The Category of Neighbourhood in Islamic Modernism of Yugoslavia. 
The Fetve of Husein Đozo

Abstract

Taking as its point of departure Carl Schmitt’s assertion that all significant concepts of modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts, the article tries to recreate the political and ethical theory of the neighbour present in the Qur’ānic commentaries and fatwās of Husein Đozo, the main representative of Islamic Modernism in socialist Yugoslavia. Subsequently, it seeks to establish a connection between the theoretical framework of theological dogmas and the everyday praxis preserved in the formula of the fatwā as a genre of religious Islamic literature, which by giving answers to the questions of the faithful Muslims, constitutes a dialogue of authority and the society, of the theory and the praxis.

Using the tools of critical discourse analysis, the text extracts the categories of neighbourhood and reveals that they are mainly faith-based. In other words, in the common perception, it is members of various religious communities: Muslims, Jews, Christians who are each other’s neighbours. According to the analysed exegetical and juridical Islamic sources, the neighbourhood category is based on freedom and mutual respect and can be shared by Muslims, atheists and apostates from Islam to atheism.

In consequence, as the text shows, the non-trespassable border between the cultures inherent to each of the neighbouring units, forms a central neighbourhood-
defining category. It is precisely the maintenance of dissimilarities between the neighbours that safeguards tolerance, respect and freedom for the members of particular entities. The internal systems of signs, behaviours, artefacts and lifestyles sustain the preservation of equality between the neighbours, as long as they share the same social capital and thus, retain the symmetrical positionality towards each other. Taking up a position of distance from the common lifestyle values (like in the case of Roma Muslims), or from intellectual legacy of Semitic Abrahamic faiths (like in the case of the Baha’i faith, which incorporates such figures as Krishna and Buddha), results in exclusion from the category of neighbourhood. Thus, both spatial and social proximity form the core of neighbourhood classification.

The paper provides rich exemplification of fatwās that reveal the absorption of Judeo-Christian heritage into the Islamic thought, and explains the theoretical and theological framework of this process. It presents the perception of the neighbour and neighbourhood in the Islam of socialist Yugoslavia, and – to some extent – the intellectual outcome of Judeo-Christian and Islamic neighbourhood in terms of spatial and theological vicinity.

Finally, the article shows that the Yugoslav Islamic stance towards the (properly classified) neighbour is inclusive, welcoming and hospitable. Intellectual background of this attitude is formed by the tradition of Islamic Modernism of the early 20th century Egypt, and the influence of such Islamic thinkers as Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, Muhammad Rašīd Riḍā, and Mahmūd Šaltūt. Hence, the article implicitly poses a question on the intellectual origins of the Islamic openness towards the neighbour, characteristic of Titoist Bosnia.

**Keywords:** neighbourhood in Bosnia, neighbourhood in Islam, Christian-Muslim relations, Islam, Islam in Yugoslavia, Husein Dozo, Islamic Modernism, Yugoslavia

**Introduction. Methods and approach: on the meaning of neighbourhood**

The relationship between neighbours has attracted astonishingly little scholarly attention, although the socio-spatial tie of neighbourhood “constitutes the closest relationship beyond the family unit, and in patriarchal societies neighbours very often also belong to the same family” (Hasan-Rokem, 2003, pp. 7–8). For some researchers who speak of *imaginary neighbours*, drawing inspiration from Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (Anderson, 1991), neighbourhood is not a description of a material socio-historical community but a politico-ethical concept (Zylinska, 2007, p. 283). This is also the approach I adopt in the present paper.
After Hasan-Rokem, I assert that the narratives (of and on) neighbours negotiate separate identities in great, sometimes threatening proximity, and as such they process intergroup relations as cultural idioms. The everyday life phenomenon of neighbourhood negotiation maintains multivalent connections with internal and external discursive fields and transforms the cultural domains of the parties involved (Hasan-Rokem, 2003, pp. 1–2).

Using tools of critical discourse analysis (Meyer & Wodak, 2009), I aim to analyse the dialogue of narratives extracted from the works of Husein Đozo, a representative of Islamic Modernism in Yugoslavia. The corpus of sources is based on materials published in Islamic press of Yugoslavia, mainly in Sarajevo, between 1958 and 1982 and consisting of periodical articles, Qur’anic commentary (tafsir) and fatāwā1 (fetve, singular fetva, in Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, further referred to as BHS). All of these can be found in the five volumes of his collected works: Husein Đozo. Izabrana djela, published in 2006 by El-Kalem and the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo under various editors. Volume I (Islam u vremenu) encompasses Đozo’s theoretical and theological works, volume II includes the translation of Qur’ānic and tafsir parts 1-4, volume III brings together articles from various periodicals of the time, and volumes IV and V (Fetve I and Fetve II) are collections of fatāwā published in “Glasnik.”

In reference to pluralistic cultures and societies, research on neighbourhood usually focuses on various aspects of class differentiation and ethno-confessional diversity.2 It is no different in the case of the present article. Although through ages of use and spanning of cultures words change their meanings,3 the very core of neighbour’s etymology is preserved and meaningful. Principally, the English word neighbour, deriving from Old English nēah ġebūr (from nēah= near and ġebūr=inhabitant, farmer), denotes the physical proximity of somebody living in adjacent or nearby land.

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1 Plural form of fatwā. Fatwā is a genre in religious literature of answers to religious questions issued by an Islamic authority.
2 I.e. David Frick’s examination of relations within the pluralist environment of 16th-17th century Vilnius, inhabited by Tatars, Karaites, Karaims, Jews, Poles, Ruthenians, Armenians, Germans, Scots. In terms of faith those were Christians but also Muslim Sunni populations, Karaites, and Jews. The Christians themselves were Orthodox, Uniate, Protestant (Calvinists, Anabaptists) and Catholic. The latter, in their turn, could be under the influence of Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Bernardines, Calced or Discalced Carmelites, Brothers Hospitallers of St. John of God (Boni Fratelli), Canons Regular of St. Augustine (Augustinians), or Canons Regular of the Lateran Congregation (Frick, 2013, p. 3).
3 Frick indicates that in the 17th century context of Vilnius, Polish sąsiad=neighbour signified a "subletter," co-renter of a dwelling space within the walls of one house. A similar or same understanding was present in Ruthenian sused in Polotsk, related ultimately to German usage of the word Beisassen (Frick, 2013, p. 60).
However, in Slavic languages – including BHS – terms for a neighbour imply communality. Their Turkish equivalent attained a similar meaning in the Western Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, encompassing the Balkans, where the word referred to “sitting together” and “talking with each other.”

I mention the Turkish context here because of its rich cultural background in the Balkans, and because it gave rise to the South Slavic words *komšija-komšiluk* (deriving from *komšu-komšuluk* in Standard Turkish), which are still in use and designate *neighbour-neighbourhood*. In the present article, I will try to show that the notion of „sitting” and „talking together” is central to the notion of neighbourhood in the Islamic Modernism of Yugoslavia.

**Islamic Modernism in Yugoslavia: an outline**

Islamic Modernism could be described as a reforming current in Islamic thought, represented by such influential jurists and thinkers as: an Afghani, Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838/1839-1897), the Egyptian Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905), the Lebanese/Egyptian Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā (1865-1935) and Maḥmūd Šaltūt (1893-1963), also from Egypt. It was a movement of reform, of return to the origins of pure Islam and in this sense a fundamentalist one. Moreover, it proposed Pan-Islamism as a counterbalance to the Western influences. It both stemmed from and fertilized Salāfī movements, and was thus sometimes called Modernist Salafism. Islamic Modernism sought to purify Islam through rational thinking and therefore it was also referred to – especially in relation to the thought of Muhammad ʿAbduh – as neo-Muʿtazilism. The four above-mentioned Islamic Modernists had a particularly strong influence on the work of Husein Đozo, one of the most important Islamic thinkers of socialist Yugoslavia.

The (ex-)Yugoslav – and here in particular, Bosnian – Islam is usually described in literature as “Moderate” and “European,” with these two denominations being mutually linked and – sometimes – self-explanatory. It is noteworthy that the label – “European” is not always associated with the territorial range, i.e. Bosnia being a part of the European continent, but rather with a supposed doctrine of “mild” Islam. Although it is difficult to characterize in academic terms the prerequisites for being labelled a

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Fatma Sibel Bayraktar interestingly suggests that in the context of Turkish and Turkic languages and cultures, the word *komşu* had its widespread variety and nuance both in spatial and temporal terms. The meanings of *komşu* can be derived from “talking together” in the western peripheries of Turkish cultural and linguistic influence, i.e. the Balkans, whereas in the Turkic “Fatherland” of the East, *neighbourhood* would be associated more with “sitting together,” community, and even “a union of fate” (Bayraktar, 2002, pp. 129–138).
“moderate Muslim,” the common perception usually points to the ability of local Muslims to peacefully coexist with their non-Muslim neighbours. Moreover, a certain lack of piouosness among the local population is also perceived as an element of such “moderate” attitude and behaviour.

These perceptions of “positive,” “acceptable,” “friendly,” “European” Islam derive from a West-centred, orientalist and colonial perspective (Said, 1978). The antinomy of the radical vs. moderate, European vs. non-European, is anchored in the presumption that Islam (associated with the Middle East and the Arab countries of North Africa and Asia) is hostile, irrational and incompatible with Europe.

Thus, whoever is a devout Muslim, must also be radical, antagonistic, and anti-European. In this spirit, it is often implied that Yugoslav Muslims were moderate because they did not follow all the prescriptions of their faith, and consequently they were able to live peacefully with their non-Muslim neighbours. Further, this “moderate” Islam was perceived as an aftermath of “de-islamization” or “Europeanization” of local Muslims. An implied consequence of this pattern of thought is the suggestion that Balkan Muslims who fulfil all the ritual commitments set upon them by their religion and/or those who have intellectual ties to the Arab world are to be seen as radicals who pose a threat to the peace-oriented intercommunal relations.

One of the aims of the article is to show that the key to the so-called “moderate” Islam of Bosnia was not necessarily a lack of devoutness and loss of connection with the Arab world. In order to illustrate the claim, I have chosen the life and work Husein Đozo, as he was one of the most influential Islamic thinkers of Bosnia. Đozo was an apt representative of a specific school in Islamic writing: a reformist and modernist who played a substantial role in Bosnian (Yugoslav) Islamic intellectual life of the socialist era.

Husein Đozo (1912-1982), born in Bare near Foča, studied at the Sarajevo medresas Atmejdan and Gazi Husrev-Beg, and went on to graduate from the School of Şari’a Law in Sarajevo in 1933. Afterwards, he travelled to Egypt to study şari’a at one of the most prominent schools of the Islamic world, Al-Azhar University in Cairo and complete his education in 1939. During World War II, he served in the 28th SS Regiment Handžar as its

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5 Among other suggested reasons, one can find the Balkan reality of (post-)Ottoman multiculturalism, the Westernizing influence of European education and proximity to a European culture, i.e. the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and finally, the influence of socialist ideology present in Titoist Yugoslavia.

6 The 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS Handžar (1st Croatian) was a mountain infantry division of the Waffen-SS. It was the first non-German SS division, comprised of Bos-
imam, and for this he was put on trial after the war at the High War Court of the Yugoslav Army and sentenced to five years of hard labour and loss of personal rights. The sentence was mild, taking into consideration the character of the unit in which he had served. On the one hand, the Court did state that Đozo “laboured to raise the morale of the enemy” (Karić, 2006, pp. 5–6). However, the fact that he was a signatory of the Sarajevo Resolution – a document written by members of the Muslim community of Sarajevo condemning Nazi and Ustaša attacks on Serbs and Jews – probably helped him.

Having completed his sentence in 1958, Đozo began publishing in some of the most important periodicals of Yugoslav Muslims: “Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starješinstva,” “Preporod,” “Islamski Glas,” “Novi Behar,” “El-Hidaje,” “Glasnik,” “Takvim,” “Zbornik Radova FIN-a”; he also became a professor at the Faculty of Islamic Theology in Sarajevo when the institution opened in 1970s.

It is essential to mention here that his notes on Maḥmūd Šaltūt,7 whom he met in Cairo during his studies, were among Đozo’s first works – from as early as 1959. It were also Šaltūt’s fatāwā that directly inspired Đozo. Originally a Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s practice – a revolution he introduced in Egypt by reviving the tradition of answering personal questions on life and religion from ordinary people (Kerr, 1966, p. 104) – this reformist spirit was continued by Šaltūt and carried over by Đozo. The questions-and-answers from between the 1960s and 1980s provide exceptional material for analysis. They form a dialogue with the society of Yugoslavia and bring special dynamics to the fatwā as a genre of religious literature. Lastly, they reflect the reality of inter-communal relations and problems of Yugoslavian Muslims.

As the authority representing the Supreme Islamic Council of Elders (Vrhovno islamsko starješinstvo, or VIS), Husein Đozo was the organizer of the Islamic Community in the entire Yugoslavia. Most of the questions came from Bosnia and Hercegovina, although there were numerous letters sent to the editors of “Preporod” or “Glasnik” from the territories of present-day Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Slovenia, as well as the north and south of Macedonia. People of all professions and social backgrounds

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7 Maḥmūd Šaltūṭ was born in Buhayra in Lower Egypt; he received his education in Alexandria, in a mosque school related to Al-Azhar, where he completed his studies. After 1928 he supported the rector of Al-Azhar in his reformist plans to restructure the curriculum. Between 1958-63 he became Al-Azhar’s rector himself (Karić, 2007, p. 7).
from university professors, to workers, to simple peasants; men, women and girls – would ask for advice on how to live according to the spirit of Islam.

As was mentioned, the intellectual tradition within which Đozo wrote his answers- *fatāwā* followed a straight line from the Egyptians: Muḥammad’Abduh, Rašīd Riḍā, and Maḥmūd Šaltūt, but it were the *fatāwā* written by the latter (possibly also through parallelisms between Nasserist Egypt and Titoist Yugoslavia) that were especially valued, and even directly quoted by Đozo (Karić, 2006, pp. 39–40). Similarly, most of the sources for Husein Đozo’s interpretation of the Qur’ān were based on the Modernist thought of the great Islamic reformer Muḥammad ‘Abduh, bearing strong resemblance and including quotations from ‘Abduh’s *Al-Manār*: prolegomena to the commentary to the Qur’ān, published in 1926 in Cairo (Karić, 2006, p. 11).

The main interpretative tenet of ‘Abduh, his disciple Rašīd Riḍā and others – Đozo among them – was the assertion that the Qur’ān is the Word of God and consists of the basic rules and conceptions (*Osnovni principi i koncepcije*) about how to live. This approach would distance it from all other sources of *sunna*, including *hadīth*. “Only the Qur’ān!” of Islamic Modernism, “*Samo Kur’an!*” of Đozo, together with the attempt to “cleanse” Islam, bear vivid resemblance to the Lutheran doctrine of “*Sola Scriptura*”. Another truly revolutionary aspect of his teachings was his approach to the Qur’ānic text: considering the *essence* more important than the *casus* and legalism (Karić, 2006).

Finally, following Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Maḥmūd Šaltūt, Đozo chose the rule of lightness of Islam and love towards the human being (*jusr i rahmet*) as the central notions for his *tafsīr* (Karić, 2007, p. 9). Quoting the Qur’ān, Đozo asserted that “Allah demands no more of any man than is within that man’s ability” (“*Allah nijednog čovjeka ne zadužuje iznad mogućnosti njegove*”). Thus, in the spirit of an easing (*olakšanje*) of Islam, he would assert – deriving this decision from Šaltūt – that it is better to eat forbidden *ḥarām* food than to starve, or not to go on the obligatory *ḥaǧǧ* (the pilgrimage to Mekka), if the road is unsafe. Similarly, prayer needs to focus on the essence of faith and can never transform itself into a symbolic sequence of head movements (Karić, 2006, p. 43).

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8 It is noteworthy that Đozo uses Serbo-Croatian translation of the Qur’ān, most probably his own. Using Qur’ān translated into a local language for the purpose of prayer, learning and meditation is allowed by the Hanafi school jurisprudence, which is the dominant one in Bosnia. In Arberry’s translation, the same passage reads: „God charges no soul save to its capacity; standing to its account is what it has earned, and against its account what it has merited” (Qur’ān, *al-Baqara*, 2:285). All of the translations of sources in the present article are based on the Serbo-Croatian texts of Đozo.
Thus, presenting the intellectual framework of Islamic Modernism in Yugoslavia, embodied in over twenty years of work by Husein Đozo, I shall proceed and analyse his *tafsīr* (Qur’ānic commentary), articles, and in particular – *fatāwā*, printed in Islamic press and published in Sarajevo from the late 1950s up until the author’s death in 1982.

**Towards a political and ethical theory of the neighbour**

The political theology of the neighbour stems from two assertions found in Carl Schmitt. The first one is the “borderline concept” of the sovereign as the one who can suspend the law in a time of emergency, in part or in *toto*, for the sake of its ultimate restitution and the preservation of the polis. Just as God suspends the laws of nature in miracles, so the sovereign is empowered to interrupt the laws of the state (Reinhard, 2005, p. 14). The second is the essential logic of the political, i.e. the *intentional* (Schmitt, 1996, pp. 27–35) opposition of friend and enemy, seen as a symptom of political theology, where secularization is merely metaphorical or “based on a structural analogy between theology and politics, and derives its legitimacy not from an existential decision, but from a history of decisions that have already been made” (Reinhard, 2005, pp. 12, 14). In other words, the notions of polity and the political are superficially secularized notions of theology. Departing from this assertion, I choose to derive the political and the ethical of neighbourly relations as presented in theological deliberations.

According to Jacques Lacan, the biblical injunction first articulated in the Torah: “love your neighbour as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), and elaborated in the substantial question of Christianity “who is my neighbour?” (Luke 10:29), revolutionizes the ethics of monotheism and distances them from the Greco-Roman “pagan” principles of moderation (Lacan, 1991, p. 186). *Neighbour* becomes the focal point for re-orientation of ethical life. The core of these deliberations – internal to the notion of the neighbour and its transformation in the light of Shoah, the Gulag and other atrocities of the 20th century, through which the “notion of neighbour has lost its innocence” – is the Freudian revolution (Freud, 1989, pp. 66–69; Reinhard, Santner, & Žižek, 2005, pp. 1–2). If Kant quotes Leviticus 19:18 as an instance of the categorical imperative and the reconciliation between religion and reason, Freud warns about the possibility of neighbour-love, which “opens up a tradition in which an alien traumatic kernel forever persists in my neighbour; the neighbour remains an impenetrable, enigmatic presence

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*Although [the sovereign] stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it* (Schmitt, 1985, p. 7).
that, far from serving my project of self-disciplining moderation and prudence, hystericizes me” (Reinhard et al., 2005, p. 4).

For Husein Đozo, on the other hand, the return to the innocence of the neighbour is attainable through another revolution: including a specific marriage of socialism and šari’a law. Acknowledging the atrocities of World War II, but also all the earlier and later wars, he incorporated into his thought the Marxist principle of linear history and cumulative development of societies. Thus, he considered the interethnic and inter-communal hatred as the result of purposive “hegemonistic policies,” perceiving Yugoslavia as the project able to stop and overcome this tendency through brotherhood and unity (Đozo, 2006c, p. 166), conforming with the essence of Islam and the Qur’ān. In an especially interesting fatwā – addressed to a non-Muslim and answering a question published in “Glasnik” in 1975 by a Serb student from Belgrade – Đozo points out to the practical dimension of life in Yugoslavia, such as the common projects of electrification, school and road building etc.:

The dialogue between Muslims, Christians and Jews is as old as Islam. […] In our practice of inter-confessional cooperation it can be said that the phase of dialogue has been almost achieved. The practice made it a reality. Regular believers could not wait for theoretical discussion on dialogue of the theologians. Their lives and experiences forced them to a brotherly life together¹⁰ (Đozo, 2006c, pp. 358–360).

He noted, however, that a real shift from hatred to cooperation could be achieved only through proper education and upbringing, and never through a political decree (Đozo, 2006c, pp. 165–171). For him, “The question of inter-human, inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations is by no means only societal, economic or political question. It is very much an ethical question”¹¹ (Đozo, 2006c, p. 171). Thus, after Shoah it must become obvious that the period of inter-communal hostility and confrontation needs to be ended. Instead, the time of ecumenism has arrived, and the process of dialogue commenced by the Catholic Church has to be continued. Nonetheless, for Muslims the ethical framework for inter-faith relations needs to be found in the šari’a – the return to Islamic law is a guarantee of normalcy between neighbours (Đozo, 2006b, p. 658).

¹⁰ Dijalog između muslimana i kršćana i Jevreja star je koliko i islam […] za praksu naše međukonfesionalne saradnje može se reći da je faza dijaloga gotovo prevladana. Praksa ju je pretekla. Obični vjernici nisu mogli čekati dijaloško-teorijske diskusije teologa. Njih su život i iskustvo prisilili na bratski zajednički život.

¹¹ [p]itanje međuljudskih, medunacionalnih i međuvjerskih odnosa nije ni u kojem slučaju samo društveno, ekonomsko ili političko pitanje. Ono je i te kako i etičko pitanje
Many Western readers could be alarmed at this stage, sensing an aporia between the nature of inter-faith relations and the šari’a law; nonetheless, Đozo provides immediate answers. He acknowledges that the past was marked by competition and wars, but the issue could be solved by a proper interpretation of the Qur’ān and *sunna*. In his Qur’ānic commentary for the students of theological faculty in Sarajevo, *Odnos prema nemuslimanima* (Đozo, 2006b, pp. 639–655), he locates the sources of hatred towards non-Muslims in the closure of *ijtihād*, departure from the *salaf*, and instead taking up the *taqliḍ* and consequential inclusion of non-Islamic thoughts into *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence):

I cannot shake the feeling of awe that this anomaly had not been spotted earlier, that it was passed over and kept quiet about. This should have been harshly condemned as a gross discrimination which has no basis in original Qur’ānic teachings (Đozo, 2006b, p. 659).

Thus, the ethical framework of a return to the šari’a finds its surprising conclusion in an assertion that could hardly be any more ecumenical, when in another Qur’ānic commentary for students, *Vraćanje Šerijatu*, Đozo – mentioning along the way the interpretative work of Šaltūt – states:

Today, everyone is asking: “Where are you going, human?” “Quo vadis, domine?” was uttered by Saint Peter as he saw Isaa, pbuh, being led to Golgotha. No one can deny that the modern human is approaching his Golgotha (Đozo, 2006b, pp. 655–664).

The notes prepared for students had to bear rhetorical power, hence the use of *Quo vadis, Domine?* with its metaphorical and symbolic complex,

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12 A term originating in Islamic jurisprudence, denoting “diligence,” independent reasoning based on the analysis of the Holy Texts.

13 Literally: “ancestors”. Tradition of the first three generations of Muslims.

14 Term of Islamic jurisprudence meaning blindly following the decisions of a religious expert without necessarily examining the scriptural basis or reasoning behind that decision. Đozo notices that the *taqliḍ* was rejected most strictly by the Wahhabi movement and points to al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh as re-openers of *ijtihād*, and the right path for interpretation of sources (Đozo, 2006b, p. 661). This approach clearly shows that the intellectual source of his inclusive and open interpretation of inter-faith and neighbourly relations stems not from the European tradition, but from Salafi/Wahhabi currents, which in the West are perceived as backward, exclusively anti-European and threatening the possibility of coexistence with Muslims.

15 Ne mogu se načuditi kako se još ranije nije uočila ova anomalija, kako se preko nje prelazilo i šutjelo. To se moralo najoštrije osuditi kao veoma gruba diskriminacija koja nema u izvorno kur’anskom učenju nikakva osnova.

which simultaneously shows that the neighbourhood – strengthened not only by physical proximity, but also intellectual dialogue – led the Islamic community of Sarajevo to the absorption of Christian notions.

Who is my neighbour and why must I love him?

The central point of Judaist and Christian ethics remains linked to the imperative of “loving God,” which is possible to do in the privacy of silence. Loving thy neighbour, on the other hand, can only be manifested through deeds: objectified through the responsibility towards the Others of the community. As we shall see, the case is no different for Islam. In a lecture prepared for students and future Imams (Odnos islama prema nemuslimanima), Đozo preaches:

Participation of Muslims in burials of non-Muslims is not only allowed but it represents an obligation. We, as Muslims, have an obligation towards our neighbours, friends and acquaintances who are non-Muslims to render them aid and offer them comfort when they are in trouble. At the same time, we also have an obligation to participate in their festivities. This is our neighbourly, civil, and even religious duty. We live here mixed with our brothers – neighbours who are members of other religious and national communities. Our life interests are so intertwined that we must rely on one another. […] Religious differences remain in the domain of dogma and ritual. Let everyone believe and pray to God in their own way. But one must act towards everyone as a human. In our mutual relationships we remain only human. Here we set aside more narrow affiliations. We appear as citizens and people, and as such we act in our relationships. Our neighbour the Catholic or Orthodox Christian is a human and a citizen just as we are. Islam proscribes that we must establish and maintain friendly relationships with them. […] The principle of brotherhood and unity […] is one of the basic tenets of our revolution17 (Đozo, 2006b, pp. 227–228).

How is this “marriage” of socialism and the šari’a possible? The answer can be found in the tafsir legacy of Đozo, and is in fact obvious for those

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who recognize one of the basic philosophical principles of Islam, the concept of “the Oneness of the Revelation,” with Muḥammad being the last prophet, but not the only real one. This context serves as an explanation to a fatwā from a 1976 issue of “Glasnik”, containing yet another absorption of New Testament ideas and answering the question of how to love those who offend us:18

[...] One should not be upset over such people, let alone become demoralized. [...] Fully opening towards the other is a feat of a highly developed moral and cultural awareness. Sincere recognition and respect for the other as an equal member of society represents a higher state of moral consciousness. Our reader does well to note that Islam teaches us how to love others. And not only Islam. Christianity preaches the same love among all people, and even to an enemy. “If someone hits you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. [...] If someone throws a stone at you, throw a loaf of bread to him. [...] If anyone wants to sue you and take your shirt, hand over your coat as well. [...]” These are significant messages and moral principles that were preached by Isa, pbuh. Muḥammad, pbuh, named love and good relation towards the other as an integral part of faith19 (Đozo, 2006e, p. 372).

The background for the absorption of the theological and thus ethical and political thought of neighbours is explained in a simple way in a fatwā issued for a reader from Čajnič, who in a 1966 issue of “Glasnik” asked: “Zašto su se vjere razdvojile i kada?”20 Đozo answered:

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18 Uvijek i na svakom mjestu govori nam se o potrebi čuvanja i razvijanja bratstva i jedinstva, da se medusobno volimo i potpomažemo jedni drugima, bez obzira na vjersku i nacionalnu propadnost. Uostalom, to od nas i islam traži. Međutim ima ljudi koji svojim postupcima narušavaju bratstvo i nanose mu veliku štetu vrijedajući druge te potcjenjujući njihova uvjerenja. Čak se dešava da takvi javno psuju drugome njegove najveće svetinje. Kako da voliš takvog čovjeka?

Translation: Wherever we go, we always hear about the need to cherish and develop brotherhood and unity, to love and help one another, regardless of religious or national affiliation. Besides, this is what Islam asks from us. However, there are people who violate brotherhood with their actions and cause great harm to it by insulting others and scorning and depreciating their beliefs. It even occurs that they curse others using their holiest symbols. How to love such a man? (Đozo, 2006e, p. 372)

19 Ne treba se zbog toga mnogo nervirati, a još manje demoralizirati. [...] Puno otvaranje prema drugom predstavlja visoko razvijenu moralnu i kulturnu svijest. Iskreno priznanje i poštivanje drugoga, kao ravnopravna člana društva, predstavlja viši stupanj moralne svijesti. Naš čitalac dobro napominje da nas islam uči kako treba voljeti druge. I ne samo islam. Kršćanstvo propovijeda isto tako ljubav među svim ljudima pa čak i prema neprijatelju. „Udari li te ko po desnom obrazu, okreni mu i drugi“, „Ko tebe kamenom ti njega kruhom“, „Ko bi te htio tužiti da se domogne tvoje košulje, podaj mu ogrtač“. To su značajne poruke i moralni principi koje je propovijedao Isa, a.s. Muḥammad, a.s., ljubav i dobar odnos prema drugome označio je sastavnim dijelom vjerovanja.

20 Why did religions separate and when? (Đozo, 2006d, p. 66)
This expression is not fitting. It is not a matter of separation but of succession. The revelation is basically one. All God’s prophets, who came one after the other, taught and preached a single truth. This truth in every instance of revelation had its appropriate form, which was determined by the given circumstances and possibilities of understanding.21 (Đozo, 2006d, p. 66).

From the standpoint of this ontological framework it becomes clear why Muslims, Christians and Jews can and should coexist and even pray together, as it is explained in the same issue of “Glasnik” to a reader from Kotor:

All temples, according to the Islamic teaching, enjoy special immunity and protection. A Muslim is even permitted to pray in a church. […] Islam […] allows the establishment of […], so to say, familial relationships with non-Muslims. Can a greater form of cooperation and convergence be imagined?22 (Đozo, 2006d, p. 80).

As Đozo states openly: religious thought is, in its essence, one; it is only heresies and sects that deform it. And thus, Christianity is divided into: Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Adventism; Judaism also has its “deforming fractions,” and Islam is likewise divided. Herein we notice that ši’a Muslims are in Đozo’s thought much further from the Yugoslav Muslims than Christians and Jews, “[…] let us not even mention the Duruz, Ahmadiyya and Baha’i faiths, which have absolutely nothing in common with Islam.”23 (Đozo, 2006b, p. 465). Apart from the dogmatic disputes with Islam itself, what excludes the aforementioned groups from the neighbourhood category is not the absence of intellectual proximity, but rather the lack of the spatial one; in other words, the lack of a common border.

The border – a dividing space between two groups – forms the closest meeting place and as such is a necessary consequence of mutual relations between groups of humans and space, and serves as the space of contact and exchange (Simmel, 1984, pp. 65–102). Crossing and trespassing borders leads to compromises and renegotiations; as “a semiotically highly condensed sign communicating nexus and plexus, [borders] are the very

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21 Ovaj izraz nije adekvatan. Ne radi se o razdvajanju, nego o sukcesiji. Objava je u osnovi jedna. Svi Božiji poslanici, koji su dolazili jedni iza drugih, učili su i propovijedali jednu istinu. Ta istina imala je u svakom izdanju objave svoju odgovarajuću formu, koja je bila determinirana datim prilikama i mogućnostima shvaćanja.

22 Sve bogomolje, prema islamskom učenju, uživaju poseban imunitet i zaštitu. Muslimani su dozvoljeni da može u crkvi čak i nanaj obvaljati. […] Islam […] dozvoljava uspostavljanje […] tako reći rodbinskih veza sa nemuslimanima. Zar se može zamisliti jači oblik saradnje i približavanja?

23 […] da ne govorimo o druzima, kadijanijama i behaijama, koji gotovo nista zajedničko nemaju sa islamom.
epitome of the cultural construction of human relations in space” (Hasan-Rokem, 2003, pp. 7–8).

Therefore, although common prayer is possible, there is a limit to it; common prayer cannot cross the border of the greatest sin of Islam apart from apostasy: that of širk, i.e. “adding companions” to the only God. Hence, although Muslims can pray in a church, they cannot buy and keep at home a picture of Ibrahim (Abraham) and Ismail accompanied by an archangel, like they do in Banja Luka, as this stands against the iconoclasm of Islam and is perceived as idolatry (Đozo, 2006e, p. 128). They also cannot go to church with their love-related problems and pray to St. Anthony as the patron of all the jealous, like the Muslims of Zenica did, at least according to a “Glasnik” reader from Ljubljana:

Islam has nothing against a Muslim entering a church, not even if he is to pray to God there according to his rules, as was recently done by Muslims in Köln. […] However, appealing to St. Anthony […] or any other man, Islam strictly prohibits and considers one of the harshest sins of širk (Đozo, 2006d, pp. 48–49).24

Therefore, members of each community can “sit together,” and “talk together,” they can intermingle and share some common spaces as long as the borders between them are being maintained. These borders ensure that their mutual position is equal and symmetrical.

The symmetrical positionality of neighbours lacks hierarchic structure if it is devoid of other hierarchy-building factors, such as disproportionate economic or symbolic capital of some neighbours. As Hasan-Rokem notices after Pierre Bourdieu, “the symmetry introduces (…) the potential of a close relationship characterized by a lack of domination yet involving contest over territory, legitimacy, and other kinds of symbolic capital by which cultural identities are negotiated” (Hasan-Rokem, 2003, p. 11; Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 171–183).

The fatāwā of Husein Đozo reveal not only the intentional balance and respect for non-Muslims in both religious and ethnic sense, but also disproportions in economic and symbolic capital between Muslims and those who are symmetrical to them, and a certain category of people who may be Muslims, may share the space, but still fail to become true neighbours.

In a 1974 volume of “Glasnik,” a Turkish reader living in Germany poses a question of whether “a Gypsy can become a mufti” (Đozo, 2006d, p. 142). Đozo answers that he had been asked about the Roma many times,  

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24 Islam nema ništa protiv toga da musliman uđe u crkvu, pa da se tamo čak po svojim propisi- 
ma pomoli Bogu, kao što su nedavno učinili muslimani u Koelnu. (…) Međutim obraćanje „svet-
tom Antunu”, ili bilo kojem drugom čovjeku, islam strogo zabranjuje i smatra to jednim od naj-
težih grijeha širk (Đozo, 2006d, pp. 48–49).
e.g. by girls who fell in love with a boy of Roma origin but whose parents disapproved of such relationship and renounced the possibility of marriage. He adds that there can be no discrimination based on race or ethnicity. However:

We cannot deny that cultural differences influence everyday relationships and behaviours of people. They dictate how people relate and socialize. [...] If a highly educated young man avoids taking an illiterate or semi-literate woman for a mate, this could not be called any sort of discrimination. [...] We will not do anything positive for the Roma by accompanying them back to their horse-drawn wagons and putting ourselves on the same level by marrying them or marrying our daughters to them. [...] The problem of removing discrimination towards the Gypsies (Roma) does not lie in allowing them to be buried in Muslim cemeteries, or relating them to Muslims by marriage. The discrimination can be removed only by helping the Roma to free themselves of backwardness and join the wider progress of society. We would greet with great pleasure an appointment of a Roma man to the position of a mufti25 (Đozo, 2006e, p. 143).

The above-mentioned passage clearly shows that Roma are denied the possibility to speak for themselves and negotiate their identity as equals. They are rather challenged to defend it, as certain judgments imposed on them without being subject to any arbitration. The disproportion between the Roma on the one hand, and the sedentary, urban class on the other, removes the neighbourly symmetry and reveals a specific conclusion. The core of the neighbour’s value lies not so much in economic capital but rather in the symbolic capital of his culture.

There are no deliberations in the writings of Đozo on whether a peasant from rural Bosnia has the moral or intellectual potential to become an imam or a good husband. Although Đozo does raise arguments about education, it is doubtful whether this is the actual reason for his concern. Rather, the ever-moving and ever-changing nomadic lifestyle is subject to criticism and removes the symmetry vis-à-vis the sedentary peasant or city-dweller:

The fact of the matter is that the Roma are at a low cultural and societal level of development. They still find it difficult to relinquish the nomadic lifestyle.

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25 Ne možemo poreći da kulturne razlike ne utječu na svakidašnje odnose i ponašanje ljudi. One određuju međusobno povezivanje i druženje ljudi. [...] Ako visokoobrazovani mladić izbjegava da uzme za drugaricu nepismenu ili polupismenu ženu, ne bi se to moglo nazvati nikakvom diskriminacijom. [...] Nećemo ništa učiniti pozitivno za Rome time što bismo se vratili njima pod čerigu i s njima se izjednačili na taj način što bismo se ženili od njih i udavali svoje kćerke za njih. [...] Problem otklanjanja diskriminacije prema Ciganima (Romima) nije u tome što će se dozvoliti da se kopaju u muslimanska groblja, što će se ženidbom i udajom povezivati sa muslimanima. Diskriminacija se može otkloniti samo tako ako pomognemo Rome da se što prije oslobode zaostalosti i da se uključe u opći društveni razvoj. Bismo sa osobitim zadovoljstvom pozdravili naimenovanje Roma na položaj muftije.
Their ethnicity has been recognized. But they have great difficulty freeing themselves from backwardness and their long obsolete, most primitive lifestyle\textsuperscript{26} (Dozo, 2006e, p. 143).

Hence, it is once again confirmed that what makes a neighbour a neighbour is the border – which, all in all, is inherent to sedentarity.

The question: “who is my neighbour?” always provokes deliberations on distinctions and the distance between observant members of religious community and the less pious ones, between members of one’s own community and those who belong to a different tribe (as in the New Testament story of the Good Samaritan) and finally, on the choice of one neighbour over another, where sometimes loving one means failing to love the other. Therefore, the category of Neighbour exposes tribal alliances and the core complex of individual and group identity and ethics. Moreover, it bears importance in the political concept when understood in the context of the claim about theological foundations of political theory, as formulated in Carl Schmitt’s proposition that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 26).

The same categorisation is revealed by the non-orthodox approach of Đozo to atheists and specifically to apostates from Islam to atheism, who should otherwise be condemned for the greatest sin of rejecting God and the Revelation. Some might say that the mild approach of Đozo towards atheists was caused by the dominant position of the Communist Party in the state. This argument cannot be discarded; however, it seems that this soft stance reveals something more than just a submission to the secularizing authority of the Party and its ideology.

Namely, it shows that within the same category of comparable social capital – and social capital of atheists in Yugoslavia was high, whether or not as a result of an imposition – one could cross between sub-categories and by abandoning one’s own tribe become its neighbour, who must be tolerated, and tolerant. And yet again, tolerance requires borders and definitions of who is my neighbour before one proceeds to speak about acceptance and dialogue. An uncomfortable implication suggests that “the multiculturalist notion of tolerance, whose fundamental value is the right not to be harassed, [is] precisely a strategy to keep the intrusive neighbour at a proper distance” (Reinhard et al., 2005, p. 2).

This distance-asserting strategy finds its full manifestation in the case of the fatāwā dealing with the burial of an atheist and an apostate. A critical analysis of the texts leads to a conclusion that it is better to be(come) an

\textsuperscript{26} Činjenica je da se Romi nalaze na veoma niskom kulturnom i društvenom nivou razvoja. Još uvijek se ne mogu lahko osloboditi nomadskog načina života. […] Priznata im je nacionalnost. Ali se vrlo teško oslobadaju zaostalosti i davno preživjelog najprimitivnijeg načina života.
atheist than to be a *munāfiq*: a hypocrite. Although this Qur’ānic term, establishing the categorization of people into a net of groups: believers, non-Muslims, non-believers, etc. refers usually to those who pretend to be Muslims while secretly concealing their disbelief, Đozo here retains the logic but gives it an opposite spin. Just like in most of Qur’ānic exegesis and ensuing *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), while answering in a 1967 “Glasnik” a reader from Mostar, who wants to know whether he can become a member of the Communist Party only formally, Đozo rejects such a possibility. He suggests that the choice would be immoral not only from the standpoint of Islam, but also from the standpoint of the Party:

The religious community will not suffer any damages if it loses such people [...] they are, as such, a burden for any community. [...] You cannot believe and not believe, be a communist and a believer 27 (Đozo, 2006d, p. 116).

As it was stated before, atheism is not condemned and it has its own place in the Yugoslav neighbourhood; however, although it is possible to become a non-believer and retain respect, it seems to be a one-way ticket: the border cannot be trespassed repeatedly. The distinction, once marked, needs to be sustained.

**Dead or alive – death and distinction**

The *love thy neighbour* commandment poses additional difficulties, provoking discussion on the relationship between distinction and equality, tolerance and... love. If loving one’s neighbour translates into the equality of forsaking all distinctions, then – following Søren Kierkegaard’s *You Shall Love Your Neighbour* from his *Works of Love* – only a dead neighbour can be truly loved, as only death abolishes all distinctions (Kierkegaard, 1994, p. 75; Reinhard et al., 2005, p. 3). This, however, is not the case in the Yugoslav society, where death seals the distinctions between the neighbours.

The *fatāwa* of Husein Đozo provide especially rich material on this matter. Apparently, it was extremely confusing to the intermingled society of neighbours to draw the line of distinction in the face of death. After all, in the Qur’ānic commentary on the Muslim attitude towards non-Muslims, Đozo himself stated: “If Qur’ān allows the Muslim to entrust the birth and upbringing of his offspring, and even his food to the People of the Book [here: Christians, Jews – O. D.], how could problems exist in other mutual relations?”28 (Đozo, 2006b, p. 658). However, as ecumenical as the practice

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27 Vjerska zajednica neće pretrpjeti nikakve štete ako izgubi takve ljude [...] oni su, kao takvi, balast za bilo koju organizaciju. [...] Ne može se vjerovati i ne vjerovati, biti i komunist, i vjernik
28 Ako Kur’an dopušta muslimanu da može radanje i odgoj svog potomstva, čak i svoju ishranu
of life could be, the practice of death would detangle the neighbours with one harsh rule of Islam: a non-Muslim cannot be buried according to the Islamic ritual.

There were many questions from all over Bosnia regarding apostates from Islam to atheism, whose still Muslim family wanted to bury their deceased husbands, wives, daughters and sons according to the Islamic ritual. The law accepted that if the deceased had managed to express his will to be buried the Islamic way before his death, he could be buried in such a manner. Similarly, a member of the family could ask for a ritual to be performed – for example the washing of the body, offering the prayers. However, answering in “Glasnik” in 1969 to a question from the Islamic Community of Ključ, BiH, Đozo confirmed the distinction:

If Muslims, Christians and Jews are buried separately, and this principle was adopted when new city cemeteries were formed, if the religious regulations do not allow to bury a member of another religious community in a Muslim cemetery, and vice versa, it would be logical and justified that in that cemetery – especially – an atheist could not be buried, as he has no faith at all. He who – according to religious regulations – is set even further apart from a religious standpoint, than a person of faith (Đozo, 2006d, p. 242).

He also asserted that people are irrational in their wishes, first letting their relatives and friends live as atheists, but then wanting them buried as members of their own religious community:

Atheists are much more realistic and smart. They don’t get mad if we take one of their dead. They fought for him while he was alive. There is a legal rule that allows close relatives to bury their dead family member who was an atheist in accordance with religious practice. […] The municipality, as a representative of the socialist government, does not mind to have an atheist buried along with the faithful and that he will join them in death. (…) It would not be easy to justify an decree ordering that a man who in life chose atheism and lived by it to have to be buried together with the faithful, and not with atheists, especially in areas where atheist cemeteries exist (Đozo, 2006e, pp. 242–243).

povjeriti ehli-kitabu, zar bi u nekim drugim međusobnim odnosima mogle postojati smetnje?

Ako se odvojeno kopaju muslimani, kršćani i jevreji, a taj je princip usvojen i kod formiranja novih gradskih grobalja ako se po vjerskim propisima ne bi moglo dozvoliti da se u muslimansko groblje sahrani pripadnik druge vjerske zajednice, i obratno, bilo bi sasvim logično i opravdano da se u to groblje ne bi mogao, pogotovo, sahraniti ateist, koji uopće ne vjeruje, i koji u odnosu na vjerske propise i po vjerskom osnovu mnogo otuđeniji i dalji nego vjernik.

Ateisti su mnogo realniji i pametniji. Ne ljute se ako im uzmemo mrtva čovjeka. Oni su se borili za njega dok je bio živ. Postoji zakonski prepis koji daje pravo bližoj rodbini da sahrani svog umarlog člana ateistu po vjerskom obredu. […] Općini kao predstavniku socijalističke vlasti ne smeta to što će ateist biti sahranjen zajedno sa vjernicima i što će se kao mrtav priključiti njima.
The above statement not only proves that one could trespass the border between “home” community and neighbour’s community, but also establishes the border and distinction as a prerequisite of tolerance and equal rights for atheists, and believers of various faiths. He confirms this in the answer to a reader from Bihać in Bosnia, asking in “Glasnik” in 1966 if a Muslim husband of a non-Muslim woman can bury her in a Muslim grave:

According to Islamic rules, the ḥalāt al-Janāzah [Islamic funeral prayer – O.D.] must not be performed. […] Besides, this would injure the principles of tolerance, which Islam especially respects and strictly enforces. The husband has no right to ask for something like that. […] If she is to be buried in accordance with her faith, it is the husband’s duty to make this happen. (Đozo, 2006d, pp. 68–69)31

The same stance is maintained by Đozo in many places; among others, in an answer to the chief Imam of Mostar, who in a 1972 issue of “Glasnik” asked whether a protestant woman who had not converted to Islam could be buried together with her Muslim husband, according to the will she expressed before she died. Đozo refused, and explained:

Svaka […] Each confession has its manner of burial, its grave markings, symbols and tombstones. Considering this, it would be far more justified for a mother who was a Christian to be buried in a Christian cemetery, because her children would be able to raise a tombstone with Christian emblems for her, which would be impossible in a Muslim cemetery. It should be noted here that the principle of separation is respected during the formation of new city cemeteries. […] Each confession raises monuments in the spirit of their tradition and develops their (own) sepulchral art 32 (Đozo, 2006d, pp. 411–412).

In the matters of burial, Đozo was pointing to ‘Abduhu as an exegetical example to follow (Đozo, 2006d, pp. 147–148). With the years, he became less strict about the question of the burial of a non-Muslim married to a Muslim, and he would underline that the answer to this question is a matter

[...] Ne bi se moglo lahko opravdati naređenje da se čovjek koji se za života opredijelio za ateizam i živio tako, mora sahraniti zajedno sa vjernicima, a ne sa ateistima, pogotovo tamo gdje postoje ateistička groblja.

31 Prema islamskim propisima, nemuslimanu se ne može niti smije klanjati dženaza. […] Osim toga, tim bi bio povrijeđen i princip tolerancije koji islam neobično poštuje i striktno provodi. Muž uopće nema pravo da tako nešto traži. […] Kad već treba da se sahrani po propisima svoje vjere i kad je muž dužan da to omogući.

32 Svaka konfesija ima svoj način sahrane, svoje nadgrobne ambleme, simbole i spomenike. S obzirom na ovaj momenat bilo bi mnogo opravdane da se majka kršćanka sahranili u kršćansko groblje, jer bi djeca bila u većoj mogućnosti da joj podignu spomenik sa kršćanskim amblemima, što im ne bi bilo moguće u muslimanskim grobljima. Potrebno je ovde napomenuti da se princip odvojenosti poštuje prilikom formiranja novih gradskih grobalja. […] Svaka konfesija podiže spomenike u duhu svojih tradicija i razvija svoju nadgrobnu umjetnost.
of *ijtihād*, i.e. free interpretation of the Qurʾān. Once he even assumed that performing a Christian ritual on a Muslim graveyard should not pose a big problem, since one could find an analogy to this in the Prophet’s life (Đozo, 2006e, p. 257). In general, however, the critical analysis of the *Fetve* of Husein Đozo clearly shows that maintaining the borders and avoiding their blurring – e.g. through mixed marriages between the neighbours – was preferred, as a guarantee of “normalcy” and as positive for the development of brotherly relations between the communities (Đozo, 2006d, pp. 125–126). Here we can find a common point between the socialist revolution of inclusion and the Freudian revolution, which sees the neighbour as an “alien traumatic kernel” which “hystericizes me” (Reinhard et al., 2005, p. 4).

**Conclusions**

The present article shows that theological notions and concepts present in Husein Đozo’s Qurʾānic exegesis and the *fatāwā*, i.e. answers to the legal and ethical aporias faced by Muslims from Yugoslavia, were inclusive and open to dialogue with neighbours of non-Islamic beliefs, including atheists. The source for this openness derived from the traumatic experience of World War II atrocities: dialogue with neighbour was perceived as a necessary means of preventing future atrocities. It also had to do with the practical dimension of a dialogue necessitated between co-workers and co-inhabitants in a single country, perceived as a wide neighbourhood.

The intellectual background for the openness, however, stemmed from the legacy of Arab thinkers, above all: Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad ʿAbduh, Muhammad Raṣīd Riḍā and Mahmūd Šaltūt. Those founders and members of the current of Islamic Modernism were proponents of Pan-Islamism, which could counterbalance Western influences in the Islamic world, as well as of the revival of Islamic thought and jurisprudence, and in this sense, fundamentalists. It might therefore prove surprising that the ecumenical attitudes of Husein Đozo were not only a result of the Modernism of the socialist secularizing state of Yugoslavia, but also – and maybe foremost – the fundamentalist Modernism of Islamic thought, nowadays so often associated with aggressive, anti-European, monolithic forces that oppose any dialogue with non-Muslims.

The Christian, the Jew, and the atheist were “truer” neighbours than many Muslims, or followers of faiths, in many regards closer Islam than Christianity or Judaism (or at the very least equally close to Islam as those religions and certainly closer than atheism). The category of neighbour and neighbourhood as a socio-political but also ethical realm of meeting the one who “sits with me” and “talks with me” on everyday basis, through
everyday encounters, was also based on the sharing of a common social capital of sedentary population. Hence, among the decisive factors for ascription to the category of neighbour was not only spatial proximity, but also the proximity of status.

Finally, the proximity did not allow for the abandonment of borders and distinctions – which were the warrants of mutual respect, tolerance, and freedom. Since hospitality requires a certain amount of self-preservation in order to reaffirm the host’s position of authority, it can be stated that non-passable borders served as guardians of the right to hospitality. The overall image painted by the *Fetve* of Husein Đozo shows that the neighbourhood of Islamic Modernism in Yugoslavia was indeed very hospitable.

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Note

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