyż język jest jednym z najistotniejszych elementów integrujących naród. W sytuacji faktycznej nieobecności książki i prasy z Polski na rynku mediów Ukrainy miejscowe gazety polskie stają się praktycznie jedynym źródłem polskiego słowa drukowanego w kraju [Slesariewa 2005: 146].

(Polish periodicals in Ukraine are an instrument of recovering Polish socio-cultural identity, largely lost under the totalitarian system. They are important for the very fact that they are published in Polish, as the language is a crucial element integrating the national community. Since books and the press published in Poland are hardly available in Ukraine, local Polish newspapers offer practically the only contact with written Polish to the Polish minority in the country.)

The Polish media in Ukraine are financed mainly from the funds of the Polish Senate, transferred to individual organizations by the Foundation for Aid to Poles in the East (Pol. Fundacja ‘Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie’) and the Polish Community Association (Pol. Stowarzyszenie ‘Wspólnota Polska’).
The Scope and Functions of Polish

There are two Polish magazines published in south-eastern Ukraine: the Polacy Donbasu (The Poles of the Donbas), a monthly issued by the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas, and the Źródło (The Spring), a bi-monthly magazine of the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association (Pol. Polsko-Ukraińskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalne) in Mariupol.

The monthly Polacy Donbasu (see Illustration 4.1) has been published for over a decade both in Polish and Ukrainian, and can be considered one of the most important magazines in the region. For its first issue (27 October 2000), the editors chose a motto from Marshal Józef Piłsudski: 'Our greatest strength is our faith. Protect it and make it stronger, for when it is undermined, there can be no hope for victory!' ('Naszą największą siłą jest nasza wiara. Strzeżmy jej, wzmacnajmy ją – wtedy wiara jest podwiera, tam nie może być mowy o zwycięstwie!') [Polacy 2000, no. 1: 1].

Illustration 4.1. The front page of the Polacy Donbasu (The Poles of the Donbas) magazine

Addressing their readers, the editors of the magazine outlined their aims and objectives as follows:

1) Dotrzeć jak najdalej przez organizacje polskie, przez parafie do naszych rodaków, zamieszkałych na Donbasie, całej Ukrainie, a szczególnie w regionach Ukrainy Zadnieprzańskiej i Republice Krym, gdzie język polski potrafiło utrzymać tylko 1–2% osób pochodzenia polskiego. Zsynchronizowane treści i rubryka szkolenia
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

pozwolą Polakom wkrótce odnaleźć to, co kiedyś bezwinnie stracili ich przodko- wie, powrócić swój ojczysty język polski.

2) Duży format gazety daje nam możliwość prowadzenia wielu ciekawych rubryk: o Polsce i dziejach Polski, o sukcesach reform i wybitnych Polakach; o tragedii naszego narodu w czterech rozbiorach; o Ukrainie i regionie Donbasu, o bogactwach tego kraju, o znanych ludziach, o przedsiębiorstwach, znanych w Europie i Świecie; o Polakach, zamieszkałych na Ukrainie w Zagłębiu Donieckim, o tragicznych losach rodziców prawdziwych patriotów polskich, wywiezionych po powstaniu styczniowym 1863 roku i o, tak zwanych, stalinowskich «wrogach ludu»; o dobrych stosunkach i pozytywnych zmianach we współpracy między Polską a Ukrainą na zasadach partnerstwa i zaufania; o Towarzystwie Kultury Polskiej Donbasu, części składowej Federacji Organizacji Polskich na Ukrainie i różnych polonijnych organizacjach w dniu dzisiejszym i planach na przyszłość, o kulturze, poezji, i dziedzictwie narodowym, o Dniach Kultury Polskiej na Ukrainie, Festiwalach, Konkursach; o młodzieży i dzieciach, o Har- cerstwie, o tradycjach naszego narodu, o kuchni polskiej; o życiu mniejszości narodowych na Ukrainie i w Polsce, o trosce o nie Rządu RP [Polacy 2000, no. 1: 1].

(1) [We aim] to reach (through Polish organizations and parishes) Poles in the Donbas and in the entire Ukraine, particularly those living in the Left Bank and in the Republic of Crimea, where only about 1–2 percent of persons of Polish extraction have managed to keep their language. Parallel texts in Polish and Ukrainian, as well as the educational column will help Polish readers to quickly recover what their ancestors once blamelessly lost.

(2) A large size of our magazine makes it possible to include a number of interesting columns devoted to such issues as: Poland and its history; success of the Polish reforms; outstanding Polish figures; the tragedy of our nation under the four partitions; Ukraine, the Donbas and the richness of the country; public figures; business enterprises known in Europe and around the world; Poles in the Donbas; the tragic fate of the families of devoted Polish patriots deported in the aftermath of the January Uprising of 1863 and the so-called enemies of the people of the Stalinist era; good relations and positive changes in Polish–Ukrainian cooperation, based on the principle of trust and partnership; the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas, affiliated with the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine [Pol. Federacja Organizacji Polskich na Ukrainie]; different organizations of the Polish minority today and their plans for the future; culture, poetry and national heritage; Polish Culture Festivals [Pol. Dni Kultury Polskiej] in Ukraine, other festivals and contests; children and teenagers, the scouting and guiding movement; our national traditions; Polish cuisine; life of national minorities in Ukraine and Poland, the protection of minorities by the Polish government.)

Having examined all the issues of the Polacy Donbasu published so far, I can conclude that the objectives set out at the beginning have been thoughtfully implemented. Considering that the magazine is edited by social activists working on a voluntary basis, rather than professional staff with background in publishing industry, the entire initiative is even more noteworthy. It is also very important that the content reflects the life and activity of the Polish community in the Donbas.
The first editor of the *Polacy Donbasu* was Ryszard Zieliński. After his death in 2008, the role was taken over by Walentyna Staruszko, a member of the editorial board since the early days of the magazine. Among those who play an important role in the project there are also visiting teachers from Poland. Although they come over only for some time, the team always includes at least one of them (e.g. Małgorzata Kamińska, Zofia Koziół and Aneta Buzuk). The editorial board was recently joined by Rev. Ryszard Karapuda from Poland, currently serving as the Roman Catholic parish priest in Donetsk. The magazine has a circulation of 3,000 and is distributed free of charge; it has its office on the premises of the Donetsk Roman Catholic parish.

The *Polacy Donbasu* includes a column entitled ‘Historia rodzin polskich’ (History of Polish families), often featuring serialized stories and accounts. Appeals to compatriots published in the magazine are another very important instrument of consolidating Polish identity:

*Rodacy!*

Od 5 grudnia na Ukrainie zostanie przeprowadzony spis ludności. Ukraina jest młodym, wolnym i demokratycznym państwem. Jesteśmy obywatelami tego kraju i ziemia ta jest nam również drogą, jak i Ukraińcom i ludziom innych narodowości zamieszkałym na niej.

Od tego, jaką przynależność zadeklarujemy, będzie zależała polityka narodowościowa państwa ukraińskiego dotycząca oświaty i kultury polskiej na Ukrainie. Nie wstydźcie się, że większość z was nie mówi poprawną polszczyzną – w tym nie ma Waszej winy! Najważniejsze, że macie polskie serca!

Według wstępnych badań przeprowadzonych w Organizacjach Polonijnych i danych parafii katolickich jest nas około 2 milionów. Dlatego podczas spisu ludności powiedz z dumą:

**JESTEM POLAKIEM, OBYWATELEM UKRAINY**

Zarząd Główny TKPD [Polacy 2001, no. 11: 1]

(Compatriots!

5 December is the first day of the census of population. Ukraine is a young, free and democratic state. We are citizens of this country and this land is as dear to us as it is to Ukrainians and to other ethnic communities living here.

The ethnic policy of the Ukrainian state towards Polish education and culture will depend on our declaration in the census.

Do not be ashamed that most of you do not speak correct Polish – this is not your fault! You have Polish hearts and this is what matters!

Polish organizations and [Roman] Catholic parishes estimate that there are as many as about two million of us.

This is why when asked in the census, say:

**I AM A POLE AND I AM A UKRAINIAN CITIZEN**

The Board of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas)

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15 Ryszard Zieliński could be rightly called a ‘pioneer of Polishness in the Donbas.’ One of the first people to proudly declare their identity after 1990, he was the founder of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas, the initiator and founder of the *Polacy Donbasu* magazine, and the editor of Polish programs on regional radio and television. He was born and spent his childhood in Lviv.
The fact that the Polacy Donbasu is a bilingual Polish-Ukrainian magazine holds a great significance in the Russian-speaking region of the Donbas, where the local press in Ukrainian is an exception to the rule. Nine months after the first issue, the Donetsk Regional State Administration awarded the periodical with a distinction for 'The best publication on national minority issues,' The occasion was reported as follows:


(6 June, the Ukrainian Journalist’s Day, was marked by the news of the Donetsk Regional State Administration announcing their distinction awards in the national journalist contest ‘Ukrainian – the language of reconciliation.’ [...] The head of the jury, Aleksandr Gurbych, highly appreciated our magazine and congratulated its editorial board and the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas on their success in working towards the common good of, and harmony in, the region and the whole country, and noted their contribution to the development of good relations between Poland and Ukraine [stress added].)

Incidentally, the quotation includes the following calques from Ukrainian: [dzień] został odznaczony ‘[the day] was marked by’ (cf. Ukr. був відзначений, buv vidznachenny; St. Pol. [dzień] zaznaczył się); wysoko docenił ‘[he] highly appreciated’ (cf. Ukr. високо оцінив, vysoko otsinyv; St. Pol. wysoko ocenił). It is worth noting that editing a bilingual magazine featuring parallel Polish and Ukrainian texts is a difficult task, which often results in calques and literal translation. For example, in another article published in the same year, the Ukrainian phrase Дорогі хлопчики і дівчатка! (Dorohi khlopcyki i divchatka, ‘Dear boys and girls’) was translated as Drody chłopcy i dziewczęta!; cf. Standard Polish Drody chłopcy i dziewczęta or Drogie dziewczęta i chłopcy [Polacy 2001, no. 7: 8].

Surprisingly, the glossary in the children’s section provides Russian rather than Ukrainian equivalents, which would suggest that Russian is still the first language of the youngest generation and nothing has changed in this respect since the publication of the first issue in 2000. For example, in 2000 and 2002 the glossary provided the Polish equivalents of Russian words and phrases (e.g., dub (dub) – dąb ‘an oak’; orel (orel) – orzel (St. Pol. orzeł ‘an eagle’), zabłudził się (zabludilisya) – zabłąkał się ‘[he/it] got lost,’ przyznanie (prizvanje) – powołanie ‘a vocation’) [Polacy 2001, no. 7: 8]; on other occasions, when the children’s rhymes and jokes are in Polish, the pattern is reverse.

The magazine publishes also patriotic appeals, such as ‘Poles, let’s learn Polish! Let’s speak Polish in our families!’ ('Polacy! Uczmy się języka polskiego! Rozmawiajmy w rodzinach po polsku!') [Polacy 2001, no. 11: 8]. It may be
Ojczyznę moją jest lan, 
Lan Polski, prostej, serdecznej, 
Niech mi pozwoli Pan 
W nim znaleźć spokojek wieczny.

Numer ukazał się 
przy wsparciu 
Senatu KP 
oraz Fundacji 
„Pomoc Polakom na Wsi Kubance”

Na nadchodzące, radne Święta 
i zbliżający się 
Nowy Rok 2010, 
niech Chrystusa siła nępięta, 
rozjaśni każdy życia mrok, 
Wesolych świąt 
Bożego Narodzenia, 
zdrowia, szczęścia i miłości 
in gromie rodzin i przyjaciele! 
Życzę swym czytelnikom 
redakcji gazety ŻRÓDŁO 
ZYCZENIA ŚWIĘTNECZNE 
ARYBISKUPA 
HENRYKA MUSZYŃSKIEGO 
PRYMASA POLSKI

Pozdrawiam nowego i starszego roku z życzeniami szczęśliwymi. Jesteśmy bardziej skłonni do refleksji, do zastanawiania się nad tym, co mamy za sobą, nad tym, co jest przed nami. Re- lizmy plany na nowy rok, zamierzenia, myślą o tym co nam przyniesie, niejedno, po ludzko nie znamy 
na odpowiadającym. 
Sądzymy sobie zwracając 
na szczęście, radosty po- lskiego 
 ula, jego wszystkiego, odbierając przewóz. Wiesz, że nie 
wszystko się spełni, potrzecie na to, co okaże 

rzeczywistości. I dlatego my chętnie uczestniczymy w zakończeniu starego roku 
mam nadzieję, że Bogu, że 
chnął na nowy, daj w nas nowych, daj w nas nowych. Jest to, co 
zaletnie odczyniemy z wielką 
redakcji w dniu, w którym prześli 

dzięki Panu, mojim rodzin 'e, namy Ojczyznę, bo od tego 

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worrying that while initially the content of the Polacy Donbasu was only in Polish and Ukrainian, the proportion of texts in Russian has increased since 2008, as has the number of articles based on Wikipedia, at the expense of information about the activity of the Polish community in the region.

At the beginning of the school and academic year, the magazine publishes announcements on Polish language courses. It also pays considerable attention to the activity of the Roman Catholic parish in Donetsk and covers visits from representatives of political and business circles. In spite of some critical comments made above, it should be stressed that the Polacy Donbasu plays an important role as a medium integrating the Polish community in the region.

The Źródło (The Spring, see Illustration 4.2) is a bi-monthly cultural and educational magazine issued in Mariupol since 2004 (officially registered 12 July 2007). With a circulation of five hundred (also available in an electronic version), it caters for the local Polish community in Mariupol area. The articles are published both in Polish and Ukrainian; Polish texts are written and proofread mostly by a visiting teacher from Poland, and information about the country often comes from Polish websites.

The main section includes articles covering current events in the local Polish community, e.g. ‘Warsztaty języka polskiego w Mariupolu’ (Polish Language Workshops in Mariupol) [Źródło, no. 5 (31), Mariupol, 2009], ‘Polscy studenci zadowoleni z serdecznego przyjęcia w Mariupolu’ (Polish Students Happy to Receive a Warm Welcome in Mariupol) [Źródło, no. 4 (30), Mariupol, 2009], ‘Kolejne spotkanie z polską poezją i prozą w Mariupolu’ (Another Evening of Polish Poetry and Fiction in Mariupol) [Źródło, no. 6 (32), Mariupol, 2009]. Regular columns featuring in the magazine are: ‘Polska poezja’ (Polish Poetry), ‘Historia jednej piosenki’ (The Story of a Song), ‘Polskie tradycje’ (Polish Traditions), ‘Świat polskiego kina’ (Polish Cinema), ‘Polskie miasta znane i nieznane’ (Polish Towns and Cities), ‘Polska kuchnia’ (Polish Cuisine), ‘Strona lekarza’ (The Doctor’s Page), ‘Polska–Ukraina EURO 2012’ (Euro 2012), ‘Strona dla dzieci’ (The Kids’ Page). The Źródło also brings important information concerning the Polish Card (Pol. Karta Polaka), and advice for those interested in studying in Poland, including details of the enrolment procedure.

The editorial board of the magazine consists of Andrzej Iwaszko (chairman of the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association in Mariupol), Igor Hryhorowicz (the medical column) and, recently, Paweł Wroński (a visiting teacher from Poland).

**Websites**

Polonia.org.ua was set up in 2000 by the Polish Cultural and Educational Society 'Revival' in Berdiansk as the first website of a Polish organization in Ukraine (see Illustration 4.3). It is edited by a team of activists of Polish extraction (who have attended Polish language courses organized by different academic institutions in Poland), including Lech A. Suchomłynow (chief editor), Olga Popowa-Żarczyńska, Jerzy Sopin and Olga Bondarewa. The site features the following sections: 'Aktualności' (News), 'O Stowarzyszeniu' (About the Society), 'Dom Polski' (Polish Center), 'Koło Lekarzy' (Doctors' Circle), 'Związek Młodzieżowy' (Youth Association), 'Centrum „Biesiada”' (Biesiada Center), 'Związek Naukowców' (Academic Association), 'O parafii' (About the Parish), 'Strony prywatne' (Private Websites), 'Badania naukowe' (Academic Research), 'Nasi podopieczni' (Charity), 'Napisz do nas' (Contact Us), 'Księga gości' (Visitors' Book), 'Fotogaleria' (Gallery), 'Linki ' (Links).

Polonia.org.ua provides a regularly updated account of the life of the local Polish community. The news section presents details of cultural events currently organized by the society, and information on the most important Polish national holidays, such as the 3 May Constitution Day and the Independence Day (11 November). The layout of the website was changed in 2006. The announcement published in March 2002 summed up its activity as follows:
Dear visitors,
Since the activation of the first website of the Polish community in Ukraine, run by the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ in Berdiansk, it has had over seven thousand visitors. We think it is a great success. Most importantly, information about Poles in Ukraine can reach our compatriots around the globe. We are currently doing our best to provide information from different regions of Ukraine at www.odrodzenie.org.ua.

The website is intended not only for the local Polish community in Berdiansk, but also for all those interested in the Polish minority in the region. It is worth noting that the texts are written in correct Polish, with colloquial expressions used only incidentally, e.g. ‘Mimo różnic językowych ludzie dogadują się językiem tańca i ekspresji’ (‘In spite of their linguistic differences, people make themselves understood using the language of dance and body expression’; Pol. *dogadują się* ‘[they] make themselves understood’ is a colloquialism).

As well as this, the website meets all the technological standards.

The Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ is also the patron of a website called Bukowina wieloetniczna (Multi-ethnic Bukovina, http://bukowina.org.ua). Run in Polish by the Circle of Friends of Bukovina (Pol. *Koło Miłośników Ziemi Bukowińskiej*) in Berdiansk, the project aims to present the region as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious mosaic, which in the course of the nineteenth century evolved into a unique multi-ethnic community, often referred to as the ‘Switzerland of the East’ or ‘Europe in miniature.’ The site includes an overview of the most interesting web resources concerning the region. Although Bukovina often features on various websites devoted to history and tourism run in different countries, those presented here focus on the issues of cross-ethnic communication. The multimedia gallery offers a selection of materials on the region (including photographs of its unique countryside and various events) and on the countries with which it is closely connected. There is also a section devoted to projects relating to Bukovina held in Romania, Ukraine, Poland and Hungary.

In turn, the website of the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association in Mariupol (pusk.w.interia.pl) has been active since 2005. The home page features a banner saying ‘Welcome to the official website of the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural
The Scope and Functions of Polish Association in Mariupol, Ukraine ('Witamy na oficjalnej stronie internetowej Polsko-Ukraińskiego Stowarzyszenia Kulturalnego w Mariupolu na Ukrainie'), and provides general information on the organization and its activity (see Illustration 4.4).


The site has several sections, including 'Ogłoszenia' (Announcements), where the only entry concerns the 5th International Academic and Applied Studies Conference (Pol. V Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowo-Praktyczna), held in Mariupol in June 2010; 'Wydarzenia' (Events), the most extensive section, offers information about the events organized by the association in 2006–2009; 'Władze i struktura' (Board and Organization), lists the chair, deputy chair and treasurer, as well as the sections of the association devoted to particular areas of its activity (education, sports and tourism, youth, economy, culture, history and heritage tourism, contact with the media);19 'Język polski' (Polish Courses), with announcements of Polish language courses for 2005/2006; 'Fotografie' (Gallery), features photographs illustrating the life of the local Polish community; 'Audycje radiowe' (Radio Programs), with a brief undated announcement reading: 'On the first Saturday of each month at 12:30, Priazov

Regional Radio broadcasts a program for the local Polish community in Mariupol and its surroundings (‘W ‘Radiu Przyazowia’ w każdą pierwszą sobotę miesiąca o godzinie 12.30 nadawane są audycje kierowane do środowiska Polaków w Mariupolu i okolicy miasta’); and ‘Współpraca’ (Contact), lists the contact details; the bi-monthly magazine Źródło (The Spring) published by the association is available in PDF format (2008–2009 issues).

Although the layout would suggest that it was planned to include also the Ukrainian language version, the website is available only in Polish. There is no information on the editor or the date of publication of the content; only the events section features signed articles, most of them by Andrzej Iwaszko, the chairman of the association.

The original website of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (www.polacy.donbass.inep.net) was not regularly updated. Practically abandoned, it was replaced with www.tkpd.org, active since 2008.

The news section features the following welcome:

Na naszej stronie mieści się informacja o czasie emitowania naszych audycji radiowych i telewizyjnych. Można tu oglądanie materiały gazety „Polacy Donbasu”, reportaże o interesujących wydarzeniach w życiu Towarzystwa itd. Spodziewamy się, że strona zainteresuje zwiedzających.

(Our website provides a guide to our radio and television programs, gives access to materials published in the Polacy Donbasu (The Poles of the Donbas), offers coverage of interesting events organized by our society, etc. We hope that the visitors will find it interesting.)

The site includes a number of sections, such as the home page, presenting the history of the society (in Russian); ‘Lekcje języka polskiego’ (Polish Lessons), with a text by a visiting Polish language teacher working in Donetsk and a timetable of Polish language courses (in Russian); telephone numbers of the representatives of the organization in Donetsk, Avdiivka, Horlivka, Makiivka and Iasynuvata; ‘O naszych mediach’ (About Our Media), providing information (in the form of announcements) on the Polacy Donbasu magazine, as well as the radio and television programs run by the society; a gallery featuring a number of photographs from concerts and Easter in Donetsk; ‘Kącik projektanta’ (Webmaster) with thanks for the people involved in running the site. In turn, ‘Gazeta’ (Newsletter) presents a rather random selection of four articles from the Polacy Donbasu, one of them in Russian, without providing the dates of publication. While the articles from the magazine are signed by their authors, there is no information on the editors of the website itself.

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To sum up, it can be observed that the website of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ in Berdiansk makes the best impression. Thoughtfully edited in literary Polish, it seems to successfully promote Poles and Poland, and thus fulfil the aims set forth by its editors.

Radio and television programs

‘TV Polaków Donbasu’ (Poles of the Donbas TV), a television program addressed to the Polish community, is broadcast in Donetsk four times a year, i.e. every three months. For example, as announced on the website of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas: “Towards the very end of each quarter, you are invited to join us and watch our program “TV Polaków Donbasu” on TRK Donetsk, channel 27. Our next program, featuring a gala concert of the Ryszard Zieliński “Polish Autumn in the Donbas” Festival (Festiwal “Polska Jesień w Donbasie” im. Ryszarda Zielińskiego), is going to be shown on 20 December at 19.15.”

In Donetsk, there is also a radio program ‘Polska fala Donbasu’ (Polish Waves in the Donbas), broadcast since 2001. Letters from the listeners and

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letters to the editor of the *Polacy Donbasu* magazine confirm the need for the local Polish media:

*Drodzy autorzy audycji «Polska Fala Donbasu!»*

Chcę się podzielić swoją radością, kiedy w radio usłyszałam dźwięki cudownego poloneza Ogińskiego „Pożegnanie z ojczyzną” i tę do bólu bliską i kochaną mowę polską tutaj u nas, w Doniecku. [...] Z Polską łączą mnie nie tylko korzenie, ale także praca mojego syna Wasyla Maslija – solisty baletu krakowskiej opery, który z poświęceniem oddaje swój talent Polsce. Jestem bardzo dumna, że właśnie on z naszej rodziny został znany tancerzem i jest kontynuatorem naszej polskości. Jest bardzo ważne, że gazeta „Polacy Donbasu” i audycje radiowe są już znane w Donbasie, więc mam nadzieję, że środki masowego przekazu zwrócą uwagę i przyciągną ludzi różnych narodowości, którym bliska jest Polska [Maslij 2001: 1].

(Dear editors of 'Polska fala Donbasu' (Polish Waves in the Donbas),

I would like to share my joy at having heard the tune of the wonderful Ogiński’s Polonez ‘Farewell to Homeland’ (Polonez Ogińskiego ‘Pożegnanie z Ojczyzną’), and the sound of our beloved Polish speech on the radio, here in Donetsk. [...] My ties with Poland include not only my Polish roots, but also the work of my son Wasyl Maslij, a soloist of the Cracow Opera ballet, who dedicates his talent to Poland. I am really proud that a member of our family has become a well-known dancer and continues our Polish family tradition. It is really important that the *Polacy Donbasu* magazine and Polish radio programs have become known in the Donbas. I hope that these media will attract people of different ethnic communities who have an interest in Poland.)

Reaching Poles dispersed over such a large area is a difficult task. The challenge is even greater considering the fact that, as I know from my personal contacts, about half of them have not disclosed their origin. Under the circumstances, Polish programs not only give them pleasure, but also stimulate the awakening of their national spirit. Information about the broadcasts can be found on the website of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas, e.g. ‘You are invited to listen to our radio program “Polska Fala Donbasu” on Ukraini-an Radio 1 on the last Wednesday of each month at 18:15. (‘W ostatnią środę miesiąca o 18.15 zapraszamy na audycję radiową „Polska Fala Donbasu” na pierwszym programie Ukraińskiego Radia’).24

In Mariupol, Priazov Regional Radio broadcasts a program of the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association for the local Polish community in Mariupol and its surroundings on the first Saturday of each month.

Apart from this, representatives of local Polish communities are often invited to take part in different radio and television programs broadcast in Russian or Ukrainian, where they can inform the audience about their activity. Important events in the community also feature in local broadcasts for the general public.

To conclude, the Polish minority in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts has its own magazines, websites, as well as radio and television programs in Polish. Each local team involved in such media activity has the support of the Polish state, not only in terms of funding, but mainly in the form of assistance from Polish language teachers who are sent over to work in the region. Apart from this, proofreading is often done by friends and associates living in Poland and working from home over the Internet. The local Polish media contribute to sustaining Polish identity and help members of the Polish minority to declare it openly.

From the brief account of the activity of the Polish media in south-eastern Ukraine presented above, it could be assumed that they play a considerable role both in the Polish community and in the region as such. Thanks to the press in Polish, Poles living in this large geographical area can form a cultural community; moreover, thanks to the Internet, Poles around the globe can become aware of their compatriots living in the far stretches of Ukraine.

Considering that the editorial boards of the Polish print media in the region receive language assistance from people from Poland, a description of written Polish used in these periodicals would not be justified.\(^{25}\)

4.5. The Roman Catholic Church and the Language Question

The Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine does not take a uniform approach to the question of language used in liturgy. The choice practically depends on the level of the Polish, Ukrainian or Russian language in particular communities. In some parishes, Ukrainian replaced Polish as of 1990; the change raised some concern among the older generation of believers, treating Polish in terms of the ‘sacred’ language, particularly in the rural areas of western Ukraine, where it is still spoken in families.

Natalia Ananeva (publishing in Polish as Natalia Ananiewa) offers a discussion of two Polish magazines issued in Mykolaiv and Siberia: the bi-monthly Kotwica (The Anchor), and the quarterly Rodacy (The Compatriots), published by the Congress of Poles in Russia (Pol. Kongres Polaków w Rosji). Concluding, the author observes:

‘Nie możemy badać polszczyzny artykułów tych periodyków pod względem odbijania się w nich właściwości regionalnych, ponieważ materiały w języku polskim w tych wydaniach są przygotowane głównie przez Polaków, którzy przyjechali tu z Polski jako misjonarze (lektorzy języka polskiego, księża). Czasem forma językowa, która pożornie wygląda jak regionalizm, w rzeczywistości jest błędem drukarskim, a tych błędów w omówionych wydaniach nie brakuje, zwłaszcza jeżeli chodzi o znaki diakrytyczne’ [Ananiewa 2007: 86].

(’We cannot study these articles with a view to analyzing the regional features of the Polish language, because they were mostly written by Poles who had come over as missionaries, teachers of Polish or priests. Sometimes, a form which might apparently look like a regionalism in fact turns out to be a misprint. Indeed, they can be found quite frequently, especially when it comes to diacritics.’)
Considering the level of religious involvement of the population, it is the highest in the west of the country; the south and Podolia display high to average figures, and the east and north the lowest ones.

W okresie przejściowym kościołom tradycyjnym pomimo tarć wewnętrznych udało się zachować dominujący stan posiadania, rzutujący na względną stabilność stosunków wyznaniowych na Ukrainie [Baluk 2002: 33].

(In the period of transition, traditional Christian churches managed to preserve their dominating position in spite of internal friction within them, thus securing a relative stability of the religious situation in the country.)

The historical context of the revival, emergence, reorganization and shaping of different Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine in 1988–1998, including the statistics and a comparative analysis of the demographic potential of the largest Christian churches in the country in the period, is the subject discussed by Jarosław Stoćykj [Stoćykj 2000].

In south-eastern Ukraine, the revival of the Roman Catholic Church began only after 1990. Although it certainly had been present there before, its history in the region was largely discontinued, particularly in the twentieth century (see Chapters 1.3 and 1.4 above). In spite of the destruction of churches in the Stalinist era, a certain proportion of the population did manage to keep their faith, at least to an extent. Today, although the number of believers across the towns and cities of the region is relatively low, the figures are steadily increasing. While the legal framework of the activity of the Roman Catholic Church has been discussed in Chapter 2.4 above, the present section is focused on the question of language used in its liturgy and on the national identity of its members.

There is quite an extensive body of academic literature on the question of language used in the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine, particularly in the western regions of the country. The language of liturgy is also a contentious issue in Belarus. Most often, people who take part in the debate want to express their indignation at the elimination of Polish from the services of the Roman Catholic Church. Sometimes, Polish parishioners appeal to different organizations in Poland to help them reverse the situation (e.g., a letter written by local Polish activists in Chernivtsi in the mid-1990s). As the academic and media community devote less attention to the problem, it is local priests who serve in the Roman Catholic parishes and have to deal with the issue on a daily basis that know the situation best.

I have long been interested in this question with regard to different parts of the former Soviet Union in general and Bukovina in particular. For the purposes of the present study, I conducted a survey in the following Roman Catholic communities in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, with the total of 530 questionnaires distributed in: Zaporizhzhia (Baburka, Kosmos), Bohatyryvka, Liutserna (203); Donetsk (Budonivka, Petrivka), Kramatorsk, Ienakiieve,
Artemivsk (132); Mariupol (90); Berdiansk (50); Makiivka and Torez (35); Melitopol (20). The total number of analyzed questionnaires was 525. In all the parishes, the survey was conducted after the Sunday Masses; for example, in Donetsk, where there are three Masses in different languages (Polish, Russian and Ukrainian), the questionnaires were distributed after each of them.

In the survey, the respondents were asked about their date and place of birth (important from the point of view of the subject of the present study), religious denomination and ethnicity (both their own and their parents'), as well as their preferences concerning the language of religious services and the country of origin of priests serving in their parishes.

The oldest respondent was born in 1919 and the youngest in 1990; although all of them are current residents of the parishes surveyed, they originally come from a number of very different places (as discussed in the previous chapters). It is worth noting that those surveyed took great care in filling the questionnaires and included their own comments and replies, for example declaring that they are ‘Ukrainian of Russian origin,’ ‘Ukrainian of Polish origin,’ ‘Polish (but Ukrainian by passport)’ (see Chapter 5.2 for more information), or a ‘Ukrainian citizen.’

The results of the survey indicate that members of the Roman Catholic Church in both provinces come from a number of different ethnic backgrounds, as presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.

In the Zaporizhzhia oblast, the multi-ethnic Roman Catholic community includes not only members declaring themselves as Poles, Ukrainians and Russians, but also Czechs, Latvians, Belarusians, Armenians and Germans (see Table 4.3). Ukrainians form the majority or a large proportion of Roman Catholics in all centers under consideration: Zaporizhzhia (40%), Berdiansk and Tokmak (54%) and Melitopol (25%). The proportion of Russians among the Catholics of Zaporizhzhia is 16%, and in Berdiansk and Tokmak – 8%. The corresponding figures for Poles were recorded at 34% in Zaporizhzhia, 38% in Berdiansk and Tokmak, and as much as 60% in Melitopol, with another 10% of the Polish respondents there putting themselves down as ‘Ukrainian by passport.’

*Ja Polka, nu pocziemu mienia zapisali Ukrainka w paszporcie ja nie znaju. I uže trudno mówić kto ja, jak w paszporcie zapisali Ukrainka, ja uže sama nie znaju, kto ja [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].*

*(I’m Polish and I don’t know why they put me down as Ukrainian in my [internal] passport. It’s difficult for me to say who I am; if they put me down as Ukrainian in my passport, I don’t really know who I am any more.)*

It is worth explaining that replies stating ‘Ukrainian of Russian origin’ and ‘Ukrainian of Polish origin’ come from the respondents who feel Ukrainian and whose one parent was/is Polish or Russian. Surprisingly, 1% of those surveyed in Zaporizhzhia describe themselves as ‘Ukrainian citizens,’ which
indicates that they are unable to specifically declare their ethnic or national identity, as can be seen in the following example:


(To me, it doesn’t matter. What’s important is that I’m a Ukrainian citizen. I don’t know who I am; my mother is Russian, my father was Polish, and me – it’s all the same who I might be. I know one thing: Ukraine is my rodina [homeland, said in Russian], ojczyzna [homeland, repeated in Polish].)

As it turns out from the interviews which I was able to conduct with representatives of the Ukrainian, Russian and Polish community in the Zaporizhzhia oblast, my informants are aware of the stereotypical association of the Roman Catholic Church with the Polish community (particularly persistent with regard to western Ukraine).26

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26 In Bukovina, it is quite rare for a Ukrainian to be a member of the Roman Catholic Church, unless the person is married to a Pole.
The Scope and Functions of Polish

Ja je Ukrajinkoju i szczu z ciaho, da ja chozu w kostel i w nas takych bahato je. A czomu tylko Polaky majut’ chodyty, ce je Bozyj Dim, win widkrytyj dla wsich nacij [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

(I’m Ukrainian, and so what; I go to the [Roman] Catholic church, like many people around here. And why should only Poles go there? It’s the House of God; it’s open to all the nationalities.)

The Russians in Tokmak made the following comments:

Da, my Ruskije, no my priszli w kostiol, potomu szczo zdieś prawda, zdieś żywjoj Christos. Mienia i muza doma nie uczuli wiery, my wet samyje iskali i naszli Boga dla siebia, dla naszych dietiej. Otiec Jan pakazał nam prawilnuju darogu i za eto my błagodarny. My dumali, możemli my Russkije pojti w katolicleskuju cerkow, sprasili i otiec nam koniczeno skazał, szczo cerkow katolicleskaja, nie tolko dla Polakow, cerkow otkrytaja dla wsiech Bożhich dietej [Tokmak 2010: interview].

(Yes, we’re Russian, but we joined the [Roman] Catholic Church because there’s truth here, there’s the living Christ. Me and my husband, we weren’t brought up in religious families; we looked for God on our own and we found Him for us and for our children. Father Jan showed us the right path and we’re grateful for that. We’d been wondering if we, Russians, could come to the Catholic church; we asked and he told us that the Catholic church surely wasn’t only for Poles, but it’s open to all God’s children.)

The data concerning the ethnic composition of the Roman Catholic Church in the Donetsk oblast as declared by the respondents is presented in Table 4.4.

In the Donetsk oblast (see Table 4.4), the proportion of Roman Catholics declaring themselves as Ukrainians is recorded at 50% in Donetsk, 17% in Makiivka and Torez, and 23% in Mariupol. The corresponding data for Russians are 19% in Donetsk and 9% in Mariupol. Poles make up as much as 54% of the Roman Catholics in Mariupol, and 48% in Makiivka and Torez; the figure for Donetsk (20%) is considerably lower. The fact that only 3% of those surveyed declare themselves as Germans (Makiivka and Torez) is quite surprising, considering that Germans used to be a large ethnic group in the region and (like Poles) are a well-organized community today. The proportion of Belarusian members of the Roman Catholic Church is higher in the Donetsk oblast (Donetsk: 5%, Makiivka and Torez: 9%, Mariupol: 4%) than in Zaporizhzhia (only 1%). Other ethnic groups represented in the Roman Catholic community of the Donetsk province include Armenians, Lithuanians, ‘Russians of Polish origin’ and ‘Ukrainians of Polish origin’ (1–2% each).

Similarly to the Zaporizhzhia oblast, the list includes also those declaring themselves as ‘Polish but Ukrainian by passport’ (23% in Makiivka and Torez, 7% in Mariupol). As explained in the interviews, it had been a conscious decision reflecting the fact that the entry in the ‘nationality’ column in internal passports (indicating the ethnicity of the holder) used to be important (see Chapter 5.2 below for more information).
In the survey question concerning the preferred language of the Holy Mass, the respondents had four options to select from (Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and ‘it doesn’t matter’), and could also provide their own answers. The resulting replies were, for example, ‘Russian or Ukrainian,’ ‘Polish or Russian,’ and even ‘Latin.’ Replies to this question are presented in Table 4.5, and the same data is illustrated in a graphic form as Figure 4.1.

**Table 4.4. The ethnic composition of the Roman Catholic Church in the Donetsk oblast, self-declared ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/town</th>
<th>Donetsk</th>
<th>Makiivka and Torez</th>
<th>Mariupol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic community</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian of Polish origin</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian of Polish origin</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish (Ukrainian by passport)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the survey question concerning the preferred language of the Holy Mass, the respondents had four options to select from (Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and ‘it doesn’t matter’), and could also provide their own answers. The resulting replies were, for example, ‘Russian or Ukrainian,’ ‘Polish or Russian,’ and even ‘Latin.’ Replies to this question are presented in Table 4.5, and the same data is illustrated in a graphic form as Figure 4.1.

**Table 4.5. The preferred language of the Holy Mass in Roman Catholic churches in south-eastern Ukraine (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Zaporizhzhia</th>
<th>Berdiansk</th>
<th>Melitopol</th>
<th>Donetsk</th>
<th>Makiivka and Torez</th>
<th>Mariupol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn’t matter</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian or Ukrainian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian or Polish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian or Polish</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the church in Zaporizhzhia, the Holy Mass is said in Russian and, once a week (on Sundays), in Ukrainian. On special occasions, as requested by a small group of Polish parishioners, there are also services in Polish. The current situation reflects the general language preferences in the local Roman Catholic community. One of the respondents made a following comment:


*It’s so good that the Mass is said in Ukrainian; I’m so happy about that, because you should pray in your mother tongue. I go to the Mass in Russian, but rarely. It’s hard for the priests; they’ve got to learn both Ukrainian and Russian. They do it for us; we’re really grateful for that.*

In Zaporizhzhia (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1), 51% of the local Roman Catholic community prefer Russian as the language of the Mass, with those opting for Russian or Ukrainian counting 20%, and for Ukrainian – 19%. As many as 6% of the respondents did not select any of the language options proposed (Ukrainian, Russian, Polish) and marked the answer ‘it doesn’t matter.’ The proportion of those who would prefer to have the Mass said in Russian or Polish was 2%, and the corresponding figure for Polish was also 2%. These results come as another indication that Poles in Zaporizhzhia, who make up 43% of members of the local Roman Catholic parish, are mostly Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking.

Roman Catholic Masses in Berdiansk are celebrated in Russian and occasionally include songs in Ukrainian or Polish. The oldest members of the parish say their private prayers in Polish, sometimes using old Polish prayer books. The middle and the younger generations of those surveyed pray in Russian. Religious services in Berdiansk reflect the actual language preferences of the parishioners. However, one of the Polish members of the community made the following comment:

*Byłaby msza po polsku, chodziłabym, a tak to nie. Nie bo nie, tak może uparta jestem, ale nie. Nie umie do Pana Boga inaczej, tylko po polsku. Tak mnie mama nauczyła się modlić i tylko tak umiem, inaczej jest mi ciężko, ja już stara jestem, żeby się uczyć odpowiadać na mszy po rusku* [Berdiansk 2008: interview].

*(I’d go to the Mass if it was said in Polish; it isn’t, so I don’t. I don’t and that’s it. Yes, I might be stubborn, but I just don’t. That’s how my mum taught me to pray, and that’s the only way I can do it. It’s hard for me to do it differently; I’m already [too] old to learn how to respond in the Mass in Russian.)*

In Berdiansk (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1), 65% of those surveyed prefer the Mass to be said in Russian, followed by 25% opting for ‘it doesn’t matter.’ Although Poles make up 38% of the local Roman Catholic community, the Polish
The preferred language of the Holy Mass in Roman Catholic churches in south-eastern Ukraine (%)

- Ukrainian
- Russian
- Polish
- It doesn’t matter
- Russian or Ukrainian
- Russian or Polish
- Ukrainian or Polish
- Latin

language was selected only by 4% of the parishioners. The remaining replies (Russian or Ukrainian, Ukrainian, Ukrainian or Polish) were at 2% each. The figures indicate that not only Poles but also Ukrainians prefer Russian as the language of the liturgy: while those who declared themselves as Ukrainians total 54% of the parish, the level of preference for the Ukrainian language was as low as 2%.
The Holy Masses in Melitopol are celebrated in Russian, with sermons in Polish occasionally translated into Russian or Ukrainian (sometimes by a Czech nun working in the parish). While old Polish prayer books can occasionally be found, the majority of those used by the parishioners are written in Cyrillic; there are also old handwritten prayers in Cyrillic still in use. In general terms, the situation reflects the language preferences of the local Roman Catholic community. One of those interviewed in Melitopol made the following comment:

Samoje łutsze kak po ruski msza, to ono tak chorośno, nu inogda i po polsku moźna usłyszeć, no dobrze, że otec u nas jest i Boga proslawajet. My każdy dień na ruskom razgwawirwajem i tak to że doma molimsia i łuczsze wsiego tak i w kostiolie, na ruskom, da na ruskom. A kto ż na polskom panimajet, nu nieskolko там можet, a na ukraińskom tiažeto [Melitopol 2009: interview].

(‘It’s best when the Mass is in Russian, it’s good this way. Sometimes it could also be in Polish. It’s good we have a priest here and he praises God. We speak Russian every day, and so we pray like that at home and, what’s most important, in church. It’s in Russian, yes, in Russian. And who can understand Polish? Maybe just a few people; and in Ukrainian, it’s difficult.’)

In Melitopol (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1), Russian is favored as the language of the Mass by 50% of the local Roman Catholics, followed by Ukrainian or Polish (25%), any of these three languages (20%), and Ukrainian (only 5%). It is quite surprising that none of those surveyed opted for Polish as the preferred language of religious services, although Poles make up 60% of the local Roman Catholic community, and a large group attends Polish language courses organized in the local parish and taught by the parish priest who is originally from Poland.

In Donetsk, where 20% of Roman Catholics are Poles, Polish is the preferred language of the liturgy for as many as 13% of the community. In St Joseph’s parish, Sunday Masses are held in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian (see Documents 16 and 17 in the Appendix). As I observed, each group tends to attend the service in their own language, and the turnout is high in all cases. The morning Mass (9 am) is said in Polish, with the readings, the gospel, the sermon and announcements in Russian; it is usually followed by Polish language courses.

The survey indicates (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1) that 46% of the local Roman Catholic community in Donetsk prefer Russian as the language of the liturgy; those who did not select any of the language options proposed (Ukrainian, Russian, Polish) and marked the answer ‘it doesn’t matter’ counted 22%; Polish was selected by as many as 13%; Ukrainian, Russian or Ukrainian and Ukrainian or Polish were at 2% each. Additionally, 2% of those asked opted for Latin.

In Makiyka and Torez (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1), the Mass is said in Ukrainian or Polish; sometimes two languages (Ukrainian and Polish, very
occasionally also Russian) are used alternately during the same service. Poles make up 48% of the local Roman Catholic community and an astonishing 43% of those surveyed expressed their preference for their native Polish as the language of the liturgy; 21% did not select any of the language options proposed and marked ‘it doesn’t matter’; the remaining replies included Ukrainian (21%), Russian (13%), and Russian or Ukrainian (2%).

In Mariupol, the Roman Catholic Masses are said in Russian and, once a week (on Sundays), in Ukrainian. There are often Polish services held at the request of the local Polish community. Indeed, Poles make up 54% of the local parish and as many as 37% of those surveyed expressed their preference for Polish as the language of the liturgy. Russian and Ukrainian were selected by 20% each, followed by Ukrainian or Russian (11%), ‘it doesn’t matter’ (i.e. Ukrainian, Russian, or Polish, 7%), and Ukrainian or Polish (5%), (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1).

The survey included also the following question on preferences concerning the country of origin of the priest/priests serving in the local parishes (see Table 4.6):

\[\text{Ви бажаєте, щоб святу месу відправляв священник:} \]
1) з Польщі
2) з України
3) не має різниці?

(Do you want the Holy Mass to be celebrated by a priest from:
1) Poland
2) Ukraine
3) it doesn’t matter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.6. The preferred country of origin of priests serving in the Roman Catholic parishes in south-eastern Ukraine (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>It doesn’t matter</td>
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<td>A particular priest: Rev. Ryszard Karapuda</td>
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In Zaporizhzhia, 86% of the respondents did not express any specific preference concerning the country of origin of their priests, while 11% opted for those from Poland, and 3% – from Ukraine. It is worth noting that apart from Polish priests there have also been ones from Italy and Romania (2007) working in the local Roman Catholic community. Currently, Zaporizhzhia has a bishop from
Poland (working locally for over fifteen years) and three Ukrainian priests (two of them originally from the city) speaking Ukrainian, Russian and Polish; their language of everyday contact with the parishioners is Russian.


(We’ve had very different priests working here: from Italy, and in Baburka there was also this one from, what’s it called, Romania; and they all have spoken Russian, we can understand everything. It’s hard for them; they learn very fast. They’re young boys and they’re very clever. We already have our own ones, from Zaporozhe [Ukr. Zaporizhzhia] region; they’re also good, they’re so good.)

Likewise, the matter is irrelevant to the majority of Roman Catholics in Berdiansk (80%, see Table 4.6); at the same time, 16% of those surveyed there selected Poland and only 4% opted for Ukraine as the preferred country of origin of their priests. As in 2012, there are two priests from Poland working in the local parish.

My nie wybieramy ksędza, każdy jest dobry, przychodzą do nas i uczą nas wszystkiego, i modlitw, i wiary. Jaka różnica, w jakim języku, jedno ważne, aby było to, co mówi do nas, zrozumiałe [Berdiansk 2010: interview].

(We don’t choose a priest; all of them are good. They come here and teach us everything, how to pray, and about the faith. What difference does it make in what language? One thing that matters is that we have to be able to understand.)

In Melitopol, the country of origin of the priest does not matter to 76% of the parishioners; 14% would prefer one from Poland. As in 2012, there is a priest from Poland working in the parish (his predecessor was from Slovakia); he is occasionally assisted by one born in Zaporizhzhia.

In Donetsk, 77% of the local Roman Catholic community shared the majority opinion of all the above centers; those opting for priests from Poland or Ukraine counted 14% and 4%, respectively; a further 5% specifically expressed their preference for a particular priest, Rev. Ryszard Karapuda, who had been working locally for over fifteen years.

My chcemy ojczulka naszego Riczarda, on nas mnogomu naucził i on wat takoj nasz. My choroszo jego panimajem. On nam wat tak wsiotchońku raskazywajet o Bogie… Nu na ruskom, na ruskom, my ż niczego nie ponimajem na polskom, a na ukrainskom tože tiażelo [Donetsk 2010: interview].

(We want our Father Ryszard; he’s taught us a lot, and he’s ours, like. We can understand him well. He quietly tells us about God… It’s surely in Russian; we can’t understand anything in Polish; and Ukrainian, it’s also difficult.)
In Makiivka and Torez, the results proved different than in other centers, with preferences for priests from Poland at 60% and ‘it doesn’t matter’ at 40%; none of the respondents opted for priests from Ukraine. As in 2012, the local priest is from Poland. The corresponding figures in Mariupol were 68%, 30% and 2%, respectively.

In the Roman Catholic churches in the region, christenings, weddings and funerals are held in Russian. Some members of the older generation occasionally use Polish in their private prayers, mostly Ojcze nasz (Our Father); some of them still remember Polish church songs and, in very few cases, still have copies of Polish prayer books which they keep at home. The vast majority of the middle and younger generations say their prayers only in Russian, or, less often, in Ukrainian. Prayer books in churches and chapels are in Russian or Ukrainian.

In all parishes included in the survey, the situation with regard to the language used in religious services reflects the preferences of the local Roman Catholic communities. As a result, conflicts between the priests and parishioners over the language issue are infrequent. If they do occur, however, they involve chairpersons of the local Polish associations rather than regular churchgoers.

It should be stressed that the parishes under consideration do not function as centers of Polish or Ukrainian national activity. Rather, the model developed by priests working in the region is focused on spreading the truths of the faith, teaching the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and explaining the teachings of the Bible. This, however, does not change the fact that some priests originally coming from Poland help local Polish communities, for example by making church premises available for Polish language courses.

In their monograph entitled Wspólnota polska Berdiańska. Wyzwania współczesności (The Polish Community in Berdiansk: Facing the Challenge of Today), Andrzej Bonusiak and Lech Aleksy Suchomłynow make the following observation:

W Berdiańsku władze „Odrodzenia” [Towarzystwa Polskiego] od samego początku uważały, że najważniejsza jest restytucja parafii, która zapewniałaby opiekę duchową garstce katolików i pozwoliłaby rozpocząć działalność misyjną. Język był i pozostał w tym miejscu sprawą drugorzędną, o którą «nie warto było kruszyć przysłowio-wych kopii». Znacznie ważniejsze dla społeczności polskiej było pokazanie, jak cenne i społecznie wartościowe treści może nieść w sobie funkcjonowanie parafii dla całego społeczeństwa miasta, niż upierać się przy prowadzeniu nabożeństw w języku zrozumiałym jedynie dla części zamieszkiwujących tu wyznawców [Bonusiak, Suchomłynow 2008: 78–79].

[From the early days, the board of the [Polish Society] ‘Revival’ considered that the crucial aim to achieve was the restoration of the local [Roman Catholic] parish, which would provide spiritual guidance to a handful of [Roman] Catholics in the area and enable the Church to pursue its missionary activity. The language question has always come second to this concern and it was not worth it to treat the matter as a bone of contention. For the Polish minority, it has been far more important to demonstrate
that the parish can make a significant and valuable social contribution to the entire local community than to insist on religious services in the language which can be understood only by a certain proportion of the believers living in the area.)

Indeed, as a result of systemic transformation in Ukraine, the Roman Catholic Church ceased to function as major center preserving Polish identity in the country. This responsibility was taken over by official organizations of the Polish minority, Polish language centers, and other forms of involvement in the Polish community which emerged from 1990 onwards. The number of newly established parishes is currently increasing, and so is the proportion of priests from Ukraine who are not necessarily of Polish extraction.

Priests working in south-eastern Ukraine have already developed their own model of organization of religious life in their parishes. They usually have considerable experience and some of them have been working in the region for over fifteen years. Over this period, they have established contact with their parishioners and take their preferences into consideration, unlike in some parishes in western Ukraine [cf. Dzwonkowski, O. Gorbaniuk, J. Gorbaniuk 2001].

The question of liturgical language in the region is quite a complex matter. Although local languages were allowed in the Roman Catholic liturgy following the Second Vatican Council (1962), this change could not be implemented in communist Ukraine owing to the suppression of the Church at the time. Another problem was that such materials as Ukrainian missals or prayer books began to appear only in the mid-1990s. More importantly, the number of priests from Ukraine was quite low: until 1990 they were educated in the only Roman Catholic seminary in the entire Soviet Union (in Riga). If it had

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27 Rev. Roman Dzwonkowski and his research team conducted studies on this question in the Lutsk, Lviv, Kamianets and Zhytomyr dioceses. In the parishes included in the survey, preferences concerning the language of the Holy Mass were as follows: Ukrainian only: 16%; Polish only: 70%; the liturgy of the word (particularly the sermon) in Ukrainian, with the ordinary parts in Polish only: 13% [Dzwonkowski, O. Gorbaniuk, J. Gorbaniuk 2001: 65]. It would appear that the 13% of those surveyed are used to the ordinary parts being said in Polish because they know how to respond and a switch to Ukrainian would mean that they have to learn the responses in another language. For example, when the parishioners in Storozhynets in Bukovina learned to make their responses in the ordinary parts in Ukrainian, the misunderstandings with the parish priest, including forcing him to say the Mass in Polish, were over.

28 The Ukrainian translation of the short version of the Roman Missal (based on Missale Romanum, third edition) was published in Ukraine in 2005, the Year of the Eucharist. The missal includes Sunday Masses for different seasons of the liturgical year, the main solemnities in ordinary time, the Paschal Triduum, selected common Masses, selected ritual Masses, selected Masses for the dead, the ordinary parts of the Mass, antiphons and prefaces. The standardized text of the short Roman Missal in Ukrainian enables the Roman Catholic parishes to more fully experience the Holy Mass. The believers have already learned the new responses, which render the text of the liturgy more adequately; there are also booklets including the responses available for them. Previously, the parishes used various translations of the missal, many of them Polonized [http://storico.radiovaticana.org/pol/storico/2005-03/31188.html (accessed 30.01.2011)].
not been for these reasons, the changes concerning the language of the Roman Catholic liturgy in Ukraine would have begun at a much earlier date. 

Roman Dzwonkowski observes that

w okresie międzywojennym Polacy zapłacili za to [za wiarę] w ZSRR bardzo wysoką cenę w postaci masowych deportacji, wyroków skazujących na lągry i zesłania, a nieradko i męczeństwa za wiarę. Nie będzie przesady w stwierdzeniu, że głównie dzięki Polakom przetrwał w podziemiu Kościół katolicki na Wschodzie i bardzo często dzięki nim rozpoczynało się odrodzenie [Dzwonkowski 2001: 122; cf. Stroński 2004].

(in the interwar period, Poles paid a huge price for their faith, including mass deportations, coercive resettlement, Gulag camps, and sometimes even martyrdom. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Roman Catholic Church in the East survived in hiding mainly thanks to Poles, who very often were also the initiators of its revival.)

Indeed, preserving the Roman Catholic Church by Poles meant the preservation of the Polish language, also because there were no Ukrainian missals. In the region under consideration, the language of the Mass is not imposed by the priests but depends on the preferences of the parishioners. According to my research findings, Russian plays the dominant role also in this domain.

I would like to conclude by saying that academic studies should try to avoid overgeneralizations about 'the Polish language being eliminated from the Roman Catholic liturgy in Ukraine.' Both my own experience and the material collected in the course of my research prove that all studies of the problem should draw conclusions with reference to a particular place, time and situation.

4.6. The Functions of Polish

The Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine is a bilingual or trilingual community, with different languages used in different domains, depending on their function. The language policy under the Soviet Union, where Russian had a dominant position, not only stimulated changes in the official domain, but also affected the language used in the family and neighborhood. Indeed, only a fraction of the Polish minority in the region considers Polish as their native language (Donetsk oblast: 4.1%, Zaporizhzhia oblast: 4.0%), with the majority declaring themselves Russian- (75.7% and 56.8%, respectively) or Ukrainian-speaking (19.3% and 38%, respectively). In the course of my research in the region, which I started in 2007, I did not hear of any Poles who would speak Polish on a daily basis. Most likely, those who put it down as their native language were the persons born in pre-war Poland whose first language at home used to be Polish. On the whole, it is Russian that has played the most considerable role in the region and remains the most widely used language today; it is also the language of high culture: theaters, cinemas, libraries and schools.
In the educational system, Polish is taught both as a compulsory subject or an optional course. There are a number of people from different age groups interested in learning the language; their motivation is to become familiar with the language of their ancestors, or to acquire language skills necessary when going to Poland.

Russian is the dominant language also in the domain of religion. Indeed, even if the ordinary parts of the Mass are said in Polish, it is often the case that the readings, the gospel and the sermon are in Russian. The priests have developed their own models concerning the language of pastoral care and use the one preferred by the majority of their parish. Those newly arrived from Poland often find it a challenging task, as they often have no language skills or awareness of the local culture. Without attempting to comment on the internal affairs of the Church, I can observe that, sometimes, Polish priests are sent to work in the East as a form of demotion. This, however, does not change the fact that those who come to the region generally display a satisfactory level of language competence. Ukraine does not have any official regulations concerning the use of language in the Roman Catholic Church. Although the Church ceased to function as a major center of Polish social and cultural activity, it readily develops cooperation with Polish organizations both in Ukraine and Poland.

In addition to Polish electronic media available abroad via satellite and the Internet, Poles living in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts have access to Polish magazines published in the region, local radio and television broadcasts in Polish, as well as the websites of the local Polish organizations. Aiming to consolidate Polish socio-cultural identity in the community, they also play a role in the promotion of Poles and Poland. As presented above, Polish magazines are often bilingual and include a fair amount of information on the country.

Chairpersons of Polish organizations in south-eastern Ukraine face a difficult task, as the region lies far away from the Polish border. Indeed, a considerable geographical distance makes it difficult to maintain close cooperation with different organizations in Poland and to organize visits to the country, particularly in the case of the older generation. Members of the Polish diaspora who were born in pre-war Poland have a mental image of the country which is entirely different from the actual reality today and often sadly talk about it from the perspective of what it used to be like. On the other hand, the younger generation is fascinated with Polish high culture and takes advantage of opportunities to learn the language and pursue studies in Poland. The development of the Polish language and consolidation of Polish identity greatly depend on the activity of Polish organizations.

Today, the Polish language in south-eastern Ukraine has a symbolic, cognitive and economic value. Its high symbolic value is observed particularly among members of the older generation, where it functions as an element of their identity. In some cases, those who still conceal it summon a Roman Catholic priest and pray in Polish on their deathbed:
Ja nikogda nie znała, szczto moja mama Polka. Wot ja choroszo uczilaś, była w partii, jeździła w komandirovki, oćeń choroszo my żyli. Połuczili my kwartiru w Zaporożje bolszju daże. Nu byli my szczasliwy. A 1998 godu moja mama zabolieła, uże staraja była i bolnaja. I goworit: Wot u nas w Zaporożje jest batiuszka katolickij, idi k niemu i poprosi, szczto on ko mnie prishoł. Ja goworiu, mama a zacziem tiebe batiuszka, da jeszcze i katolickeskij. A ona mnie togeda, Ty znajesz Lina, mienia kriestili w cerkwi katolickeskoj i ja katolicka, was bjajała uczit', u was charoszaja rabota. A fot tie-pier' na mienia priszło wriemia i choczu umieriet' po katolickiesku. [...] Ja bojałas, no prishoł nasz otiec katolickij i oni wmiestie moliliś na polskom jazykie. Ja nie znaju siejczas szczto mnie dielat', ja że Ruskaja wsio taki [...]

(I never knew my mum was Polish. I was a good student, I was in the Party, I went away on business trips; we had a very good life. We got a flat in Zaporozhe [Ukr. Zaporizhzhia], quite a big one. We were happy. And in 1998, my mum got sick; she was already quite old and ill. She says to me: ‘There’s this [Roman] Catholic priest here, in Zaporozhe [Ukr. Zaporizhzhia]. Go to him and ask him to come to see me.’ I say to her: ‘And why would you see a priest, and a Catholic one at that?’ And then she says: ‘You know, Lina, I was baptized in a [Roman] Catholic church and I’m a Catholic, but I was scared to teach you; you have a good job. But now my time has come and I want to die the Catholic way.’ [...] I was afraid, but our Catholic priest came over and they prayed together in Polish. I don’t know what to do now; I’m Russian, after all.)

For middle-aged and younger people whose grandparents or parents are/were Polish, the Polish language mostly has a cognitive value: they would like to know it not only to be able to speak the language of their ancestors, but also to have access to Polish high culture. This aspect is manifested in their attendance at concerts of Polish classical music in Donetsk (popular particularly among students), and participation in ‘Polish Culture Festivals’ (Pol. Dni Kultury Polskiej) in other centers of the region.


(I want to get to know everything, everything that’s Polish. I’m very much interested in music. I listen to Polish music; I go to concerts. It’s Chopin’s Year, so I’ve been to a fantastic Chopin concert; really marvellous. I also read a lot on the Internet, because my grandfather was Polish and I want to know everything he kept in his heart.)

Economic motivation is important in the younger generation. Young people in the region learn Polish to enhance their career prospects or pursue studies in Poland. Although a lot of them have Polish ancestry, Polish language courses are popular also among the local Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians; in their case, economic motivation plays a major role. Members of the younger generation very often take advantage of opportunities offered for the holders
of the Polish Card (Pol. *Karta Polaka*) to study in Poland. While some of them return to their home region on completion of their courses, a considerable number choose to settle down in Poland permanently.

The above presented information on the use of Polish in education, Church, the mass media, etc. among the Polish diaspora in south-eastern Ukraine can be concluded with the following observation:

Czynnikiem wzmacniającym prestiż języka mniejszości jest jego możliwie szeroki uzus, potrzeba komunikowania się w tym języku, odczuwana i realizowana przez jego nosicieli. Wielkie znaczenie ma też istnienie rodzimej inteligencji będącej motorem pracy nad językiem i jego statusem oraz istnienie instytucji zajmujących się promowaniem języka mniejszościowej społeczności etnicznej/narodowej i jej kultury [Zieniukowa 2006: 73].

(What improves the social standing of a minority language is its broadest possible usage, stemming from the fact that its speakers both feel and fulfil the need to use it for communication. Other significant factors include the native intelligentsia, stimulating work on the language and its status, as well as institutions devoted to the promotion of the language and culture of a given ethnic/national minority.)
CULTURAL AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY: TYPES, DIMENSIONS
AND COMPONENTS

Identity is a multidimensional and multi-layered concept referring to complex long-term processes which occur at the level of individual awareness and are subsequently manifested in collective behavior.

In Polish, the literal meaning of the word tożsamość (identity) is ‘sameness,’ as derived from the adjective tożsamy ‘one and the same, or the same as, identical,’ recorded since the nineteenth century, the earlier eighteenth century form being tosam, identical’ [Boryś 2005: 639].

The English word ‘identity’ has two basically different meanings. One is ‘sameness’ (the term used by Erik Erikson; the original etymological meaning, as idem stands for ‘the same’), the other is ‘distinctiveness’; both of them may be applied to personal identity as well as to collective identity. Consequently, the discussion of personal identity should consider both similarities and differences between the individual and other individuals [Jacobson-Widding 1983: 13; Melchior 1990: 25]. However, such a distinction concerns different aspects or a different focus rather than clearly different meanings. When the concept of identity is applied, it is generally the case that one of its dimensions is clearly foregrounded without, however, eliminating the other [Bokszański 1997: 91].

For the purposes of the present study of the Polish community in south-eastern Ukraine, it is particularly worth noting works on the multidimensional and multi-layered nature of identity by such authors as Zbigniew Bokszański [Bokszański 2006], Janusz Mucha [Mucha 2005], Hanna Mamzer [Mamzer 2002], Irena Machaj [Machaj 2005], Krzysztof Kwaśniewski [Kwaśniewski 1986], Antonina Łoskowska [Łoskowska 1996], Brunon Synak [Synak 1998], as well as collective volumes Tożsamość a język w perspektywie slawistycznej (Identity and Language from the Perspective of Slavic Studies), edited by Stanisław Gajda [Gajda (ed.) 2008] and Tożsamość polska w odmiennych
Concerned with the theoretical dimension and typology of identity, the studies listed above provide a number of important observations. Krzysztof Kwaśniewski points out that 'collective identities only occur in a particular group of people which has internal bonds, own interests and social subjectivity' ('tożsamości zbiorowe występują tylko w związku z jakąś konkretną zbiorowością ludzką, mającą wewnętrzne powiązania i własne interesy, własną podmiotowość społeczną') [Kwaśniewski 1986: 14]. Zbigniew Bokszański [Bokszański 2006: 26] draws attention to the transformation of the relationship between 'individuality' and 'collectivity.' The author proposes a typology of approaches to collective identities dividing them into two groups: according to the type of collective social subjects (including groups which actually exist, such as national or ethnic communities), and according to the nature of their origin and ideology (including symbolic culture as an expression of self-affirmation of the group or maintaining boundaries separating it from strangers). Irena Machaj considers the social identity of the individual in diachronic and synchronic perspectives, with the former involving an awareness and preservation of continuity of the self across time (in spite of changing circumstances and the ensuing psychological and social evolution of the individual), and the latter related to the understanding of the self in a variety of social roles and contexts [Machaj 2005: 21–22].

Zbigniew Bokszański observes that national identity is an important component of collective identity [Bokszański 2006: 44–63]. In Antonina Kłoskowska’s definition, '[t]he national identity of a nation is its collective self-knowledge, its self-identification, the creation of its own picture and the entire contents of self-knowledge, but it is not a picture of the character of a nation constructed from the outside’ [Kłoskowska 2001: 87]. According to Bokszański, the theory of national identity rests on three fundamental assumptions:

1. collective identity is perceived as a set of general features which are supposed to characterize a certain group, and is the work of a collective author or authors proposing the form of identity discourse of the group in question;
2. collective identity is formed by socially constructed divisions and boundaries;
3. the construction of boundaries and divisions, and, consequently, the attribution of features to areas being separated from one another, assumes the existence of symbolic codes serving to make these distinctions [Bokszański 2006: 124].

Summing up the theoretical proposals of different authors, it remains to be noted that a researcher should not only devote attention to the group under scrutiny, but also determine his or her own attitude to the subject of study. Brunon Synak observes that
należałoby wyróżnić jej subiektywny i obiektywny wymiar. W wypadku pierwszego wymiaru mamy do czynienia z określonym sposobem autodefiniowania samego siebie, z poczuciem emocjonalnej więzi z daną zbiorowością, ze świadomościowym aspektem przynależności i tożsamości z jej członkami, celami, wartościami [Synak 1998: 52].

(considering different aspects of identity, we should distinguish its subjective and objective dimensions. The former involves one’s own self-definition, including the emotional bond with a particular community, as well as an awareness of this attachment and of sharing a common identity, aims and values with other members of the group.)

On the other hand, the objective dimension is based on the assumption that identity can be recognized in the characteristics of the community which lend themselves to objective description from the position of an outside observer [Bokszański 2006: 114].

An awareness of common history and ancestry also constitutes an important component of national identity. Although the role of a common language, another significant identity factor, greatly increases particularly when a nation loses its statehood [Malinowska 2008: 307], the results of my research presented below indicate that it is not always an essential element of national identity.

As characterized by Brunon Synak, the subjective dimension of identity involves such criteria as self-identification, emotional attachment to the homeland, the feeling of belonging to an own group and an awareness of its distinctness from others. Objective indicators, in turn, fall into two categories: formal (one’s place of birth, the place of birth of one’s parents and grandparents, duration of residence in a particular locality, a ‘typical’ local surname, etc.), and cultural (knowledge and use of the ethnolect of the group, participation in various forms of ethnic culture, membership in ethnic and regional organizations, etc.) [Synak 1998: 52–53]. It is thus important to search for indicators of identity in such a way as to ground one’s own personality in a particular cultural continuum and relate personal experience to a particular geographical and cultural space [Kłoskowska 1996: 252–267]

Since theoretical considerations of national identity form an extensive area of research in its own right, I have limited the above section to a brief outline of different approaches to the question, without providing a full-length review of literature.

The present study describes identity correlates, i.e. self-declared attitudes of the respondents to particular criteria of Polish identity, as well as their individual perception and definition. Kłoskowska observes that ‘[t]he concept of national affiliation is based on two types of indicator: (1) consciousness of a tie with one’s own group and its culture, that "subcutaneous" relation to one’s own country [...]'; and (2) consciousness of the distinctness of one’s own group, its difference from others, from strangers’ [Kłoskowska 2001: 345].

The criteria of Polishness in Poland are certainly different than those in Ukraine; Polish identity in Lviv, Warsaw, Cracow, and even in Siberia is different
than in south-eastern Ukraine. An analysis of Polish national identity offered by Jan Błuszkowski defines the following criteria of Polishness: national self-identification, blood ties, the bond with the national territory, the cultural bond, the bond of religion, and civic bonds [Błuszkowski 2005: 125]. Ewa Nowicka, in turn, draws on the results of her studies of Polish identity in Belarus, Lithuania, Kazakhstan and Siberia to propose a typology of Polishness in the East, including: restricted Polishness (Pol. polskość ograniczona)\(^{1}\) in Belarus, Polishness under threat (Pol. polskość zagrożona)\(^{2}\) in Lithuania, residual Polishness (Pol. polskość rezydualna)\(^{3}\) among the Polish deportees in Kazakhstan, and sentimental Polishness (Pol. polskość sentymentalna)\(^{4}\) in Siberia. According to specialists in the field, the situation of the Polish minority in Ukraine is different depending on the region: the west of the country is a case of restricted Polishness under threat, while the dispersed Polish minority in the east is characterized by residual Polish identity [Nowicka 2000: 12]. Considering that Nowicka conducted her surveys before 2000, the evolution of indicators of identity as well as changes in the economic situation and legal framework in the countries under consideration might have altered the picture presented in her study.

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\(^{1}\) Restricted Polishness (Pol. polskość ograniczona): ‘[a]t present, this aspect of Polishness can be observed in Belarus [...], where, partly due to the Soviet Union’s policies regarding ethnicity, and partly because of an ethnic “weakness” of the Belarusian ethnic element, the Polishness of the Polish minority is mostly vague and uncertain.’ Although elitist in character, among the wider social groups of Poles, it is ‘restricted to an awareness of Polish family ties, a limited knowledge of the language and a vague vision of the ancestral culture’ [Nowicka 2000: 10; English quotation see: Nowicka 2006: 8–9].

\(^{2}\) Polishness under threat (Pol. polskość zagrożona) is currently the case, for example, in Lithuania, where the Polish ethnic community ‘enjoyed the most advantageous position of all the Polish minorities in the entire USSR. [...] From the early 1990’s onward, that is from the emergence of the independent Lithuanian state [...], the Polish identity there suddenly came under particular threat’ [Nowicka 2000: 10; English quotation see: Nowicka 2006: 7].

\(^{3}\) Residual Polishness (Pol. polskość rezydualna) is one whereby individuals retained a feeling that ‘they are Polish’ and that their forefathers were Polish [Nowicka 2000: 11].

\(^{4}\) Sentimental Polishness (Pol. polskość sentymentalna): a social environment which led to the emergence of sentimental Polishness can be encountered in different regions of Siberia. ‘Pride in the Polish origin is in this case connected with a very positive stereotype of a Pole among the local population – the Iakuts and the Buriats’ [Nowicka 2000: 11; English quotation see: Nowicka 2006: 10–11]. Elżbieta Smułkowa observes that the typology of Polishness in these countries as proposed by Ewa Nowicka is ‘Nie mogę jednak przyjąć bez komentarza przeprowadzonej dla tych krajów typologii polskości, opartej na jednej cesze, uznanej dość arbitralnie za najistotniejszą. Rzeczywistość jest znacznie bogatsza, a zasięgi wydzielonych składników typów nie przebiegają według granic państwowych’ [Smułkowa 2004: 262].

’(based on one particular feature, quite arbitrarily recognized as the most significant, and I cannot accept it without comment. Indeed, the reality is far more complex and the geographical extent of the proposed types does not correspond to the political map.)’

I agree with Smułkowa, as my research experience suggests that the above types of Polishness observed in Belarus, Lithuania and Siberia are present also among the Polish minority in Ukraine, where they vary depending on the geographical area and activity of Polish organizations.
In order to examine the indicators of Polish identity in south-eastern Ukraine, I carried out a pilot survey including a hundred interviews with Poles in Berdiansk, Donetsk, Makiivka, Mariupol, Melitopol and Zaporizhzhia in 2007. The informants answered such questions as: 'Who can be considered a Pole? In what circumstances?' and 'What makes you a Pole?' The most frequent replies were as follows: 'My parents are/were Polish'; 'I remember that someone in my family was Polish'; 'I know the Polish language'; 'I'm a Roman Catholic'; 'I was born in Poland.' A description of the identity of a given group should consider not only its past and awareness of continuity (if it was the case), but also a consciously shaped vision of its own future. Another crucial point is an awareness of the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘others,’ ‘ours’ and ‘strangers.’ It should also be noted that the social culture of a group is shaped by such factors as a sense of community and distinctness from other groups around.

On the basis of these findings, in 2010 I conducted a survey of Poles living in six urban centers in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The total of 435 questionnaires was collected in Berdiansk, Melitopol, Makiivka, Mariupol (60 each), Donetsk (105) and Zaporizhzhia (90), and the number of those analyzed was 430 (in five cases, the respondents declared their national identity to be other than Polish).

The survey included two types of questions:

(a) questions about the respondent: ethnicity (Pol. narodowość; both their own and their parents’), age, sex, place of birth (country), place of residence, level of education (primary, secondary, higher);

(b) questions concerning the factors determining the respondent's self-identification as Polish, and his/her self-identification as opposed to 'others' in the neighborhood.

The analysis of the findings included both the collective (survey results) and individual perspective (interviews with respondents).

The questionnaires were completed by 254 female (59%) and 176 male respondents (41%) aged between twenty and eighty-eight; they declared their level of education as higher (252 persons, i.e. 58% of the total), secondary (98, i.e. 23%), or primary (80, i.e. 19%). The findings concerning particular indicators of their Polish national identity are presented in further sections below. The discussion takes into consideration the features of the group shaped in the process of its formation, as well as the current activity of Polish communities aiming to raise the level of Polish national awareness and, consequently, national self-identification of the group.

The selected and analyzed criteria of Polishness which emerged in the course of the pilot survey are similar to those applied in related disciplines, such as sociology or ethnology, and have been described for example in a study of Kashubian identity by Brunon Synak [Synak 1998] and Polish identity in Belarus by Iwona Kabzińska [Kabzińska 1999].

Their findings and the results of my preliminary research served as the basis to distinguish the following indicators or criteria of Polishness discussed below:
(a) blood ties, i.e. I am Polish because my parents are/were Polish,  
(b) official documents indicating Polish ethnic origin,  
(c) religious awareness,  
(d) language awareness.

I also quote some comments from the respondents relating to other identity factors, such as their place of birth.

5.1. Blood Ties

An individual inherits their ethnicity from their parents, with no formal procedures required to be accepted into the community. The ethnicity of a child is determined by *ius sanguinis*, whereby the parents transmit their ethnicity to their offspring [Błuszkowski 2005: 126]. In his study of Polish identity in the Ternopil region, Janusz Rieger considers the criterion of blood ties and quotes his informants:

„moi rodzice są (byli) Polakami, moje rodzeństwo to Polacy...” Rodzina w Polsce nie była tu istotna. Warto dodać, że może być i taka sytuacja, że narodowość (synów) określa się po ojcu: w znanej mi rodzinie w Tarnopolu syn Ukrainki i Polaka jest Polakiem, i to nie dziwi. Ale w Oleszkowcach – wsi polskiej i po polsku mówiącej – córka Polki i Gruzina jest Polką. Tu zresztą może być przypadek przejęcia narodowości matki (wraz z wyznanieniem) przez córkę (zwłaszcza że ojciec nie jest Ukraińcem); w Hałuszczyńcach stwierdzono, że dziewczęta “szły” za matką, a synowie – za ojcem: „zakon był taki, jeszcze w Awstrii” [Rieger 1996b: 121–122].

('My parents are/were Polish, my siblings are Polish.' Having a family in Poland was not important. It is worth adding that the case might be different, and the sons inherit ethnicity from their father: in a family in Tarnopol [Ukr. Ternopil] (which I know personally), a son born to the Ukrainian mother and the Polish father is Polish, and the situation is perceived as obvious. On the other hand, in Oleszkowice [Ukr. Olyshkivtsi], a Polish (and Polish-speaking) village, a daughter born to the Polish mother and Georgian father is Polish, which might be the case of inheriting the ethnicity (and religion) by the daughter from the mother (particularly that the father is not Ukrainian). In Hałuszyńce [Ukr. Halushchynetsi], the girls ‘followed’ their mothers, and the boys – their fathers: 'It’s been a custom, since as long back as the Austrian times.'

In Bukovina, children mostly take their ethnicity after their father. It is very rare that a Romanian man should marry a Polish woman in a Roman Catholic church, as was the case in Stara Krasnoshora (Pol. Stara Huta):


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(My wife took me with her and that’s how I learned to speak [the language]; it’s already been twenty-five years since I got married and learned to speak [it]. My children don’t want to be Romanian, but Polish. They’re ashamed to say that their dad is Romanian. And so I speak just like everyone around here; it’s nice speech; and here the whole village speaks like us.)

Janusz Rieger’s study entitled ‘Identyfikacja narodowa i religijna Polaków na Ukrainie’ (National and Religious Identity of Poles in Ukraine) includes an important suggestion concerning further research in this field:

Należałoby jednak nie poprzestawać na impresjach, lecz na większym materiale zbadać sytuację zaistniałą w przypadku małżeństw mieszanych, uwzględniając linię męską i żeńską, a także otoczenie [Rieger 1996b: 122].

(It is, however, best not to be satisfied with a mere impression, but rather study the situation in mixed marriages, taking into consideration the ancestry both in the male and female line, as well as the social environment.)

According to the results of my survey in Donetsk, the majority of the respondents from the older generation declared that both their parents had been Polish. A few cases which came as an exception to this general pattern were as follows: a woman born in the Khmelnytskyi oblast in 1938 declared herself as Ukrainian, even though her parents had been Polish; a male respondent born in the Zhytomyr oblast in 1925 specified his national affiliation as ‘[Roman] Catholic,’ while he referred to both his mother and father as Poles; a person born in 1924 in the Minsk region (today in Belarus) described herself as Belarusian, but her parents had been ethnic Poles; a male informant born in 1925 to the Russian father and Polish mother stated that he was Russian, i.e. according to his descent in the male line. More interesting cases involved a Ukrainian respondent born in 1940 whose father had been Russian and mother – Polish, and a woman born in the area of Zhmeryinka in 1930, who declared herself to be a Ukrainian of Polish origin (her father had been Polish and mother – Ukrainian). As can be seen from the above examples, some of the respondents do not feel Polish, but Ukrainian, commenting on their change of self-identification as follows: ‘I live in Ukraine, so it’s my homeland’ (‘ponieważ mieszkam na Ukrainie; jest to moja bat’kiwszczyna’).

Moje wspomnienia poczynają się z dwudziestych lat ubiegłego stulecia, z dzieciństwa w ukraińskiej wsi niedaleko Teofipola i Szepetówka. […] Rzecz jasna, że we wsi rozmawiało się po ukraińsku, ale w polskich rodzinach używano języka polskiego. […] Tatụś uczył w polskiej szkole, ale nie w naszej wsi, a w sąsiedniej Kajetanówce, maleńskiej wiosce, oddalonej o siedem kilometrów od Wolicy [Polacy 2002, no. 1: 7].

(My memories go back as far as the 1920s, beginning with my childhood in a Ukrainian village near Teofipol and Szepetówka [Ukr. Shepetivka]. […] Obviously, the language used in the village was Ukrainian, but Polish families spoke Polish. […] My dad
used to teach in a Polish school, but not in our village, in the neighboring Kajetanówka [Ukr. Kaetanivka], a tiny little village seven kilometers away from Wolica [Ukr. Volytsia].)

The author recording these memories does not say her parents were Polish because she takes it for granted. The examples provided above refer only to some indicators of identity.

About 80% of the middle generation of the respondents surveyed in Donetsk feel Polish because both of their parents were/are Polish (most of these respondents were born in the Khmelnytskyi or Vinnytsia oblasts, with those originally from the Donetsk oblast in the minority; one person came from Russia). In this age group, those in Donetsk who declared themselves as Poles reported their father as Ukrainian and mother as Polish; this category included mostly women. One male respondent who put himself down as Polish was born in Donetsk in 1944 to a Jewish father and Polish mother.

As for the younger generation in Donetsk, a person born in 1988 declared herself as Polish after her father (her mother is Russian); in three other cases, Polish identity was inherited in the female line (the father is Russian).

In Makiivka, most persons declaring themselves as Poles had Polish parents; there were only a few exceptions to this rule: two respondents considered themselves Polish after their mothers (in both cases, the father was German), one of them was born in the Zhytomyr oblast in 1937, the other in the Donetsk oblast in 1956; a female informant from Makiivka born in the Sharhorod raion in 1941 described her own ethnicity and the ethnicity of her parents as 'Polish-Ukrainian' (Pol. Polak-Ukrainiec, Polaczka-Ukrainka):

Jestem i Polką, i Ukrainką, bo moja mama tak samo i tato tak samo i Polak, i Ukrainiec. [...] Polak, bo z polskiej krwi, ich rodzice byli też Polakami, krew u nich czysto polska, a Ukrainiec, bo była tu respublika ukraińska, a teraz Ukraina i my się cieszymy, że jest tu Ukraina, bo dzięki temu, możemy wyznawać, że my Polaki [Makiivka 2010: interview].

(I’m both Polish and Ukrainian, because both my mum and dad were the same, both Polish and Ukrainian. [...] Polish, because of Polish blood; their parents were Polish as well, of pure Polish blood; and Ukrainian, because it was the Ukrainian Republic here, and now it’s Ukraine; and we’re happy it’s Ukraine here, because thanks to this we can openly say we’re Polish.)

Another informant (born in the village of Strilnyky in the Vinnytsia oblast in 1927) declared he was Ukrainian of Polish origin, just like his father (his mother had been German). A female informant from Makiivka (born in 1964) told me ’I’m actually Polish, but Ukrainian by passport’ (’Jestem Polką faktycznie, no Ukrainką w paszporcie’), and used the same term to describe both her mother and father; this means the entry in the ‘nationality’ column in her internal passport (indicating the ethnicity of the holder) had been subject to change in the course of an administrative procedure over which she had no control.
In Mariupol, 60% of those surveyed declared they were Polish because both their parents were/had also been Polish. The remaining 40% (mostly women) had/had had Polish mothers (their fathers were/had been German, Armenian, Jewish, Russian, Ukrainian, and Buriat).

In Melitopol, just as in all the above urban centers, most informants identified themselves as Polish for the same reason: both their parents were/had also been Polish; the pattern can be observed in the older generation and, to a lesser extent, also in the middle generation. In other cases, respondents inherited their ethnicity from one of their parents, for example: a female informant born in Ribnita (Ukr. Ридниця, Rybnytsia, today in Moldova) in 1922 stressed her father’s name had been Piotr: ‘Zawadski Piotr, son of Paweł, and I’m Piotr’s daughter’ (‘Zawadski Piotr; syn Pawła, a ja jestem córką Piotra’), her mother had been Russian; a female respondent born in Vitsebsk in 1922 identified herself as Polish after her mother (her father had been Belarusian); a female respondent born in a Polish family in Shyrets (Pol. Szczerczec) in the Lviv (Pol. Lwów) region in 1935 stated she was Polish because her father had been Polish (her mother had been Ukrainian), but her two children considered themselves Russian after their father. It is worth noting that two of those surveyed in Melitopol (born in Piatyhirka in the Zhytomyr oblast in 1940) whose both parents had been Polish made an additional comment that they were Polish ‘by blood’ (Rus. по крови, po krovi), but Ukrainian ‘by passport’ (Rus. по паспорту, po pasportu).

The members of the older generation in Berdiansk (born in the Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Chernivtsi and Vinnytsia oblasts) identified themselves as Poles because both their parents had been Polish. Eight respondents (born between 1930 and 1980) inherited their ethnicity from their mothers (their fathers were/had been Ukrainian, Russian, Bulgarian, two cases each; German, Greek). One informant found out that her father was Polish shortly before his death (her mother had been Ukrainian). One of those surveyed in Berdiansk described herself and her parents as Polish of Ukrainian origin:


(I’m Polish, yes, but of Ukrainian origin; my parents were also of Ukrainian origin. We used to live in Stavropolskii Krai [region], but we came there from Ukraine, so we’re Polish, but of Ukrainian origin, yes.)

The village of Bohatyrvka near Zaporizhzhia has a Polish community whose members were born in the Zhytomyr oblast and were deported to Kazakhstan in 1937. Today, most of the residents of Bohatyrvka and Liutserna who identify themselves as Polish are those born in Kazakhstan. All the respondents put down their Polish descent as the reason why they feel
Polish themselves. The community is characterized by a high degree of social cohesion; it is bound by common tragic experience (exile in Kazakhstan and return to Ukraine, but not to the home region), as well as by membership in the Roman Catholic Church. The Polish surnames in the area include such examples as Sidorski, Rogowski, Żurawski, Popławski, Zieliński, Marczewski, Rewuski, Ruczyński, Sawicki, Jaskólski, Turowski, Sitnicki, Mokrecki, Weselski, Korliński, Andriusiewicz, Kiron, Przybysz.

To familii polskie, da my Polaki, my żyli w Kazachstani i potemu my przyjichały tut. My adni ciut’ po polski rozmowlajemo, no a bilsze tak po ukraiński, tak i w Kazachstani my mówili, ale my Polaki. Naszi roditeli to Polaki, wot u nich taki familiji polski, jak Turowski, Sitnicki, Weselski i tam bahato je. U nas ne buło kostela, to my do cerkwy chodyły, a teper majemo swój kostel i tak molimosia szczo wsio teper je dobre, szoby wjyny ne buło i bilsze tych zsyłok do Kazachstanu, a tak duże dobre żyty [Bohatyrivka 2010: interview].

(These are Polish surnames, yes, we’re Polish; we used to live in Kazakhstan and then we came here. It’s only us who can speak a bit of Polish, but we mostly speak Ukrainian, just as we did in Kazakhstan, but we are Polish. Our parents were Polish, they had Polish surnames, like Turowski, Sitnicki, Weselski and many others. We didn’t have a [Roman] Catholic church, so we went to the Orthodox one; and now we have our own church, so we pray that everything will be all right, that there won’t be a war and deportations to Kazakhstan anymore, and we pray for good life.)

The younger generation of the respondents surveyed in Zaporizhzhia define their national self-identification according to their descent in both the male and female line, with no specific pattern to be observed. Those born after 1991 find the identity issue particularly difficult. Indeed, sometimes it happens that in the application form for the Polish Card they put themselves down as Ukrainians. A female informant born in 1996 described herself as ‘Ukrainian of Polish origin,’ like her father (her mother is Polish). She explained it as follows:

U mamy raditieli Polaki i ona toże Polka, u papy mojego otiec Polak, a mama Ukrainka, mój papa nie czistokrownyj Palak, i ja toże nie czistokrownaja Polka. Wot mogu skazat,’ szczto ja kak i papa Ukrainka polskoho proschożdienija [Zaporizhzhia 2010: interview].

(My mum’s parents are Polish and she’s also Polish; my dad’s father is Polish, and his mum is Ukrainian; my dad is not of pure Polish blood, and neither am I. So, I can say that I’m like my dad, Ukrainian of Polish origin.)

The middle generation in Zaporizhzhia approach the question of their identity in many different ways. Some more interesting examples are as follows: a female informant born in Zaporizhzhia in 1966 states that she is Ukrainian
of Polish origin after her mother, who also was Ukrainian of Polish origin. The woman remembers that, unlike her mother, her grandmother could speak Polish and even was a Polish noble. They all lived in Russia, where the grandmother always used to say that she was Polish, and her mother – that she was Ukrainian. The informant’s father was a Lowland Don Cossack. She describes her identity as follows:

U mnie papa Donskij Kazak nizowoj, on wszędą był Kazakom. Ich wysłała Katierina w Rosiju i tam oni żyli. Mama s babuszkoj toże żyły w Rosii, no babuszka żyła na Ukrainie i mama toże radiaś na Ukrainie. Mama potomu szczt.o szczt.o na Ukrainie, wsięgda gostorła szczt.o ona Ukrajinka, ja nie ponimaju pocziemu, no możet potomu szczt.o w Rosiji tam gdzie ani żyli, byli samyje Ruskije. Ja czstwuuś Ukrajinkoj polskoho proischożdienja, żywu to ja na Ukrajinie, to ja Ukrajinka, a proischożdjenije u menia polskoje, potomu szczt.o u menia pływiot krow polskaja, ja wam skaju u menia oczeń mnogo krowi polskoj, ja eto czstwuju [Zaporizhzhia 2010: interview].

(My dad was a Lowland Don Cossack, always had been. They had been sent to Russia by [Empress] Catherine and that’s where they lived. My mum and granny also lived in Russia, but before that my granny had lived in Ukraine and my mum was also born in Ukraine. Because she was born in Ukraine, my mum always used to say that she was Ukrainian. I don’t know why, maybe because where they lived in Russia there were only Russians. I feel Ukrainian of Polish origin; I live in Ukraine, so I’m Ukrainian; and I have Polish origin because I have Polish blood running in me. I can tell you I have a lot of Polish blood, I can feel this.)

In other cases, a male informant born in Estonia in 1954 explains he is Polish after his mother (his father was Finnish); a female informant born in Zhytomyr area describes how she tried to establish contact with other Poles and Roman Catholics in Melitopol:


(I’m of pure Polish blood. I was looking for other Poles in Melitopol. My whole family has been Polish for generations. They lived near Żytomier [Pol. Żytomierz, Ukr. Zhytomyr]. I remember we prayed in Polish, but we spoke Ukrainian at home. And then, there was no church here, so we went there to baptize our children. My husband is Russian, katsap as they say.)

As it turns out, in south-eastern Ukraine there is no uniform pattern as to Polish identity being inherited in the male or female line. In the case of most respondents from the older generation, both their parents were Polish born

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5 The informant described her father as a ‘Lowland Don Cossack,’ which in fact is not an ethnic group.
in different regions of Poland. Those in the middle and the younger generations who identify themselves as Poles come from mixed marriages; Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present data concerning Polish identity in the female and male line of descent (in Table 5.1 the informant’s mother is/was Polish; in Table 5.2 the informant’s father is/was Polish).

**Table 5.1. Self-declared ethnicity of the respondents whose mother is/was Polish**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent’s self-declared ethnicity</th>
<th>Respondent’s mother’s ethnicity</th>
<th>Respondent’s father’s ethnicity</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Belarusian</td>
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<td>Bulgarian</td>
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<td>Czech</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Don Cossack</td>
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It can be seen that mixed marriages include quite a considerable range of different ethnicities and there is no pattern as to how the children choose their identity. While conducting the survey, I also encountered people who consider themselves Ukrainian or Russian even though both their parents are/were Polish.

Out of the total of 430 questionnaires (completed in six urban centers of south-eastern Ukraine) in which the respondents declared their Polish national identity, 243 persons (153 females and 90 males) indicated blood ties (i.e. the fact that at least one of their parents is/was Polish) as the reason (Figure 5.1 presents the data for each center). Other criteria of Polishness, such as official documents, language, as well as religion are discussed in further sections below.

The fact that at least one of their parents is/was Polish is important to 63% of the respondents who declare themselves as Polish in Donetsk, and the corresponding figures for other urban centers are as follows: Zaporizhzhia: 54%;
Makiivka: 42%; Berdiansk: 37%; Mariupol: 32%; Melitopol: 24%. Thus, the average for this factor in the province is at about 40%.

My respondents are generally deeply convinced that one is Polish if one was born in a Polish family, or has at least one Polish parent. The phrase ‘of pure Polish blood’ (Rus. чистокровная полька, chistokrovnaia pol’ka and чистокровный поляк, chistokrovnyi poliak) was repeated a number of times in dozens of interviews. One of the informants tried to explain what she meant by ‘pure Polish blood’ as follows:

\[-Ja czistokrownaja Polka. Da wot ja sczitaju siebia czistokrownoj Polkoj.\]
\[-A szcztoto eto oboznaanzajet?\]
\[-Nu szcztoto u mienia czistaja krow polskaja, papa mój był Polak i mama toże i u mienia polskaja czistaja krow.\]
\[-A kak eto czistaja, kakoho cwjeta?\]
\[-Nu kak kakogo czisto krasnogo, tak kak u wseh Polakow.\]
\[-A kakaja krow u Ukraincew?\]
\[-Nu siniaja, taka griaznaja i mutnaja... nie znaju... a możet i krasnaja, no nie takaja kak polskaja [Melitopol 2010: interview].\]

(– I’m of pure Polish blood. Yes, I consider myself to be of pure Polish blood.
– And what does it mean?
– Well, that I have pure Polish blood; my dad was Polish, and my mum too, and I have pure Polish blood.
– And what do you mean pure, what color is it?
– Surely it’s pure red, just like in all Poles.
– And Ukrainians? What’s their blood like?
– It’s dark blue (Rus. синяя, siniaia), it’s, like, livid and murky (Rus. грязная, griaznaia; мутная, mutnaia)… I don’t know… Maybe it’s red, but not like Polish.)
Another female informant, who feels Polish but is Ukrainian by the ‘nationality’ column in her internal passport, said that she was learning ‘the language of her bloodline’ i.e. Polish (Rus. языка я учусь кровного, iazyka ia uchus' krovnogo), adding she ‘dreams to be able to keep the ability to speak “the language of her bloodline”’ (Rus. я мечтаю сохранить возможность говорить на своём кровном языке, ia mechtaiu sokhranit' vozmozhnost' govorit' na cvoём krovnom iazyke) [Melitopol 2010: interview].

5.2. Official Documents

According to my informants, what also plays an important role is an entry which specifies the ethnicity (Ukr. національність, natsional'nist', Rus. национальность, natsional'nost', Pol. narodowość) of both parents on the birth certificate issued by the civil registry office (see Document 22 in the Appendix). Indeed, such official confirmation of their national identity can be a factor at play when the child develops his or her own national self-identification in the future. As the matter was largely dependent on the discretion, or sometimes the mood, of the officials in charge, it was often the case that the ethnicity featuring in the document was different to that indicated by the parents. Nevertheless, some of them managed to have their actual ethnicity registered on the birth certificate of their children. The situation changed only in 1990.

6 The situation in other regions of Ukraine was similar; Janusz Rieger writes:

‘Deklarowanie polskości, polskiej narodowości, polskiego pochodzenia. Taka deklaracja, składana przy różnych okazjach, a więc przy staraniach o wydanie paszportu (dowodu osobistego), zapisywaniu dziecka w urzędzie stanu cywilnego, staraniach o pracę, o szkołę, była niekiedy dowodem wielkiego hartu ducha. Wpisu narodowości polskiej częstokroć nie tylko odmawiano, ale jeszcze szantażowano przy tym: “jak się będziesz upierać, to cię jeszcze ześlemy.” Wpis taki utrudniał znalezienie (lepszej) pracy, mógł być powodem represji. Zresztą zależało tu wiele od stosunków miejscowych. Ale informatorzy wiele razy podkreślali ważność takiego wpisu; wpisanie narodowości polskiej było powodem dumy. Tam, gdzie dochodziło do wpisania narodowości ukraińskiej, z uznaniem mówiono o tych, którzy nie ugięli się czy dopięli swego. Z uznaniem mówi się o “prawdziwych Polakach,” tj. o takich, którzy nie kryli się ze swoją narodowością, którzy uczyli dzieci po polsku. Oczywiście w wielu wsiach problem nie istniał w tym sensie, że kogoś „zażyczyło” jako Ukraińca, wcale z nim nie rozmawiając; por. np.: “ja ojca nie pytał, czego wy nie zapisywane Polaki, czego wy zapisane Ukraińcy, gdyż wy Polacy jesteście. Oni: ничего не чодили, не pytał, to już... zapisali Ukrainiec (Gródek Podolski)” [Rieger 1996b: 121].

(A declaration of Polish identity, ethnicity or origin made on different occasions (such as a passport (identity card) application, registration of a child in the civil registry office, a job or school application) was sometimes proof of great courage. An official entry of Polish ethnicity was often not only refused, but also provoked blackmail: “if you keep insisting, you might be deported.” The entry also made finding (better) employment more difficult and could cause repressions. However, it all depended on the situation in a particular area. It needs to be noted that the informants often stressed how important it was to them to be registered as Polish, and that it was something to be proud of. In the areas where there were cases of registration of Poles as Ukrainians, those who did not succumb or who achieved what they wanted commanded respect in the community; so did the “true Poles,” i.e. those who did not conceal their Polish identity or taught their
On the other hand, it was often the parents themselves who wanted their ethnicity to be recorded not as Polish, but as Ukrainian or Russian in the birth certificates of their children. The moment of registration of new-born children afforded a perfect occasion to conceal the ethnicity of the parents, the child and the future generations. According to my informants, official registration as Ukrainian or Russian was to give their children better opportunities for education and to improve their career prospects in the future. However, there was also a far more important motivation involved: to survive and to avoid coercive resettlement or deportation which were so frequent in the 1930s. The generation who went through these hard times is now passing away; they talked about their experience very reluctantly, often with tears in their eyes. They are still full of fear, as can be seen in the following quotation from an informant from Donetsk:

Listen, if I told my daughter that she is Polish, like me, they could deport her and my beloved granddaughter to Siberia. You can’t trust anyone these days, it’s hard times. My dad was in Siberia for ten years because he was Polish. He came back, and so what, it was never the same as before. When they took my dad away, my mum got sick in the head, she didn’t talk, she was silent and prayed; she also taught us to pray for our dad in Polish. Dad came back really ill and there was something wrong with his head, too. He said one thing: don’t tell anyone you’re Polish. And so he died. I keep it a secret to protect my daughter and my granddaughter.)

Until the introduction of the new format of internal Ukrainian passport (i.e. the identity document equivalent in function to the national identity card, as children Polish. On the other hand, in a number of villages the problem was different: Poles were registered as Ukrainians without being asked about it at all, for example: “I didn’t ask my father why he was not registered as Polish or why he was registered as Ukrainian even though he was Polish. He told me he had never been asked about it, so, well... they put him down as Ukrainian” (Gródek Podolski [Ukr. Horodok]).)
distinct from international passports, required to travel abroad), the document used to contain the ‘nationality’ column indicating the ethnicity of the holder. If both parents were Polish and the information was entered on the birth certificate, theoretically it was not a problem to be registered as an ethnic Pole in the internal passport. However, I have encountered several cases in which the local authorities insisted on ‘Ukrainian’ or ‘Russian’ entry being made. The option was either to accept it or resist the pressure.

Today, there are Polish territorial communities in western Ukraine and a number of Polish organizations in the region conduct (more or less successful) activity to pursue Polish interests; they remain in contact with their compatriots dispersed in the south-east. Polish activists in different regions discuss the problem of the lack of Polish representation at the level of the government administration which would take care of the problems of the Polish minority in the country. The ‘Official report on the situation of the Polish diaspora (Polonia) and Poles abroad’ (Pol. *Raport o sytuacji Polonii i Polaków za granicą*) comments on the situation as follows:

Osób identyfikujących się z polską tożsamością nie ma w parlamencie ukraińskim, choć jest w nim kilka osób pochodzących z rodzin mieszanych i pamiętających o swych polskich korzeniach. Polacy nie zajmują również eksponowanych stanowisk we władzach centralnych na Ukrainie. Nieliczni, głównie na Żytomierszczyźnie i w lwowskim okręgu konsularnym, znajdują się w lokalnych organach przedstawicielskich i samorządowych [Raport 2009: 244].

(There are no deputies who would identify themselves as Poles in the Ukrainian parliament, although there are several who come from mixed families and remember about their Polish roots. Likewise, there are no Poles holding important positions in the central state administration. Only a handful of them are members of the local councils and other representative bodies, mainly in the Zhytomyr oblast and in the area served by the Polish consulate in Lviv.)

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7 The Ukrainian word *pasport* (паспорт) refers to two different identity documents: the internal passport (equivalent to the national identity card) and the international passport, required to travel abroad.

8 Writing about her studies of the Polish communities in the Lviv, Ternopil and Khmelnytskyi oblasts, Ewa Dzięgiel observes:


(‘[…] in the villages included in the field study, the entry in the [internal] passport which specified whether the holder was Polish or Ukrainian was mentioned as a formal criterion of Polish self-identification: the informants included it as one of the elements indicating their Polish ethnicity. […] The territorial criterion, i.e. the place of birth and permanent residence in Ukraine, was often used as an argument by the officials exerting pressure to register Ukrainian ethnicity in official documents.’)

(Do Polish social organizations petition the Ukrainian government on the question of preserving the ‘nationality’ column in passports? I am in contact with Tatars and Greeks, their initiatives are highly visible in our mining society; they have their representatives in the government. And us? We cannot just disappear as an ethnic community. Our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will never forgive us.)

The new format of the internal passport introduced after Ukrainian independence does not include the ‘nationality’ column indicating the ethnicity of the holder. Members of the Polish minority comment on the change as follows:


(The fact that the new passports do not include the ‘nationality’ column leads to the liquidation of the so-called national minorities, which will not be able to prove anything [their ancestry] in twenty years’ time. Our poor grandchildren. The Russian Duma [the lower chamber of parliament] decided to reintroduce the former regulation. I am not going to change my passport until the very last day.)

Indeed, the problem of the ‘nationality’ column still raises considerable controversy. Iwona Kabzińska, studying the situation of Poles in Belarus, encountered cases in which no record had been made at all and the entry featured a straight line instead [Kabzińska 1999: 33]. The ‘nationality’ column used to be a problem also in the past, for example in the pre-war Republic of Lithuania.

9 Teresa Kulikowicz-Dutkiewicz published a selection of letters she received from Ryszard Zieliński writing from the Donbas, including comments on the life of Poles living in the region.

10 ‘W jednej z miejscowości pokazano mi paszporty z lat siedemdziesiątych, w których w rubryce “narodowość” widniała pozioma kreska. Właściciele tych dokumentów nie wyrazili zgody na wpisanie do paszportu narodowości rosyjskiej lub białoruskiej zamiast deklarowanej narodowości polskiej. Urzędnik wydający paszporty nie tylko odmówił im prawa do zachowania i demonstrowania określonej identyfikacji, lecz arbitralnie stwierdził, iż są osobami bez narodowości’ [Kabzińska 1999: 33].

(‘In one of the localities, I was shown passports from the 1970s, in which the “nationality” column featured a straight line. Their holders had not agreed to Russian or Belarusian ethnicity being entered instead of the Polish one that they had officially declared. The official who issued the documents not only denied them the right to preserve and demonstrate a particular identity, but also arbitrarily decided that they were persons of no ethnicity at all.’)

11 In the pre-war Republic of Lithuania, a number of Polish residents were registered as Lithuanians although they never agreed to it. Also, their surnames were changed to fit the rules of Lithuanian spelling and grammar [Zielińska 2002: 34].
The annotation in the internal passport was important proof confirming the declared ethnicity; some comments on its removal in Ukraine were as follows:


(The final deadline for changing the [internal] passports, or ‘identity cards,’ is coming. My daughters, Danuta and Helena, have already changed their old passports and got new ones, which do not indicate that they are Polish. I am not changing mine until the very last moment, although they keep reminding us about it, and even sometimes refuse to pay out our beggarly pensions to those who produce old passports. It might be a childish game, but what can we do?)

Owing to the socio-historical situation, some people preferred to conceal their ethnicity. They did the same in the case of their children to give them better opportunities for the future. Looking back, some of the informants admit that what they did was a mistake:


(I was in the Party, so how could I be registered as Polish? And my children, they also couldn’t because they wouldn’t have been allowed in the Komsomol, and it was obligatory. And what next? They wouldn’t have gone to university and they wouldn’t have a good job. My son is a senior official (nachalnik), and my daughter is a director of a factory. They were able to make it because they were Russian. And now I tell them they are Polish! [and they say] How is that, it can’t be! So we could get the Polish Card, but we have no documents.)

Indeed, the problem became apparent with the introduction of new Polish legislation.12 Article 2 (1) of the Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card 2007 (Pol. Ustawa o Karcie Polaka) provides as follows:

Karta Polaka może być przyznana osobie, która deklaruje przynależność do Narodu Polskiego i spełni łącznie następujące warunki:
1) wykaże swój związek z polskością przez przynajmniej podstawową znajomość języka polskiego, który uważa za język ojczysty, oraz znajomość i kultywowanie polskich tradycji i zwyczajów;

12 There are a number of publications on the Polish Card (Karta Polaka) [for example Bonusiak 2008: 176–194]; I only want to present the kind of problems the applicants might face.
2) in the presence of the consular representative of the Republic of Poland, referred to as the "consul," or an authorized representative of an organization specified in Article 15 (1) who declares in writing that he or she is a member of the Polish Nation;
3) proves that he or she is of Polish ethnicity or held Polish citizenship; or that at least one of his or her parents or grandparents, or two great-grandparents, were of Polish ethnicity or held Polish citizenship; or submits a certificate confirming his or her active involvement in the activity for the Polish language and culture or the Polish national minority for a period of at least three years prior to the application, issued by a Polish organization or an organization of the Polish diaspora (Polonia) operating in one of the countries specified in Article 2 (2).

Thus, indication of Polish ethnicity in the internal passport turns out to be an important proof of Polish origin recognized by the Polish authorities. This produces problems for those who did not have it registered in their documents:

Kak mnie tiepier byt’, wot u mienia napisano szczto mama Ruskaja, a papa Ukrainiec, jak ja mogu dokazat’ szczto ja Polka, wot szcztoby paluczit’ Kartu Polaka. Ja że Polka, ja znaju u mienia dieduszka odin i wtoroj byt’ Polak, wot widietie szczto oni sdietali [Melitopol 2009: interview].

(And what am I supposed to do now? I’ve got it written that my mum was Russian and my dad was Ukrainian. How can I prove that I’m Polish so that I can get the Polish Card? I’m Polish; I know that both my grandads were Polish. You see what they’ve done.)

In the absence of the ethnicity entry in Ukrainian identity documents, it is important that the Polish Card confirms the Polish origin of the holder. However, in the case of Poles from south-eastern Ukraine, producing proof of Polish ethnic origin is quite difficult. In the past, some were denied registration as
Poles, while others chose not to do so and preferred to be registered as members of other ethnic communities. Also, requests for documents confirming the Polish ethnicity of the grandparents are often deliberately made difficult and the ill will of officials in charge of archives is sometimes quite evident.


(The procedure varies between different regions. For example, in Podolia (Khmelnytskyi and Vinnytsia oblasts) the steps to receive documents officially confirming ethnicity begin in the archives, where those interested apply for a copy of their birth certificate, as the document was often not issued to them at all. In the 1950s, the policy was to issue [internal] passports with the ‘nationality’ column indicating ‘Ukrainian,’ which did not reflect the actual origin of the holder and was made without his or her consent. It required great courage to refuse to accept such a document and insist that it should specify the actual ethnicity. Unfortunately, those courageous were few and far between and the rest of the Polish community in Ukraine accepted their fate, yet again.)

Producing proof of Polish origin required to obtain the Polish Card is also a problem for informants from the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, one of them comments on this issue as follows:

\[U\text{ mienia \ wot, u roditielej bylo zapisano Ukrainiec, a wot dieduszka so storony papy by\l\ zapisan Polak. Nu ja pojecha\l\ specjalno w \zetomier tuda k rodstwienikam, dawaj sprasyw\acute{\text{a}}t' kak ono bylo, no i poszla ja w archiw. Nu dumaju, dadut mnie buma\acute{\text{z}}ku, szczo dieduszka u mienia by\l\ Polak i ja po\lucz Kartu Polaka. Nu wot ja pris\ilia i gowor\acute{\text{u}}, wot moj dieduszka by\l\ takim i takim, wot dajtie mnie buma\acute{\text{z}}ku takaju. A oni mnie otwier\acute{\text{i}}li: Wot smotri, ona w Polszu choczet ujechat' wot i dokument jej nu\zen. I skazali: My takich dokumentow nie dajem, iditie kuda choczetie. I wot ja nie po\luczila buma\acute{\text{z}}ku,\]

13 In search of missing proof of their Polish origin, they make an effort to trace different kinds of records (village councils, district departments of citizens’ affairs, etc.); sometimes, the name and surname make it clear that the documents refer to Poles. Fortunately, some registers include also the record of ethnic origin. In some documented cases, the ‘nationality’ column features the entry ‘Roman Catholic.’ In some cases (e.g. in the Lviv oblast), civil registry offices (holding church registers) have refused the requests on the grounds that there is no law which would authorize the issue of documents confirming Polish ethnicity. When one of the applicants asked about the reasons for the refusal, the reply was that the officials had been forbidden to issue such documents. The list of similar examples is far more extensive.
(And you see, my parents were registered as Ukrainians, but the grandad on my dad’s side had been registered as Polish. So I especially went to Zhytomier [Ukr. Zhytomyr] to see my family there and ask them all about it and I went to the archives. I thought I would get a piece of paper saying that my grandad had been Polish and I would get the Polish Card. So, I come in and I say my grandad was such and such, please could you get me the papers. And they tell me: ‘Just look at this, she wants to go to Poland so she needs the papers’; and then they say ‘We don’t give such documents, go wherever you like.’ So, I didn’t get the papers saying that my grandad had been Polish, but I got a document from the organization, I mean the Federation, saying that I do a lot for the Poles, and I got the Card anyway.)

Also, the informants often complain about the lengthy procedure:

(I was waiting and waiting, I wrote an application and I waited for a very long time; then I got it [the document] that my father was Polish.)

However, only very few of them complain that they were refused a document confirming their Polish origin. The director of the State Archives of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast confirms he is happy to issue such documents if there are records to prove it:

(Everyone has the right to receive it if there are documents to confirm their ethnicity (Rus. natsional’nost’); I agree and I sign the documents very quickly. There are very few Poles who come here to ask for such documents; there are Germans, sometimes Hungarians, Greeks and even Bulgarians, but very few Poles, somehow. Maybe they know that such documents are in different archives, for example in the places where their parents were born. There are many people who came over here from different places.)

Basing on my own research and observations, I can also say that the number of such requests filed with the archives in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts is relatively low.14

14 The situation is different in Lviv, where requests for documents confirming the Polish origin filed with the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine have doubled since the introduction of the Polish Card [Nowiny 2008].
Poles in the region approach the question of identity in many different ways. Each case is worth consideration, as each of them involves different personal paths of those who identify themselves as Polish. They came to the region for various reasons (most often because of the mandatory work placement they had to complete in a specific location), but their identity patterns differ mostly depending on the place of birth, both their own and their parents. People from the younger generation who were born in the south-east often have a double identification i.e. both Polish and Ukrainian:¹⁵

_Nu ja Ukrajiniec, bo na Ukrajinie ja się narodził, i na Ukrajinie do szkoły też chodził, no ale Polak, bo u mienia mama Polka, i krow u mienia polskaja, i ja jeszcze poju polskije piesni_ [Berdiansk 2010: interview].

(Well, I’m Ukrainian, because I was born in Ukraine and I went to school in Ukraine; but I’m also Polish because my mum is Polish and I have Polish blood, and I can sing Polish songs, too.)

In Zaporizhzhia, I talked to a male informant who identifies himself both as Polish and, because of his citizenship, as Ukrainian. He was born in 1991; his father is Belarusian, but his paternal grandparents were Polish; his mother is Chuvash. He explained this as follows:

_Da, ja imieju ukrainskij pasport, no ja Palak, u mienia i dieduszka, i babuszka byli Palakami so storony papy. Papa Bielarus, ja nie znaju poczemu on Bielarus, no on tak choczet byt’ Bielarusom. A mama u mienia Czuwaszka, u niejo roditieli toże Czuwaszy. Ona uže skoro budiet katoliczkoj, ona znajet szczto ja choczu byt’ Palakom, tak kak mój dieduszka, a papa nie znaju czeho nie choczet_ [Zaporizhzhia 2010: interview].

(Yes, I have a Ukrainian passport, but I’m Polish; my grandad and grandma on my dad’s side were Polish. My dad is Belarusian; I don’t know why he is Belarusian, but that’s what he wants to be. And my mum is Chuvash, her parents are also Chuvash. She’s soon going to become a [Roman] Catholic. She knows I want to be Polish, like my grandad; I don’t know why my dad doesn’t want to.)

A female informant born in Zaporizhzhia in 1963 considers herself Polish because her paternal grandfather was Polish; both her parents identify themselves as Russian:

_U mienia dieduszka był Palakom, i ja toże tak wol czuwswuż szcztó ja Polka. Roditieli u mienia Ruskije, no ja wol Polka. I wstupiła w obszczestwo i uczuś jazyka i oczeń lublu polskije piesni. Roditieli specjalno zapisališ Ruskije, oni byli w partii, a wol toga da nie można byt’ w partii i byt’ Polakom, wol oni i stali Ruskimi_ [Zaporizhzhia 2010: interview].

¹⁵ In a similar pattern, double identification in Carpathian Bukovina involves Polish and Romanian identities.
(My grandad was Polish, and me too, I feel I’m Polish. My parents are Russian, but I’m Polish. I’ve joined the association and I’m learning Polish; I really like Polish songs. My parents got registered as Russian on purpose; they were in the Party, and back then you couldn’t be in the Party if you were Polish; so they became Russian.)

The respondents are aware that official records indicating their ethnicity serve as important proof of their origin (the entry was first made on the birth certificate and, for the most part, depended on the official ethnicity of the parents). If they are registered as Polish, they are eligible for the Polish Card. At this point, it is worth noting that in the south-east the role of the document is different than in Lviv or western Ukraine, where the geographical proximity makes contact with Poland much easier. For example, nearly all graduates from the two Polish schools in Lviv study in Poland. On the other hand, Poles from the Donetsk or Zaporizhzhia oblasts do not go to Poland so often and neither do they take advantage of other benefits offered to the holders of the Polish Card, such as a free Polish visa.

For members of the older generation, the Polish Card serves as proof confirming their self-identification and as a substitute of the official status they used to have. In very few cases, they still have their old Polish documents, such as identity cards issued before the war (see Document 25 in the Appendix). The middle and the younger generations are perfectly aware that they cannot apply for the Polish Card unless they can produce evidence that at least some of their ancestors are or were Polish. The respondents comment on this as follows:

– Ja Polak, bo u mniecia dieduszka był Palakom;
– Ja Polka, u mienie babuszka była Polka;
– Moi dwa dieduszki byli Polakami;
– Da, u mienia kto-to z daliekich rodstwiennikow był Palak;
– U mienie pradieduszka był Polak, ja imieju prawo szcztatsia tože Palakom;
– Mój pradied rodlisia w Polsze, potomu ja Polak;
– Ja celyj Polak, u mienie died był Palak i niemnożko ja Ukrainiec, no bolsze ja Palak.

(– I’m Polish, because my grandad was Polish;
– I’m Polish, my grandma was Polish;
– both my grandads were Polish;
– Yes, someone among my distant relatives was Polish;
– My great-grandad was Polish; I have the right to consider myself Polish as well;
– My great-grandfather was born in Poland, that’s why I’m Polish;
– I’m a true Pole, my grandfather was Polish, and I’m Ukrainian, a bit, but I’m more Polish.)

Figure 5.2 presents the proportion of the 430 respondents who consider themselves Polish because their grandparents were Polish, while their parents declare/declared a different national identity. Although the criterion of
Polish self-identification is blood ties, it does not refer to the generation of the parents, but to the ancestors further back in the lineage.

**Figure 5.2.** I am Polish because some of my ancestors were Polish (grandfather, grandmother, great grandfather, great grandmother)

In Donetsk and Berdiansk as many as 10% declared themselves as Polish because some of their ancestors (grandmother or grandfather; in some cases even great-grandfather) were Polish; the corresponding figures for other centers included in the survey were as follows: Melitopol: 3%; Zaporizhzhia: 2%; Mariupol: 1.5%; Makiivka: 1%. In a small number of cases, the respondents indicated that their great-grandfather had been Polish, their grandfather was Ukrainian, their father was Russian and they consider themselves Polish. For this group, it is important that they can choose to declare their identity not after their parents but after their ancestors further back in the lineage. According to some informants, their parents did not feel the need to identify themselves as Polish, while others concealed their Polish origin. In some cases, the parents revealed it to them only in their final hours:

*My sobie żyliśmy dobrze, nie zastanawialiśmy się, jakiej narodowości jesteśmy, matka była Ukrainką, tata, jak wszyscy uważaliśmy, był Rosjaninem, tak przynajmniej się pisał, nigdy nie wspominał o żadnej polskości, ani nie widzieliśmy, co to jest. Ja byłem już mężatka, moja siostra też, duże dzieci, a tata, jak umierał, powiedział, pamięta jcie, jesteście Polkami, ja jestem Polakiem. Był to szok. Zaczęłam szukać wszystko co polskie, jeździć do Polski, zakładać organizacje, przekazała to swoim dzieciom, oni też teraz som Polakami* [Berdiansk 2010: interview].

(We had a good life; we didn’t think what ethnicity (Pol. narodowość) we were. My mother was Ukrainian; my dad, as we all thought, was Russian; at least that’s what
he had in his papers. He never mentioned any Polish identity; we never knew what it was. I was already married, my sister as well, I had big kids; and my dad, when he was dying, he said: 'Remember, you are Polish; I am Polish.' It was a shock. I started looking up everything that was Polish, I started going to Poland, setting up organizations; I passed this on to my children, they are now Polish as well.)

5.3. Religion

In general opinion, 'Poles are distinct from Ukrainians and Russians because they are of different religion. If someone is Polish, it is assumed that they are Roman Catholic' ('Polaków wyraźnie odróżnia od Ukraińców czy Rosjan wyznanie. Jeśli ktoś jest Polakiem, to wiadomo, że jest on (rzymskim) katolikiem') [Rieger 1996b: 118]. What is the situation in south-eastern Ukraine? Is it really the case that Ukrainians and Russians cannot be Catholic and the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine is exclusively Polish? Although I addressed these issues in Chapter 4.5 above, the problem still deserves further discussion. Today, religion is becoming increasingly important among the Polish minority in the south-east of the country. Indeed, Poles in the region are gradually beginning to disclose both their ethnic origin and their religion.


(In 1970, I came back (from Kazakhstan) to Ukraine and I worked at the Ministry of Education. I go to the [Roman] Catholic church, even though it is not really well looked on when you have such a post.)

Disclosing religious affiliation became possible only after independence (1991).

As discussed in the above chapters, south-eastern Ukraine has always been a multi-ethnic and multi-religious region. In his study of the religious question in Zaporozhia in the first half of the seventeenth century, Mariusz Drozdowski analyzes the attitudes of the Cossacks to the conflict which occurred in the aftermath of the synod of Brest in 1596 between the followers of the Roman Catholic and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Churches and those adhering to Orthodoxy; the author also provides an assessment of their activity in support of the Orthodox Church [Drozdowski 2008: 7]. Other authors observe that even współcześni Ukraińcy boleją nad tym, że „nie posiadają” Kościoła i religii narodowej, która mogłaby integrować w sposób porównywalny z Polską. Z tożsamością ukraińską są związane i prawosławie, i grekokatolicyzm, a także, w pewnym stopniu, katolicyzm [Borowik, Doktór 2001: 158].
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(today, Ukrainians express their regret that there is no uniform Church or religion which would be able to integrate them to a degree comparable to that observed in Poland. Indeed, Ukrainian identity is connected with Orthodoxy, Ukrainian Greek Catholicism and, to an extent, also Roman Catholicism.)

In addition, the south-east of the country was Russified and atheized under communism, with most of the population identifying themselves as non-believers or concealing their religion until 1990. It was not only Roman Catholic, but also Orthodox churches which were sealed or demolished. In fact, in the 1970s Zaporizhzhia as a model city was the only oblast center in Ukraine which had all its churches closed or destroyed. Even today, there are still people who are afraid to reveal their religious affiliation:

Ja bajuś szczto nas wyszlut na Sibir, ja oczeń bojuś, u mienia docz i wnuczka, ja nie chaczu szczto bymy na Sibiri byli, mój papa był, ja znaju szczto takö Sibir u nas nikakoj żyzni. Moja docz dąże ne znajet szczto ja wierujujszcza katolicka, no ja bojuś chodit i bojuś jej skazat’ [Donetsk 2008: interview].

(I’m afraid that they are going to send us to Siberia, I’m really afraid. I have a daughter and a granddaughter; I don’t want all of us to go to Siberia. My dad was there, I know what it means, we had no life at all. Even my daughter doesn’t know that I’m a faithful [Roman] Catholic, but I’m afraid to go to church and I’m afraid to tell her.)

In the course of my research in the region, I conducted a number of interviews with members of the Roman Catholic Church who did not always identify themselves as Polish.

An informant from Mariupol tells about his search for faith and explains how he was looking for a church (today, he is an assistant to Roman Catholic priests from Poland):


(We were looking for a [Roman] Catholic or Orthodox church for four years; we had been like on some sort of test for forty years, there was nothing. We went around, we looked for it, but there was no Catholic church. When I got ill, I went to an Orthodox church; I went there and so I began to go there. Later I got to know from this woman that there was a [Roman] Catholic church in Mariupol. My wife didn’t like the Orthodox Church; she wanted us to get married, so we went to Kijów [Ukr. Kyiv]. [...] She calls Kamensk-Podolsk [Ukr. Kamianets Podilskyi], they call Berdiansk and she says there is a [Roman] Catholic church in Mariupol, with priests coming over from Berdiansk twice a month.)
Members of the older generation born in western Ukraine are convinced that only a Catholic can be considered Polish:


(Our whole family was Polish, because we all went to the [Roman] Catholic church. That's what it used to be like back there: if someone went to the Catholic church, they were called Polish. I don’t know if it's still the same, I haven’t been there for a long time. It was near Tarnopol [Ukr: Ternopil]: I'm already too old to go there […]. We prayed in Polish there; I don’t know if it's only Poles who go [to the Catholic church] there now.)

In Zaporizhzhia, 34% of members of the local Roman Catholic community are Polish and the corresponding figure for Berdiansk and Tokmak is 38%; in Melitopol, the proportion is as high as 60%. The quotations below come from informants who consider themselves Polish because they are Roman Catholic:

*Nu da, ja Polka, potomu i w kostioł chożu, da ja polskoho jazyka nie znaju, no ja Polka, a kak że. Ja uże uczitsia nie budu jazyka, zaczem mnie, ja uże staraja, da moi roditieli razgawariwali na polskom, a ja niet, zaczem. Ja po nacjonalnosti Polka, a eto oznaczajet szczto ja katolicka. Nu kogda nie było u nas kostioła, to ja nikuda nie chodila, a kuda pojdiesz i bajalaś wierowat’, ja że znała, szczu u mienia wiera katolicka, tak mienia roditieli nauczyli* [Melitopol 2009: interview].

(Yes, I’m Polish, and that’s why I go to the [Roman] Catholic church; I don’t know the Polish language, but of course I’m a Pole. I’m not going to learn it, what’s the use for me, I’m already old; my parents used to speak Polish, but I don’t, what for. I’m an ethnic Pole (Rus. po natsional’nosti) and this means I’m a Catholic. But back when we had no Catholic church, I didn’t go anywhere, there was nowhere to go, and I was afraid to believe, but I knew that [in Russian] I was of the Catholic faith, that’s how my parents had brought me up.)

As can be seen, for this informant it is not the language but religion which is an important criterion of Polish identity. She makes a point of clearly stating her Polish *natsional’nost’, i.e. ethnicity indicated in her internal passport, and her affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church.*

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16 In one of her articles, Anna Engelking quotes her informant talking on the issue of national identity and religion in Belarus:

Another person interviewed in the course of my research heard from her father that if someone is Polish, this means they are Roman Catholic. She concealed her religion for a long time, but the words of her father proved important in her later life as an adult:

Mój ojciec – Polak po tych wszystkich perypetiach w obozach nigdy nie mówił z dziećmi w języku polskim – bał się, że ktoś się dowi o Lachu, bo to były lata czterdzieste–pięćdziesiąte. Byliśmy ochrzczeni w cerkwi prawosławnej, ale nie zapomniam, jak kiedyś, przed samym Nowym Roku, tata zaprosił nas do swego pokoju i powiedział, że jesteśmy Polakami i katolikami, ale o tym się nie mówi i dał nam jakiś wafelek, złożył życzenia. Miałam wtedy lat jedenaście i po raz pierwszy widziałam prawdziwy opłatek. Skąd on się wziął u nas na Donbasie? Ojciec dawno nie żyje i chyba już o tym nigdy się nie dowiem. Wigilia w Polsce to dla mnie jeszcze jeden krok do samookreślenia się, utrwalenia mojej polskości. Dopiero teraz rozumiem, że wiara i świadomość religijna pomogły ojcowi przetrwać okres represji i budowy 'rozwickniętego socjalizmu' [Berdiansk 2010: interview].

(My father, who was Polish, never talked to his children in Polish after all he had been through in the camps. He was afraid that someone might get to know he’s a Lakh [Pole]; these were the [19]40s and [19]50s, after all. We were baptized in an Orthodox church and I will never forget when once, just before the New Year, our dad asked us to come to his room and told us that we were Poles and Catholics, but should not say this to anyone; he gave us some sort of a biscuit and wished us all the best. I was eleven at the time and that was when I first saw a real Christmas wafer [Pol. opłatek]. How did he get it here in the Donbas? My dad is long dead and I don’t think I will ever know. For me, Christmas Eve in Poland has been an important experience shaping my self-identification and consolidating my Polishness. It’s only now I understand that my father’s faith and religious awareness helped him to survive the period of repressions and building ‘developed socialism.’)

An informant from Donetsk comments on her national and religious awareness as follows:

I Polacy, kościół więcej silny jak cerkwa. O, tu w Grodnie ile ich jest, i modlą się, i młodzież tak ładnie po polsku mówi... A Bielarusy to więcej po rusk, albo baptysty swoje wiary zaczynają wprowadzać [Engelking 1996: 181].

("[Question:] “What’s the connection between the nationality and religion?” [Reply:] “There are [Roman] Catholics who say they are Belarusian, and [on the other hand] there are also Orthodox who consider themselves Polish. For example, how to get married [in church] if one of the couple is a Catholic and the other Orthodox? They want to get married, but their parents won’t let them; or the Catholic priest or the Orthodox one won’t agree to marry them. Well, the Orthodox one might still agree, but the Catholic one would not. The Catholic Church used to be stricter; the rules were stronger. I don’t believe there’s going to be this Belarus here, because half of the people are Catholic, and Polish; the Catholic Church is stronger than the Orthodox one. Look how many of them there are around here, in Grodno [Bel. Hrodna]; they pray, and young people speak Polish so well... and Belarusians mostly speak Russian. And there are those Baptists who are beginning to come here to teach this faith of theirs.”)
Nu ja narodilaś w Chmielnickoj obłasti, tam odni Polaki chodzili do kościoła, i ksiądz toże s Polski był – Polak, tam było tak szczo ty byli Polakami, jak chodzili do kościoła, a oni byli prawosławni. [...] Oni to Ukraincy, Ruski i drugije, wsie drugije prawosław-nyje, nu potom uže poszli sekty i kto kuda. No Polaki w sektu nie pojдут, oni wierują w kostioł [Donetsk 2009: interview].

(Well, I was born in the Khmelnytskyi oblast; it was only Poles who went to the [Roman] Catholic church there, and the priest was also Polish, from Poland. There, it used to be like that: we were Poles, because we went to the [Roman] Catholic church, and they were Orthodox. [...] They means Ukrainians, Russians and others, all other Orthodox people. Later there were also different sects, but Poles wouldn’t join a sect, they follow the Catholic Church.)

Some of those surveyed expressed their happiness since they have a local church where they can find ‘a bit of Poland.’ In Donetsk, 20% of members of the Roman Catholic community are Polish and the corresponding figure for Makiivka and Torez is 48%; in Mariupol, the proportion is as high as 54%.

Teraz się wszystkie radująom, że jest u nas taki kościołek, kawałeczek Polski, to serce się raduje, przyjdziesz, można porozmawiać z naszymi [Mariupol 2008: interview].

(Everyone is so happy that we have our little [Roman] Catholic church here, a bit of Poland; we’re so happy, you can go there, you can talk to your own people.)

The above observations made in south-eastern Ukraine confirm those presented by Iwona Kabzińska in her study concerning Belarus, where a considerable proportion of the local population associate Polish culture with the Roman Catholic religion and its customs and holidays [Kabzińska 1999: 48].

In their monograph entitled Wspólnota polska Berdiańska. Wyzwania współczesności (The Polish Community in Berdiansk: Facing the Challenge of Today), Andrzej Bonusiak and Lech Aleksy Suchomłynow rightly observe that


(in eastern Ukraine (just as practically anywhere around the world), the Roman Catholic Church serves different ethnic communities, not only the Polish one (a fact which is quite often forgotten). The task of the Church is – as Zdzisław Zając puts it – to ‘search for Catholics.’ And around here, ‘a Catholic’ does not automatically mean ‘a Pole.’)

However, the fact that a considerable proportion of the followers of the Roman Catholic Church in the region are Ukrainian comes as somewhat of
a surprise. The survey figures range from 17% in Makiivka and Torez, to as much as 54% in Berdiansk and Tokmak (with the remaining centers as follows: Donetsk – 50%; Zaporizhzhia – 40%; Melitopol – 25%; Mariupol – 23%). While there are a number of studies devoted to Belarusian Catholics, Ukrainian members of the Roman Catholic Church seem to be overlooked in academic research. In terms of their national identity, they consider themselves Ukrainians; most of them belong to the middle and younger generations and their affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church is a result of a conscious decision, for example:


(Yes, I’m Ukrainian; I want to be a [Roman] Catholic, I am one already. I didn’t know God, that’s why I came here. I really found God here, I know it. It isn’t like in the Orthodox church, where the priest says that it’s forbidden to go to other churches because it’s a sin. It isn’t a sin; it’s one Christian faith.)

Some respondents make comments concerning the times when there were no churches and taking part in religious practices was forbidden:


(Everything here was closed, absolutely everything. Our parents were afraid, they didn’t tell us anything about God; it was forbidden, you understand, just forbidden; they could be sacked or deported. It was quite late that a [Roman] Catholic church opened around here. I went there to have a look, it was all in Russian and I could understand everything. I took my mum with me and we began to learn how to pray and all about what we should do; we didn’t know anything. Yes, we are Ukrainians, but those people who go there are good, they’ve helped us a lot. I don’t even know their ethnicity, but it doesn’t make any difference to me. For me, what matters is that they’re Catholics and that we’re already one big family.)

What comes across as important to some of those interviewed is both the faith and the community spirit they share:

*Ja katołyczka, da ja wybrała i ja je katołyczka. Ba’tko i maty u mene atejisty. Ja wiriu w Boha, i wybrała ja sobi dorohu do kastioła, u nas w kosteli nichot ne boronyt’ prychodyty Ukrajinciam, Rosijanam czy nawit nehram, wony takož prychodiat’, pobożni*
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In this context, it is worth noting the charity involvement of the Roman Catholic Church in the region. Zaporizhzhia and Berdiansk have active centers of the Caritas organization helping the poor regardless of their religion or ethnicity. The Congregation of Albertine Brothers, whose aim is to help the homeless, is very active in Zaporizhzhia. In 2009, they opened a homeless shelter, where they also prepare and distribute meals. Makivka has had a soup kitchen for the homeless for a few years now. Those who come to receive help in such places are never asked about their ethnicity or religion. Sometimes some of them become followers of the Roman Catholic Church, mostly, however, only for a short period of time. It is often the case that Russians and Ukrainians become involved as volunteers in the charity activity of the Catholic Church (e.g. in Zaporizhzhia).

Ukrainians who have decided to join the Roman Catholic Church are happy about the choice they have made:

Ja wże try roky katolyczka. Da ja Ukrajinka i moja mama Ukrajinka, a tato buw Ruskyj. Wony atejisty, my doma ne wiryły i my ne znały, mene ne wczyły Boha. Ja sama wže wyrosła i dumaju, jak dali żyty bez Boha. Piszła u cerkwu, a tam pip każe,
I've been a Roman Catholic for three years now. Yes, I'm Ukrainian, like my mum, and my dad was Russian. They were both atheists; there was no religion at home, we didn't know anything about it, I wasn't taught about God. I grew up and I thought how I could go on living without God. I went to an Orthodox church, and the priest asked me why I had come if I wasn't a believer. I said I wanted to learn how to pray, and he told me to come back when I've learned it, or not at all. And when I went to a Roman Catholic church, they taught me everything, how to pray, what makes a sin; I got baptized and I went to the First Communion; I'm already a Catholic and my kids too. We learned together and we were baptized together. I chose the right way.

The Roman Catholic Church in the region also has members who identify themselves as Russian. They make up 19% of the total number of local parishioners in Donetsk, and figures for other centers included in the survey are as follows: Zaporizhzhia – 16%; Berdiansk – 8%, and Mariupol – 9%. They come from the middle and younger generations (older people are an exception), and mostly begin their life as believers with a course of preparations for baptism, followed by teachings leading up to the First Communion. Sometimes they also get married in church after as long as eighteen to twenty years of civil registry marriage; in such cases, it is generally the female partners who observe the rules of the faith. Broken marriages are quite frequent in this part of the Roman Catholic community.

I've been going to the Roman Catholic church for a long time now. My husband served in Afghanistan, he has no clue about these things. I wanted us to get married [in church], but he didn't; I was really very sorry. Then he finally agreed and Father Ryszard got us married. I'm already a Catholic and my husband, well, he isn't a believer and he still doesn't understand who Jesus Christ is. We have a son and I want to teach him too, but it isn't easy, he is already twenty. I'm going to pray.

Such a relatively high proportion of people who identify themselves as Russians in the Roman Catholic Church in south-eastern Ukraine could be surprising. Also, geographical pattern of religious involvement of the population indicates that while its level in the Zaporizhzhia oblast is quite low, in Donetsk the figures are in fact the lowest in the entire country. As observed by specialists in the field,
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(conflicts between different Orthodox Churches in general, and between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) in particular, as well as their hostile attitude to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church are the subject of general concern.)

This situation could be one of the reasons why some people decide to become followers of the Roman Catholic Church, for example:

Ja Ruskaja i muž u mienia Ruskij. U mienia nikto nie był wierujuszczim. Nu ja padowała, szczo nado wierowat w Boga. Słyszę w cerkwi toliko odni kriki. Moskowskij chaczet odnoho, Kijewskij chaczet drugowo, nie dumajut o ludiac. Poszła ja k bap-tistam, a tam ludiam w golowie tak mieszajut, tak mieszajut, nu dumajut k tolikam. I wot ja uže szestoj god kak katolicka. I zdieš choczu umieriet', oczeń zdeš ujutno i choroszo i otiec Riczard u nas oczeń choroszyj, on wsie problemy reszajet, kak Bog [Donetsk 2009: interview].

(I’m Russian and my husband is Russian. There have been no believers in my family, but I gave it a thought and I decided you need to believe in God. All I could hear in the Orthodox church was shouting: the Moscow one wants this, and the Kiev one wants that; they don’t think about the people. I went to the Baptists, but they mess up your head so much, so I thought I’d go to the [Roman] Catholics. And it’s already six years that I’ve been a Catholic and I want to die as one. I feel so comfortable here, so well; and we have Father Ryszard, he’s so good, he sorts out all the problems, like God.)

Among the Roman Catholic believers in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts there are also those who declare Belarusian identity: they make up 9% of the total number of members of the Catholic community in Makiivka and Torez, 4% in Donetsk and Mariupol and 1% in Zaporizhzhia. Most often, they are people born in Catholic families who were baptized in a Catholic church in their childhood:

Mienia krestili w kostiolie, da ja Białoruską, no ja katolicka i moi roditieli tože kato-
liki. Ja swoi dieti tože krestiła w kostiolie, nielźia było, no ja ich woziła i chriestiła, tak tichońko, szctoby nikto i nie wiedał [Donetsk 2009: interview].

(I was baptized in a [Roman] Catholic church. Yes, I’m Belarusian, but I’m a Catholic, like my parents. Me too, I baptized my children in a Catholic church. It was forbidden, but I took them away and baptized them, all very quietly so that no one would know about it.)

17 Considering the regional pattern of the five levels of religious involvement of the Ukrainian population described in literature, the figures are the highest in the west of the country; the south and Podolia display high to average level of religious involvement, and the east and north the lowest [Baluk 2002: 33–34].
– You’re Belarusian, but what’s your religion?
– Of course I’m a [Roman] Catholic, yes, a Catholic.
– And when did you become one?
– I’ve been a Catholic since my childhood; I was baptized in a [Roman] Catholic church. Then I came over here, to Donetsk, to work; it was in 1974, I think. There was no church here, so I suffered a lot. Sometimes, I went back to Ivano-Frankovsk [Ukr. Ivano-Frankivsk] and went to church there. And when they started building one here, I went there straight away. I’ve already started teaching my grandchildren to pray. My children don’t really know how to pray, but my grandchildren already know quite a lot. And I baptized them as well and it’s all as it should be.

Another category is the followers of the Roman Catholic Church describing themselves as ‘Russian Orthodox-Roman Catholics’ (Rus. православный католик, pravoslavnyi katolik). Although this group in south-eastern Ukraine is somewhat different than its counterparts presented in other studies, the question might boil down to a different name being applied to the same phenomenon. Writing about Russia, Iwona Kabzińska observes:

Kościół katolicki może chlubić się swoją wielowiekową i tragiczną historią, a dziś jego wyznawcy – w większości rosyjscy obywatele, mają prawo wyznawać swoją wiarę w swoim kościele. Wielu z nich powraca do Kościoła po latach prześladowań; wielu z nich – z braku kościołów katolickich, zostało ochrzczonych w świątyniach prawosławnych i za tę opiekę są wdzięczni Cerkwi prawosławnej. A jeżeli dzisiaj znów są katolikami, to w żadnym wypadku nie jest to prozelityzm [Kabzińska 2004: 198].

(The Roman Catholic Church can be proud of the centuries of its history, which was quite tragic; today, its followers, most of them Russian citizens, have the right to profess their faith as they wish. A lot of them return to Catholicism after long years of persecution. As there were no Catholic churches at the time, a lot of them were baptized in Orthodox ones and they are grateful for the religious guidance they received there. However, if they decide to become Catholics again today, it has nothing to do with proselytism at all.)

Some of my informants who belong to the Roman Catholic Church today were baptized in an Orthodox church in their childhood; the group includes those who declare themselves as Polish, Ukrainian and/or Belarusian, and Russian.

(I’m a [Russian] Orthodox-[Roman] Catholic by religion. I was baptized in a church; I don’t know which one, they didn’t tell me, but I know I was baptized. And then my mum taught me how to pray and she always told me we were Catholics. When I read in the paper that there was a [Roman] Catholic church here, I went there straight away. I know I’m a [Roman] Catholic. [...] I just don’t know if I’m Ukrainian or Russian, but I know I’m a Catholic. My grandma was probably Polish, but I don’t know that for sure.)

Indeed, they are mostly people of Polish origin who concealed their national and religious identity and assimilated with the atheist majority of the ‘Soviet people’ in the region. Today, they feel the need to identify with a community; they search for their roots and wonder who they might be. Who are they?

Nu ja był w partii, i my wsie partijnyje naczit wsio choroszo, potom partija rozpałas, a my astaliś kak biednyje uže niczego nietu. Nu i mnie skazali tam ludi, Ty wierujuszczij, ja goworiu, da niet w szczo ja budu siejczas wierit’? Nu-ka dawaj idiem w kostioł, ja goworiu nu w kakoj kostioł mienia gdieto w cerkwi kriestili kak ja tuda pojdu. No poszoł, chodił ja dołgo, a potom kak to siestra goworit, Ty znajesz choroszo szczto ty chodisz w kostioł u nas prababuszka była Polka, ona tože w kostioł chodiła, ty tam i okrestiś [Mariupol 2009: interview].

(Well, I was in the Party, like all the rest, so it was alright. Then the Party fell apart and, poor us, we were left with nothing. And then some people ask me ‘Are you a believer?’ and I say ‘Well, no, what can I believe in now?’; ‘So, let’s go to the [Roman] Catholic church,’ they say; ‘To the Catholic church? And how’s that? I was baptized in an Orthodox church somewhere, so how can I go there?’ But I went. I’d been going there for a long time and then one day my sister told me ‘It’s good you go to the [Roman] Catholic church; our great grandma was Polish, she also went to one. You should get baptized there.’)

In her book, Iwona Kabzińska asks whether there will be the time when the Pole-Catholic stereotype will have become a phenomenon confined to academic studies of distant past [Kabzińska 2004: 203]. The results of my surveys indicate that the process is on the way, even though my research is devoted to south-eastern Ukraine, where it is not only Poles who are Catholics. Indeed, the Roman Catholic community in the region includes Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, members of other ethnic communities, as well as those who describe themselves as ‘Russian Orthodox-Roman Catholics.’

The results of the survey indicate that those who declare themselves as Poles often associate their Polishness with Catholicism. Figure 5.3 presents the proportion of respondents who identify the Roman Catholic religion as
an important indicator of their Polish identity. As can be seen, it is the highest in Melitopol (60%), with Mariupol (54%) and Makiivka (48%) following relatively closely. In Berdiansk, 38% of those surveyed consider themselves Polish because they are Roman Catholic, and the figure for Zaporizhzhia is at 34%. In Donetsk, religion as an indicator of Polishness is important to 20% of the respondents.

**Figure 5.3.** I am Polish because I am a Roman Catholic

![Figure 5.3](image)

However, it should be noted that being Polish or Roman Catholic is understood in different ways (and has different connotations) in Poland and in south-eastern Ukraine (or, for example, in the United States, for that matter). According to the studies conducted by Irena Borowik, to be a Roman Catholic in Poland means:

– I was born in a Catholic family, so I have been brought up in the Catholic tradition;

– I go to church on Sundays, maybe not every Sunday, but I do go to church (the fact that it is a Roman Catholic church is taken for granted).

Thus, being a Roman Catholic in Poland first and foremost involves self-identification at the levels of religious affiliation (by virtue of being born in the Catholic community) and religious practices (a result of upbringing or, in case of deeply religious persons, a conscious choice). This has been conducive to bringing up children in the same religious tradition. It also explains a high level of importance attached to religious occasions (such as baptism, wedding or funeral) and the most important religious holidays, and is reflected in the organization of social life [Borowik 2001: 159].

On the other hand, in south-eastern Ukraine those who were born as Roman Catholic are to be found only among the older residents of the region,
while members of the middle and the younger generation mostly chose to become Catholics at some point in their life. It is also important to remember that in the past the parents used to conceal their religious affiliation and there was no opportunity to receive sacraments. Today, owing to widespread atheism in the region, they do not always manage to bring up their children in religious tradition. At the same time, it often happens that parents (or just one of them) become Catholic and receive at least one sacrament under the influence of their children.

What is more, Catholic holidays are public holidays in Poland, but not in Ukraine, where Roman Catholics are in the minority. It is often the case that bishops move religious celebrations (e.g., the Corpus Christi or Epiphany) from weekdays to Sunday so that the believers can attend them.

To conclude, let us note that as a result of systemic transformation in Ukraine, the Roman Catholic Church has ceased to function as a major center preserving Polish identity in the country. This responsibility has been taken over by official organizations of the Polish minority, Polish language centers, and other forms of involvement in the Polish community which emerged after 1990. The number of newly established parishes is currently increasing, and so is the proportion of priests from Ukraine, who are not necessarily of Polish extraction. Roman Catholic priests from Poland who arrive to work in the country have considerable language problems, which they manage to overcome after a few years spent in Ukraine.

5.4. Language

Linguistic phenomena characteristic of the language of different ethnic or national communities living in borderland areas have been studied by linguists, as well as representatives of other academic disciplines, such as sociology, ethnology and history. The question of language as an indicator of identity has been discussed in book-length works by such authors as Brunon Synak [Synak 1998], Zbigniew Greń [Greń 2000], Justyna Straczuk [Straczuk 1999], Iwona Kabzińska [Kabzińska 1999], Anna Zielińska [Zielińska 2002], and Agnieszka Chwieduk [Chwieduk 2006]; their other contributions are to be found in collective volumes devoted to the subject.

At this point, it is worth noting that, as in 2001, the Donetsk oblast had a population of 4,825,600, with those declaring themselves as Poles counting 4,300 (0.09%), and the corresponding figure for the Zaporizhzhia oblast was 1,926,800, with those declaring themselves as Poles counting 1,800 (0.1%).

The 2001 census revealed the following data concerning the Polish minority in the south-east of the country: 75.7% of its members living in the Donetsk oblast regard Russian as their mother tongue and those who declare Polish amount only to 4.1% of the total. At the same time, it is Ukrainian (native to 19.3%) which enjoys higher prestige among the Polish community in the
region; 0.9% indicated other language(s). The language situation in the
Zaporizhzhia oblast is slightly different, even though the position of Russian
as the mother tongue across all ethnic communities is high in both cases. In
the Polish minority in the province, the figures for languages declared as
mother tongue are as follows: Russian: 56.8%; Ukrainian: 38.0%; Polish:
4.4%; other: 1.2%.

For the sake of comparison, I include here some information concerning
the Ukrainian–Romanian borderland in the Chernivtsi oblast. While the
south-east of the country has long been under the influence of Russian, the
language influence in the south-west of today’s Ukraine has been different.
According to the statistics for 2001, the Chernivtsi oblast had a population of
919,000, with those declaring themselves as Poles counting 3,300 (0.4%).
The proportion of the Polish minority in the province regarding Polish as their
mother tongue was at 40.9%, with the corresponding figures for Ukrainian at
47.8%, and Russian at 8.3%. As can be seen from these figures, the Poles in
the region tend to evolve into a Ukrainian-speaking community, whereas in
the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, they are mostly Russian-speaking.

The 2001 census shows a clear enough picture revealing historical influenc-
es: while only around 4% of the Poles in the south-east (4.1% in the Donetsk
and 4.0% in Zaporizhzhia oblasts) declare Polish as their mother tongue, the
corresponding figure for those in the south-west (Chernivtsi oblast) is over
40%. Comments from the informants in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia confirm
the situation:

My tut wsie pa ruski, nu pa polski, ja doma razgawiriwała, no uže zabyła. Możet
cut‘-cut’ s Palakami rozmawlą, ale to tak, kak na każdyj dień to pa ruski. Da ja
Polka, nu i szto, Palaki tože takije szczo pa ruski toliko. Nu a kak. Palaki, bo Palaki, bo
tato byt Palak, i u mamy rodstwienniki Palaki, i ja Polka, nie szcitažu szczo nada pa
polski [Donetsk 2008: interview].

(We all speak Russian here; I spoke Polish at home, but I’ve already forgotten. I might
speak it a bit with Poles, but only just a little; it’s Russian I speak every day. Yes, I’m
Polish; and so what, those who only speak Russian, they are Polish as well. That’s
right. We’re Polish and that’s it; because my dad was Polish, and my mum’s relatives,
and I’m Polish as well; I don’t think you have to speak the language to be Polish.)

An interview conducted in Zaporizhzhia included the following comments:

Ja Polka, z Żytomyra, ale ja ukrajińskoju rozmowlaju. U nas Polaky mało chto po polski
howoryt.’ U nas Polaki taki pomiszani. Ne buło szkoly, ne buło de wczytysia i ne moźno
buło, bo zaboroniali, a teper moźno, ale Polaky my i ne musymo po polsky, my tak po
ukrański [Zaporizhzhia 2008: interview].

(I’m Polish, from Zhytomyr, but I speak Ukrainian. Very few Poles around here speak
Polish. Poles around here are kind of mixed up. There was no school, there was nowhere
to learn it and we couldn’t learn it because it was forbidden; it’s allowed now. We are Polish but we don’t have to speak Polish; we speak Ukrainian.)

On the other hand, those interviewed in Chernivtsi expressed quite a different opinion on the matter:

*No co za Polak, co nie mówi po polsku. Polak to ten co po polsku mówi i śpiewa i do kościoła chodzi, to ten Polak. Polak musi mówić po polsku. Ja wiem, że tak musi być, inaczej skażesz Polak, no a dlaczego Polak, no bo po polsku mówisz [Chernivtsi 2009: interview].*

(What kind of Pole is it if they don’t speak Polish? A Pole is someone who can speak and sing in Polish and goes to the [Roman] Catholic church; that’s a Pole. I’m sure it’s got to be like this; if you say you’re Polish and they ask you ‘And why is that,’ you tell them ‘That’s because I speak Polish.’)

Having quoted these examples, it needs to be observed that the views in the south-east are not so entirely clear-cut. A number of the informants I met in the region, particularly from the older generation, were convinced that ‘A Pole is someone who can speak Polish’ (‘Polak, to ten co mówi po polsku’), ‘A Pole has to know Polish, even just a bit’ (‘Polak to chot’ trochu, ale musi znać jazyk polskij’), ‘If a Pole doesn’t know the language, he or she has to learn it’ (‘Polak jak nie zna jazyka, dolżen jego nauczitsia’). There have been comments from members of the middle and the younger generations ‘that they learn Polish, because they feel Polish’ (‘że uczy się polskiego, bo czuje się Polakiem’). It sometimes happens that elderly people learn the language ‘because the knowledge of Polish means I’m Polish’ (‘ponieważ znajomość języka uzasadnia, że jestem Polką’) [Melitopol 2008: interview].

Statistical data indicating that 4.1% of Poles in the Donetsk and 4.0% in Zaporizhzhia oblasts regard Polish as their mother tongue do not mean that the same proportion of the Polish minority in the region speak the language on a daily basis. From my own observations and studies on this question, I can say that that so far I have never heard of any Poles speaking Polish at home in the region. Indeed, the language used in the family is mostly Russian. Polish used to be the primary language of some informants prior to their arrival in the south-east. On the other hand, in the Chernivtsi oblast there are not only families, but even entire villages where a local dialect of Polish is spoken on a daily basis, which is a factor of their Polish identity.

Writing on similar questions in Belarus, Iwona Kabzińska observes:

Już podczas pierwszego wyjazdu na Białoruś (w 1992 r.) stwierdzilam występowanie dwóch typów postaw. Połowa rozmówców (18 osób) uważała znajomość polskiego za podstawowy warunek identyfikacji z polską narodowością, połowa zaś twierdziła, że nie jest to konieczne, by mówić o sobie „jestem Polakiem.” Te wstępne wnioski znalazły potwierdzenie podczas kolejnych wyjazdów badawczych [Kabzińska 1999: 51].
(It was already during my first study visit to Belarus (1992) that I noticed two types of attitudes. A half of the informants (eighteen persons) considered a command of Polish a fundamental condition of Polish self-identification, and the other half did not think such knowledge was necessary to declare ‘I’m Polish.’ These initial findings were confirmed in the course of the following visits.)

Another example concerns the names given to children. My informants from south-eastern Ukraine explained that the general practice in the Polish minority in the region is to give children names in the Russian or Ukrainian form. Indeed, although the Polish forms (such as Jan, Jadwiga, Mieczysław, Michał, Józef, Filip, Łukasz, Czesław) were in official use as late as towards the end of the Second World War, they eventually came to be replaced by their Russian equivalents and today can only be found in archival records. During the mass persecutions of the late 1930s, ethnic Poles were deported to Siberia or executed on such charges as espionage or involvement with Polish intelligence services. In an attempt to protect them from such a fate, children were given Russian names in order to conceal their Polish origin and avoid excessive interest of official institutions. For example, if someone was called Ian Ianovich Lisetskii (Rus. Ян Янович Лисецкий, Pol. Jan Janowicz Lisiecki), both his first name and patronymic (Rus. отчество, otchestvo) were immediately recognizable as Polish (i.e., the Polish form Jan (Jan), and not the Russian Ivan; Ianovich and not Ivanovich). In the case of a person called Ivan Liudvikovich Pavlikovskii (Rus. Иван Людвиикович Павликовский, Pol. Iwan Ludwikowicz Pawlikowski), while the first name was the Russian form Ivan (instead of the Polish Jan), the patronymic was still a liability. Until today, informants from the Zaporozhzhia and Donetsk oblasts are very reluctant to give their children Polish names. Although the same is also the case in Bukovina, the general mood is different than in the south-east, as can be seen in the following example:


(My son’s name is Marek. It’s a Polish name, because we’re Polish. It was strange in our village: at the time, nineteen years ago, no one was called like that. And a few years later, there was a priest who came over from Poland, he was called Marek. People looked at us differently.)

Some informants comment on the problems they encountered when they wanted their name to appear on a birth certificate or in their internal passport in the Polish form:\18

18 My parents had a similar experience when they applied for my birth certificate. All my siblings have Polish names: Anna, Weronika, Mikołaj, Józef, Maria, although all of these names have
I was born in 1948. My dad’s name was Jan, Jan Kuczabiński, and they wanted to put me down as Jadwiga Ivanovna. He wasn’t Ukrainian; there was no way I could let them do it. I argued, I shouted and I got what I wanted. I’m not Ukrainian, so why should I be called Ivanovna in my papers?

The survey study which I conducted in the south-east included questions concerning the respondents’ self-assessment of their command of Polish. Their replies from the questionnaires distributed in the six urban centers under consideration are presented below.

In Donetsk (100 questionnaires), 5% of those surveyed selected the reply ‘I can speak and write well’; 8% cannot write but assessed their level of spoken Polish as good; 16% rated themselves as ‘average’ speakers with no writing skills; it is hardly surprising that the proportion of those who cannot speak or write in Polish was at 53%; 12% can only remember Polish prayers, and 4% – Polish songs.

The situation in Mariupol (60 questionnaires) is somewhat different: four out of sixty respondents are good Polish speakers and can use the language in writing; seven cannot write but rated themselves as good speakers; eight of those surveyed selected the reply ‘I’m an average speaker, but I can’t write’; seven out of sixty cannot speak or write Polish; twenty-five only know Polish prayers, and eight – Polish songs, without being able to use the language in speaking or writing at all.

In Makiivka (60 questionnaires), eight persons taking part in the survey think they can use Polish in speech and writing well; five put themselves down as good speakers with no writing skills; for seven out of sixty, their speaking skills are average and writing ones – none at all; thirteen Poles in Makiivka cannot speak or write Polish; those whose knowledge of the language is limited only to prayers counted fourteen, and twelve can only remember Polish songs.

Out of the ninety respondents in Zaporizhzhia, eight considered their level of speaking and writing good; thirteen cannot write well in Polish, but are good speakers of the language; twenty-one cannot write either, but rated their speaking as average; twenty-one cannot speak or write at all; fifteen selected the option ‘I only know Polish prayers, I can’t speak or write’; and those whose knowledge of the language is limited to songs counted ten.

their Ukrainian equivalents. In their cases, there were no formal problems. In mine, however, it was different: the name Helena did not feature on the official list of names which could be given to children, and this is why I was registered as Елена (Elena), being the Ukrainian and Russian form (at the time, birth certificates were issued both in Ukrainian and Russian). On the other hand, on my certificate of baptism issued by the Roman Catholic Church, my name appears in the Polish form: Helena.
In Berdiansk (60 questionnaires), four out of sixty respondents are good Polish speakers and can use the language in writing; eight cannot write but rated themselves as good in speaking; fifteen assessed themselves as ‘average’ speakers with no writing skills; those who cannot write or speak counted twenty; eight can only remember Polish prayers, and four – Polish songs.

Only one out of sixty respondents surveyed in Melitopol considered him/herself a good Polish speaker with good writing skills; those who cannot write but have a good command of spoken language counted three; five rated themselves as average speakers with no writing skills; twenty-eight have no written or spoken Polish; those whose knowledge of the language is limited only to prayers counted eighteen, and four can only remember Polish songs.

As for the reply ‘I only know Polish songs, I can’t speak or write,’ the respondents from the younger generation meant mainly contemporary ones they had learned in courses or events held by the Polish minority organizations in Ukraine, or during courses or summer camps they had attended in Poland. On the other hand, a number of older respondents declared they knew religious songs.

The section ‘Other’ included such comments as: ‘I can understand everything, I can't speak or write Polish’ (‘wszystko rozumie, nie mówię i nie piszę po polsku’); ‘I don’t have to learn Polish, it’s similar to Ukrainian, I can understand everything’ (‘nie muszę polskiego się uczyć, jest podobny do ukraińskiego wszystko zrozumiałe’); ‘I know Polish poems, because I recited them in a contest, but I can’t speak’ (‘znam po polsku wiersze, bo recytowałam na konkursie, ale nie mówię’); ‘I can speak a bit of Polish with Ukrainian and Russian, all kind of mixed up, I can't write’ (‘trochę rozmawiam po wsiakomu i po polsku, i po ukraińsku, i po rosyjsku w takiej mieszaninie, pisać nie umiem’); ‘Well, it’s hard to rate your own knowledge of this language’ (‘nu samemu trudno powiedzieć jak się zna ten język’); ‘I've learned a little in some courses, I can write a bit and I can read a bit’ (‘ja trochę uczyłam na kursach, ale tak trochę i piszę, trochę i czytam’).

The above results of the survey indicate that the respondents who cannot speak Polish or use it in writing and those who only know Polish prayers are a majority in all urban centers under consideration. The group rating their speaking and writing skills as average is smaller, while those who assess their command of both spoken and written Polish as good are few and far between.

Different spheres of culture, including the language, play an important role in the consideration of the ethno-cultural identity of a group. What is often noted in this context is the level of active and passive knowledge of the language. ‘For minority groups which use their own language, preserving its core is an essential condition required to maintain the continuity of their culture’ (‘Dla posługujących się rodzimym językiem grup mniejszościowych warunkiem koniecznym zachowania ciągłości ich kultur jest utrzymanie rdzenia własnego języka’) [Smolicz 1997: 16]. This observation can be useful also in the context of borderland areas. For example, the Polish residents of Nyzhni
Petrivtsi (Pol. Piotrowce Dolne) in northern Bukovina consider their own local dialect of Polish, which plays a major role in their everyday life, to be the key element of their identity.

**Figure 5.4.** I am Polish because I know Polish

![Figure 5.4](image)

Figure 5.4 presents the replies of the respondents concerning the command of Polish as a criterion of their Polish identity. In Mariupol and Melitopol, 12% of those surveyed considered themselves Polish because they knew the language; the corresponding figures for Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia and Makiivka were 10%, 9%, 8%, respectively, with the lowest proportion (only 4%) recorded for Donetsk. Thus, the average proportion for the six centers was 9%. In this context, it is worth quoting a Polish activist from the Donbas:

Wysłano mnie daleko od domu i Lwowa do Makiejewki w Donieckim Zagłębiu Węglowym, w którym pracowałem bez przerwy 34 lata. Tu mieszkam do dnia dzisiejszego. [...] Donbas zawsze różnił się od terenów zachodniej Ukrainy, gdyż tu mieszka około stu narodowości. [...] Bardzo to przykre, ale przez ponad 37 lat nie spotkałem tu Polaka, który znalby język ojczysty, chociaż nierzaz wspominali górnicy, że babcia czy dziadek byli Polakami. [...] W Donbasie założyłem rodzinę. Wyrosły córki: Danuta i Helena, rosną wnuki. W domu zawsze dźwięczał miły szczebiot dziecięcy. Jednak jest mi szalenie przykro, że nie brzmiał w języku polskim [Zieliński 2002b: 134].

(I was sent far away from home and from Lvów [Ukr. Lviv] to Makiejewka [Ukr. Makiivka] in the Donets Coal Basin, where I worked for thirty-four years without any break periods, and where I still live today. [...] With about a hundred different ethnic communities, the Donbas has always been different from western Ukraine. [...] It is really upsetting, but for over thirty-seven years I did not meet here any Pole who would speak the language, even though some miners often said that their grandmother...
or grandfather had been Polish. [...] I started a family in the Donbas; my daughters, Danuta and Helena, grew up, and now my grandchildren are getting bigger. Our home was always full of the chatter of little kids, but I am really so sorry that it was never in Polish. There was no time to teach children Polish in peace and quiet.)

Rather than to lack of time as such, the final comment refers to the situation in the Soviet times, and to the attendant fear and anxiety about the future, particularly the future of children. Indeed, concealing anything that was related to Polishness was the main survival strategy used by Poles living in south-eastern Ukraine:

Roditieli władieli rozgowornym polskim jazykom. Tak słucziłoś, szczto w naszej siemje nie razgowariwali na polskom, nas nie uczili, chotia sami roditieli czitali knigi na polskom jazykie, w tom czislie klasiku, kotoraja ostałaś w nasledstwo [Melitopol 2010: interview].

(My parents had conversational Polish. It so happened that we didn’t speak Polish in our family; the parents didn’t teach us, although they read Polish books, including the classics they left us when they died.)

Language is not always the principal element of cultural identity. For example, in the case of Belarusians in Latvia ‘you do not have to speak the language to consider oneself Belarusian’ (‘nie trzeba mówić po białorusku, żeby uważać się za Białorusina’) [Jankowiak 2009: 59]. Likewise, the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine does not perceive the language as a core element of their identity. As indicated by the respondents, there are other characteristics which they find more important in this respect.

To sum up, the region has always remained under Russian influence (the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union), with Russian used as the language of the administration and public life. The situation has had an immediate impact on language used in the family and neighborhood.

5.5. Components of Polish Identity in South-Eastern Ukraine

The communist regime deprived Poles in Ukraine of any hope of ever returning to Poland. Cut off from their native culture, language and spiritual center, they felt that efforts to preserve their identity were pointless, which led to apathy and passivity. In this way, the attractiveness of being Polish was devalued.

Today, in the new geopolitical situation, national ideology is still in statu nascendi and, as yet, the ideological vacuum has not been filled. A certain proportion of Ukrainian citizens are facing an identity dilemma and ask themselves who they are. The experience of seeking to find an own place in the social
structure is shared not only by members of national minorities, but also by Ukrainians and Russians, who belong to communities with a far greater demographic potential. Most people satisfy this need by engaging in different domains of social life, which involves identification with the majority: the so-called ‘titular nation’ (i.e. the nation that gave the country its name), or the local community. Others discover their sense of identity by developing an awareness of their origin and distinctness and by becoming involved in activity aiming to revive or enrich the culture of their community.

With the exception of those members of the older generation who originally come from the regions where Poles formed a territorial community – e.g. Lviv (Pol. Lwów), Vilnius (Pol. Wilno), Hrodna (Pol. Grodno) – the views of the vast majority of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine have been formed in the course of their life in the cultural melting pot. Declaring their Polish origin, these respondents often take into consideration only ethnic criteria (in the sense of descent or blood relations) and completely forget about the cultural aspect.

The situation of the Polish minority in the region is particularly complex, and an answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ – particularly difficult. This is all the more true about the area under consideration, where Poles constitute only an insignificant proportion of the population and are highly dispersed. The results of the interviews and surveys carried out among the respondents in south-eastern Ukraine make it possible to present the criteria of Polish identity in particular cities. Blood ties and official documents indicating Polish ethnic origin have been considered as two separate criteria of Poloniness, as suggested by the results of pilot interviews. In the case of those respondents who identified themselves as Polish on the basis of the criterion of official documents, they did so after their grandparent(s) or other relatives, such as a distant aunt, given the fact that their parents usually did not declare themselves as Polish.

In Donetsk, the survey reveals the following picture (see Figure 5.5): 63% of the respondents consider themselves Polish because at least one of their parents is/was Polish, 20% because they are Roman Catholic, 4% because they know the Polish language, and 10% because one of their relatives was Polish; 3% chose other criteria, for example:

- jestem Polakiem, bo u Lwow urodzony, a Lwów przecie i dziś to polskie miasto, tam i dziś na ulicach po polsku, tam wszędzie po polsku;
- jestem Polakiem, bo tak się czuję, a kim mam być, tato był się wydaje Polakiem, ale to ukrywali, mama Rosjanka;
- jestem Polką i uczę się po polsku, tak chcę pojechać do Polski;
- jestem Polakiem, bo interesuje mnie Polska, pisałem pracę o Polsce i jestem Polakiem;
- nu nie znaju, a kiem ja mogu być, ja choczu byt' Polakom, ja uczuś polskomu i in-

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19 The term ‘titular nation’ (Ukr. титульна нація, tytul’na natsiia) is often used in Ukraine, cf. Kipiani 2003.
Cultural and National Identity: Types, Dimensions and Components

The members of the Polish minority surveyed in Mariupol consider themselves Polish on the basis of the following criteria (see Figure 5.6): active membership in the Roman Catholic Church: 54%, at least one Polish parent: 32%, knowledge of the Polish language: 12%, one of the relatives was Polish: 1.5%; other replies (0.5%) included such examples as:

- urodziłem się we Lwowie, Lwów jest polskim miastem;
- nu teraz Ukraina, no ż nie Ukraińcem, to tak nie można, ale moja siostra Ukrainka, bo ona chce tak jak państwo, ona po pomaranczowej rewolucji zrobiła się Ukrainka, a ja Polak, nuż nie russkij, oj niet, niet;
- nado kiem-to byt’, pionierow uže nietu, komsomolcow uže nietu, wot padumajesz, a wiej wieszcie ruskie u nas na Donbasie, no to ja Polak, ja dumaju szczto u mienia daliokije korni polskije, ja uczuś polskoho jazyka, szczoby gordo skazat’ szczto ja Polak.

Figure 5.5. Indicators of Polish identity, survey results: Donetsk
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

(- I was born in Lwów [Ukr. Lviv] and Lwów is a Polish city;
- Well, it’s Ukraine here now, but I’m not Ukrainian, you can’t say that; my sister is Ukrainian, she wants to go along with the state; after the Orange Revolution, she turned Ukrainian. And I am Polish, not Russian, no, no way;
- You’ve got to be someone; there are no Pioneers or Komsomolets anymore; when you come to think of it, everyone around here in the Donbas is Russian, so I go for Polish; I think I have some distant Polish roots, I learn the language so that I can proudly say that I’m Polish.)

In Makiivka, the replies pointed at the following criteria of Polishness (see Figure 5.7): at least one Polish parent: 42%, Roman Catholic religion: 48%, command of Polish: 8%; Polish relatives: 1%; other replies (1%) explained their Polish self-identification as follows:

- ja czlen obszczestwa polskoho i ja Polak; ja rabotał w Polsze i podumał szczto ja wsio taki Polak, nie choczu byt’ ruskim, u mienia daże daliojkie korni polskije, no nie pomniu ja;
- interesujuj istrorijej Polszi, potomu ja Polka;
- czytam już gazete Polską „Polacy Donbasu” i dumaju szczto ja Polka, tak liehko mnie idiet, ja nie znaju swoich roditielej;
- jestem członkiem towarzystwa polskiego i śpiewam po polsku; gram polskie melodie i słucham polskich muzyków;
- ja słyszała szczto u mienia tiojta daliojaka była Polkoj, ja wat padumała i ja toże choczu byt’ Polkoj, ja uže spiewam na Polskom;
- roditieli u mienia Ruskie, a ja słyszała dawno szczto vot pradiedy moj byli s dworian-stwa, nu Polskije dworianie, nie Ruskie.)

**Figure 5.6.** Indicators of Polish identity, survey results: Mariupol
I am a member of the Polish society and I'm Polish; I worked in Poland and I gave it a thought that I'm Polish after all, I don't want to be Russian, I even have some distant Polish roots, but I don't remember [the details];
- I'm interested in Polish history, that's why I'm Polish;
- I can already read the Polacy Donbasu (Poles of the Donbas) magazine and it so easy for me that I think I’m Polish; I don’t know my parents;
- I’m a member of the Polish society and I can sing in Polish; I can play Polish tunes and I listen to Polish music;
- I’ve heard that my distant aunt was Polish, so I thought I also want to be Polish, I can already sing in Polish;
- my parents are Russian; a long time ago I heard that my great grandparents were Polish, from the nobility, Polish nobility, not Russian.)

In Zaporizhzhia, the breakdown of different criteria motivating the respondents’ declaration of their Polish identity was as follows (see Figure 5.8): at least one Polish parent: 54%, Roman Catholic religion: 34%, knowledge of Polish: 9%, Polish relatives: 2%; other replies (1%) included the following examples:

- ja była w Polsze, Polsza mnie nrawitsia, i ja zapisałaś w obszczestwo, uże ja Polka, u mienia Karta Palaka jest’;
- pomniu kogda-to babuszka gawariła szczto jej roditieli byli Palakami, a potom my wsie stali Ruskimi, ja ruskoy nie chochu byt’, ja Polka, tak ja pisałaś w pieriepisi, nu szczto w dokumentach uże nie piszut, ja w dusze i w serce Polka;
- ja czuwstwju szczto ja Polka;
- ja znaju szczto u mienia w krowi jest i polskaja krow, nu da i ruskaja i kazachskaja, nu możet i ormianskaja, no polska toże i potomu ja Polka.
In Melitopol (see Figure 5.9), 60% of the respondents consider themselves Polish because they are Roman Catholic, 24% because at least one of their parents is/was Polish, 12% because they know the Polish language, 3% because one of their relatives was Polish; 1% chose other criteria, for example:

- ja rodyłasia za Polszi;
- zdzieś nielzia było w sowietskoje wremia byť Palakom, nu uže možna, ja znaju maja babuszka byla Polkoj i dieduszka tože, mama bajiša, a siejczas ja gordo gaworiu szczo u mienia krow polska, ja eto znaju;
- kogda-to na rabotie mnie gaworili, ty kak nie Russkaja, niczego im nie skazała, nielzia;
- dieduszka moj byl polskij dwarian, no potom wsiu zabrali, jego wysiali, my nie zna-jem kuda, a my ostališ uže zdieś wot, stališ my Ruskimi i tak żywjom, ja kak uznała niedawno szczo u mienia diedeusza dworian był, no to uže stałaś ja Polkoj, ja budu nastojaszczej, czistokrownoj Polkoj;
- ja dla Polszy wsiu sdielaju, wsiu oddam potomu szczo ja Polka.
Cultural and National Identity: Types, Dimensions and Components

Figure 5.9. Indicators of Polish identity, survey results: Melitopol

(- I was born in Poland [before the war];
- in Soviet times it was forbidden to be Polish here, but it’s allowed now; I know my grandma was Polish, and so was my grandad; my mum was afraid, but now I proudly say I have Polish blood, I know it;
- they told me at work that I wasn’t like the Russians, but I didn’t say anything, it was forbidden;
- my grandad was a Polish nobleman, but they took everything from him and sent him away, we don’t know where; we stayed here, we became Russians and that’s how we live now; I became Polish when I got to know that my grandad was a noble, it wasn’t a long time ago; I’m going to be a real Pole, of pure Polish blood;
- I’ll do anything for Poland; I’ll give anything because I’m Polish.)

In Berdiansk, the survey reveals the following picture (see Figure 5.10): 38% of the respondents consider themselves Polish because they are Roman Catholic, 37% because at least one of their parents is/was Polish, 10% because they know the Polish language, 10% because one of their relatives was Polish; 5% pointed to other criteria, for example:

(- bo urodziłam się w Polsce, w Jarosławiu;
- bo należę do Towarzystwa Polskiego Odrodzenie;
- bo śpiewam polskie piosenki;
- bo należę do Biesiady;
- bo kocham wszystko, co polskie, tak moja mama to Ukrainka, tata Rosjanin, a ja Polka, bo mówię po polsku, czytam i czuję się lepiej Polką, inaczej nie mogę;
- gram tylko polskich muzyków, dlatego czuję się Polakiem; no kiem ja mogu byt’, tolko Polkaj wot ja znaju szczto sierce i dusza moi polskije, czuwstwa u mienia takije tonkije
kak u Polaków, ja dawno czuwstwuję prosto siebia Polkoj, nie znaju możęt i dawno kto-to był w siemje Polakom, no ja nie znaju etogo, głównoje szczto ja tak czuwstwujus'; raz ja pojechała w Polszu i u mienia sierce sżałoś tak szczto ja stałas’ Polkoj.

(– because I was born in Poland, in Jarosław;
– because I belong to the Polish Society ‘Revival’;
– because I sing Polish songs;
– because I’m a member of the ‘Biesiada’ Center;
– because I love anything that’s Polish; yes, my mum is Ukrainian, my dad is Russian, and I’m Polish, because I can speak and read Polish and I feel better as Polish, it just can’t be otherwise;
– I play only Polish composers and that’s why I feel Polish; I couldn’t be anything other than Polish; I know that I have a Polish heart and soul, I am as sensitive as Poles, I’ve simply felt Polish for a long time now; I don’t know, maybe there was someone Polish in my family a long time ago, but I don’t know that; what matters is how I feel; I was so deeply touched by my visit to Poland that I became Polish.)

As it turns out from the analysis of the data provided by 430 questionnaires completed in the six urban centers included in the survey, 188 respondents identified themselves as Polish motivating this by the fact that at least one of their parents is/was Polish, and a further thirteen by having Polish relatives. This brings the number of those who declared themselves as Polish on the basis of their blood ties to the total of 201, with 163 respondents from the older generation (born between 1919 and 1945), 31 from the middle generation (1945–1975), and 7 from the younger generation (1975–1990). Another criterion of Polishness, the Roman Catholic religion, was declared by 178, including 103 from the older, 53 from the middle, and 22 from the younger generation.
The least frequently selected motive for Polish identity of the respondents was their knowledge of the language, where the figures for the older, the middle and the younger generations were 25, 15 and 6, respectively. Five respondents specified other reasons for their self-identification as Polish (with the examples presented above).

Poles in south-eastern Ukraine lived through the period of Soviet rule away from Poland, Polish organizations and the Catholic Church. They originally came from different places and for different reasons; in addition, they were geographically dispersed.

From the early 1930s...

...proszę dwa konsekwencje: uświadomiały prześladowanym, że cierpią, bo są Polakami, z drugiej strony prowadziły do skrywania polskości tam, gdzie Polacy okazali się izolowani, do zaniechania rozmów po polsku poza domem, a także w domu (z obawy, by dzieci wyszeli na ulicę nie mówiły po polsku [Rieger 1996b: 115].

...the consequences of the persecutions were twofold: firstly, it became clear to those oppressed that they suffered because they were Polish; secondly, this made them conceal their Polishness in the areas where they found themselves isolated, and to abandon speaking Polish both outside and at home (for fear that the children might start speaking Polish in the street).

This can be illustrated by the following comment made by one of the informants:


...It so happened that my grandma and grandpa left this world at a young age. I really regret and I’m ashamed that don’t know anything about them. These were Soviet times. We were very careful about everything. My dad used to say ‘The walls have ears. You can’t say anything.’

The research which I conducted in south-eastern Ukraine indicates that the most important component of Polish identity in the region is that of blood ties: the highest proportion of the respondents declared they were Polish because at least one of their parents was/had been Polish. Importantly, before they relatively recently discovered the fact, they had identified themselves as Russians, the so-called ‘titular nation.’ In several cases, it was the respondent’s grandfather, grandmother or more distant relatives who played a role in their self-identification as Polish: the older generation often preserved the memory of the long-lost homeland and transmitted the tradition to their grandchildren. The generation of the parents had suffered repressions and deportation in their childhood, which stimulated their fear of the Soviet reality...
and the attendant disinclination to foster the Polish identity of their children in order to protect them from problems in their future life and career in the Soviet Union. Following the Ukrainian independence, when an open declaration of family origin no longer involved a threat, the grandparents made their grandchildren aware of their Polish roots. As a result, some young people identify themselves as Polish today. Although the command of the Polish language in this age group is quite limited, many of them become involved in Polish minority organizations, where they have an opportunity to develop their knowledge of Polish culture, literature and language.

Another component of Polish identity in south-eastern Ukraine is the Roman Catholic religion, although the results of the survey indicate that the preferred language of religious services is mostly Russian. Considering the fact that Poles in the region do not speak Polish as the language of everyday communication, the importance of the command of the language as a criterion of Polish self-identification is very low. Other less frequently selected criteria of Polishness include a bond with the original home region of the parents or grandparents, membership in Polish minority organizations, and participation in Polish high culture (Polish song and dance groups, performances, concerts of classical music).

The continuity of Polish tradition in south-eastern Ukraine was broken: it has survived only in the residual form. The Polish identity which is currently developing in the region is different than it used to be. The ‘new kind of Polishness’ (Pol. nowy rodzaj polskości) is adapted from Poland or ‘imported’ in a ready-made form via television or the Internet. Polish magazines issued in the south-east include information, recipes, songs and Christmas carols from Poland. Polish identity is also upheld by such local initiatives as the Polish Center (Dom Polski) in Berdiansk, a true stronghold of Polish culture in the city.

Another factor which has a great impact on fostering Polish identity is group visits to Poland (summer camps, language courses, trips, etc.), providing Poles from the region with an opportunity to get immersed in things Polish and see real Poland with their own eyes. On return, one of the young participants commented in her essay as follows:

Jestem dumna, że urodziłam się Polką, że należę do tak wielkiego narodu, który dał światu Matejku, Mickiewicza, Chopina. Do narodu, który po latach niestnienia Ojczyzny na mapie, zachował swą tożsamość. Do narodu, którego jedna trzecia rozsiana jest po świecie, ale czuje się wielką wspólnotą, tworzącą Polskę [Berdiańsk: interview].

Transmission of cultural heritage, including the language, has always been, and will probably remain, a process which first and foremost takes place in the family environment, particularly in the case of national minority communities. Indeed, it is the family which is the social institution where children are introduced to language and culture, and these factors play a role in their self-identification. The ethnic policy of the state is largely based on acculturation taking place in the family. There are some important differences between the situation of the Polish minority in Bukovina and in eastern Ukraine. For a discussion of factors of Polish identity in northern Bukovina and eastern Ukraine, see Krasowska 2008c: 345–353.
(I am proud to have been born Polish and belong to such a great nation that gave the world Matejko, Mickiewicz, Chopin; to the nation which preserved its identity for all these years when its Homeland was not on the map; to the nation one third of which is scattered around the globe, but feels as one great community making up Poland.)

Polish associations in south-eastern Ukraine organize trips for local Poles to celebrate Roman Catholic holidays in Poland. For example, a group from Berdiansk was received by the Dominicans in the Shrine of Our Lady in Borek Stary near Rzeszów in 2000; one of the members of the group made the following comment:

*Dla przeciętnego Polaka dzielenie się opłatkiem, pasterka, polska kolęda, karp na stole są faktem przeżywanym co rok, więc to jest tradycja. Natomiast Polonusi, którzy dopiero po roku 1990 otrzymali możliwość przestać się bać być Polakami, wiedzą o tym ze słyszenia*[Berdiansk 2010: interview].

*(For an average Pole [in Poland], it all happens every year, sharing the wafer (opłatek) on Christmas Eve, the midnight Mass, Polish carols, the carp on the table, it’s all tradition. But the Poles abroad who no longer had to be afraid to be Poles only after 1990, they know about all this only from stories.)*

Children, too, are keen on Christmas trips to Poland. Olga Pawluk writes:

*Tożsamość narodowa zachowała się i była formowana w rodzinach wbrew różnym warunkom środowiskowym, represjom, strachowi, a często nawet wbrew woli krewnych, pamiętających represje stalinowskie. Dlatego jest ona ważna, bo była odtwarzana z okruchów pamięci przez ludzi, którzy dziedzictwo swych przodków przynęli zachować od zapomnienia. To ważne, że są osoby, które wraz z powstaniem niepodległej Ukrainy zjednoczyły się: żeby głośno powiedzieć o sobie, że są Polakami; żeby mieć prawo do nauczania języka polskiego swych dzieci i tych wszystkich, którzy chcą poznać język i kulturę polską; żeby móc obchodzić święta okolicznościowe i śpiewać polskie pieśni*[Pawluk 2011: 160–161].

*([Polish] national identity was preserved and shaped in families in spite of the social environment, repressions and fear, and often even against the advice of the relatives who remembered the repressions of the Stalinist period. It was recreated from fragmentary memories by the people who wanted to preserve the heritage of their forefathers from oblivion. It is important that there are people who – following the establishment of independent Ukraine – came together to declare openly that they are Polish. They did this in order to have the right to teach Polish to their children and to all those interested in the Polish language and culture, and to have the right to celebrate Polish national holidays and sing Polish songs.)*

In my opinion, Polish organizations in south-eastern Ukraine are currently facing an exceedingly difficult problem. They should considerably enlarge their
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offer: provide more hours of Polish courses at all levels, hold more competitions, teach songs and poems, continue working with the already existing Polish song and dance groups, continue Polish film clubs, literary evenings, etc. However, the expected results cannot be achieved without the financial support from the Polish Senate (the upper chamber of the Polish parliament) and organizations in Poland engaged in helping Poles in the East. Although such assistance is provided, it mostly concentrates in western Ukraine, where Poles are a territorial minority and thus their presence is more easily noticed. On the other hand, in the south-east, a systematic effort is required even to reach those who as yet are not members of Polish organizations in the region. This is particularly important considering the fact that they are mostly elderly people, whose passing away will mean the demise of Polish tradition in the region. For example, members of the Polish community in Bohatyrvka and Liutserna comment as follows:

*Polska o nas zapomniała, nikomu my nie potrzebni, wiadomo, że Ukrainie my też nie potrzebni, bo my Polacy, ale jakoś żyjemy, póki żyjemy. Co mamy zrobić, aby dzieci nasi też czuli się Polakami. Teraz to można, w Kazachstanie jak nam zabronionowali, to my po cichu, czytali, modlili się, że my Polaki, a nasi dzieci, jak mamy ich nauczyć, nikt do nas z tej Polski co nas zapomniała nie przychodzi [Bohatyrivka 2010: interview].*

*(Poland has forgotten about us; nobody needs us; surely Ukraine doesn’t need us either, because we’re Polish, but as long as we live, we live, somehow. But what can we do to make our children feel Polish? These days it’s allowed; in Kazakhstan, when it was forbidden, we secretly read and prayed in Polish. And our children, how can we teach them? Nobody from Poland, which has forgotten us, comes over.)*

The combined result of cultural discontinuity and the mechanisms observed above is the emergence of a new Polish culture in south-eastern Ukraine, which cultivates only selected elements that are considered the core of Polishness. The Polish minority in the region needs new methods and techniques of teaching Polish, as well as a new model of bringing up the future generation of Poles who would have a distinct Polish national and linguistic identity.
Cultural memory theory can be applied in interdisciplinary studies of cultures of memory in various social and political structures. Individual experience is the subject of ‘oral history,’ which relies exclusively on information acquired in oral interviews [J. Assmann, 2011: 37]. As Barbara Szacka notes, the term itself was coined in the 1930s, while research practice developed half a century later [Szacka 2006: 21].

Cultural memory concerns a group of people asking themselves ‘What cannot be forgotten?’ (‘Czego nie można zapomnieć?’) [Karp, Traba 2004: 9]. In the present chapter, I focus on individual memory generated as a result of the participation of individuals in communicative processes. Kazimierz Feleszko observes:

Zawsze mnie fascynowało splecenie losów jednostek z wielką historią zapisaną potem w podręcznikach i ich wzajemne związki. Wiem, że nie należy moje przecznić roli zwykłych małych ludzi, lecz też chyba nie trzeba tego nie doceniać. Postawa psychiczna tych ludzi i wynikające z niej reakcje chyba jednak – dziś bardziej widocznie niż kiedyś – wpływają na bieg wydarzeń [Letter from Kazimierz Feleszko to an addressee in Romania].

(I have always been fascinated by how the fate of individuals is intertwined with grand history subsequently recorded in history books, and by the mutual relations between them. I realize that the role of ordinary people probably should not be overestimated, but, on the other hand, it does not need to be underestimated, either. After all, psychological attitudes of such people and their ensuing reactions are likely to have an impact on the course of historical events, which is more visible today than it used to be in the past.)

1 The study includes an extensive bibliography of works on ‘oral history.’
This would suggest that the individual has considerable influence on the environment in which he or she functions, and, in turn, social processes (historical and political determinants) have an impact on the individual. All these combined factors are reflected in the manner of communication, awareness, vocabulary resources, adaptation of new lexical units, or a change of their meaning. Individual memory provides a link between the individual and the social groups with which he or she remains in constant contact.

Jan Assmann distinguishes between two ‘modes of remembering’ or ‘uses of the past’ which are largely connected in real historical culture. […] The foundational mode always functions […] through fixed objectifications […], such as rituals, dances, myths, patterns, dress, jewelry […], landscapes, and so on, all of which are kinds of sign systems and, because of their […] function [of] supporting memory and identity, capable of being subsumed under the general heading of memoria [J. Assmann 2011: 37].

On the other hand, biographical memory is a matter of natural growth and accumulated experience which become a major component of communicative memory, comprising memories related to the recent past, with generational memory as a typical example [J. Assmann 2011: 36]. Piotr Tadeusz Kwiatkowski observes that the list of subjects relating to the past confirms that family discourse incorporates two streams of memory: memory of ‘grand history’ and memory of family history [Kwiatkowski 2008: 188]. In the center of the narrative, there is always a particular individual who notices and selects particular persons or life events, thus constructing a particular autobiographical narrative.

Writing about the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Jacques Le Goff notes an increasingly important role of memory in the process of forming individual and collective identities. On the one hand, memory multiplies, becomes more individualized and democratic, on the other – it becomes more familial, largely as a result of autobiographical accounts, photography and video. Collective memory has become recognized as the key element of collective identity [Le Goff 2007: 15].

Jan Assmann makes a distinction between personal, individual and collective identity:

[p]ersonal identity […] is the embodiment of all the roles, qualities and talents that give the individual its own special place in the social network. Individual identity relates to the contingencies of life, incorporating such key elements as birth and death, physical existence and basic needs. Personal identity relates to social accountability and recognition [J. Assmann 2011: 113].

The author observes that both of them are different aspects of what he calls ‘the “I” identity,’ and both of them ‘arise from a consciousness that is formed and determined by the language, ideas, norms, and values of a particular
time and culture,’ which makes them social and cultural constructs [J. Assmann 2011: 113]. In Assmann’s view, collective, i.e. ‘the “we” identity,’ is the self-image of a group with which its members identify. As such, collective identity is the result of identification of individuals and does not exist per se, but only to the extent to which it is recognized by its participating individuals [J. Assmann 2011: 113–114].

Jan Assmann also distinguishes the concept of communicative memory, which I am going to use in the present study. In his view, ‘[t]he communicative memory comprises memories related to the recent past. These are what the individual shares with his contemporaries. A typical instance would be generational memory’ [J. Assmann 2011: 36]. Aleida Assmann, in turn, observes:

Denn Erinnerungen werden stets in Kommunikation, d.h. im Austausch mit Mitmenschen aufgebaut und verfestigt. Das Gedächtnis wächst also ähnlich wie die Sprache von außen in den Menschen hinein, und es steht außer Frage, daß auch die Sprache seine wichtigste Stütze ist [A. Assmann 1999: 36].

(Memories are formed and consolidated in communication, i.e. in exchange with others. Consequently, like language, memory grows in people from the outside and there is no doubt that language is its most important foundation.)

The present chapter includes only a handful of autobiographical narratives revolving around age, time and space. In the older generation, the main elements of the accounts involve time and change of the environment (moving to south-eastern Ukraine), as well as the memory of the place of origin and Polish identity. The middle generation focuses on what it means to be Polish and the attendant declaration of affiliation with a particular community. Accounts of ‘witnesses of history’ may be treated as a testimony of those whose individual biographies became intertwined with grand history [Kaźmierska 1999: 20].

The use of Polish is an important component of the narratives presented in Chapter 6.1, hence extensive direct quotations from the respondents are included in the text to illustrate their command of the language. While in the first three cases Polish is the first language of the informants, the last account comes from a person who learned it as another language later in life.

I also decided to include here (Chapter 6.2) biographical portraits of members of the Jelski family, as well as Andrzej Korwacki (an excellent surgeon and orchard farmer) and Ludwik Godlewski (an outstanding painter and medical doctor, whose works were presented during the ‘Polish Culture Festival’ (Pol. Dni Kultury Polskiej) in Berdiansk in 2011). Their achievements are not widely known, although, like many other Poles, they all made a considerable contribution to the cultural and economic development of the region. The present chapter does not attempt to exhaust the question of Polish biographical memory in south-eastern Ukraine. Rather, it is an introductory exploration pointing at the need of further research.
6.1. Cultural Contexts of Individual Awareness

6.1.1. 'We Always Used to Speak Polish at Home'

Halina Petkiewicz, née Raczyńska, was born in 1924 in Odessa; her grandmother, Honorata, was a Pole from Kiev; her mother, Róża (Rus. Алуиза Адамовна, Aluiza Adamovna), called Lusia, was also born in Odessa, where they all lived nearby a Roman Catholic church. Halina’s mother sung in the church choir; the Mass was said in Latin, but people who came to the church spoke Polish. She comments on her command of Polish and on entries indicating ethnicity in documents and official records as follows:

\[W \text{ domu my rozmawiali zawsze po polsku, tylko po polsku. Tata ja nie znała. Jak po-}\\ \text{szłam do szkoły, to były trzydzieści roki zeszłego stulecia. To było zabroniono po polsku}\\ \text{rozmawiać, ale zabronione tak, że my nawet w domu między sobą nigdy nie rozmawiali}\\ \text{my po polsku. Ktoś będzie słyszał, mało co. To trudno powiedzieć, takie byli czasy, bali}\\ \text{się i sąsiadów i wszystkich. To trudno powiedzieć. Chodzi o to, że z tamtych czasów,}\\ \text{ile siebie pamiętam, i do dzisiejszego dnia, ja myślałam tylko po polsku. Ot, ja nie}\\ \text{wiem, dlaczego, nie wiem co, ja nigdy nie myślałam, o, po rosyjsku, tylko po polsku.}\\ \text{Alie nawet z mamą już potem nie rozmawiali. No, a w szkole też było zabronione, nie}\\ \text{daj Boże, żeby ktoś dowiedział się. Nu byli takie czasy. Przyszło się nawet wymienić}\\ \text{dokumenty, że u mamy nie było napisane Polka, a zrobili tak, że ona była jakby z Litwy –}\\ \text{Litówka. Ich nikt nigdzie nie wypędzał, oni zostawali na miejscu. A Polaków wszystkich}\\ \text{wypędzili} \text{ [Zaporizhzhia 2009: interview].}\]

(We always used to speak Polish at home, only Polish. I didn’t know my dad. When I went to school, it was back in the 1930s, it was forbidden to speak Polish, and it was so strict that we never spoke it, not even at home; someone might have heard it. The thing is that from back then, as far back as I can remember, until today I have always thought only in Polish. Well, I don’t know why, I don’t know how, but I’ve just never thought in Russian, it has always been Polish. But I didn’t speak it later, not even with my mother. And it was forbidden at school as well; God forbid anyone should know. Well, such were the times. At some point, my mum had the documents changed so that they wouldn’t say she was Polish: she got it fixed that she was, as it were, from Lithuania, a Lithuanian – Litówka. Nobody deported them [Lithuanians] anywhere, and all the Poles were deported)

The family spoke Polish at home until 1937, when it was strictly forbidden. Poles were spied on and speaking their language instead of Russian could mean an execution or exile to Siberia.

In her school report in 1931, little Halina featured as an ethnic Pole. Afraid of the possible consequences this entry could entail, her mother asked the school to alter it. Indeed, at the time the Soviet authorities were already starting a campaign of repressions against the believers and particular eth-
nic communities, and the Great Famine was soon to follow. In her childhood, Halina heard from her grandmother that she came from a noble family, but children were not told too much in those days. She was brought up by her mother, grandmother and an aunt (her mother’s sister); she does not remember her father, who left the family when she was two years old. She met him when she was older, but did not even know that she was talking to her father.


(I got married, my husband was a military man, but he was also Polish. We had known each other since our childhood, we grew up together. Their family, like ours, was Polish, both back there and here as well. He had also used to speak Polish, but we never spoke it between us; just a few words, perhaps. We never spoke Polish. And I’ve forgotten it, somehow; it has only stayed in my head.)

As she married a member of the military forces who was stationed in different parts of the Soviet Union, they quite often changed their place of residence. Although her husband was also Polish and had spoken the language in his family home in Odessa, they both concealed their origin and always used Russian at home. Fearing the Soviet authorities, they gave their children Russian names and brought them up as Russian speakers. Because they lived in so many different places, her daughter went to seven or eight different schools, most of them with Russian as the language of instruction; she got married and finally settled down in Zaporizhzhia.

A graduate of the Odessa University of Culture, Halina Petkiewicz worked in a concert hall, where she met a number of talented musicians, and was a regular theater-goer. She has been a member of the ‘Polonia’ Polish Cultural Association (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej ‘Polonia’) in Estonia (since 1989), and the Union of Poles in Ukraine (Pol. Związek Polaków na Ukrainie), since 1993 (see Documents 23 and 24 in the Appendix). When a Polish organization was established in Zaporizhzhia, she joined it straight away; she comments as follows:

Chciałam usłyszeć polskie słowo, ale jak się okazuje, oni w Stowarzyszeniu mówią po rosyjsku, tu w Zaporożu nie ma z kim rozmawiać po polsku. Jeszcze z ojcem Janem, z Euzebiuszem, może ktoś z Polski przyjedzie, to tak, ale w Zaporozju nie ma z kim. Poszła tam raz, zobaczyła, że słowa polskiego tam nie ma i koniec, po co tam pójde [Zaporizhzhia 2009: interview].

(I wanted to listen to Polish, but it turned out that all of them in the Association speak Russian; there is no one to talk to in Polish here, in Zaporozhu [Ukr. Zaporizhzhia]. Well, there is Father Jan, there is [Brother] Euzebiusz, sometimes there is someone
from Poland who comes over, but there is no one from Zaporozhe. So, I’ve been there once, I’ve seen there’s no Polish there and that’s it. Why would I go there?)

Halina Petkiewicz has no family in Poland, at least to her knowledge. She liven up when talking about how they used to celebrate Christmas when she was a child:


(We always celebrated [Roman] Catholic holidays, I mean before the war. In 1936, we put black curtains in the windows so that no one could see our Christmas tree all lit up. After the war, it was all totally forbidden.)

They used to make their own Christmas tree ornaments; there was Santa Claus, all in white; she does not remember him wearing a red outfit. At this stage, the communists had definitely introduced their Ded Moroz instead of the traditional Santa. The family always made sure to prepare kutia and dried fruit compote (Pol. kompot) for Christmas Eve (Pol. wigilia) supper. Although there were other dishes as well, there did not have to be twelve of them as the tradition requires, perhaps because the times were hard. At Easter, they painted Easter eggs (Pol. pisanki) and baked Easter cake (Pol. babka wielkanocna) with eighty egg yolks in it; there was also her mother’s excellent home-made cherry-flavored vodka (Pol. wiśniówka). She does not remember Polish Christmas carols being sung at home at Christmas, but they all prayed in Polish and there was a picture of Our Lady of Częstochowa on the wall. When her mother began to live on her own, she had all the paintings, photographs, family albums and heirlooms taken away from her.

The family went through hard times during the war: We survived because we were not under the German, but Romanian occupation there (Uratowało nas to, że tu nie było Niemców, lecz Rumunii) [Zaporizhzhia 2009: interview]. The last days of the war were particularly tragic: people were deported and murdered everywhere around; it was utter horror. She went into hiding with four other girls and even her mother did not know where she was. They survived but could not leave the city because they did not have enough money.

After the war, when Halina followed her husband and moved away, there was no Catholic church in any of the places where they lived. Although they shared the kitchen and bathroom with other families living in the same ‘communal apartment,’ there was not a single case of anything ever being stolen.

As she was unable to obtain a permanent residence permit in Moscow (only a temporary one), she had to go back to Odessa every three or four weeks to have the required paperwork issued. Her husband was an army engineer who took up painting on his retirement.
Born in Odessa, she studied in Moscow and then as the wife of a member of the military forces, moved to a different place every five years (including Omsk, Samara, Kuibyshev, Kislovodsk, and Estonia), before finally coming to live with her daughter in Zaporizhzhia in the early 1990s.

Polaków w Odessie dużo było, tam trzy kościoły było, i zaraz trzy. Wszystkie byli oddane, co tam tylko nie było. Ja przyjechała tam w dziewięćdziesiąt trzecim, tutaj wróciłam, od razu pojechałam do Odessy, bo z Estonii ja tyle lat nie jeździłam nigdzie. 

Nu daleko bardzo. Przyszła tam, a proboszcz pyta: A pamięta Pani, jak to było. Ja wszystko pamiętam. [...]

Jeździłam, to była w tym mieszkaniu, gdzie urodziłam się, żyłam cało wojne, dwa i pół roku okupacji, wszystko było w tym mieszkaniu, wyszła za mąż i pojechałam do Moskwy. [...] Żyli my na Kawkazi, nie było niedźwiedzi kościoła, nu w Estonii był kościół, msza po polsku była, po rosyjsku, na szwiedzkim, estonskim, było tak napisane, kiedy o której, ja chodziła zawsze tam. I potem przyjechała ja tutaj, na Wierbowej i tak od początku tutaj [Zaporizhzhia 2009: interview].

(There were many Poles living in Odessa; there were three [Roman] Catholic churches and all three, with everything in them, have now been restored to the Church. I went there in 1993; I went to Odessa as soon as I moved over here. I didn’t use to travel anywhere when I lived in Estonia; it’s really far. So, I arrive there and the parish priest asks me if I remember what it all used to be like. I remember everything. [...] When I went there, I stayed in the flat where I was born and lived throughout the war, two and a half years under the occupation; so much of my life had passed there; I got married and went away to Moscow. [...] We lived in the Caucasus, there was no [Roman] Catholic church there, but there was one in Estonia, with the Mass said in Polish, Russian, Swedish, Estonian; it was all written down on what day and at what time; I always went there. And then I moved over here and I’ve been going to [church in] Verbova [vulytsia, Willow Street] ever since.)

Since she settled down in Zaporizhzhia, Halina Petkiewicz has been regularly attending religious services at the Roman Catholic church of God the Merciful Father. Although she has never been to Poland, she says:

Polskę mam w sercu!, jestem Polką i z tego jestem dumna. Jestem Polką, bo wiem, że moi rodzice byli Polakami, babcia i krewni, jestem Polką, bo mówię po polsku i modzę się po polsku, chodzę do kościoła, to taką charakterystykę można dać Polakowi [Zaporizhzhia 2009: interview].

(I have Poland in my heart! I’m Polish and I’m proud of it. I’m Polish because I know that my parents, my grandma and relatives were Polish; I’m Polish because I can speak Polish and I pray in Polish, and I go to the [Roman] Catholic church. That’s how you can tell a Pole.)

A devout member of the Roman Catholic Church, she is one of very few local parishioners who would welcome a change of the language of the Mass from Russian to Polish; she says:
Jeżeli msza jest po polsku, to serce się raduje, wspomina dzieciństwo, kościół w Odessie i te wszystkie piękne chwile bliskości z Bogiem. Na urodziny ksiądz Jan robi mi prezent i odprawia mszę po polsku. Jest to dla mnie największy present [Zaporizhzhia 2009: interview].

(When there is a Mass in Polish, my heart is so happy; this takes me back to my childhood, the church in Odessa and all these beautiful moments I felt so close to God. Father Jan says a Mass for me in Polish as my birthday present; it’s the best one I could get.)

It is quite extraordinary that after fifty years of having no contact with the Polish language Halina Petkiewicz still thinks in Polish. She told me that sometimes she translates from Polish to Russian as she speaks. She is disappointed with Polish social and cultural organizations in Zaporizhzhia, as they do not come up to her expectations, an opinion shared by many other Poles in the area.

6.1.2. ‘I Kept My Polish Language in the Mines’

Ryszard Zieliński died in February 2008. Shortly before he passed away, I had had an opportunity to interview him on a number of occasions; he had been also one of the respondents in my surveys. After 1990, he was among the first in the Donbas to openly declare that he was Polish and engage in organizing Polish activity in the region.

He was born in Lviv (Pol. Lwów) in 1941; his father was from the city, and his mother originally came from the Ternopil (Pol. Tarnopol) region; the language used in his family home was Polish. Writing about his childhood after the Second World War, he notes:


(Polish could be heard everywhere – in shops, parks, streets, markets and on trams. There was also the sound of Ukrainian, as people from rural areas sought to leave the kolkhozes and find work in industry; they settled down in Lwów [Ukr. Lviv] and became its ordinary citizens. Russians, officers and specialists working in military industry, moved into empty flats which had used to be occupied by Polish and Jewish families. [...] We used to speak Polish at home and among ourselves, and Polish, Ukrainian and Russian in the street.)
The carefree days of his childhood were soon over and Ryszard Zieliski started his education in a Polish school in Lviv:

_Polską dziesiątkę kończyłem. Moja nauczycielka ostatnia była młodzientka absolwentka uniwersytetu pani Maria Iwanowa, ona była naszą polonistką, po profesor Jaworskiej. Profesor Jaworska była posłem na sejm przed wojną. I myśmy mieli czterech profesorów. Kiedy uniwersytet stał się radiańskim, sowieckim, tych profesorów po prostu... w takim poważnym wieku profesor Kwiatkowski, profesor Sabatowska, profesor Niemontowska i profesor Jaworska byli w naszej szkole i wszyscy nam wykładali._

(I graduated from dziesiątka, school number ten, a Polish one. My last teacher there was a very young university graduate, Maria Iwanowa; she taught us Polish; she took over from Professor Jaworska. Professor Jaworska used to be a deputy to the Sejm [the lower chamber of the Polish parliament] before the war. We had four professors; when the university had become radianskii, Soviet [when it had been taken over by the Soviets], they were just... [dismissed?]; all of them quite elderly: Professor Kwiatkowski, Professor Sabatowska, Professor Niemontowska and Professor Jaworska; they worked at our school and we had classes with all of them.)

He highly appreciated the work of his teachers in the Polish school in Lviv he had attended: he owed them a lot, most importantly the ability to use literary Polish. He continued his education at the Secondary Technical School of Mining in Lviv; on graduation (1961), he was sent to the Donbas to do his mandatory work placement. A mining engineer, in his professional career spanning thirty-four years he was employed in different capacities in the industry, including managerial positions; he was devoted to his work and showed his organizational talents.

Ryszard Zieliński said that he had kept his Polish thanks to his work in the mines, where he did not have to talk to anyone. In the course of his professional duties, he sometimes met Poles, but did not speak Polish to any of them as they all concealed their origin; occasionally, some mentioned that their mother or father was Polish. He got married and settled down in Makiivka. The language used in the family was Russian; he explained that there was no time to teach children Polish in peace and quiet.

He retired following a mining accident in 1993, in which he suffered broken ribs as well as liver and spleen injuries. He remained in contact with his Polish friends, both in his home city of Lviv and in Poland:

The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

(We wrote letters, later also we also talked on the phone. I went to Lwów whenever I had some time off. It’s my home city; I’ve missed it all my life. We were a great class at school; nearly all of us have completed higher education. Having a friend like Teresa Dutkiewicz has always been great support, especially when I was setting up the Polish Society in the Donbas.)

His contacts with Poles in Lviv were instrumental in founding the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu, TKPD), registered in 1999 and affiliated with the Federation of Polish organizations in Ukraine (Pol. Federacja Organizacji Polskich na Ukrainie, FOPU), based in Lviv. He went around the region in search of Poles, delivered talks, placed announcements on the radio and television, providing information on Polish language courses, set up the Polacy Donbasu (The Poles of the Donbas) magazine, and finally managed to start Polish radio and television programs. His accounts of what he had managed to achieve as the chairman of the society were truly fascinating; he also had a remarkable knowledge of the history of Polish–Ukrainian relations. He appreciated people in general and his associates in particular:

Te nauczycielki, które do nas przyjeżdżają, to prawdziwe cuda. Dzięki ich wytrwałości język polski jest nauczany już na trzech uczelniach, proszę sobie wyobrazić, wielki Donieck. A w tym na trzech uczelniach jest język polski, z tego jestem dumny. Zawdzięczam to mądrości nauczycieli z Polski [Donetsk 2007: interview].

(These female teachers who come over here are really fantastic. Thanks to their effort, Polish is already taught at three institutions of higher education in Donetsk. Just imagine: great Donetsk, and Polish in three of them there; I’m proud of it. It’s been thanks to the brains of the teachers from Poland.)

Ryszard Zieliński was the first to begin organized Polish activity in Donetsk. He was greatly supported by the priests from the Society of Christ Fathers for Poles Living Abroad (Pol. Towarzystwo Chrystusowe dla Polonii Zagranicznej, SChr), based in Poznań. On the other hand, he helped them in their effort to reclaim church buildings: he wrote a number of official letters, e.g. to the president and prime minister of Ukraine, and his personal involvement brought visible results. Sadly, he passed away before the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas, held in 2009.

The post of the chairperson was taken over by Walentyna Staruszko, who summed up the activity of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas as follows:

Polska delegowała do nas wolontariuszy-nauczycieli polonistów. Ci, którzy tęsknili do ojczystej mowy, mogli ją poznać. Skorzystało z tego wiele osób, w tym rodzina Terleckich, Erdmanów, Nesterowych, Klujewych, Czuriłowych itd. Jednak, niestety, nie znam rodziny, która w domu na co dzień zaczęła posługiwać się polszczyzną... Otrzymaliśmy możliwość założenia własnych mediów, w których staramy się szerzyć
informacje o Polsce, jej historii i kulturze, obyczajach i charakterze narodowym. Otrzymaliśmy również możliwość zrzucenia z pleców ciężkiego ładunku – ukrywanych przez wiele lat historii naszych rodzin [Staruszko 2009: 1].

(Poland has sent volunteer teachers of Polish to our region and those who missed their native language could learn it. Many people took this opportunity, for example members of the Terlecki, Erdman, Nesterow, Klujej, Czuriłow [Terletskii, Erdman, Nesterov, Klujev, Churilov] families. Regrettably, however, I do not know of any family who would begin to use Polish at home on a daily basis... We have pursued an opportunity to establish our own mass media, where we are trying to spread information about Poland, its history and culture, customs and national character. We have also been able to get off our backs the heavy burden of concealing our family histories.)

Ryszard Zieliński declared his Polish identity in various official documents:

Szczyciłem się zawsze tym, że we wszystkich ankietach w moim życiorysie wpisywałem jako język ojczysty język polski. Jeszcze w moim starym paszporcie pozostał wpis Polak – nie przeszkadzało to ani górnikom, ani kolegom różnych narodowości [Zieliński 2002b: 136].

(I've always been proud that I put down Polish as my native language in all personal files. I also featured as a Pole in my old passport – it was not a problem to the miners or colleagues of different nationalities.)

He thought that there was a need for a Polish association in the region because it certainly provides opportunities for a revival of the native language, faith and tradition of our nation (ponieważ obowiązkowo daje możliwości odrodzenia języka ojczystego, wiary i tradycji naszego narodu) [Donetsk 2007: survey]. The establishment of a Polish organization was to serve the revival of eroded Polish Identity, the revival of faith and culture of our nation (dla odrodzenia zniszczonej Tożsamości polskiej, odrodzenia wiary i kultury naszego narodu) [Donetsk 2007: survey]. In his opinion, polskość jest w sercach ludzi dąże [nawet] już nie z takim strachem, a może i z dumą deklarują swe polskie pochodzenie [Donetsk 2007: survey].

(Polishness is in people's hearts; they are not dazhe [even] so afraid any more, they are perhaps proud to declare their Polish origin.)

In his comment on the differences between Poles and other ethnic communities of the Donbas he observed:

Być może nas, prawdziwych Polaków i osób pochodzenia polskiego, którzy zachowali w Sercach Wiarę – właśnie Wiarę różni od innych narodowości [Donetsk 2007: survey].

(Perhaps what makes us different from other nationalities is our Faith – we, true Poles and people of Polish origin, have kept it in our hearts.)
Asked about the indicators of Polish identity, he put them down as follows: ‘my parents were Polish’; ‘I speak Polish, it’s my first language, my mother tongue’; ‘I celebrate all Polish and [Roman] Catholic holidays.’ It was the language and identity that we talked about on all the occasions we met: he explained it to me, he considered it, and returned to the subject again. The last time I saw him was in November 2007, when I visited him at Banacha street hospital in Warsaw, where he came to have a spleen transplant. Again, we talked about Polishness in the Donbas and its perception in a broader sense. It was then that he gave me his poem he had written in 2006:

**Polishness**

**POLSKOŚĆ**

POLSKOŚĆ to Wiara, Polskość to mowa. 
Polskość to pierwsze matki mojej słowa. 
Ciepłe jak kromka babcinego chleba, 
Promienie słońca płynącego z nieba. 
Słowa modlitwy w tamte straszne czasy, 
Ciche – Ojczyzna w polskiej pierwszej klasie. 
Kochanej szkoły naprzeciw kościoła, 
Dokąd me serce dziś po nocach woła. 
„Magdusi” drogiej znanej szkoły lwowskiej, 
Słynnych profesorów szczyt elity polskiej. 
Dla nas tu zostali, by uczyć miłości 
Do Boga, Ojczyzny, w Honorze, w Polskości. 
A wzorem miłości do Boga i ludzi 
Był pierwszy ksiądz prałat, co zachwyt w nas budził. 
On nas ministrantów uczył tej Polskości 
W kraju zdziczałym, w kraju bezbożności. 
Przykładem zaś dla nas było życie księdza, 
Życie męczennika w Gułagach i w nędzy. 
Ileż lat minęło w dalekim Donbasie? 
A wciąż jestem z wami w naszej polskiej klasie... 
Nowi ministranci w Marii Magdalenie, 
Służy w pięknych komżach trzecie pokolenie... 
Serce pełni radość tu, w górnicym kraju, 
Że Polacy wszędzie Bogu pieśń śpiewają. 
Bogu i Ojczyźnie, kochanej Macierzy, 
Czemu każdy Polak całym Sercem wierzy. 
To jest właśnie znakiem polskiej tożsamości, 
Częścią nieodjemną prawdziwej POLSKOŚCI. 
[A 2006 poem by Ryszard Zieliński, from Helena Krasowska’s files]

**Polishness**

POLISHINESS means Faith, Polishness means the mother tongue. 
Polishness is my mother’s first words. 
Warm like my grandma’s fresh loaf of bread, 
Like sun beams pouring from the sky. 
The quiet words of a prayer in those wretched times,
My Homeland in the first class at Polish school,
My dear school, opposite the church
Which my heart longs for even today
‘Magdusia’ [affectionate for St Magdalene], my dear, famous school in Lwów
With renowned professors, the flower of Polish elite.
They stayed for us, to teach us to love
God and the Homeland, in Honor and Polishness
And our first Father Prelate, whom we all admired
Was an example of love for God and for other people.
He taught us, altar boys, about Polishness
In the savage land, in the godless land.
His life was an example for us,
His life of a martyr in Gulag camps, in poverty.
How many years is it in the far Donbas
And I am still with you in our Polish class...
There are new altar boys in St Mary Magdalene
The third generation serves at the Mass in white surplices...
My heart fills with joy here, in this mining land
Because Poles sing songs of praise to the Lord wherever they are
To God and the Homeland, dear mother land
As every Pole believes with all his heart.
This is a sign of true Polish identity
An indispensable part of true Polishness.)

When he gave me a copy of this poem, he said this was where I would find his answer to my questions about Polishness, identity and otherness in the region.

A number of other respondents born in Lviv share the same characteristics: their parents were Polish, they spoke Polish at home, Polish was the language of their childhood, and they are Catholic. Also, all of them miss their school and ‘Polish Lwów’ (Ukr. Lviv). They are obviously very well aware of the fact that the city has changed since they left it and is quite different today.

Ryszard Zieliński said:

Polskość mam w sercu, w czasach radzieckich też miałem polskość w sercu, z tym żyłem cały czas, choć bywało, że nie zawsze mogłem głośno o tym mówić, ale specjalnie z tym się nie kryłem. Rezygnowałem ze stanowiska ewentualnie [Donetsk 2007: interview].

(I’m Polish in my heart and in the Soviet times I also was Polish, all the time; even if I wasn’t always able to talk about it openly, I made no particular secret about it. I gave up the post I held, if need be.)

He was one of those people who have both personality and organizational skills: he stirred Polish activity in the region and set up branches of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas in different centers, always maintaining a close contact with them. As I observed, it is thanks to the attitude and commitment
of individual people (in this case, chairpersons of Polish organizations) that the region is changing, with more and more people declaring their Polish identity.

6.1.3. ‘I’m Different’

Jerzy Pawluk has been living in Zaporizhzhia since 1956. He was born in Piotrków Trybunalski (Poland) in 1928; his grandmother, Olga Wiełowicz, was an honorary citizen of the town. He used to work as an engineer in coking coal works in Zaporizhzhia.

Przyprowadziliśmy tutaj z żoną, żona moja pochodzi z Makiejewki. Tam się urodziła, a potem się przeprowadzali. Mójżona nie była Polką, to jest bardzo pokręcone. Moja żona ma bardzo pstrą narodowość, i Grecy tam są, i Ukraińcy, i jeszcze ktoś, zapisana jest, że Ukrainka. Ona nie czuje się, że jest Ukrainką, ale bardzo ubolewa za Ukrainą [Zaporizhzhia: interview].

(We moved over here, my wife and me, she’s from Makiivka; she was born there and then they moved to different places. My wife isn’t Polish; it’s all really mixed up. My wife’s ethnicity is a bit of a patchwork: there’ve been Greeks there, and Ukrainians, and still others. She’s registered as [ethnic] Ukrainian. She doesn’t feel Ukrainian but she’s all for Ukraine.)

He spent his childhood before the war in Łódź (Poland), where he had a number of relatives; his father was Headmaster of the school in Węgrzynowice. From 1944, the family lived in the Chełm region (Poland). He describes his arrival in Ukraine as follows:


(After a month of our journey, they told us to get off at a tiny railway station somewhere near Krzywy Róg [Ukr. Kryvyi Rih]. It was on 19 January 1945. The frost was really bad. We stood there and we did not know what was going to happen next. Then, they took us by carts to a kolkhoz called Zoria Komunizmu [Ukr. Зоря комунізму, Zoria Komunizmu, the ‘communist light’].)

Their living conditions were really difficult:

Mieszkalismy w jednym pokoju, który był i sypialnią, i jadalnią, i salonem. Nie było czym palić, czasami udawało się wyprosić słomę, ale ona nie rozgrzewała pokoju. O węgiel było bardzo ciężko [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].
(We lived in one room; it was our bedroom, dining room and living room. We had no fuel; we asked for it and sometimes they gave us some straw, but it wasn’t enough to heat the room. It was really hard to get coal.)

His father worked as a teacher and his wage was nine kilograms of flour.


(We starved. I went to school hungry. Because there was only elementary school where we lived, I walked to the one right beside the coal mine, seven kilometers away from the village. It was fourteen kilometers a day, across fields and gorges, sometimes filled with water up to my knees. It was difficult to learn: the school was in Ukrainian and there were subjects I had not done in Poland. My father was taken away to hospital, all swollen up because of hunger. Fortunately, they managed to rescue him there.)

After the war, Jerzy Pawluk studied in Dnipropetrovsk. On graduation (1952), he was sent to work in Lipetsk in Russia.


(And my wife was already in the fifth year of her studies. She’d told me once ‘I won’t get married before I graduate; wait if you want, don’t if you don’t.’ We got married on 30 December 1956. She got her raspredelenie to work [mandatory work placement].)

Today, when he thinks about Poland what comes to his mind is larch trees (Pol. modrzew) and sour rye soup (Pol. żur); he views Polish men as characterized by their sense of honor (Pol. honor), and Polish women by their attachment to domesticity (Pol. domowatość, Standard Pol. ‘domatorstwo’). In his opinion, the Polish association in Zaporizhzhia is important

dla zachowania i odrodzenia języka i kultury Polskiej. Daje możliwość spotkań i kontaktów między Polakami, odzначенie Świąt Polskich, podtrzymywania kontaktów z Macierzą [Zaporizhzhia 2007: survey].

(for the preservation and revival of the Polish language and culture. It provides an opportunity to meet and keep in contact with Poles, celebrate Polish holidays, and maintain contact with the Homeland [Macierz].)
He is the chairman of a Polish association acting
dla odrodzenia języka, kultury, tradycji Polskich, dla odnalezienia i zachowania korze-
ni, zrzeszenia Polaków, pomocy charytatywnej, rozpowszechnienia kultury i wiedzy o Polsce [Zaporizhzhia 2007: survey].

(for the revival of the Polish language culture and traditions, the discovery and pres-
ervation of Polish roots, the self-organization of the Polish community, charity work,
the popularization of Polish culture and knowledge about Poland.)

Jerzy Pawluk’s first language was Polish. Over the years, when they lived in a Russian-speaking environment, the whole family turned to Russian. It is his daughter’s primary language; she learned Polish in language courses in Poland after 1990. He comments as follows:

Język polski znam z dzieciństwa, nu potem tu w Rosji my już rozmawialiśmy po rosy-
jsku, nie można było. Mnie w zasadzie to brakowało potem słów, bo wymowa i to wszystko zostało, ale słów brakowało. Nie czytałem, nic nie było, do Polski daleko [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

(I know Polish from my childhood. But then, here in Russia, we spoke only Russian; Polish was forbidden. Later, I was practically only short of words; I still had the pronunciation and all that, but I was short of words. I didn’t read anything, there was nothing; I was far away from Poland.)

Today, he teaches Polish to senior citizens and students in Zaporizhzhia and is involved in activity aiming to promote Poland in the region, in which he is assisted by his daughter, Olga Pawluk, deputy chairperson of the association. Jerzy Pawluk explains his view of the question of identity as follows:


(The breeders from the Kremlin have bred the homo sovieticus. It’s thousands and thousands of people; they don’t have their own identity. Those people move here and there; wherever they get something, they will say it’s their nationality. Nobody fostered their national identity, nobody consolidated it; it’s been all the same to them.)

He also comments on the entries indicating ethnicity in official documents and records:

W trzydziestym siódmym roku pod Melitopolem była wieś polska, w tym roku wszyst-
kich tam rozstrzelieli. I wtedy zapisywali już Rosjanin, Ukrainiec. I takich jest sporo u nas w Towarzystwie. Za łapówki przepisywali w dokumentach, z Polaka na inną.
Tu była prowadzona polityka denacjonalizacji, oprócz tego poszli mieszane rodziny, ukraiński albo rosyjski. A to było niebezpieczne mówić, że znasz język polski albo że ktoś tam jest Polakiem [Zaporizhzhia 2007: interview].

(There was a Polish village near Melitopol, and all the people there were shot in 1937. So, people started putting themselves down as Russian or Ukrainian. There are quite a few ones like that in our association. They paid bribes to have their ethnicity changed from Polish to something else in their papers. There was this anti-national policy here; apart from this, there have also been mixed families, Ukrainian or Russian. And it was dangerous to say you knew Polish or that such and such person was Polish.)

He proudly says he is Polish because his parents were Polish, he was born in Poland (and everyone there was Polish), he has a lot of friends in Poland and, most importantly, he speaks the language. He writes about the situation of Poles in the region as follows:

Wiele ludzi nie mają dokumentów potwierdzających ich polskość, ale mają ją w sercu, w pozostałych kartkach, listach, drobiazgach wywiezionych z kraju i przechowywanych przez wieka [Zaporizhzhia 2007: survey].

(Many people don’t have any official documents confirming they are Polish, but they are Polish at heart; they still have various notes, letters or bits and pieces taken from their home country and kept for generations.)

Jerzy Pawluk thinks he is different from Ukrainians or Russians: Ukrainians are miserly and they are always in good mood, and Russians are chauvinists.

6.1.4. Others among Strangers

Lech Aleksy Suchomłynow is much younger: he was born in 1974 in Krasnyi Luch, Luhansk oblast, and has been living in Berdiansk since 1989. His surname, which he takes after his father, who declares himself as Ukrainian, does not indicate his Polish origin. The language spoken in the family has always been Russian. In 1982, Aleksy Suchomłynow’s mother, Teresa née Krasnokucka (born in 1947), found out from her father that she was Polish and Catholic. The family was not convinced about this and began to research their genealogy. Lech Suchomłynow talks about his family roots as follows:

Rodzina Krasnokuckich najprawdopodobniej wywodzi się z drobnej szlachty zamieszkałej gdzieś w centralnej Polsce. Nie wiadomo, w jakich okolicznościach, może za działalność wymierzoną przeciwko caratowi, znalazła się ona na Syberii. Jedne z pierwszych osób, o których wiemy, to Tytus i Barbara Krasnokucz. Tytus pracował w kopalni w Zagłębiu Donieckim, a jego żona Barbara zajmowała się domem. Mieli siedmioro dzieci, ze względu na warunki życiowe i ekonomiczne do 1941 roku dożyło jedynie trzech synów, którzy podobnie jak ich ojciec pracowali w kopalni. Nasza linia
The Polish Minority in South-Eastern Ukraine

pochodzi od Sergiusza, syna Tytusa. Sergiusz urodzony był w 1914 roku [Berdiansk 2011: interview].

(Most probably, the Krasnokucki family originally comes from petty nobility living somewhere in central Poland. We don’t know in what circumstances, perhaps because of their anti-tsarist activity, they ended up in Siberia. One of the first people we know of is Tytus and Barbara Krasnokucki. Tytus worked in a mine in the Donbas, and Barbara, his wife, took care of the household. They had seven children; because of [hard] living conditions, only three sons were still alive in 1941; they worked in the mines, like their father. Our line of the family comes from Sergiusz, a son of Tytus; Sergiusz was born in 1914.)

In 1933, Sergiusz Krasnokucki, Lech Suchomłynow’s grandfather, married Sofia Baturina, who was a Ukrainian. He fought on different fronts of the Second World War and returned home, to the Donbas, when the war was over.

Lech Suchomłynow explains:


(Sergiusz had featured in his identity documents as an ethnic Pole until 1947, when he had this entry changed. The family thought he was concerned about their security and that’s why he made every effort to conceal his Polish origin. His anxiety could also be seen in the way he brought up his daughters. Between themselves, my grandparents spoke a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, the so-called Surzhyk, with Polish words added every now and then by my grandfather, but when they talked to their daughters, they tried to use Russian, the language which dominated in the Donbas.)

1982 proved to be an important year for the Suchomłynow family. It was then that Teresa and her sister Halina (Galina) found out that they were Catholic and Polish after their father. They had grown up in a family of non-believers and they were non-religious themselves. They could only guess that they might have been baptized in an Orthodox church. Until 1990, the information circulated strictly within the closest family and was a source of anxiety: if some of the neighbors or colleagues got to know about their true origin, this might have meant a dismissal, as well as a loss of respect among friends and neighbors.

Lech Suchomłynow explains how the family came to Berdiansk:

W Berdiańsku rodzina znalazła się całkowicie przypadkowo. Jeszcze w okresie pracy zawodowej moich rodziców często przyjeżdżaliśmy do kurortu na wakacje. Po zakończeniu pracy zawodowej przez mojego tatę Mikołaja Suchomłynowa, który był
górnikiem przez całe swoje życie, wszyscy przenieśliśmy się nad Morze Azowskie [Berdiansk 2011: interview].

(It was just a coincidence that we live in Berdiansk. When my parents still used to work, we often came here for holiday. When my dad, Mikołaj Suchomłynow, retired, he had been a miner all his life, we all moved to live on the Sea of Azov.)

In 1992, he began his studies at the Faculty of Ukrainian and Slavic Philology at the Higher Pedagogical School in Berdiansk; he was interested in everything relating to Polish literature, culture and history. He soon came into contact with several people who, still quite tentatively, admitted they were Polish and established the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ (Pol. Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo ‘Odrodzenie’). He tried to find opportunities to take Polish language courses in Poland, which he attended a number of times; he also completed his doctoral studies in Poland. Lech Suchomłynow talks about the association as follows:


(I didn’t realize the situation; I thought it was only me who didn’t know Polish and that other Poles were different. And it’s true that they are. I thought about the name and I decided that it should include the revival of the Polish language and culture. After several years, I can say that it wasn’t about the revival of the Polish language and culture or Polish traditions, but about learning everything from scratch. There was no continuity, it had been lost. So, whatever we’ve done in our association, we’ve done it from scratch. In the early 1990s, in Poland, I begged for books, kids’ books, songbooks; I brought them over here in bags. Of course, my mum had started all this and took care of things; she also took part in Polish courses herself, and so did my sister as well. We managed to get together a group of the eldest Polish people around here and take them over to Poland, to the sanctuary in Stary Borek. They cried, they kissed the ground; to them, it was a new Poland, a different one; a Poland practically none of them knew. We knew we’re a different kind of Poles than those who live in Poland; it’s still going to be that way for a long time. In our heads, we’re still homo sovieticus.)
In his academic work, Lech Suchomłynow studies issues relating to Poland; his doctoral dissertation was devoted to the Polish writer Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (Twórczość Jarosława Iwaszkiewicza okresu międzywojennego: topika i funkcjonalność polsko-ukraińskiego pogranicza kulturowego, Topics and Functions of the Polish–Ukrainian Cultural Borderland in the works of Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz from the interwar period).

He is the main Polish activist in the region; thanks to his efforts, the Polish Center (Pol. Dom Polski) in Berdiansk provides an attractive offer for those interested in the country and its culture (the building was purchased in 2001 from the funds made available by the Polish Senate, the upper chamber of the Polish parliament).

Lech Suchomłynow explains that he is Polish because his mother is, and his grandfather was, Polish; he stresses that Poles in the region are bound by ‘an awareness of origin’ (Pol. świadomość pochodzenia). In his opinion, the Polish organization in the city is needed in order to ‘foster Polishness and a sense of community’ (Pol. krzewić polskość i poczucie wspólnoty).

6.2. Memory of Polish Culture

6.2.1. Contribution of the Jelski Family to the Development of Medicine in the Donbas

The origins of the Jelskis of the Pielesz heraldic clan go back to the second half of the fifteenth century. Their presence in Dobrzyń Land (central Poland) is confirmed in 1500 [Żernicki-Szeliga 1900: 374–377; Paszkiewicz et al. (eds.) 1990: 255]. The Jelskis are no exception to the rule that the history of Polish noble families is often full of gaps which cannot be filled, as records documenting their past perished over the centuries. What remains certain, however, is that members of the Jelski family have made a significant contribution in a number of fields (such as farming methods, economics, music, architecture), and their names feature in history books and encyclopedias. Their service to science and culture in Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania has been extensively documented.

Wiktor Jelski, son of Nikolai, is a representative of the thirteenth generation of the family; he was born in 1933 in Novorossiisk (Russia).

This branch of the Jelski family found themselves in the East as a result of the anti-tsarist activity of his grandfather, Jan Jelski. In 1883, he was stripped of his noble status for his involvement in subversive Polish activity, and forced to join the army as an ordinary rank-and-file soldier. His service record book with an entry specifying that he was a gentleman was confiscated. What survived is a document containing information that he was a Roman Catholic. On release from the army, Jan found a position as a locksmith in Pinsk.
(Ukr. Полісся, Polissia, Pol. Polesie region). He was later deported to Novo-
rossiisk in the North Caucasus, where he worked at the construction of the
Vladikavkaz railway, and where his daughter, Zofia (1897–1962), Wiktor’s
mother, was born.

Zofia Jelska was the second of the six children born to Jan and Hortensja
Jelski. Zofia was an extremely gifted person showing talents for science, arts
and music. In 1914, she was admitted to Kiev University, where she pursued
her studies in natural science, an interest she took after her grandfather, Kon-
stanty Jelski. In 1916, she worked at a military hospital and was transferred
to Rostov-on-Don, where she met Wiktor’s father, Nikolai, a biologist and a gradu-
ate of Warsaw University. They worked together at the Institute of Bacteriol-
ogy headed by the renowned Russian microbiologist and epidemiologist

In Rostov, Zofia Jelska became infected with different varieties of typhoid
she contracted from the patients. She developed a new test to diagnose the
disease, which was successfully applied in the clinic. In 1919, she was an as-
sistant at the Department of Microbiology at the University of Rostov, and in
1920–1922 worked as a director of a marine research station.

Wiktor’s father, Nikolai Blagoveshchenskii (1893–1938) came from a cler-
ical family. He studied at the Medical Faculty at Warsaw University and was
a professor of microbiology at Kazan University, where he headed the Insti-
tute of Bacteriology.

In 1922, Zofia Jelska and Nikolai Blagoveshchenskii married and moved
from Rostov to Kazan, where Zofia decided to continue her studies. In 1925,
she graduated from the Faculty of Mathematics and Physics at Kazan Univer-
sity, while also pursuing studies in agriculture and forestry at Kazan Agricul-
tural Institute, which she completed in 1929. By the time Wiktor’s elder sister,
Irena (Irina) was born (1929), the Blagoveshchenskii had already adopted
two foster sons, Valerii and Viktor, Nikolai’s nephews, whose mother had died
young, and father had been persecuted as an Orthodox priest.

From 1929, Zofia worked at a plant protection research station. She was
the author of a study on cancer of the pith of apple trees, which was high-
ly praised by academics in Russia and other countries, including the United
States. She investigated the condition of the endangered orchard farms in Ta-
taria (today: Tatarstan) and saved them from dying off.

Nikolai Blagoveshchenskii, Wiktor’s father, was a well-known microbiologist
whose works were published in Russia and abroad. Owing to the independent
views he manifested while still in Kazan, he was interrogated and detained
for several months with no charges being brought [Błagowieszczeńska, Jelski
2007: 199].

In 1930, the couple, both renowned medical experts, were invited to work
at the newly established Donetsk Medical Institute (today: the Donetsk Na-
tional Medical University), and became co-founders of this academic center:
Nikolai Blagoveshchenskii set up and headed the Department of Microbiology,
and Zofia Jelska was involved in organizing the Biology Department [Wakulenko, Linczewska 2007: 233].

In December 1937, when little Wiktor was four years old, his father was arrested and sentenced to ‘ten years without the right of correspondence,’ which meant a death sentence; he was executed in 1938. His charges involved ‘harmful activity’ in the field of medicine, contacts with foreigners (he was a graduate of Warsaw University and published abroad), social background (his father was an Orthodox priest), etc. [Iel’skiĭ 2001: 5].

During the Second World War, the family lived in Donetsk, where Zofia worked at a hospital laboratory; she was also involved in the resistance movement against the Germans. Her bacteriological research into cholera saved a number of people in the city in 1943 [Iel’skiĭ 2001: 4]. In 1943, the family received information that Wiktor’s elder brother had been arrested while on the front, repressed as an ‘enemy of the people’ and sent to a Gulag camp in Siberia [Wakulenko, Linczewska 2007: 234].

After the war, Zofia restored the Department of Biology, which she headed for the next five years. In 1948, genetics was officially condemned and branded as hostile to Soviet ideology. Zofia Jelska was soon dismissed as the head of the department and her dissertation was destroyed. She was forced to retire in 1956. All these events affected her health; she died in 1962. Talking about his mother, Wiktor Jelski said: My mother discovered 119 species of plants producing phytoncides, which found their application in medical practice. (Mama odkryła 119 gatunków roślin produkujących fitoncydy, które znalazły zastosowanie w praktyce medycznej) [Donetsk 2007: interview].

For his security, Zofia registered her son Wiktor under her own surname, i.e. Jelski. In one of his interviews, he explained this as follows:


(My mother kept her maiden name and used it to sign her academic works. I was registered in her [internal] passport; after my father’s arrest, we didn’t have his documents, and my birth certificate perished when our house burnt down. We got a reply from Novorossiisk, where I was born, that the birth records had been lost in the war. As a result, quite by accident I am called Jelski. My sister Irina was born in Kazan, so she received a copy of her birth certificate from there, which is why she has our father’s surname: Blagoveshchenskaia.)

* Wiktor completed his school in 1952 and was admitted to the Medical Faculty at the Stalino (Donetsk) Medical Institute, from which he graduated with honors in 1958, to be sent to work at the Department of Pathophysiology. He
wrote a number of academic articles and devoted his doctorate to this field of medicine. In 1966, he became associate professor (Rus. доцент, dotsent) at the department, where he studied treatment of shock. Published in Moscow in 1977, his post-doctoral degree dissertation proposed a new line of research on the problems of extreme states.

Professor Jelski has made a considerable contribution to the development of medical science in Donetsk. Head of the Department of Pathophysiology for over two decades, he formulated a theory of traumatic diseases, authored several monographs, 202 articles and eighteen pioneering research projects; seventy-six of his works were published abroad. He has a vast academic and organizational experience; he has introduced a novel approach to assessing students’ performance, supervised several doctorates, and supported the academic development of sixteen post-doctoral candidates. Some of his former students went on to become world-class specialists, heads of research laboratories and medical departments in Russia, Finland, Germany and France.

Wiktor Jelski is a corresponding member of the National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, a member of the Academic Council for Theoretical and Preventive Medicine at the Presidium of the National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine, and a number of academic committees. He also serves on editorial boards of ten periodicals, including the *Travma (Trauma)*, *Fiziolohichnyi zhurnal (The Physiological Journal)*, *Patolohiia (Pathology)*, and *Universytetska klinika (University Clinics)*.

In spite of his considerable academic involvement, Professor Jelski has found time to pursue his interest in sport, music, literature and painting; he has been a member of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu) since 2002.

This brief sketch of the Jelskis’ contribution to the development of medical science in the region would not be complete without a mention of the next, fourteenth generation of this Polish noble family: both Wiktor Jelski’s sons graduated from the Donetsk Medical Institute; Andrzej is a member of the academic staff of the Faculty of Traumatology and Orthopedics at Moscow Clinical Institute, and Konstanty, Doctor of Medical Science, works at Donetsk Medical University [Wakulenko, Linczewska 2007: 240].

Despite his advanced age, Wiktor Jelski continues to take active part in professional and social life of Donetsk and Ukraine.

I have presented a sketch of the tragic story of the Jelskis of the Donbas, focusing mainly on Wiktor Jelski’s parents, renowned medical professors: Zofia Jelska and Nikolai Blagoveshchenskii, the founders and heads of two departments at the Donetsk Medical Institute. His father was killed as an ‘enemy of the people,’ the fate shared by a number of ethnic Poles and Germans, and his mother was persecuted, dismissed from her position and refused credit for her academic achievement by Soviet propaganda. Wiktor Jelski and his parents are an example of Polish noble families and their descendants who made a contribution to the region.
Today, members of the Jelski family live not only on the outskirts of the historical Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also in different parts of the world. They remain in contact, visit one another and share their photographs and family memorabilia.

6.2.2. Andrzej Korwacki: The Father of Melitopol Orchards

Andrzej Korwacki was born in 1844 in Kherson as the eldest of eleven children. His grandfather, Stanisław Korwacki, had lived in Cracow, and this is where Andrzej’s father, Waclaw, was born. In 1830–1831, Stanisław Korwacki had sheltered one of the organizers of the November Uprising, which earned him death penalty. His widow, Andrzej’s grandmother, who was left on her own with three little sons to provide for, fell seriously ill; Waclaw was twelve at the time. The children left home and went their separate ways. Having joined a group of traveling salesmen, Waclaw found himself in Kherson, where he spent the rest of his life. Andrzej Korwacki’s mother, Elżbieta, was a housewife [Reznik 2003: 60–61].

Ever since his early childhood, Andrzej was interested in medicine and planned to study in the imperial capital. On graduation from secondary school for boys in Kherson (1868), he was admitted to the Imperial Medical and Surgical Academy in Saint Petersburg, one of the most prestigious medical academies in Russia at the time [Korvatskiĭ 1994: 1]. It is interesting to mention that the journey from his home town to the capital was far from easy: he went by boat from Kherson to Nikopol, where he boarded the train: first the so-called long-carriage to Kharkiv, then the mail carriage on the Kursk-bound train, finally – a standard train from there to Petersburg via Moscow. The journey took over ten days [Reznik 2003: 66].

After his first year of studies, the academy became a scene of student riots and strikes in protest against tight police control of higher educational institutions and against backwardness. An organizer of student meetings, Korwacki found himself in trouble following the speech he delivered in one of them: he was arrested, imprisoned, tried and sent back home to his parents in Kherson, where he was to remain under strict police supervision. Although his expulsion from the academy theoretically could have been revoked, this hope proved illusory [Vol’vach, Dubrovskiĭ 2007: 9–20].

It was not until 1872 that Andrzej Korwacki received a permit to leave for Odessa, where his brother, Jan, worked as a secondary school teacher and library director. He tried to enrol at the University of New Russia, but his application was rejected by the authorities. While in Odessa, he met Daria Lubinska, his future wife and the mother of their four sons.

In 1873, Korwacki went to Germany, where he studied medicine at Würzburg University (Bavaria). He also pursued his broad-ranging interests, took a number of various courses, including pomiculture and vine-growing, and expanded his experience, also through contacts with his fellow students [Reznik 2004:
In 1877, Andrzej Korwacki returned to his homeland. However, he could not work as a medical practitioner until his German degree was formally recognized in Russia. He passed all the exams required for the procedure at the University of St Vladimir in Kiev (today: the Taras Shevchenko National University), and in 1878 his dreams came true: he received a degree which qualified him to work as a surgeon in the Russian Empire.

Although he was offered an academic position in Kiev, he left the city driven by his desire to ‘serve the people’ and began to work in the Chernihiv province. In October 1878, he moved to Vasylivka in Melitopol district, from where he was sent to take the post of head doctor at Melitopol hospital. He soon earned respect and reputation both among his associates and patients in the area. The best surgeon in Melitopol, he continued to hold his hospital position until his death in 1907.

Andrzej Korwacki, Polish by origin, became part of the history of the region not only as an excellent surgeon, but also the best vine grower and orchard farmer. He successfully performed operations which, considering medical equipment available in the period, were very complex indeed. He also attached great importance to medical help for the poor of the district, including emergency home visits he made himself.

Korwacki devoted his free time to experimenting with fruit tree and vine growing. He became interested in the sandy area around the town, locally known as sheliuga (from willows which were planted to keep the sands from shifting); dust blown with the wind sometimes made it difficult to breathe for miles around.

He knew that the sands around Melitopol were fertile land which only needed to be properly prepared to plant fruit trees, and began accumulating small plots in the area in 1883. The first one he bought was in the village of Semenivka, and he expanded his orchards and vineyards each year.

Korwacki was the first to import the best varieties of grapevine and fruit trees of different species, such as cherries (‘Franz Josef,’ jaboulay, ‘French,’ ‘Napoleon’), all of which turned out to grow well in the climate of southern Ukraine. The range of varieties he imported and grew on around thirty hectares of his land was impressive: pears (seventy-five varieties), apples (forty varieties), cherries and sweet cherries (forty varieties), apricots (over ten varieties), grapevine (over forty varieties).

As an orchardist, he was focused on perfecting them and making them more suited to the local climate. He was absolutely in love with his orchards and, assisted by his wife Daria, devoted nearly all his free time to them. Indeed, the sources from the period confirm that they were expertly run. Considering
the shortage of water in the area, Korwacki’s tree nursery in Stara Dacha had
a purpose-built well with a capacity of over 15,000 buckets of water a day to
irrigate the orchards. It is interesting to note that the site is occupied by a tree
nursery also today.

He was in contact with a number of orcharding experts, particularly for-
eign ones, and swapped saplings with them; for example, he wrote:

Сильные юго-восточные ветры, преобладающие в нашей степной местности,
летние продолжительные засухи, недостаток воды, пригородной для оро-
шения сада, и многие другие обстоятельства и соображения побуждали меня
начать акклиматизацию плодовых деревьев в форме полуштамба и австра-
лийского куста [after Reznik 2004: 37–38].

(Strong south-easterly winds prevailing in our steppe area, prolonged summer
droughts, shortage of water suitable for irrigating the orchard, as well as many other
factors and considerations gave me an idea to prune and train fruit trees to form
half-standards (polushtamb) and Australian bushes (avstraliĭskiĭ kust).)

Once trained to suit the climate better, the trees did not require any par-
ticular care in summer or winter and produced good crops; Korwacki gave the
saplings away to his friends and patients. He used apples and apple juice in
the treatment of digestive diseases, diabetes, as well as heart, liver and kidney
conditions; baked and grated, apples were also applied in duodenal diseases.

Andrzej Korwacki initially experimented mainly with apple trees and
turned his particular attention to the American variety called Filiber’s
reinette, which was sent over to Melitopol by a firm from Paris. His other fo-
cus of interest was sweet cherries, where the best variety was ‘Franz Josef’
he bought from Austria. Orchard farming in the district rapidly developed,
with the total area of orchards reaching over 10,000 desiatinas. The rate of the
growth can be seen from the figures for fruit shipped from Melitopol railway
station (in puds): 1904: 33,000; 1905: 62,000; 1906: 54,941; 1907: 96,000
[Luk’ianov 1908].

Fruits from Korwacki’s orchards and vineyards were known in the country
(e.g. Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Katerynoslav, the Crimea) and abroad; he re-
ceived golden and silver medals in a number of international fairs, including
those in Yalta (1897), Paris (1901) and Reims, France (1903) [Spisok 1901].

Andrzej Korwacki died in 1907 and was buried in Melitopol. In 1922, all
his orchards and vineyards were taken over by the state, with most of them
allocated to an orchard farming research station. Today, Nova Dacha, with his
forgotten grave on the grounds, is the center of the Research Institute of Irri-
gated Horticulture, and all fruit trees grown on the land that once was his are
still watered from the well he drilled in 1903.

Until the end of his life, Korwacki was under police supervision as a de-
portee from the capital. Although he was much appreciated as a professional
medic and horticulturalist, as soon as the word spread that he was involved in revolutionary activity of 1905, the governor-general of the province in Simferopol received letters denouncing him as a ‘democrat’ spreading ‘subversive’ ideology, and demanding that he should be sent as far east as only possible. However, thanks to the respect he had earned and to his highly professional services rendered not only to ordinary people, but also to members of the authorities, including the police, he was able to remain in Melitopol until his death.

As a physician, Andrzej Korwacki made every effort to improve the quality of drinking water in town: he conducted hydrological surveys indicating suitable locations for three-hundred-meter-deep drills, and offered advice on how the aquifer (which is a source of drinking water for the town until today) should be exploited; the local water supply system was built in 1887. He also located a mineral spring and used its water for medical purposes; since 1949, it has been bottled and sold as Melitopolskaia mineral water [Reznik 1999: 55–57]. On his initiative, a sanitary and epidemiological station was established in the town in 1897. From 1899, he was involved in the design and construction of the new hospital, which exists until today (as Melitopol City Hospital No. 1).

As can be seen from the above biographical portrait, Andrzej Korwacki made a significant contribution both to local healthcare and orchard farming. The orchards and vineyards which he started have been a landmark of Melitopol area and a source of its prosperity ever since. In this context, it is interesting to note the following comment published by the Plodovodstvo (Orcharding) magazine from 1905:

В 1883 году в «Сахаре» начал расти виноград. Потом черешня, вишня, абрикосы, персик... безрадостная «Сахара» превратилась в роскошный промысловый сад, что раскинулся правильными рядами лучших южных сортов груш, яблонь, персиков, абрикос и черешен. Деревья, выращенные на песчаном грунте, поражают своим здоровым и красивым декоративным видом, густыми листьями, необычайно правильным и щедрым урожаем [after Sushko 1976].

(The first grapevine seedlings began to grow in this Sahara-like area in 1883. Then there were cherry, plum, apricot and peach trees... And so the desolate arid wilderness has been transformed into a magnificent industrial-scale orchard, spreading out in straight rows of the best southern varieties of pear, apple, peach, apricot and sweet cherry trees. Growing on sandy soil, they strike us with their astonishingly healthy and beautifully decorative appearance, lush foliage, and unusually regular and generous crops.)

Indeed, thanks to Andrzej Korwacki, Melitopol is known as the ‘City of Cherries’ until today.
6.2.3. Ludwik Godlewski: A Forgotten Polish Painter

Ludwik Godlewski, a medical doctor by profession and a painter by passion, was born on 30 May 1891 in Kiev. In 1907–1911, he attended secondary school for boys in Petrozavodsk (north-western Russia). A graduate from the Medical Faculty of the University of St Vladimir in Kiev, he was interested in painting and attended courses at the Academy of Arts. During the First World War (from 1916) he worked as the head of a hospital ward in Dobruja. Fragmentary records indicate that in 1926 he worked as a doctor in the town of Izium in Kharkiv province. In 1927, he moved to Berdiansk, where he specialized in diagnostics and ophthalmology. During the Second World War he helped people of Berdiansk to avoid deportation to Germany as coercive labor force: he issued certificates specifying they were unfit to work, or even diagnosed terminal diseases. After the war, he continued his career as a doctor. He died in 1974 and was buried in a local cemetery.

The subjects of Godlewski’s paintings revolve around historical events in the region, the daily life of its people and the urban landscape. He is the author of 250 pictures, twenty-four of which, including *Pierwsze spotkanie mieszkańców Berdiańska w dniu wyzwolenia* (*The first meeting of the people of Berdiansk after the liberation*), are held at the Berdiansk Regional Museum [Nozdrina (ed.) 2011].

His works, known only to very limited audience, were presented in an exhibition entitled ‘Ludwik Godlewski – malarz, lekarz, Polak, patriota’ (Ludwik Godlewski – painter, doctor, Pole, patriot) opened on 27 May 2011 in Berdiansk. Commemorating the 120th anniversary of the birth of the artist, the event was held as part of the ‘Polish Culture Festival’ (Pol. *Dni Kultury Polskiej*), organized by the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ (Pol. *Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo ‘Odrodzenie’*). The life and work of this Polish doctor and artist living in Ukraine brings the two countries and nations closer together.

On 3 December 2011, a memorial plaque was unveiled on the wall of the Medical College on the grounds of the City Hospital in Berdiansk. Founded by the General Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv, it bears the following inscription:


Ludwik Godlewski’s outstanding personality and original paintings, his life, career and respect he commanded among the people of Berdiansk come as proof that harmonious coexistence and cooperation of different ethnic and cultural communities living in south-eastern Ukraine is possible.

Thanks to the first public exhibition of his paintings, the people of Berdiansk and visitors to the city had an opportunity to become acquainted with the works of this local Polish artist.

* * *

As can be seen, the autobiographical accounts of the four informants in Chapter 6.1 are concerned with a number of important problems, including space (such as their home region), political changes, their otherness in the Russian-speaking environment, and their perception of Polishness.

In the accounts, the spatial aspect is related to the sense of rootedness, a sense of awareness and memory of one’s own place from the past. Writing on this issue, Małgorzata Melchior observes:


(It would seem that in order to define his or her own identity, the individual has to develop a sense of spatial attachment, which requires a knowledge of their own ‘roots,’ of their origin – social, historical, cultural, etc. Indeed, a sense of self-identity is shaped in response not only to the question ‘Who am I?’ but also ‘Where am I from?’.)

Each of the above examples of autobiographical accounts is connected with the place of birth, a private homeland. Each displays

bezpośredni stosunek osobisty, przywiązanie do środowiska, w którym spędziło się życie albo znaczną część życia, czy wreszcie okres szczególnie podatny na tworzenie się trwałych więzi emocjonalnych, przede wszystkim okres dzieciństwa [Ossowski 1984: 26].

(an immediate personal relationship, an attachment to the environment in which one has spent their life, or a large part of it, or a period of life, such as childhood, typically involving the formation of lasting emotional bonds.)

This can be observed in the life stories of Halina Petkiewicz, Ryszard Zieliński and Jerzy Pawluk. The authors constantly returned to their childhood and their
family home, where they had used to speak Polish. There is no sense of rootedness without an awareness of the past involving a knowledge of historical, cultural and family origin. A sense of spatial attachment makes it possible to form a definition of oneself.

The narratives quoted above include references to places which the informants find important, such as the place where they were born, spent their childhood, places which have a symbolic value or the ones they have lost. Some of those places are indelibly imprinted in their memory because of a particular attachment the narrators feel, or, as wounded memory, because of dramatic experiences they went through. The good and bad memories seem to be clearly separated. The informants joyfully and sometimes solemnly talk about the good ones, as can be seen in Ryszard Zieliński’s comments on his Polish school and teachers. On the other hand, the narrators from the older generation talk about the pre-war times or the time of their childhood in a particular way, trying to avoid their dramatic experiences. Indeed, the memory of wounds, such as loss of their home and members of their family, loss of contact with the Polish language, is sometimes fragmentary. In the case of some informants it was probably so tragic that they simply refuse to talk about it: I haven’t told my granddaughter we used to be Poles, because they can get [her] deported to Siberia, like my dad; and I won’t tell you anything more either (Nie mówię wnuczce, że byliśmy Polakami, bo mogą zesłać do Syberii, jak mojego tatę; i pani więcej nic nie powiem) [Donetsk 2010: interview]. In the case of the first three narratives, the 1930s and the beginning of the Second World War marked the end of the rooted order of their childhood worlds. For the older generation, the period from then on until the 1990s was the time of concealing anything that could possibly relate them to Polishness. Their place in the world became unsettled and liable to change. The period is often omitted in the narratives, which is an indication of wounded memory which has not yet been healed. Also, the narration is often fragmentary and does not form a sequence of events.

Political changes in Central and Eastern Europe made it possible to look at the past from a different perspective. In the narratives, the past does not exist without the present. Indeed, the comparison and contrast between the two is mentioned quite often: ‘then’ and ‘now,’ ‘before’ and ‘after the war,’ ‘under the Soviet Union’ and ‘in Ukraine.’ In Lech Suchomłynow’s narrative, biographical memory appears as a ‘discovery’: a discovery of who he could be, who he really is, and why. Why was it that the roots of his maternal grandfather gave him an idea to search for and finally identify with his grandfather’s national heritage and make it his own?

The narratives indicate an awareness of twofold otherness. Although the informants are Russian speakers immersed in Russian high culture and the Russian literary canon is their own, they see themselves as different in the Russian-speaking environment of the region. This is mainly because of their religion (cf. Ryszard Zieliński above); they are also aware of other ethnic
minorities, such as German, Armenian, Greek, or Belarusian. On the other hand, they are ‘different than the Poles in Poland’: We’re different than the Poles in Poland; there’s still homo sovieticus in us (Jesteśmy inni niż Polacy w Polsce, u nas jeszcze mocno tkwi homo sovieticus) [Berdiansk 2011: interview]. Their communicative memory also includes personal experience of otherness:


(I’ve been called Russkii in Poland, what can you do. At home, they call me names because I’m Polish, and in Poland they call me names because I’m Russian. Poles don’t know that Ukraine is a different country [than Russia]; I’d rather they called me Ukrainian and not Russian, at least.)

The discourse of otherness among the Poles in south-eastern Ukraine involves also common experience. It certainly has not been the same in the case of all the narrators: the ones from the older generation originally came from different regions, inherited different cultural values in their childhood, and, prior to their arrival in the region, their lives ran along different paths. However, what they all share in common is the experience of living in the region and, until 1990, the attendant lack of contact with the Polish language, access to Polish organizations and Roman Catholic churches, as well as fear of the neighbors and practically anyone else around other than Polish.

The informants have perceived themselves as ‘others’ also after the perestroika. All narratives reveal an awareness of common ancestry, a sense of community and engagement in fostering Polishness. However, one of the informants comments that what was intended as a revival of Polish identity actually meant building it from scratch as the cultural continuity had been lost. Polish associations and activists in the region have thus faced ‘patchwork’ Polishness: None of our people knew what 3 May or 11 November holidays are about. I read about them on the Internet and told them about it in our gala meetings. I taught children patriotic songs and poems (Nikt z naszych nie wiedział, co to jest za święto 3 Maja czy 11 Listopada. Czytałem w Internecie i przekazywałem na apelach. Uczyłem dzieci patriotycznych piosenek, wierszy) [Berdiansk 2011: interview].

In some autobiographical accounts, not only those presented above, Polishness features as part of wounded memory: All the Poles there were shot as the ‘fifth column’ (Polaków tam wszystkich rozstrzelali jako piąte kolumny); Poles were treated as spies (Polaków traktowali jako szpiegów); for Russians, Poles were the enemies (Polacy byli wrogami dla Russkich); Poles have always been rebellious, there’s always been a problem with them (Polacy zawsze się buntowali, byli niewygodni) [Zaporizhzhia 2011: interviews]. On the other hand, some informants emphasize their positive experience of Polishness: We, Poles, we were
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respected in Tarnopol [Ukr. Ternopil] (Nas Polaków szanowano w Tarnopolu); We had more culture than the Russians (U nas była wyższa kultura niż u Rosjan); Our people were honest and they helped one another (Nasi byli uczciwi i pomagali wzajemnie) [Zaporizhzhia 2011: interviews].

As presented by the narrators, Polishness is an essential part of their lives. However, the first two narratives indicate the lack of continuity of Polish identity in the next generations. Indeed, Halina Petkiewicz’s children and grandchildren do not feel Polish and are not interested in what their parents or grandparents went through. They are assimilated with the Russian-speaking environment, but who do they feel they are? Likewise, Ryszard Zieliński’s daughters do not speak Polish at home or engage in the life of the Polish community. In this way, they relinquish the heritage of their father’s culture. Thus, in the case of these narratives we can observe the discontinuity of cultural memory.

The last two narratives in the first part of the present chapter indicate an awareness of responsibility for the future and the attendant activity aiming to foster Polishness. In my opinion, however, the question remains whether Polish heritage can survive in the region and be transmitted to the next generations, or whether it is going to continue only as long as Poland is still found attractive. Cultivated among the communities of members of Polish associations today, the memory of Polish experience might survive in family memory tomorrow. Although the efforts of Polish organizations in this field command great respect, I believe it is the family environment that is crucial to the formation of personal identity.

While Chapter 6.1 presents the importance of communicative memory, the second part is focused on the contribution of selected individuals and families both to Polish culture, and the culture, science and economy of south-eastern Ukraine. Based on secondary sources, their biographical portraits reveal different perspectives of time, space and achievement.

I have briefly outlined the historical contribution of the Jelski family, which constitutes an important component of Polish culture. This pertains to both the earlier generations active over several centuries on the eastern outskirts of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and those living in Donetsk today. Indeed, the Jelskis have preserved their family memory going back as many as thirteen generations. The family has produced distinguished sculptors, architects, political activists, naturalists, musicians and doctors. The Jelski surname features in Polish encyclopedias, which may serve as evidence of their importance for Polish national culture. However, family memory also abounds in traumatic experiences: some of its members were deprived of their noble title and of human dignity, deported into the Russian interior as a result of repressions; many of them perished in the course of turbulent historical events. Still, importantly, biographical and familial memory continues, and the Jelskis from Ukraine, Poland and Belarus organize meetings of the clan. Wiktor Jelski, a representative of the family currently living in Donetsk, is well aware of his historical roots and passes on the memory of his family’s
contribution to Polish culture to his children and grandchildren, irrespective of the language of communication (at present the Jelskis in Donetsk use Russian at home). Wiktor Jelski’s grandchildren learn Polish and are interested in their ancestors’ genealogy: in 2007 Jan Jelski, aged sixteen at the time, made the following comment:

Kontynuując działalność polonijną w Towarzystwie Kultury Polskiej Donbasu, pragnę pracować dla kraju, w którym mieszkam – Ukrainy, i dla Polski, dla naszego narodu, jak to robił daleki przodkowie Jelscy. Tym bardziej zobowiązuję mnie to, że jestem przedstawicielem najmłodszego, piętnastego pokolenia Jelskich [Jelski 2007: 359].

(By continuing my activity in the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas, I wish to work for Ukraine, the country in which I live, and for Poland, our nation, like our forefathers, the Jelskis. I feel even more obliged to do this, considering that I’m a representative of the youngest, fifteenth generation of the family.)

The life and achievement of Andrzej Korwacki, an excellent surgeon and pioneer of orchard farming on the sands of Melitopol area, serves as another example of the contribution which Poles have made to the region. This is also the case of Ludwik Godlewski, who was not only a medical doctor but also a gifted painter. Born in 1891 in Kiev, he spent most of his life in Berdiansk.

The above presentation of examples of narrative and biographical memory is not extensive or exhaustive, but indicates the importance of the subject in the study of cultural identity.
CONCLUSION

The great change of 1991, when Ukrainian independence brought political and cultural freedom, came as a surprise to most people in Ukraine. The new reality of developing Ukrainian democracy stimulated a search for new individual and collective identities, and the Polish minority in the country has been no exception to this general process.

Over the centuries, south-eastern Ukraine has been a multi-ethnic region populated by a number of ethnic communities displaying different levels of national awareness. Following independence, the masses of the ‘Soviet nation’ of the south-east suddenly faced the question of their identity. This was the case also among Ukrainians, especially those living in the region, who in fact did not have a fully developed sense of distinct cultural or national identity. The fundamental questions of Ukrainian cultural identity in the new reality are discussed by Ola Hnatiuk [Hnatiuk 2003].

Janusz Rieger, referring particularly to the question of the Polish language in the part of Ukraine which belonged to Russia after the Second Partition (1793), and formed part of the Soviet Union in the interwar period, observed:

Nie ma „typowych Polaków na Ukrainie”, są konkretni Polacy, mieszkający w konkret-nych warunkach, stykający się z konkretnymi Ukraińcami. I jedni, i drudzy bywają bardzo różni [Rieger 1996b: 111].

(There are no such people as ‘typical Poles in Ukraine.’ There are particular Polish people, living in a particular environment, in which they are in contact with particular Ukrainians. Both of them might be very different.)

Indeed, my studies in the region have entirely confirmed this view.

It is a well-known fact that Ukraine is a politically, culturally and linguistically divided country. The western regions are closer to Poland not only in the geographical sense: the culture and mentality of the people living in the

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1 The author offers a discussion of new visions of the place of Ukrainian culture in the changing world, changes in Ukrainian culture following the independence, and changes in the definitions of Ukrainian cultural and national identity at the turn of the millennium [Hnatiuk 2003: 9].
territories which for centuries used to belong to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are quite different than in the east of Ukraine. While Poles in the west often still form territorial communities, those living in the south-east have always been dispersed and, as a result, have become assimilated with the Russian-speaking environment in the region. Another factor at play here was that they originally came to this industrial and highly urbanized area from different parts of the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and different regions of Soviet Ukraine; there were also those who were born in the territories which belonged to the Second Polish Republic in the interwar period. The fact remains, however, that Poles have lived in the region for a considerable period and have made a contribution to its economic and cultural development.

South-eastern Ukraine has had a turbulent history. First populated by different nomadic peoples, the steppe known as the Wild Plains (Pol. Dzikie Pola) later formally belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or the Ottoman Empire. In the eighteenth century, the region became part of the Russian Empire, and in the nineteenth century was administered within the Katerynoslav and Taurida provinces. The Ukrainian National Republic established in 1917 was soon followed by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1920).

The Donetsk oblast is the most industrial part of the country; its capital, known as the ‘city of roses,’ was established in 1869 following the industrial activity of the Welsh entrepreneur John Hughes, who built steelworks and several collieries in the seventeenth-century settlements in the area. Apart from Donetsk itself, the main industrial centers of the region are Artemivsk, Horlivka, Lenakiieve, Kramatorsk, Makiivka, Mariupol, and Torez. Poles have made a considerable contribution to their development and played an important role in the Roman Catholic parishes in the region, particularly after 1991.

The Zaporizhzhia oblast was established in 1939; its major urban centers include Zaporizhzhia, Berdiansk, Melitopol and Tokmak, all of which have members of the Polish ethnic minority.

Considering the ethnic composition of the two provinces, Ukrainians form the majority in both of them, while the second largest group are Russians. Other ethnic communities which have made a contribution to the development of the region and still form a part of its population include Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, Jews, Czechs, Tatars, Poles, Armenians and many others. The process of industrialization and the Stalinist policy aiming to create a homogenous state of the so-called titular (i.e., Russian) nation were a blow to ethnic and cultural diversity. As a result, today the region is quite uniform in terms of language with the majority of the population using Russian. However, a number of ethnic minority associations that have been established since independence engage in teaching and promotion of minority languages, contributing to the revival of multiculturalism and tolerance in south-eastern Ukraine.

Centuries ago, Poles first came to the region to seek refuge from exploitation or punishment at home; more recently, they arrived as voluntary economic
migrants or deportees to the mines of the Donbas. Repressed as the ‘fifth column’ under the Soviet Union, they were exterminated and humiliated because of their origin and Roman Catholic faith. Indeed, seventy years of the Soviet policy aimed to erase them from the ethnic map of the country. On the other hand, Poles were considered good specialists in a number of fields and had a good reputation among the Russians and other ethnic communities as hard-working, cultured and honest people. This was particularly difficult to achieve considering the hardships of everyday life they faced in their work and education.

The questions of Ukrainian policy towards ethnic minorities after 1990 are outlined in Chapter 2. As presented, the legal framework, including the constitution, clearly defines what groups of citizens are considered a minority and provides guarantees of their rights. Members of the Polish minority fully exercise the rights to which they are entitled and form officially registered associations, pursuing their activity with various level of success.

In the Zaporizhzhia oblast, there are five Polish associations (three of them based in the regional capital) with a total membership of 466; Poles from Bohatyriivka and Liutserna do not belong to any of them. Although the recently established Polish association in Berdiansk has forty-one members, the figure does not reflect the actual size of the Polish community in the city, which is much larger. There are two Polish associations registered in Donetsk alone; one of them, the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu) has over ten local branches and almost seven hundred members, which makes it the largest Polish organization in the region. Another center of Polish activity in the province is Makivka, where two local Polish associations count 402 members. It is worth noting that Polish organizations are not exclusive in terms of the ethnic origin of their members, and they are open both to Ukrainians and other ethnic communities, as is evident even from some of their names, e.g. the Polish-Ukrainian Cultural Association (Pol. Polsko-Ukraińska Stowarzyszenie Kulturalne) in Mariupol, or the Melitopol Ukrainian-Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Polonia’ (Pol. Melitopolskie Ukraińsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Kulturalno-Oświatowe ‘Polonia’).

Considering the size of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, the number of Polish organizations seems relatively low: there are ten independent Polish associations with eleven local branches and a total membership of over two thousand. Nevertheless, they conduct a broad range of cultural activities including concerts, exhibitions, Polish Culture Festivals (Pol. Dni Kultury Polskiej). There are also a number of Polish folk, song, dance and music groups with a total of about 230 members, who are actively engaged in promoting Polish culture; they have received international awards and honorable mentions.

In south-eastern Ukraine, Polish courses are organized by: institutions of higher education (almost 800 students), secondary schools (almost 230), Saturday and Sunday schools (35), Polish associations (228), Roman Catholic parishes (about 130); 42 people attend other types of courses. The figures quoted here
obviously keep changing; however, based on my research which began in 2007, I can conclude that the interest in learning Polish is increasing, particularly among young people, and so is the number of those attending the courses.

1990 saw the beginning of the revival of the Roman Catholic Church. Each of the urban centers included in the study has a local parish church, established by members of the Polish community. Priests working in the region are mainly from Poland and Ukraine; in some parishes, there have also been ones from Austria, Russia, Italy, Slovakia and other countries. The Roman Catholic community in the region counts about two thousand members of different ethnic backgrounds and is growing.

The linguistic situation of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine is highly complex, as the region is characterized by different varieties of spoken Polish influenced by language contact with Ukrainian and Russian. The self-assessment survey of the command of Polish included such categories as: ‘I can speak and write well,’ ‘I can speak well, but I can’t write,’ ‘I’m an average speaker, but I can’t write’; by far the largest number of those questioned declared that they could not speak Polish or use it in writing (49 respondents from the older generation, 66 from the middle generation and 27 from the younger generation); there were also those who could not speak or write and only knew Polish prayers or songs.

Today, there are no Poles in the region who would use Polish at home or in the neighborhood on a daily basis. The language of everyday communication in the family domain is Russian and/or Ukrainian, while the one used in contact with the neighbors is mostly Russian. The findings of the survey concerning the language(s) used for everyday communication in the family domain conducted among the respondents declaring themselves as Polish, were as follows: the older generation: Russian: 39%, Ukrainian: 45%, Russian and Ukrainian: 16%; the middle generation: Russian: 57%, a ‘mixed’ language, i.e. Surzhyk: 24%, Russian and Ukrainian: 9%, Ukrainian: 10%; the younger generation (born after 1975): Russian: 77%, Ukrainian and Russian: 15%, Ukrainian: 8%. A description of the language of everyday communication in the family domain takes into consideration the fact that the Polish community has been living among other ethnic groups bound together by the Russian language, and its linguistic situation has been shaped by such important factors as the geographical dispersion of the community, mixed marriages, and the Russian-speaking environment.

Members of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine are active users of two languages, Ukrainian and Russian. Even though they use Polish only exceptionally, they might be described as multilingual. The above study includes a detailed description of different models of becoming, and functioning as, a multilingual person in different age groups. The multilingualism of the Polish minority in the region results from a number of factors, mainly the historical and political context (such as coercive or voluntary settlement in the south-east) and the state language policy. The demographic characteristics
of the Polish minority also played an important role with its dispersed pattern of settlement and a considerable geographical distance from the Polish border.

Since the early nineteenth century, Polish speakers in south-eastern Ukraine have also used, to various extents and degrees, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian, which has led to the emergence of Polish-Ukrainian/Belarusian, Polish-Russian bilingualism or Polish-Ukrainian/Belarusian-Russian trilingualism. The linguistic systems used by the informants have developed as a result of contact between the following Slavic languages: Polish and Russian or Surzhyk; Polish, Ukrainian and Russian; Russian, Ukrainian and Polish (currently being learned by a certain proportion of the population under consideration); Ukrainian, Russian and Polish learned as a foreign language.

A survey of attitudes to Polish, Ukrainian and Russian reveals that while the older generation is positive about all three of them, some respondents in the middle age group have their reservations about Ukrainian, to which, on the other hand, the younger generation is inclined very positively.

Considering that the linguistic codes in question are closely related, it is hardly surprising that interference is a common feature in the use of language among the Poles in the region. Indeed, interference phenomena are observed in the phonetic, inflectional and syntactic systems, as well as in vocabulary. The spoken language of the respondents often involves the phenomenon referred to as Surzhyk, a pattern of mixing Ukrainian and Russian. Indeed, the older and the middle generation of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine frequently rely on Surzhyk as a means of oral communication (particularly in the family and among the neighbors) and they are aware that they speak 'a mixed language.' The results of the study indicate that Surzhyk is the most popular among the informants of rural origin.

The language policy favoring Russian induced changes in the use of language in the family and neighborhood. According to official statistics, only a fraction of the Polish minority in the Donetsk (4.1%) and Zaporizhzhia (4.0%) oblasts consider Polish their native language, with the majority declaring Ukrainian (Donetsk oblast: 19.3%, Zaporizhzhia oblast: 38.0%) or Russian (75.7% and 56.8%, respectively) as their mother tongue. In the area under consideration, Russian has long played the most considerable role and remains the most widely used language today; it is also the language of high culture: theater, cinema, literature.

In the educational system, Polish is taught both as a compulsory subject and an optional course. There are a number of people from different age groups interested in learning the language; their motivation is to become familiar with the language of their ancestors, or to acquire language skills necessary when going to Poland.

Russian is also the dominant language in the sphere of religion. Indeed, even if the ordinary parts of the Mass are said in Polish, it is often the case that the readings, the gospel and the sermon are in Russian. Ukraine does not have any official regulations concerning the use of language in the Roman
Catholic Church; the language of liturgy is subject to the preferences of the local parishioners. 

The Polish print media issued in the region (e.g., the Polacy Donbasu [The Poles of the Donbas] magazine) play an important role, as they provide members of the older generation who do not have access to the Internet with an opportunity to keep in contact with written Polish.

The chairpersons of Polish organizations face a difficult task. They try to locate and reach as many Poles as possible and convince them to openly declare their Polish identity. The region of their activity is geographically distant from Poland and both cooperation with, and presentation of, modern Poland is often quite difficult. The development of the Polish language and other subjective aspects of Polish identity is largely dependent on the activity of Polish organizations and involvement of their chairpersons.

Today, the Polish language in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts has a symbolic, cognitive and economic function. The symbolic significance of Polish is observed particularly in the older generation as the language provides them with a sense of identity.

The situation of the Polish minority in the region is particularly complex, and the answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ – particularly difficult. The results of the pilot survey conducted in the south-east revealed the following indicators of Polish identity:
- blood ties, i.e. I am Polish because my parents are/were Polish,
- official documents indicating Polish ethnic origin,
- religion,
- language.

As it turns out from the analysis of the data provided by 430 questionnaires completed in all urban centers included in the main survey, 188 respondents identified themselves as Polish motivating this by the fact that at least one of their parents is/was Polish, and a further thirteen by having Polish relatives. This brings the number of those who declared themselves as Polish on the basis of their blood ties to the total of 201. Another criterion of Polishness, the Roman Catholic religion, was declared by 178 respondents; the least frequently selected motive for Polish identity was the knowledge of the language (46). Five respondents specified other reasons for their self-identification as Polish.

The sense of Polish national identity in south-eastern Ukraine is far weaker than in Carpathian Bukovina, where the life of the local Poles concentrated around the family and, in spite of the Soviet ban, the Roman Catholic Church. In this spirit, they also used to meet in some rural homes which sometimes served as premises to run Polish classes. In this way, the continuity of Polish tradition, language, culture and memory in Bukovina was preserved. On the other hand, Poles in eastern Ukraine were geographically dispersed and had no contact with Poland, the Roman Catholic Church or Polish organizations throughout the period of Soviet rule, with the continuity of Polish tradition broken as a result. The Polish identity which is currently developing in the region is...
a ‘new kind of Polishness’ (Pol. nowy rodzaj polskości). It is adapted from Poland or ‘imported’ in a ready-made form via television or the Internet. The teaching of Polish to the Polish minority in the region should adopt a new approach and apply new methods. It is also important to work out a model of education of the new generation of Poles with a clearly developed national awareness.

The older generation of Poles in south-eastern Ukraine have been through many hardships. They were often forced to work in atrocious conditions, some of them suffered from the famine, others were deported to Siberia. Their memory has preserved Polishness and the image of Poland as they used to be in their original home regions. The final chapter presents a number of narratives featuring the role of language, identity and sense of Polishness in their past experience and today. Historically, Poles made a significant contribution to the development of the region in such fields as medicine or civil engineering. This achievement is illustrated in the biographical portraits of three of them, Wiktor Jelski (a member of a distinguished family which has left a mark in the history of Poland), Andrzej Korwacki, a pioneer of orchard farming, and Ludwik Godlewski, a medical doctor and an artist.

For the last two decades, Poles in Ukraine have been openly pursuing their organized activity as guaranteed by Ukrainian law. There are Polish associations, language courses, folk groups, magazines, etc. However, the fact remains that what can be observed in south-eastern Ukraine is not so much a revival of Polish identity as the case of creating it anew. This involves direct transfer from Poland via television or the Internet, and through different types of visits to the country. The future of the next generation of Poles in this region largely depends on local Polish activists and on the Polish policy towards the compatriots in the East. In this context, it needs to be stressed that the situation of the Polish minority in south-eastern Ukraine is entirely different than in the west (e.g., Lviv) or south of the country, which is why they should be approached differently. It is certain, however, that only an appropriate course of action will ensure that in twenty years’ time some of those in the region will make a conscious choice of Polish identity. Social organizations can certainly support and promote language and culture, but it is the family that plays the key role in fostering Polish language and identity.

It seems to me that it would be advisable to conduct a similar research project in two decades. Indeed, only time will tell whether the number of those learning Polish is still going to increase; whether the rising figures indicate only an economic motivation or a sense of Polish identity is also going to grow; whether political, economic or personal considerations are still going to play a major role in Polish self-identification, and whether the appeal of Polishness is going to be a lasting phenomenon in democratic Ukraine. In this context, Iwona Kabzińska writes that
że jest to zjawisko zmienne, dynamiczne, w dużej mierze uzależnione od określonych warunków historyczno-politycznych [Kabzińska 2011: 145].

(different types of Polishness can be observed both at the collective and individual level. It should also be noted that Polishness is a dynamic phenomenon, largely dependent on specific historical and political context.)

The south-east corner of Ukraine is a multi-ethnic region, which makes it an interesting area for linguistic, sociolinguistic, historical and ethnolinguistic study. There are a number of issues which, owing to the nature of this monograph, have only been mentioned and are worth further discussion in more detail, such as the problem of language interference and historical memory. Professor Ewa Wolnicz has also pointed at the anthroponymic data as a potential study area.

Polishness in south-eastern Ukraine (which is now reviving or, to be more precise, being created or transferred from Poland) is an important part of the regional landscape. It is also an important element of the body of knowledge about the Polish minorities living abroad, to which the present volume makes a significant contribution.

Регистрационная карточка члена Георгебурской римо-католической общины

• Кун Франц Игнатьевич
• Год рождения: 1876;
• Национальность: немец;
• Отец до старости служил народным учителем в Херсонской губернии.
• Образование: по окончании курса Кучурганского Центрального училища в Страсбурга Одесского уезда вступил в Саратовскую духовную Семинарию, восьмилетний курс который прошел.
• Принадлежность к политической партии: безпартийный;
• Вероисповедание: римокатолическое;
• Обязательности: настоятель Георгебурского римо-католического прихода;
• Посвященный в священника Епископом Тираспольским А.Церр в городе Саратове в 1901 г. 7 января.
• Богослужение велось на латыни.
• На каком языке следует совершать богослужение: всемирная римо-католическая церковь употребляет при святой Литургии почтенный неизменяемый латинский язык, правоучения, обучения и духовную помощь предлагает на языках соответствующих национальностям отдельных народностей.
• назначен Епископом на должность настоятеля;
• чем занимался – наукой.
• Принимал-ли участие в войнах – нет;
• Подвергал-ли наказаниям – нет;
• Отношение к последним событиям православной церкви;
• К какой из определившихся церковных группировок себя признако- 

ete – никакой;
• Взгляд на ... церковь государственного значения – римо-кат. Цер-
кви при государстве на пользование большей свободой в России.
• Что касается отделением школы от церкви – что мне печально, быть лишеным возможности вращаться среди юного поколения;
• Отношения к совецкой власти – подчиняюсь;
• Отношение к ком.партии – безпартийный;
• В каком размере начисляется годовой доход – до октября 1917 года доход = 800 руб, сборы = 700 руб., доходов с недвижемости имуще-
ства не было.
• Размер платы в настоящее время – установленности такой у меня нет; большинство из прихожан не в состоянии платить что-либо. Месячный доход в настоящее время – 20 рублей.
2. The list of items confiscated from the Roman Catholic church in Iuzivka; GADO, R-522, Opis’ 1, p. 218

Протокол № 6
«О передачи церковных ценностей в фонд помощи голодающим».

Заседания Юзовской Уездной Комиссии по изъятию Церковных Ценностей, от 5.05. 1922 года. Участвуют Горя, Рындин, Гринев и Лесниченко.

Об изъятии ценностей из молитвенных домов и храмов
Римо-католической г. Юзовки изъять:

1. Кадило и крест
2. Чаш серебрянных две и подставка медная
3. Дискос со звездницей
4. Ковш и две тарелочки серебряная
5. Кадильниц серебрянных две
6. Крестов серебряных четыре
7. Лжиц серебрянных две
8. Дароносиц серебрянных два
9. Евангелий серебряных покришек четыре (снять накладки)
10. Чашу одну медную №5 по описи

Заберать ценности от всех церквей для голodomora!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Название</th>
<th>Укр.</th>
<th>Рос.</th>
<th>Евреи</th>
<th>Немцы</th>
<th>Поляки</th>
<th>Греки</th>
<th>Татары</th>
<th>Болгары</th>
<th>прочие</th>
<th>Неизвест.</th>
<th>Всего</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Бахмут и окрестности</td>
<td>11919</td>
<td>8209</td>
<td>6540</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Горловка</td>
<td>2063</td>
<td>2782</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Гришино пос.</td>
<td>2271</td>
<td>2863</td>
<td>1668</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Дебальцево</td>
<td>4027</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Енакиево. зашт. гор.</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>9044</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>215</td>
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<td>13742</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Константиновка приг.</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Лисичанск поселок</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3а. Poles in the Donbas by district (1923); based on: Itogi demografischeskoi perepisi Donbassa 1923, vol. 4, Kharkov 1923. Itogi gorodskogo naseleniia po natsional’nosti i gramotnosti gorodskoi perepisi po Donbassu, ianvar’–fevral’ 1923, GADO

Бахмутский округ = 1969 Поляков

<p>| | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Бахмут</td>
<td>- 195</td>
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<tr>
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<td>- 74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Гришино</td>
<td>- 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Дебальцево</td>
<td>- 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Енакиево</td>
<td>- 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Пригород Константиновка</td>
<td>- 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ливенговский завод</td>
<td>- 149</td>
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<tr>
<td>Петровский завод</td>
<td>- 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Словянски городок</td>
<td>- 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Стекольный завод</td>
<td>- 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Рудник Щербинский</td>
<td>- 92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Луганский округ

| Рудник «Ветка» |  -  | 22 |

Мариупольский округ = 494 поляков

| Мариуполь |  -  | 191 |
| Мариуполь гос. Завод «А» и «Б» |  -  | 246 |

Старобельский округ = 37 поляков
Старобельск – 19 поляков

Таганрогский округ = 674
Таганрог – 527

Шахтинский округ = 138
Юзовский округ = 1304

| Рудник «Ветка» |  -  | 101 |
| Дмитревск зашт. Городок |  -  | 187 |
| Юзовка, окр. Гор. |  -  | 300 |

Итоги сельского населения национальности и грамотности сельскохозяйственной переписи по Донбассу 1923 год:
Бахмутский округ – 203 человек
1. Бахмутский район = 5 поляков
Д. Прасковьевка – 5
2. Гришинский район – 18 поляков

| с. Гришино |  -  | 11 |
| пос. Ивановка |  -  | 5 |
| с. Сергеевка |  -  | 1 |
3. Енакиевский район = 10
   Д. Веровка – 10

4. Железнанский район = 17
   Колония Нью-Йорк – 17

5. Зайцевский район = 1

6. Камышевахский район = 1
   д. Кленовое 1

7. Константиновский район = 6

<p>| | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Д. Сантуриновка</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Х. Сурово</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Х. Щербиновка</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</table>

8. Краматорский район = 100

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Д. Белянская 2-а</td>
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<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Х. Княжий кут</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Пос. Краматорский 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Пос. Краматорский 2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Д. Николаевка</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Д. Петровка</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Лиманский район = 4
   с. Дробышево – 1
   пос. Лиман 3

10. Лисичанский район = 15
    с. Верхнее – 14
     Д. Рубежная 1

11. Ново-Экономический район 14
    Д. Грусская 3

12. С. Новое-Экономическое 5
    Х. Полтавка – 2
     Х. Русин Яр – 4
13. Рай-Александровский район = 1
   Д. Резниковка

14. Сергиевский район = 5
   д. Лавровка – 2
   с. Новоселовка 1-а – 1
   с. Ново-Райское – 1
   с. Прелесное – 1

15. Словянский район – 0
   Луганский округ = 105 поляков
   1. Алчевский район = 10
      С. Васильевка – 7
      Х. Должик – 3
   2. Городищенский район = 0
   3. Ивановский район = 4
      С. Ивановское – 2
      Х. Хрустальный – 2
   4. Каменно-Бродский район = 7
      С. Александровка – 4
      С. Малая Вергунка – 3
   5. Лозово-Павловский район = 12
      С. Богдановка – 1
      Д. Вергилевка – 1
      с. Лозовая – 4
      с. Павловка – 4
      д. Петровка – 2
   6. Ново-Светловский район = 5
      х. Надеждино – 1
      с. Ново-Божедаровка – 1
      д. Политровка – 3
   7. Петропавловский район = 50
      с. Желтое – 46
      х. Пришиб – 1
      с. Черкаское – 3

8. Словяно-Сербский район = 50 поляков

9. Станично Луганский район = 8
   Х. Валуйсков – 4
   Х. Гандиловка – 1
   Ст-ца Луганская – 3

10. Успенский район = 9
    С. Иллирия – 5
    Д. Македоновка – 4
Мариупольский округ = 55 поляков
1. Александро-Невский район = 2
   С. Розовка 2
2. Мангушский район = 1
   С. Ялта – 1
3. Никольский район = 18
   Д. Александровка – 18
4. Ново-Николаевский район = 3
   Пос. Козловский – 3
5. Новоселовский район = 29
   Х. Ковальчик –
   С. Новоселовка – 2
   Пос. Садки – 11
   С. Садки – 8
   С. Сартана – 2
   С. Старый Крым – 1
   Пос. Успеновка – 1
6. Старо-Каранский район = 2
   Пос. Малая Игнатьевка – 1
   С. Старо-Игнатьевка – 1
4. Ukrainian Residence Permit for a person of Polish origin; DAZO
5. Letter to the District Educational Authority in Melitopol (stating that the proportion of Poles in some areas was as high as 60%); DAZO
6. Record of an interrogation of an ethnic Pole by a representative of Stalinist authorities; a copy of an arrest warrant and a decision to charge the suspect; DAZO
ВОПРОС: Вы говорили о промышленности г. Демидовки?
ОТВЕТ: Да, я говорил о количестве заводов в г. Демидовке и характере выпускаемых ими продукции.

ВОПРОС: Следствию точно известно, что вы проводили к-р на цивилистическую пропаганду. Признаете себя в этом виновным?
ОТВЕТ: Да, признаю себя виновным в этом. Будучи в заводоуправлении на Советскую власть, недавнюю мне возможность выехать за границу, я полнокровно, а присутствия своих знакомых Шевченко - переводчика из Польши и АБРАМЗИЧА, высказывал недовольство Советской власти, хвалила Польшу, заявляя, что в последней народ живет действительно свободно, не так как здесь в Советском Союзе, где живут не человечно только коммунисты и евреи. Я также говорил, что немцам эту власть и готовы пойти на любое дело, лишь бы этой власти не было. Кроме того, я заявлял, что в случае войны, победа будет за нами, а когда ей приведет поляков, то путь будет хороший война, а особенно в весточках. Я также заявлял полякам, проживавшим здесь, чтобы они отказывались от Советского гражданства и не брали советских паспортов, так что в ции видел в пример само, что не беру Советский паспорт и мне никто ничего не может сделать.

Я также своим знакомым говорила, что в случае если мне удается уехать в Польшу, то я буду уведомлена.
там клеветать на Советский Союз, что в последнем поле, перед мучается, а не живет, что в дес рынке и предметов первой необходимости нет и т.д.

Это я решил делать для того, чтобы поддерживать авторитет Советского Союза в глазах польского населения в Польше.

Как ШЕВК, так и АБРАЗЕЖИЧ полностью разделяли мои контрреволюционные взгляды, и, в свою очередь, также высказывались против советской власти, в особенности при этом Польшу и ее политический строй.

Протокол записи с моих слов правильный, лично мной прочитан, в чем и расписываюсь.

ВИОЛЯ.

ДОПОЛНЕНИЕ: СПЕЦИАЛЬНО НАПОЛНЕННЫЙ З СТД УТВЕРЖДЕН ДЕПУТАТОМ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУХОВНОЙ НАД НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

/ ВУЧКО /
ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ:

1937 года, 27-го сентября, в Запорожском гор. прокуроре Малишевский, рассмотрев представленный Запорожским гор. отделом НКВД материал в отношении Чеслава Францевича, нашел, что он проводит активную контрреволюционную работу, направленную против существующего строя.

На основании изложенного и руководствуясь ст. ст. 143, 145 и 156.

ПОСТАНОВИЛ:

Санкционировать Запорожскому гор. отделу НКВД арест и содержание под стражей Чеслава Францевича и привлечение его к ответственности ст. ст. 54-6 УК УССР.

Запорожский гор. прокурор
ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ
(о привлечении в качестве обвиняемого)
Гор. Запорожье, 10 апт. 1937 г. Я.

Переписано из Запорожского гор. ЧК НКВД УССР старший
лейтенант Государственной Безопасности Ефимович

Рассмотрев следственный материал по обвинению гр. Вернер Людвика
ачерену вчера

преступлениях, предусмотренных ст. ст. 54-6 УК УССР нашел,
что произведенными следственными действиями установлено, что Вернер Люд
иетер агентом понейной разведки по
заданию которой на территории СССР проводил липомую работу
в поиску Похищения.
7. The Statute (constitution) of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’ (Pol. Polskie Kulturalno-Oświatowe Towarzystwo ‘Odrodzenie’) in Berdiansk; provided by Lech A. Suchomłynow, from the Archive of the Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Revival’

Statut Польського культурно-освітнього товариства “ODRODZENIE” (ВІДРОДЖЕННЯ).

1. ЗАГАЛЬНІ ПОЛОЖЕННЯ

1.1. Товариство має назву: Польське культурно-освітне товариство “ODRODZENIE” (ВІДРОДЖЕННЯ).

1.2. Товариство є добровільною, незалежною та самовердною громадською організацією м. Бердянськ, Мелітопольське шосе 22/1 кв.8.

1.3. Товариство діє у відповідності до Конституції України, куруючись чинним законодавством та даним статутом.

1.4. Товариство є юридичною особою, що в повній мірі володіє дієздатністю самостійного суб’єкта цивільних правовідносин, має крім основних наступі права:
   – мати приміщення, валютний та інші рахунки в банках, абонентську скриньку та ін.
   – користуватись стягом, гербом, фірмовими бланками та знаками.

1.5. Місцем перебування (центром) є м. Бердянськ.

2. МЕТА ТА ЗАСОБИ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ

2.1. Основною метою товариства є:
   – відродження та поширення духовної та матеріальної польської культури,
   – оволодіння польською культурою,
   – встановлення зв’язків та підтримування контактів з групами, товариствами на території України, Польщі та інших країн,
   – підтримування дружніх стосунків з братніми народами у відповідності до найвищих гасел: ВОЛЯ, РІВНІСТЬ, БРАТЕРСТВО,
   – вивчення історії та культури польського народу у минулі часи та на сучасному етапі розвитку польської держави.

2.2. У співпраці з Українською православною церквою (київський патріархат) та Римо-католицькою церквою виховує високі моральні людські якості.

2.3. Організовує гуртки та клуби за інтересами, в яких займається:
   – вивченням мови та літератури,
   – музыционо та культури взагалі,
   – народних обрядів та ремесел,
   – відродженням польських традицій,
   – створенням аматорських та професійних колективів.
2.4. Вищенаведені завдання досягаються шляхом співробітництва з провідними компетентними органами влади на основі взаємоповаги, Конституції України та чинного законодавства.

2.5. Взаємодіє з засобами масової інформації.

3. ЧЛЕНИ ТОВАРИСТВА. ЇХ ПРАВА ТА ОБОВ'ЯЗКИ

3.1. Членом товариства може бути будь-який громадянин України або іншої держави, полської чи іншої національності, що досяг шістнадцятирічного звіку, визнає статут товариства, прагне активною діяльністю досягти поставлених в ньому завдань.

3.2. Підставою членства в товаристві є письмова заява про бажання вступити в дане товариство та позитивне рішення Правління товариства з даного питання.

3.3. Всім членам товариства видається посвідчення з порядковою нумерацією, що збільшується в залежності від часу вступу в товариство.

3.4. Товариство згуртовує своїх членів.

3.5. Член товариства має право:
- обирати та бути обраним в керівні органи товариства,
- брати участь у діяльності товариства, вносити свої конструктивні пропозиції, одержувати інформацію, висловлювати свої думки та критичні зауваження з приводу діяльності керівних органів товариства,
- користуватися певними пільгами, наданими йому товариством.

3.6. Член товариства зобов'язаний:
- бути відданим ідеям товариства, сумілінно ставитись до покладених на нього обов'язків,
- чесно та сумілінно виконувати рішення та постанови керівних органів товариства, проявляючи при цьому розумну ініціативу,
- регулярно сплачувати членські внески.

3.7. Членство припиняється рішенням Правління товариства, з подальшим затвердженням цього рішення на загальних зборах у разі:
- порушення, морально-етичних норм взаємовідносин між членами товариства, відповідно з духом товариства,
- несплати членських внесків,
- відмови від участі у діяльності товариства, або ця діяльність була спрямована на підрив авторитету товариства,
- з поданням заяви за власним бажанням.

4. СТРУКТУРА І КЕРІВНІ ОРГАНІ ТОВАРИСТВА

4.1. Вицьими керівними органами товариства є:
- Загальні Збори членів товариства (надалі по тексту «Збори»),
- Правління товариства,
- Ревізійна комісія.

4.2. Збори товариства:
- регламентують порядок проведення Зборів,
- обирають голову товариства терміном на і рік (голова обирається та переобирається виключно на звітно-відоми зборах)
- обирають Правління, Ревізійну комісію,
3. Збори скликаються Правлінням у разі необхідності, але не менше двох разів на рік.
4. Час проведення зборів може бути перенесений у разі незважки 50 % членів товариства.
4.5. Рішення зборів приймається простою більшістю голосів при відкритому голосуванні.
4.6. Позачергові збори можуть бути скликані за ініціативою Правління, Ревізійної комісії або 1/3 всіх членів товариства.
4.7. Вибори Правління проводяться простим відкритим голосуванням.
4.8. Кожен член товариства користується правом одного голосу.
4.9. Правління товариства:
4.9.1.
– складається з обраних на зборах: голови, заступника, секретаря,
– скеровує свою діяльність на досягнення мети та виконання статутних зобов'язань товариства,
– приймає до перегляду заяви про бажання вступити або вибути з товариства,
– розробляє зразок посвідчення члена товариства,
– розробляє та затверджує регламент проведення своїх засідань,
– організовує діловість товариства.
4.9.2. Правління обирається простою більшістю голосів терміном на I рік.
4.9.3. Засідання правління повинні проводитись не менше одного разу на місяць.
4.9.4. Рішення Правління приймаються простою більшістю голосів при відкритому голосуванні (для голосування необхідно 2/3 членів).
4.10. Ревізійна комісія:
– контролює матеріальний баланс, фінансову діяльність товариства,
– встановлює законність рішень, які приймає Правління,
– Ревізійна комісія складається з голови та 2 членів, які обираються Зборами,
– голова Ревізійної комісії обирається членами,
– члени Ревізійної комісії мають право брати участь в роботі Правління з правом дорадчого голосу, а голова з правом ухвалювання,
– засідання Ревізійна комісія проводить у разі необхідності, але не менше одного разу на місяць,
– діяльність Ревізійної комісії підзвітна та підконтрольна виключно Зборам.

5. МАЙНО ТА ФІНАНСОВІ ЗАСОБИ ОБ’ЄДНАННЯ

5.1. Майно та фінансові засоби товариства утворюються з:
– добровільних внесків, пожертвувань, дарунків від підприємств, установ, організацій та громадян, як України, так й інших держав,
– вступних та щорічних членських внесків,
– від господарської та іншої діяльності, передбаченої статутом.
5.2. Членські внески та доходи від статутної діяльності товариства перераховуються правлінням на банківський рахунок.
5.3. Право розпорядження майном та коштами товариства належать Правлінню та Зборам.
5.4. Члени товариства вносять вступні внески в довільній сумі.

6. ПРАВОВИЙ СТАТУС ОБ'ЄДНАННЯ

6.1. Всі поправки та доповнення вносяться в статут товариства на підставі рішень Зборів та регулюються у встановленому законом порядку.
6.2. Питання про саморозпуск товариства повинно бути завчасно внесено в порядок денний Зборів.
   - рішення про розпуск товариства вважається правомірним, якщо за нього проголосувало не менше 2/3 учасників Зборів. В рішенні повинна бути вказана причина саморозпуску та визначений правовий статус /режим/ майна, що залишилося.
6.3. Товариство може бути розпущено у випадку досягнення поставленої ним мети або ліквідовано у випадках передбачених чинним законодавством.
6.4. Офіційною мовою товариства є національна польська та державна українська.

ЗАТВЕРДЖЕНО НА ЗАГАЛЬНИХ ЗБОРАХ 04.11.1993
ГОЛОВА ПРАВЛІННЯ
СУХОМЛИНОВ О. М.
8. A list of ethnic cultural associations registered in the city of Melitopol; provided by Melitopol City Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№ п.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Назва організації</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольський регіональний комітет етнічних товариств кримських татар на історичну батьківщину &quot;Акі&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Чеська культурно-просвітницька товариство &quot;Богемія&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольське відділення Кримської татарської громади</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольське товариство білоруської культури &quot;Балкані&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Громадська організація &quot;Мелітопольська міська українська обіція&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольське товариство німецької самоідентифікації &quot;Відлів уроду&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Громадська організація &quot;Мелітопольське товариство армені&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Громадська організація &quot;Вірменська громада &quot;Масіс&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольське товариство корейцій України</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольське товариство греків &quot;Еллада&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Німецька громадська організація &quot;Центр зустріч&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольський російсько-просвітницький центр &quot;Слав'янка&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольська громадська організація &quot;Руський дом&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольська громадська організація &quot;Велика Русь&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольська українсько-польська культурно-освітня товариство &quot;Польша&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Мелітопольська українсько-польська громадська організація німецької культури &quot;Полуміс&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Запорізька обласна Громадська організація індійської культури &quot;Ганга&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SZANOWNE KOLEŻANKI I KOLEDZY!


**Cele konferencji:**
1. Podsumowanie działalności za okres minionej kadencji;
2. Opracowanie koncepcji dalszego rozwoju oświaty polskojęzycznej na Ukrainie;
3. Omówienie propozycji zmian w statucie ZNPNu;
4. Wybory nowych władz ZNPNu.

Bylibyśmy niezmiernie wdzięczni wszystkim zainteresowanym osobom za uwagi i propozycje na temat przyszłego losu polskiego szkolnictwa na Ukrainie.

Uwagi prosimy kierować na adres redakcji:

n/c 157a, m. Drogobycz, 82100 Lwowska obł.
e-mail: adam-ch@mail.lviv.ua
fax: (03244) 50177
10. Call for papers: Poland and Poles in the research of young scholars (Pol. Polska i Polacy w badaniach młodych naukowców), an international conference, Mariupol 2010; photo by Helena Krasowska
11. Letter to the head of the Kramatorsk City Council in reaction to his comment that ‘There won’t be another Vatican here’ (Rus. ‘Здесь второго Ватикана не будет’); provided by Rev. Ryszard Karapuda, the priest of St Joseph’s parish in Donetsk
12. Decree issued by the Bishop of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia concerning work in the parish; provided by Rev. Ryszard Karapuda, the priest of St Joseph's parish in Donetsk.
OGŁOSZENIA


***

W soboty o godzinie 10.00 z çift 196-17 przy ul. Smolnego 17 prowadzi kursy językowe dla dorosłych. W terenie są również kursy dla dzieci i młodzieży.

***

W kantorze Polskiego Towarzystwa Kultury na Ukrainie w Donetsku znajduje się kantor kolejki do Polski oraz kantor pogranicza.

Helena Krasowska, Redaktor Polskiego Towarzystwa Kultury na Ukrainie w Donetsku.
14. Announcement about Polish language courses, noticeboard, St Joseph’s Church in Donetsk; photo by Helena Krasowska

Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu

Aktualności
Na naszej stronie znaleźć można informacje o czasie otwierania naszych audycji radioowych i telewizyjnych. Można tu oglądaj materiały z serii "Polski Donbas", reportaże o interesujących wydarzeniach w życiu Towarzystwa itd. Spodziewamy się, że strona zainteresuje zwiadowców.

Gazeta Lekcje języka polskiego Galeria fotograficzna

Przejdź

Strona główna Media Galeria fotograficzna Kątik projektanta

Wstęp

Nazwa użytkownika [ ]
Hasełko [ ]
Pamiętaj mnie [ ]
Załącz

Nie pamiętasz hasła?
Nie pamiętasz hasła?
Załącz nowe hasło?

Szukaj na stronie

Szukaj...

Wklej

Sukien

Chcите изучить польский?

Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu

Aktualności
Na naszej stronie można znaleźć informacje o czasie otwierania naszych audycji radioowych i telewizyjnych. Można tu oglądanie materiałów z serii "Polski Donbas", reportaże o interesujących wydarzeniach w życiu Towarzystwa itd. Spodziewamy się, że strona zainteresuje zwiadowców.

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Przejdź

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Załącz nowe hasło?

Szukaj na stronie

Szukaj...

Wklej

Sukien

Chcите изучить польский?

Obecność polskiej kultury Donbasu może pomóc w tym! Zarejestrowane użytkownicy mogą otrzymać-learning materiały freebie! 

Pri obliczach organizacji OPIK i przy Sokol polskych Donieck rozwija kursy polskiego języka.

Rozkład zajęć:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dzień tygodni</th>
<th>Przykład</th>
<th>Grupa</th>
<th>Kto prowadzi</th>
<th>Gdzie przebywali zajęcia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pon</td>
<td>3:00 PM</td>
<td>Policjant</td>
<td>Zofia Kozak</td>
<td>Polish class OPIK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wt</td>
<td>3:00 PM</td>
<td>Dla dzieci</td>
<td>Zofia Kozak</td>
<td>Polish class OPIK</td>
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<td>Dla dzieci</td>
<td>Zofia Kozak</td>
<td>Polish class OPIK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Polski class OPIK znajduje się w budynku Katolickiego kościoła po adresie: Doniecko-33004, ul. Arhena, 191. Zajęcia prowadzone są przez autobusy z centrum miasta do stacji PKP, a następnie do stacji PKP. Do stacji PKP prowadzeni do wynajętych, autobusami NNE 16, 19-A, 5, 106, 139 do stacji "Wawelska".

< Poprzednia
16. Schedule of Mass times (in Russian) including information about the language of liturgy, St Joseph’s Church in Donetsk; photo by Helena Krasowska
17. Schedule of Mass times (in Ukrainian) including information about the language of liturgy, the chapel in Horlivka; photo by Helena Krasowska

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ВІВТОРОК</td>
<td>(УКР.)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>СЕРЕДА</td>
<td>(РОС.)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ЧЕТВЕР</td>
<td>(УКР.)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>ПЯТНИЦЯ</td>
<td>(ПОЛЬС.)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>СУБОТА</td>
<td>(УКР.)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(ПОЛЬС.)</td>
<td>16.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>НЕДІЛЯ</td>
<td>(УКР.-РОС.)</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(РОС.)</td>
<td>16.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. Certificate of registration: the Melitopol Ukrainian-Polish Cultural and Educational Society ‘Polonia’ (Pol. Melitopolskie Ukrainsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Kulturalno-Oświatowe ‘Polonia’); provided by the Chairman of the Melitopol Society
19. The annual activity program of the Polish Union ‘Polonia’ (Pol. Związek Polaków ‘Polonia’) in Zaporizhzhia for 2007 (in Russian); provided by the Chairman of the Polish Union ‘Polonia’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№ п/п</th>
<th>Наименование мероприятий</th>
<th>Дата проведения</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Музыкальный вечер «Женщина любви»</td>
<td>март</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Общегородской конкурс среди учащихся школ: «Поляки земли запорожской»</td>
<td>февраль-апрель</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Подведение итогов и награждение победителей общегородского конкурса «Поляки земли Запорожской»</td>
<td>27 апреля</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Праздник полынской песни «Полонез над Днепром» (приурочен ко Дню Конституции Польши и празднику весны).</td>
<td>13 мая</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Торжественное чествование ветеранов Второй мировой войны - членов СПЗ «Полония»</td>
<td>8 мая</td>
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Примечание:
Союз поляков Запорожья «Полония» оставляет за собой право переноса сроков проведения мероприятий, замены на иные, а также включение дополнительных мероприятий.

Председатель

Л. И. Егорова
20. The annual activity program of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas (Pol. Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej Donbasu) for 2010 (in Polish and Russian); provided by the Chairman of the Polish Cultural Society of the Donbas

Plan działalności Towarzystwa Kultury Polskiej Donbasu w 2010 roku

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24. Halina Petkiewicz in Zaporizhzhia; photo by Helena Krasowska
25. Polish national identity card issued to one of the respondents, the Republic of Poland, 1937; Lwów province, Sambor district, Biskowice commune (today, Lviv, Sambir, Biskovychi); provided by one of the respondents
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LIST OF INFORMANTS
SEX, DATE OF BIRTH, PLACE OF BIRTH,
PLACE OF RESIDENCE (RES.),
OTHER INFORMATION

Donetsk
Female, 1966, Russia
Female, 1956, Makiivka
Female, 1953, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Male, 1944, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr oblast
Male, 1941, Lviv
Female, 1940, Vinnytsia
Female, 1938, Vinnytsia
Female, 1933, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Female, 1932, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Female, 1930, Vinnytsia oblast (resident of Donetsk since 1962)
Male, 1930, Minsk oblast (Belarus)
Female, 1929, Belarus, until 1939 lived in Poland (prożywała pod Polszej)
Male, 1928, Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1926, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Female, 1921, Vilnius

Makiivka
Female, 1979, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Male, 1972, Shyrets, Lviv oblast, res. Artemivsk
Female, 1964, Khmelnytskyi oblast, res. Torez
Female, 1962, Khmelnytskyi oblast, res. Torez
Female, 1952, Khmelnytskyi oblast, res. Torez
Male, 1947, Khmelnytskyi oblast, res. Torez
Female, 1946, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Female, 1943, Vinnytsia
Female, 1941, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Male, 1941, Hrodna (Belarus)
Female, 1940, Vinnytsia oblast
Female, 1939, Zhytomyr oblast, res. Torez
Female, 1938, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Female, 1932, Kherson oblast
Male, 1931, Cherkasy oblast
Female, 1920, Khmelnytskyi oblast, res. Khartsyzk

Mariupol
Male, 1973, Sudova Vyshnia
Male, 1959, Kolomyia
Male, 1956, Cracow province (Poland)
Male, 1943, Lviv
Female, 1942, Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1941, Kamianets Podilskyi
Female, 1938, Rostov-on-Don
Female, 1937, Ternopil oblast
Male, 1934, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast
Female, 1932, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Female, 1932, Kherson oblast
Male, 1932, Vinnytsia oblast
Female, 1930, Lviv oblast
Female, 1925, Vinnytsia oblast

Melitopol
Female, 1978, Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1959, Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1959, Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1941, Kamianets Podilskyi
Female, 1939, Sambir area, only spoke Polish at home
Female, 1937, Arys (Kazakhstan)
Female, 1937, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Female, 1937, Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1935, Lviv oblast
Female, 1935, Lviv oblast
Female, 1934, Rivne oblast
Male, 1934, Ternopil oblast
Male, 1932, Volyn oblast
Female, 1922, Ribniţa (Moldova)
Male, 1922, Vitsebsk (Belarus)
Female, 1919, Vinnytsia oblast

Zaporizhzhia
Female, 1976, Zaporizhzhia, parents from Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1971, Zaporizhzhia, parents from Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1967, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1966, Zaporizhzhia
Female, 1961, Zaporizhzhia
Female, 1957, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1951, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
List of Informants

Female, 1951, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1946, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Male, 1943, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1939, Kazakhstan, res. Liutserna
Female, 1939, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1937, born on the way to Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1936, Zhytomyr oblast, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1934, Ternopil
Female, 1930, Zhytomyr oblast, Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1930, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Male, 1929, Zhytomyr oblast, later Kazakhstan, res. Bohatyrivka
Female, 1924, Odessa
Male, 1917, Brest oblast (Belarus)

Berdiansk
Female, 1987, Berdiansk
Male, 1974, Krasnyi Luch, Luhansk oblast
Female, 1966, Krasnyi Luch, Luhansk oblast
Female, 1961, Khmelnytskyi oblast
Male, 1954, Zhytomyr oblast, res. Tokmak
Female, 1947, Krasnyi Luch, Luhansk oblast
Female, 1947, Luhansk oblast
Male, 1947, Chernivtsi oblast
Female, 1943, Dzhankoi (Autonomous Republic of Crimea)
Female, 1941, Krasnyi Luch, Luhansk oblast
Female, 1940, Dnipropetrovsk
Male, 1940, Zhytomyr oblast
Female, 1936, Stavropol krai
Male, 1934, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast
Female, 1931, Vinnytsia oblast
Female, 1930, Jaroslaw (Poland)
Female, 1930, Ternopil oblast
Female, 1926, Lviv
Female, 1924, Kherson oblast
DAZO – State Archives of Zaporizhia Oblast (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zaporiz’s’koj oblasti).
GADO – State Archives of Donetsk Oblast (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Donetskoj oblasti).
RKCB – Roman Catholic Church in Bakhmut (Artemivsk) (Bakhmutskaiia rimo-katolicheskaia prikhods-kaiia tserkov Tiraspol’skoi rimo-katolicheskoi dukhovnoi konsistorii, g. Bakhmut, Bakhmutskogo uezda, Ekaterinoslavskoi gubernii).
RKCIe – Roman Catholic Church in Ienakiieve (Ienakievskaia rimo-katolicheskaia tserkov Tiraspol’skoi rimo-katolicheskoi dukhovnoi konsistorii, g. Ienakieva Bakhmutskogo uezda Ekaterinoslavskoi gubernii).
RKClu – Roman Catholic Church in Iuzivka (Donetsk) (Iuzovskaia rimo-katolicheskaia tserkov g. Iuzovki Tiraspol’skoi konsistorii, Ekaterinoslavskoi gubernii).
RKCMak – Roman Catholic Church in Makiivka (Makievskaiia rimo-katolicheskaia tserkov Makievskogo rimo-katolicheskogo vikariata Berdianskogo dekanata Tiraspol’skoi rimo-katolicheskoi dukhovnoi konsistorii, st. Makeevka, Makievskoi volosti Taganrogskogo okruga Oblasti Voiska Donskogo).
RKCMar – Roman Catholic Church in Mariupol (Metricheskaiia kniga o rozhdeniakh, zaregistrovannykh kuratom rimo-katolicheskoi tserkvi g. Mariupolia v koloniiakh Davido-Orlovka, Nova-Orlovka, Grin’tal’, Blumenfel’d, Dementerovo, Printsfeld, Novokrasnovka, mestechnakh Iuzovo, Druzhovka, Debal’tsevo).
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Data 2007 – Data for 2001 received from the Office for Ethnic and Religious Minority Affairs in Melitopol.
DAZO – Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zaporiz'koї oblasti, fond 1, opis' 1, sprava 41.
Godovoi 1890 – Godovoi otchet Melitopol'skoj zemskoi bol'nitsy za 1890 god. A. V. Korvatskii, fondy Melitopol'skogo kraevedcheskogo muzeia, delo No. 13.
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RKCB 1917 – Metricheskaia kniga o rozhdenii 1917, GADO, f-314, opis' 1, delo 6, 115 pp.
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