
Abstract

In the twenty-first century, Ukraine has been experiencing new social and political changes, which have resulted into shifts of the national identity. This has created resonance not only within Ukrainian society but abroad as well. Historical events, such as the Orange Revolution or Euromaidan, provided new directions for reconsidering Ukrainian identity by the external actors. The image of Ukraine has been created abroad with the help of the mass media, which enable the wide audience to receive information about particular events and arrive at its own conclusions. The more in-depth information presented in the opinion-forming press is better suited for deliberating the issue of identity. Thus, this paper seeks to investigate how Polish intellectuals present Ukraine in contemporary Polish opinion-forming press. This research, on the one hand, provides an understanding of Ukrainian identity problems, and gives possibility to examine positive and negative aspects of the way identity has been expressed. On the other hand, it demonstrates the way public opinion-makers in Poland perceive, construct and reconstruct the identity of Ukraine and Ukrainian nation and how they present them to their society. The article seeks to investigate what attributes of Ukrainian identity were crucial for the Polish media: what factors, historical events, cultural and political features, myths and symbols were important for reflecting on Ukraine in Polish opinion-forming press.
Introduction

The issue of identity is crucial for contemporary Ukraine. After gaining independence, Ukraine remained the most ambiguous post-Soviet state in terms of identity (Riabchuk, 2012, p. 439). The twenty-first century brought Ukraine new challenges. The country has been experiencing new social and political changes, as well as historical events, such as the Orange Revolution or the Euromaidan, which – to a varying degree – have resulted in shifts of national identity (Kuzio, 2010, p. 285) and have resonated not only within Ukrainian society but abroad as well, providing new directions for reconsidering Ukrainian identity.

Ukraine and Poland are closely connected by historical ties. After the demise of the USSR, the countries have been maintaining an intensive political and cultural relationship. Nowadays, Poland is Ukraine’s closest neighbor in the EU. Two points stem from these circumstances. Firstly, history as well as contemporary political and social events influence the image of Ukraine in Poland. Secondly, further successful political communication is crucial to both nations, and in order to maintain it, it is significant to know how Ukraine is perceived in Poland.

The image of anything is created mostly with the help of different sort of media (McQuail, 2007, p. 341). The media enable the wide audience to receive information about particular events and arrive at its own conclusions. It goes without saying that influential opinion-forming press (prasa opinii) is better suited for deliberating of such an important issue as identity. The reason is that opinion-forming press is not always oriented towards the mass reader, and there are numerous periodicals which serve as a platform for intellectuals and scholars to discuss important issues in a more inclusive, not strictly academic environment. Thus, this paper seeks to investigate how Polish intellectuals present contemporary Ukraine to Polish readers – what image of Ukraine is described on the pages of Polish intellectual journals.

In doing so, it, on the one hand, provides understanding of Ukrainian identity problems, and gives possibility to examine positive and negative aspects of the way this identity has been expressed. On the other hand, it demonstrates the way public opinion-makers in Poland perceive, construct and re-construct the identity of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, and present them to their society. The aim of the article is to find the crucial attributes of Ukrainian identity which were significant for its Polish
perception. It looks at what factors, historical events, cultural and political features, myths and symbols were important for deliberating Ukraine in Polish opinion-forming press.

In this paper, Ukrainian identity will be analyzed in two Polish opinion-forming journals – *Arcana* and *Res Publica Nowa*. Those two periodicals provide rigorous discussions on important socio-political, cultural, geopolitical and other issues. Both *Arcana* and *Res Publica Nowa* have the same circulation of 2,500 copies. They differ in frequency and ideological orientation. *Arcana* is a bimonthly and *Res Publica Nowa* is a quarterly; *Res Publica Nowa* is more liberal and centrist, while *Arcana* is more conservative (Mielczarek, 2013, p. 100).

Discourse analysis is the main method used for the study of the text samples. Hence, the paper presents quantitative as well as qualitative results. The methodology of studying perceived identity differs from that of regular research on national identity as it actually operates within social strata and milieus. In this study, the difference between perceived and real is taken into consideration. Thus, referring to the methods of textual analysis, three stages of critical discourse analysis are used: description of the text, interpretation of the relationship between the text and the interaction within which it appeared, and explanation of the relationship between this interaction and its social context (Fairclough, 2001, p. 91).

This paper consists of two parts. The first one provides theoretical framework for research on national identity in general and reviews the most relevant academic enquiries into Ukrainian identity in particular. The second part is dedicated to the analysis of the Polish periodicals *Arcana* and *Res Publica Nowa* with a view to discover how Ukrainian identity issues are presented by Polish intellectuals to Polish society.

The issue of Ukrainian national identity. A general outline

The notion of national identity is crucial for this analysis. Although this paper does not pretend to provide a wide retrospective analysis of the theory of national identity, it is worth mentioning the main definitions related to national identity used in this paper.

National identity can be researched as a part of an individual’s social identity, and as a collective phenomenon of particular national groups (Korostelina, 2013, p. 293). In this paper, national identity will be presented on both collective and individual levels. The concept of national identity derives from the study of nations and nationalism, i.e. the shapes assumed by the nation and by national identity. National identity is a feature that is not inherent but is constructed by specific circumstances organizing people

Depending on the type of nation, national identity is divided into civic and ethnic. Anthony Smith delineates five main features of national identity: (1) common historic territory, or homeland; (2) common myths and historical memories; (3) common culture; (4) common legal rights and duties for all members; and (5) common economy with territorial mobility for members (Smith, 1991, p. 14). The first three define the ethnic type of identity. Common territory, culture and historic memories constitute the core of common origin of a certain ethnie and its nexus with the nation state. Speaking about ethnies (ethnic communities), Smith adds three more features, namely collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. (Smith, 1991, p. 21). Hence, ethnic identities are more exclusive, emphasizing the uniqueness of their respective in-groups (Smith, 1986, p. 47). Ethnic identity is composed of various components, such as exploration, resolution, and affirmation of ethnicity (Umaña-Taylor, 2011, p. 792). Overall, ethnic identity stresses the primordial values – the special role of national culture, history and traditions (Phinney & Ong, 2007, p. 271) and promotion of one’s sub-group to the exclusion of other groups (Hansen & Hesli, 2009, p. 4).

Civic identity, on the contrary, is based not on ethnic attachment but on the group membership of residence, and on tolerance to the other ethnic groups living in the state (Shulman, 2004, p. 37). It is closely related to such notions as citizenship and civic participation, which are the foundations of civic behavior (Hart, Richardson, & Wilkenfeld, 2011, p. 771). Civic identity is a subject of personal choice, following Liah Greenfeld, “membership in the nation in this case ultimately depends on one’s will to be a member, and nationality, similarly to religion, may be both acquired and lost” (Greenfeld, 2001, p. 2).

In post-Soviet states, national identity is closely linked to supra-national or transnational ones (Tárás, Fillipova, & Pobeda, 2004, p. 836). It is believed that Ukraine, like many post-Soviet states, suffers from an inferiority complex and this was the reason for attaching national identity to a supra-national – imperial or post-imperial one (Melnıykowska, Schweickert, & Kostiuchenko, 2011, p. 1062). The connection between Ukrainian national and supra-national identity is clearly illustrated by Stephen Shulman. He demonstrates the entire problem of Ukrainian identity by distinguishing two “identity complexes”: ethnic Ukrainian national identity and Eastern Slavic national identity (Shulman, 2004, p. 36). The first one is based on the notion that Ukrainian ethnicity, culture and language should be the dominant integrating forces in the Ukrainian nation state. Ethnic
Ukrainians as a dominant group and primary indigenous people should have a special status. The supporters of this type of identity consider the Ukrainian-Russian historical relations as relations between the colonized and colonizer and the presence of Russians in Ukraine as a result of Russian imperial politics. It was Russia and Russification (*rusifikatsia*) which caused the unnatural division between ethnic Ukrainians. The spread of the Russian language was imposed during the times of the Russian Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union.

This kind of identity is similar to other Central and Eastern European identities. Despite the presence of ethnic elements, some researchers characterize this type of identity as inclusive civic, albeit with a strong component of national cultural adherence (Riabchuk, 2012, p. 422). This is also confirmed by Shulman in his another article, where he analyses Ukrainian identity complexes and their ability to support changes and reforms in social and political life. Shulman discovers that ethnic Ukrainians are more likely to participate in civic life and support social changes towards democracy (Shulman, 2005, pp. 74–75).

By contrast, the Eastern Slavic ethnic identity complex is associated with the view that Ukrainian nation is founded on two primary ethnic groups, languages and cultures – Ukrainian and Russian – unified by being embedded in a common historical and cultural space. The Eastern Slavic identity follows the imperial Russian and Soviet historiography of “brotherly relation” or “Slavic unity” between Russians and Ukrainians (Shulman, 2004, p. 39). Part of the Eastern Slavic identity is the post-Soviet identity, which derives from the *homo sovieticus*. It is characterized by a weak feeling of adherence to culture and ethnicity. The representatives of post-Soviet identity often regret the dissolution of the USSR and speak neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian language but a mix of the two, called *surzhyk* (Melnykowska et al., 2011, p. 1060).

One of the reasons of such ambiguity in identity construction in Ukraine is the political factor of late nation creation. As Andrew Wilson admits, “despite winning independence, Ukraine remains an amorphous society without strong national identity” (Wilson, 2002, p. 31).

Besides political factors, the issue of history or the interpretation of history played a significant role introducing the Russia–Europe dichotomy into Ukrainian identity. The Soviet historiography constantly imposed the myth about common Slavic world of three brotherly nations – Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian, under the obvious leadership of the Russians. This interpretation of history was presented in everyday discourse and has continued to exert strong influence even after the demise of the Soviet Union. The factor of the distorted perception of history was crucial in the
formation of the Soviet or Eastern Slavic identity types, subsequently united under a common pro-Russian orientation.

Whereas Russia influenced the pro-Soviet category of Ukrainian identity, Poland facilitated the Ukrainian national context, seeking to connect Ukraine to Europe. Analysing the process of Ukraine’s transition to a modern nation state, Roman Szporluk tries to belie the popular image about Ukraine as a Russian province. Deliberating the historical situation of the annexation of the Ukrainian lands by Russia, Szporluk demonstrates that initially, more than three and a half centuries ago, only a small part of Ukraine belonged to Russia. It was contemporary regions of Poltava and Chernihiv, with the city of Kiev also under rule of the tsar (Szporluk, 1997, p. 87). Still, after 1667 Warsaw ruled over more Ukrainian territory than Moscow did. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was present on the territory to the west of the river Dnipro until the final partition of Poland in 1795. Furthermore, Szporluk writes that the Polish nobility was the dominant group in the area until 1830, if not 1863, and the Poles retained great social and cultural influence until and after the Russian revolutions of 1917. In the west, the Ukrainian-Polish nexus continued until 1939–1945 (Szporluk, 1997, p. 87). Szporluk claims it is erroneous to consider Ukraine as only post-Soviet state – it is partly Central European due to the Polish factor combined with the Austro-Hungarian one.

Since Europe has played a significant role in the forming of Ukrainian cultural identity, it finds its reflection on different levels of public intellectual discussion in independent Ukraine. The European factor has been among the most important in forming contemporary Ukrainian identity by elites, both political and cultural. In the realm of political discourse, Europe as a “symbolic power” (Charnysh, 2013, p. 2) has remained significant in independent Ukraine. The idea of Europe can integrate Russian and Ukrainian-speaking population and help to construct one European supra-national identity (Charnysh, 2013, p. 10), as was demonstrated during the Euromaidan.

Wider reflection on the idea of Europe has found its way to cultural context and to public intellectual discourse. Ukrainian writers and scholars have emphasized that the European idea could be inscribed within the frame of Ukrainian identity in the notion of “Central and Eastern Europe” as it was formulated by intellectuals of former Soviet bloc (Hnatiuk, 2005b, pp. 260–275). In this case, Europe’s value for Ukraine and its identity has been perceived mostly in two different dimensions: Europe as an institution and Europe as an idea (Yermolenko, 2014, p. 2).

In conclusion, Ukrainian national and supra-national identity has constantly been influenced by external actors, which is confirmed by
abundant historical evidence. Thus, the contemporary Ukrainian identity is polarised between – and consequently, constitutes a combination of – pro-Russian orientation and post-Soviet style of living on the one hand, and pro-European orientation and cultural aspirations on the other.

Perception of Ukrainian identity in Polish press

This section will try to answer the question about forms of perception of Ukrainian identity by Polish intellectuals on the basis of an analysis of two Polish periodicals: Arcana and Res Publica Nowa. The period of analysis encompasses ten years, from 2004 to 2014. During this period, the Ukrainian question occurred in 14 articles in Res Publica Nowa and 21 articles in Arcana. In some years, there were no mentions about Ukraine at all: 2007, 2009, 2011 in the case of Arcana and 2004, 2007, 2011, 2012 in Res Publica Nowa (See Figure 1).

Based on the patterns of Ukrainian identity outlined in the previous section, the issue of Ukrainian identity is analyzed using the two categories of national and supra-national identity. National identity is divided into two concepts: of civic identity and ethnic identity. In turn, supra-national identity is divided into two concepts: post-Soviet and European. The methodological division provided above enables the author to research in-depth the issue of Ukrainian national identity in the Polish press and also to deliberate on the attributes of its perception (Tkachenko, 2016, pp. 79–84).
Supra-national identity

European identity

The European factor in Ukrainian supra-national identity occurred in the equal amount of articles in both Res Publica Nowa and Arcana (See Table 1). It was presented mostly within the category of Central and Eastern Europe. The cultural factor was decisive in the interpretation of Ukrainian issues in the majority of articles in Res Publica Nowa (See Figure 2).

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<th>Identity</th>
<th>Arcana</th>
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<td>European</td>
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<td>Post-Soviet</td>
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Table 1. Quantitative indicators of the presence of supra-national identity of Ukraine in Arcana and Res Publica Nowa (amount of articles). Source: own elaboration.

In terms of cultural factors, the aspect of literature occupies a significant place in Polish intellectual deliberation of Ukrainian identity. In Res Publica Nowa, the first article about Ukraine after the Orange Revolution was written by the Polish intellectual Aleksandra (Ola) Hnatiuk. In the article Kuszenie Ukrainą, Ola Hnatiuk admits that there is peculiar Central European component in contemporary Ukrainian literature, which implies a kind of imagined European identity:


¹ “A Europe whose center moves to the east. The Habsburg myth finds a new, Galician-Ukrainian dimension. The magnificent heterogeneity of a cultural mosaic glimmering ominously from time to time. A weird territory: stuck between the East and the West, its face turned with admiration towards the West and its back – to the East. Don’t we recognize in it with nostalgia Kundera’s The West Kidnapped? Our illusions and later disappointments?” (all translations mine – O.T.).
Herein Hnatiuk refers to the discussion about the “return” to Europe in the intellectual milieus of the former Soviet bloc in the 1980s, when Milan Kundera’s essay *The West Kidnapped, or the Tragedy of Central Europe* caused intensive disputes about the belonging to Europe of the countries constituting the bloc. To stress this, Ola Hnatiuk explains that Ukrainian writers provide numerous indicators of the European vector of Ukrainian culture. For instance, Hnatiuk notes that one of contemporary Ukrainian literary characters has the last name Zumbrunnen, which means “back to the sources.” It is interpreted as an allusion to Ukrainian literature of the 1920s, whose motto “Ad fontes” became a symbol of European orientation in the culture (Hnatiuk, 2005a, p. 52).

In *Arcana*, contrary to *Res Publica Nowa*, there is no such deep deliberation of Ukrainian culture as a component of supra-national identity (see Figure 1). The cultural aspect appears in a few articles but within the scope of civilizational aspects. Mostly, the authors discuss European factors.

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2 The English version was originally published in *The New York Review of Books* under the shortened title *The Tragedy of Eastern Europe*.

3 Ola Hnatiuk writes about Yurii Andrukhovych’s novel *Twelve Rings*, whose main character was called Karl Joseph Zumbrunnen.

4 Ola Hnatiuk refers to Mykola Zerov, Ukrainian poet and literary scholar, who wrote in the 1920s a series of papers entitled *Ad Fontes*, where he claimed that Ukrainian writers should focus on modern European streams and not on the requirements of Soviet ideology.
in the Ukrainian identity comparing it to Poland in contradiction to Soviet tradition.

In the article *Nasze problemy z tożsamością* (2004), the Polish historian Jan Kieniewicz analyzes Ukrainian problems mostly in historical and civilizational dimensions (Kieniewicz, 2004, p. 49). In the context of Ukrainian supra-national identity, Kieniewicz emphasizes that the existence of Central and Eastern Europe presupposes an *Eastern Europe*, where he places Ukraine. We can assume that according to Kieniewicz, Eastern Europe begins where Western Christianity ends. In his article, Jan Kieniewicz also ponders the problem of different inferiority complexes resulting from the colonial and imperial heritage in Ukraine. Kieniewicz assumes that this colonial aspect caused the presence of alien cultural domination and plausible supra-national orientation both in Poland and Ukraine. Thus, the scholar connects Ukrainian and Polish problems with identity with the common heritage of totalitarian past (Kieniewicz, 2004, p. 52).

Another problem which Kieniewicz points out is the blurred definition of the Ukrainian *Other* (Kieniewicz, 2004, p. 52), although he concludes that in order to construct national identity, Ukrainians should speak and think less about the *other* but focus on the issues which unite their society. At the same time, the Polish component in the construction of Ukrainian identity in the last years is very significant for Kieniewicz. Hence, he states that construction of national Ukrainian identity depends partly on the historical memory from which Polish component cannot be excluded (Kieniewicz, 2004, p. 50).

The civilizational aspect of supra-national identity is presented in another Jan Kieniewicz’s article, entitled *Jaka Europa na Wschodzie?* and published in 2010 in *Arcana*. Although the author mostly seeks to define the notions *Eastern Europe* or *Europe in the East* from the Polish perspective, the former USSR republics are mentioned in the context of the geopolitical concept that is the *Intermarium* (*Międzymorze*). Kieniewicz does not specify what states he understands under the term Intermarium, he just delineates the Intermarium as a territory between the Black and Baltic Seas (Kieniewicz, 2010, p. 30). However, in the broader sense it is assumed that the Intermarium includes also the Adriatic region and encompasses such states as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, Czech Republic, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania (Levy, 2007, p. 175). If we were to agree with Kieniewicz’s definition, Ukraine occurs in the context of a geopolitical project which was supposed to replace the German *Mitteleuropa* and form a new Central and Eastern Europe as a counterweight to both Russia and Germany (Chodakiewicz, 2013, p. 3). It could be assumed that there are also implicit references to Józef Piłsudski’s
idea of a federation of Central and Eastern European states. Hence, Ukraine is placed within an idealistic concept of one of the variants of Central and Eastern Europe.

Geopolitical and civilizational factors also occur in Bartłomiej Bańka’s article *Grossraum Europy i Rosji a Ukraina* (Bańka, 2004). Bańka considers Ukraine as a unity influenced by three geopolitical superpowers – the US, Russia and the EU. He also uses the German world *Mitteleuropa* for Central Europe, including in it Galicia, because of the Polish influences there, at the same time emphasizing the German (Austrian) factor in Central and Eastern Europe. Inasmuch as Bańka perceives Ukrainian identity from the political and economic perspective, the only European identity without any additional adjectives is possible exclusively through the EU enlargement. The author concludes that when Europeans create the mechanisms which will be able to unify different ambitions of particular players in Europe, then Kyiv will find itself among “EU capitals” (Bańka, 2004, p. 59).

Thus, the geopolitical factor is rather used by Polish intellectuals to project a plausible Ukrainian European identity. However, if Ukraine had no prerequisites for it, any model of a European identity could not be possible. The following two examples prove this assumption.

Marcin Kacperek’s article *Od Wyszehradu do Hadziacza. Druga szansa Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* (Kacperek, 2013) discusses the possibility of official limits of the part of Europe called Central and Eastern. His main point is that without Ukraine, the concept of Central and Eastern Europe is incomplete (Kacperek, 2013, p. 37). Kacperek states that the chance for Ukraine to be “officially” included in the scope of Central and Eastern Europe is to enter the Visegrád Group.

Jeremi Sadowski, in his article about the Euromaidan *Jak wspierać Kijów i nie ulegać złudzeniom* (Sadowski, 2014), demonstrates a perception of Ukrainian identity as European in political terms, based on the institutional identity of European integration. However, the author warns that a European Ukrainian identity depends on whether Europe will stand for it in the competition with Russia. Sadowski emphasizes that Ukraine relies on Europe and is ready to pay a high price for it (Sadowski, 2014, p. 115).

The analysis shows that there is no one single perception of Ukrainian identity defined only in terms of alleged European categories. Historical and social factors are at the roots of the perception of Ukrainian identity in terms of Eastern and Central European concepts, and in some cases, the concept of Eastern Europe has strong connotations with pro-Russian, post-Soviet features of Ukrainian identity.
Post-Soviet identity

Post-Soviet supra-national identity of Ukraine is presented in Arcana and Res Publica Nowa in strong connection with national identity. Post-Soviet identity is linked to pro-Russian political orientation of regular people and the ruling elites.

In Res Publica Nowa, post-Soviet supra-national identity appears firstly in the article “Pomarańczowi” zdają test, signed XYZ (2005). In the context of the Orange Revolution, the article juxtaposed post-Soviet identity with European and national Ukrainian ones, referring to the former as “Asiatic satrapia” and the “liberal empire of Putin” (ZYZ, 2005, p. 94).

Post-Soviet type of identity can be recognized through different signs of the Soviet era which Polish intellectuals notice in Ukraine. Andrzej Muszyński’s article Maile ze Wschodu (Muszyński, 2010) is full of symbols of the former époque: monuments to Lenin, the Russian Lada cars, Soviet-style buildings, the mix of Russian and Ukrainian languages in people's everyday lives. This example demonstrates that for Polish observers, the presence of cultural heritage, namely some material signs of the former USSR, defines post-Soviet identity.

Similar semiotic factors define Ukrainian post-Soviet identity in Leszek Wołosiuk’s essay Charków: dzieje nowożytniej Ukrainy (Wołosiuk, 2008). In his description of Kharkiv, an Eastern Ukrainian city, there are many mentions of Soviet symbols, like monuments to Lenin, or the names of the streets and squares.

The post-Soviet category of Ukrainian national identity appears also in several articles which focus on the aspect of the political elites. A vivid example is Józef Darski’s article Czy Pomarańczowa Rewolucja poniosła klęskę? (Darski, 2005). The author tries to examine the results of the Orange Revolution in the context of the emergence of the new elites. The fact is that identity is created by elites (Lane, 2011, p. 926). Therefore, the majority of problems with identity in post-Soviet states are caused by the lack of strong and responsible elites on different social levels. This statement constitutes the main argument of Darski’s deliberation of Ukrainian post-Soviet identity after the Orange Revolution. The reason for this stems from the fact that the Ukrainian elites from before the revolution have not been replaced by new ones. All the officials and players originate either from the Soviet ruling apparatus or at least from the environment of the second Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, who himself started his career as a Soviet official (Darski, 2005, pp. 50–64). To emphasize post-Soviet identity in Ukrainian
politics, Darski uses the term “nomenklatura”⁵ as an identification of Ukrainian political elites.

In the contexts of the Soviet type of Ukrainian ruling elites, Darski highlights the role of oligarchs in Ukrainian politics. He states that the Orange Revolution was not an uprising of the people but a conflict between oligarchic elites. In terms of political identity, Ukraine is presented to the Polish reader as a territory of different clans of oligarchs. Therefore, Ukrainian identity is defined by the interest of the currently ruling oligarchic clan. Darski demonstrates that all clans of Ukrainian oligarchs are linked to Russia to varying degrees, economically, politically or by personal relations. And since politics is built in accordance with clan interests, this confirms the perception of Ukraine in terms of the category of post-Soviet identity and pro-Russian orientation.

The post-Soviet category of Ukrainian supra-national identity also occurs in the description of Ukrainian academic milieu in Łukasz Adamski’s article Dialog historyczny z Rosją i Ukrainą – podejście endoskopiczne (Adamski, 2013). Adamski’s account of the lack of autonomy and of bureaucracy and corruption in Ukrainian universities is presented as evidence of Soviet legacy. Post-Soviet academic reality and its components, such as feudal relationships, nepotism, lack of transparency, autoplagiarism, low intellectual level of Ukrainian scholars, and limited access to international academic world (Adamski, 2013, p. 28) nowadays constitute a part of post-Soviet institutional identity.

During the Euromaidan, the post-Soviet supra-national identity of Ukraine was not emphasized as much in the analyzed periodicals. Only one article by Spasimir Domaradzki, Kres Polityki sąsiedztwa (Domaradzki, 2014), published in Res Publica Nowa, presents Ukraine using the category of post-Soviet identity. However, the main topic of this article is not Ukraine. It mostly presents the failure of EU doctrine of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is only while writing about Ukraine as one of the ENP states that the author defines its post-Soviet identity in political and economic terms by describing the entire image of post-Soviet political order in the state (Domaradzki, 2014, pp. 109–111).

In conclusion, the post-Soviet category in Ukrainian identity as presented in the Polish press is caused mostly by the political factor of contemporary ruling elites and the cultural factor of the remnants of visible Soviet signs.

⁵ The word “nomenklatura” used to indicate the political elites and higher officials in the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries.
National identity proper

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<td>Civic</td>
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Table 2. Quantitative indicators of the presence of national identity of Ukraine in *Arcana* and *Res Publica Nowa* (amount of articles). Source: own elaboration.

**Ethnic identity**

For the sake of this analysis, depictions of Ukrainian identity will be discerned which present it in ethnic and civic categories. The first category of ethnic identity is presented in the already mentioned Ola Hnatiuk’s article *Kuszenie Ukrainą* (Hnatiuk, 2005a). The Polish intellectual here perceives Ukraine through the prism of its ethnic identity, measured by the cultural factor. She states that Ukraine has got a new cultural identity because of the emergence of new literature, which makes it interesting and recognizable for other countries (Hnatiuk, 2005a, pp. 51–52). The scholar emphasizes the numerous attempts of separation of Ukrainian identity from Russian, of distinguishing it from the remnants of former Russian and Soviet empires. In Hnatiuk’s opinion, Ukrainian literature creates different mythologies in order to free itself of Russian colonial influences. These myths form a specific type of regional national identity. One of them is the mythological image of Galicia in Yuri Andrukhovych’s writings, or the sophisticated bricolage of Huculshchyna in writings by Taras Prochas’ko (Hnatiuk, 2005a, p. 51). The cultural frame of the perception of Ukrainian identity encompasses also the issue of language. Language as an attribute of ethnic features occupies an important place in Polish press texts about Ukraine. Ola Hnatiuk emphasizes that Ukrainian cultural elites nurture their language and place it high on the list of values defining national identity (Hnatiuk, 2005a, p. 52).

The aspect of literature as an attribute of Ukrainian identity is discussed in the article *Literatura ukraińska – mission impossible?* (Czechowska, 2014). The article is an interview with the Ukrainian cultural manager Iryna Vikyrchak. Herein, Ukrainian identity is perceived from the perspective of the cultural dimension and the sphere of values.

The cultural factor in Ukrainian ethnic identity appears in the already mentioned Leszek Wołosiuk’s travel essay *Charków: dzieje nowożytniej Ukrainy* (Wołosiuk, 2008). Cultural discourse is present in references to numerous symbols of Ukrainian cultural tradition – the reference to
Cossacks, Ukrainian philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda, and the Ukrainian blind folk singers kobzari (Wolosiuk, 2008, p. 101). Also, the author highlights the very important discourse of Russian colonial attitude towards Ukrainians and therefrom derives the ambiguity of the perception of Ukrainian identity in Kharkiv. On the one hand, this is a city with heroic Ukrainian history and Ukrainian culture, on the other, the author describes it as a space of Soviet mentality with a Russified population.

Ethnic categories in the perception of Ukrainian identity appear in Polish intellectual press also in some historical articles, especially about the period of Józef Piłsudski.

For instance, in the article Józef Piłsudski a Ukraina (1918-1922), Jan Pisuliński (2006) demonstrates Piłsudski’s ideas about Ukraine as a part of federation of Eastern European states under the protectorate of Poland (Pisuliński, 2006, p. 106). Ukraine in Piłsudski’s perception is a society with weak elites and without ability to form its own state. Therefore, Ukraine for Poles was nothing more than a buffer zone between them and Russia. Thus, the author concludes: “Niewątpliwie w koncepcjach Piłsudskiego Ukraina stanowią funkcję problemu rosyjskiego”6 (Pisuliński, 2006, p. 128).

Piłsudski’s views on Ukraine are also at the heart of Jan Jacek Bruski’s article Zamach majowy a rywalizacja polsko-sowiecka. Kontekst ukraiński i białoruski, published in Arcana in 2006. This article presents Ukrainian elites as the ones responsible for forming Ukrainian national identity. The elites’ own identity is demonstrated as anti-Russian and anti-Soviet (Bruski, 2006, p. 136). The author also presents Ukraine in the context of the Prometheus Movement in Poland, a political project dedicated to the liberation of the non-Russian borderland of the USSR. Hence the problem of former Polish dominions on the territories of contemporary Ukraine, part of the so-called Kresy, is cast in the context of Polish-Soviet rivalry. In general, all dimensions in the perception of Ukraine as different from Russia derive from persistent Polish fear of occurring under Russian domination again.

From the historical angle, the issue of the Kresy occupies significant place in Polish perception of Ukraine. For instance, Józefina Hryniewicz in the article Koniec kresowego świata (Hryniewicz, 2012) perceives Poland’s former Ukrainian territories in axiological terms, with nostalgia for former Polish possessions. Therefore, Ukrainians in these lands are presented as an unnatural component, which implies a colonial aspect of the Polish perception of Ukraine.

A very interesting implication of placing Ukrainian ethnic identity within Polish identity is demonstrated in Teresa Oleszczuk’s essay Obywa-

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6 “Doubtless, Ukraine was a function of the Russian problem in Piłsudski’s conception.”
telka polski narodowości ukraińskiej (2009). Through the story of her family, the author explains what Ukrainian identity means to her. Being a daughter of a Polish mother and a Ukrainian father, and a citizen of Poland, she discovers her “Ukrainianness.” Very often she tries to refute the stereotypical perception of Ukraine in Polish discourse, especially – “the paternalism in relation to so-called Kresy” (Oleszczuk, 2009, p. 136) and the persistent myth of Banderites (banderowcy):

Nie wiedziałam, dlaczego moja matka w chwilach złości mówiła do ojca, żeby przestał być takim banderowcem. Nie wiedziałam, kim jest banderowiec, ale wówczas było to jedno z moich ulubionych słów. […] Nie wiedziała również, dlaczego nasz sąsiad na widok ojca wykrzykuje: „rezun” (Oleszczuk, 2009, p. 135).

Teresa Oleszczuk demonstrates that the stereotype of the Ukrainian as a nationalistic murderer is still present in Polish society. That means that the aspect of Ukrainian nationalism and Polish historical memory play a significant role in the perception of Ukrainian identity.

![Figure 3. Mentions about Ukrainian nationalistic identity (amount of articles). Source: own elaboration.](image)

7 “I did not know why my mother, in moments of anger, asked my father to stop being such a Banderite. I did not know who a Banderite was, but back then it was one of my favorite words. […] I also did not know why our neighbor, when he saw my father, yelled: ‘slaughterer.’”

8 This stereotype has its roots in painful common history of Ukraine and Poland. A Banderite (banderowiec) is a member of the movement named after Stepan Bandera, leader of the Ukrainian nationalistic organization Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA, Polish Ukraińska Armia Powstańcza, Ukrainian Українська повстанська армія). In Polish society, the memory about Ukrainian Insurgent Army is connected with the ethnic cleansings in the 1940s, especially the Volhynia Tragedy, when the soldiers of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Banderites) killed thousands of ethnic Poles living on the territory of contemporary Volhynia Region of Ukraine (for more, see e.g. Snyder, 2003, pp. 154–175). On the other hand, in Ukrainian discourse, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is a symbol of struggle for independence, first and foremost against the Soviets.
Figure 3 demonstrates that description of the Ukrainians in nationalistic terms prevails in *Arcana*. The peak of the discussion about Ukrainian nationalism occurred in 2013, because of the seventieth anniversary of the Volhynia Tragedy. *Arcana* published few articles devoted to deliberation of possibility of a historical dialogue between Ukraine and Poland. Herein, the Volhynia Tragedy takes the first place. Hence, Ukrainians who are in favor of the UPA are treated as radical nationalists or even fascists. For instance, Łukasz Adamski criticizes sharply the heroic narrative of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Ukrainian historical works. For him, the UPA is definitely a fascist and terrorist organization (Adamski, 2013, p. 30).

The nationalistic aspect occurred again during the Euromaidan. In this aspect, visible signs of right-wing organizations played a significant role. Portraits of Bandera, people holding black and red flags of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, shouting the motto “Glory to Ukraine! To heroes – glory,” were perceived as indicators of Ukrainian radical nationalism. However, in some articles, the presence of these signs is highlighted but without automatic ascription of the label “radical nationalist” towards Maidan participants. Some authors emphasize that young Ukrainians perceive the UPA as a symbol of the struggle for independence from the USSR, without any anti-Polish connotations (Grajewski, 2014, pp. 156–157).

**Civic identity**

As shown in Table 2 above, the civic category prevails in the articles about Ukraine in *Res Publica Nowa*. First articles about the Ukrainians as a civic nation appear during and soon after the Orange Revolution. One of the authors, writing about the Orange Revolution, portrays the Ukrainians as those who have been purging their identity from the *homo sovieticus*, emphasizing the role of young people in this process (XYZ, 2005, p. 94).

Similar point of view is described in Bogumiła Berdychowska’s article *Jesień obywateli. Polska kronika pomarańczowej rewolucji* (Berdychowska, 2006). The title (which translates “Autumn of Citizens. A Polish Chronicle of the Orange Revolution”) illustrates the civic category in the perception of Ukrainian identity. Moreover, the metaphor of “autumn” could imply maturity of Ukrainian society. Hence, the expression “autumn of citizens” implies a complete awareness of Ukrainian society in terms of their civic rights and freedoms. In Polish tradition, the word *obywatel* (citizen) semantically means not merely one who is *de jure* a member of a certain state community but one who consciously identifies him- or herself with the state, who knows his or her rights and duties and actively acts in the civic life of his or her state (Sucharski, 2012, p. 286).
Besides, Berdychowska argues that civic identity was embodied in the people’s desire of “defense of the personal choice” during the Orange Revolution (Berdychowska, 2006, p. 138). Berdychowska discerns the capability of members of a society for self-discipline and self-organization as the main components and symbols of civic identity. The article also compares the Ukrainian case with the Polish Solidarity movement as a symbol of civic identity (Berdychowska, 2006, p. 140).

In the years after the Orange Revolution, Polish intellectuals have not been so optimistic about Ukrainian national identity, especially civic. For instance, in 2008, the Polish ethnographer Anna Wylegala in her article *Ukraińskie elity i mit dwóch Ukrain* noted the weak civic society in the country, language division in Ukraine, the lack of authority of cultural and intellectual elites in politics and in Ukrainian society in general. Therefore, Ukraine is presented as a state where people do not feel a homogeneous national community (Wylegala, 2008, p. 124).

In contrast to *Res Publica Nowa*, *Arcana* dedicated fewer articles to the category of civic identity. The first one was written by the already mentioned Polish scholar Ola Hnatiuk (2004). Hnatiuk juxtaposes the Ukrainian civic nationalism with the Russian imperial one. She concludes that Ukrainians should construct their nation (“national community”) based on the civic sentiments present in all people (Hnatiuk, 2004, pp. 39–43) and only then will they have a chance to form a strong political nation.

The second event which contributed to the perception of Ukraine in terms of civic identity was the Euromaidan. Polish intellectuals perceive the Euromaidan in contrast to the Orange Revolution. They stress that in 2004, the Maidan was organized by political parties. The strength of the second Maidan stems from the civic aspect and its motto “Human rights above all” (Bendyk, 2014, p. 118). Liberal values and European orientation were decisive in terms of perception of Ukraine as a civic nation. Some authors state that new collective subjectivity (*nowa zbiorowa podmiotowość*) appeared in Ukraine in the wake of the Euromaidan (Bendyk, 2014, p. 118). This illustrates that the Euromaidan caused Polish intellectuals to redefine Ukraine from a haphazard and uncertain image to a society with a strong civic identity.

This reinvention of Ukrainian identity in Polish intellectual milieu is usually associated with expectations to see Ukrainian society as strong and conscious, one which could eliminate the persistent post-Soviet order. For instance, Andrzej Grajewski writes in *Arcana* that the Euromaidan is the starting point for a new Ukrainian nation-state. The author delineates the civic component of national identity by stressing that the Maidan emerged aside from ethnic, linguistic and religious differences (Grajewski, 2014, pp. 151–153).
Conclusions

The analysis undertaken in the present article has demonstrated that the perception of the Ukrainian identity in the Polish press depends on social and political situation foremost in Ukraine but in Poland as well. This implies that the most important factor influencing the perception of Ukrainian identity is state politics and social situation.

The political factor defined Ukrainian image both during turning points, such as the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, and during silent years. Hence, social protests fostered portraying Ukraine as a European state with visible civic elements. Nevertheless, Polish intellectuals did not create a holistic image of Ukrainian identity even during the time of mass mobilization. Articles about Ukraine from the period of the Orange Revolution or the Euromaidan are polarized. On the one hand, the authors present Ukraine as a political nation united by one common idea of state-building. During the Orange Revolution, this was the idea of transparent election process and the freedom of choice. During the Euromaidan, it was the idea of Europe, which was crucial in presenting the Ukrainians as a civic nation. On the other hand, Polish intellectuals were aware of the polarization of Ukrainian society and noticed some categories dividing it, such as Ukrainian ethnic nationalism in its western part and pro-Russian orientation and post-Soviet mentality in its eastern part.

Alongside politics, the factor of culture in constructing Ukrainian identity was very visible in Polish perception. Contemporary Ukrainian literature, art, music and even vernacular cultural tradition were presented as factors which formed a strong Ukrainian identity linked to European cultural and civilizational tradition. The European aspect of Ukrainian identity was considered by Polish intellectuals mostly in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the concept of Central and Eastern Europe was itself not holistic. From the cultural perspective, it was regarded as a particular feature of Ukrainian culture, which was caused by its historical ties with European tradition. In that context, Ukraine was perceived as a definitely European state. On the other hand, while deliberating about political and economic situation and ways of functioning of the administrative and state system in Ukraine, Polish intellectuals definitely did not perceive Ukraine as European. The description “Eastern European” was used as an indicator of a former communist territory with contemporary post-Soviet identity.

The evidence considered in the present research also demonstrates that for the Polish perception of Ukraine, historical factor still remains important. Such common Polish and Ukrainian history as ethnic cleansings do not foster a positive image of the Ukrainians, and strengthen the persistent
stereotype about Ukrainians as radical nationalists and Banderites. Also certain idealistic and nostalgic perception of Ukraine in terms of the former Polish possessions in the Ukrainian territories still influence the image of Ukraine as the land of former Polish political and cultural domination. Therefore, Ukraine is not always perceived as entirely Ukrainian, and some authors desperately search for any trace of Polishness in Ukraine.

The reinvention of Ukraine on the part of Polish intellectuals is still ongoing. The perception of Ukrainian identity abroad, namely in Poland, is not a one-way process, depending only on the external observers. Undoubtedly, there are some patterns of Ukrainian identity which constitute a particular, established image but nonetheless the self-perception in Ukraine definitely influences the way it is perceived by others. The Polish and Ukrainian case is a vivid example of two nations which, on the one hand, have some mutual images of each other, constructed by common and long-lasting history, and, on the other, have been able to constantly change these images in response to new political and social challenges.

References


Ponowne odkrycie Ukrainy: 
Ukraińska narodowa i ponadnarodowa tożsamość we współczesnej polskiej prasie opiniotwórczej

W XXI wieku Ukraina przeżywa nowe zmiany społeczne i polityczne, które prowadzą do zmian tożsamości narodowej. To spowodowało rezonans nie tylko w społeczeństwie ukraińskim, ale również za granicą. Najnowsze wydarzenia historyczne, takie jak Pomarańczowa Rewolucja czy Euromajdan, na nowo ożywili wśród podmiotów zewnętrznych dyskusję o ukraińskiej tożsamości.

Zewnętrzny wizerunek Ukrainy kształtują środki masowego przekazu, które dostarczają szerokiej publiczności informacji o wydarzeniach historycznych. Informacje prezentowane w prasie opiniotwórczej są istotnym źródłem dla rozważań nad kwestiami tożsamości w ogóle.

Artykuł ma na celu zbadanie, jak polscy intelektualiści przedstawiają Ukrainę we współczesnej polskiej prasie. Badanie umożliwi zrozumienie problemów ukraińskiej tożsamości, będzie także prezentacją pozytywnych i negatywnych jej aspektów. Zarazem jednak unaczeń, w jaki sposób polskie środowiska opiniotwórcze postrzegają, konstruują i rekonstruują tożsamość Ukrainy i narodu ukraińskiego i jak przedstawiają te kwestie społeczeństwu.

Staram się jednocześnie wyjaśnić, jakie atrybuty ukraińskiej tożsamości – wydarzenia historyczne, cechy kulturowe i polityczne, mity i symbole – były istotne dla rozważań nad Ukrainą w polskiej prasie opiniotwórczej.

Note

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The article was written during the PhD program “Searching for Identity. Global Challenges Local Traditions” at the faculty of “Artes Liberales,” University of Warsaw. The author’s research was funded by the educational program Erasmus Mundus Action 2 Lot 5 – Strand 1, Whole Europe Beyond the Borders.

No competing interest have been declared.