The Perception of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations in the Daily “Politika” in the Context of the Pan-Balkan Entente Concept in the First Part of the 1930s.

Abstract

The Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement, initiated by King Aleksandar I Karadordević in the early 1930s, with the idea of including Bulgaria in the planned Balkan Pact, was one of the biggest reorientations in Yugoslav policy at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. Since the end of the Great War, Yugoslavia’s eastern neighbor had been treated rather as one of the greatest threats to the postwar order in the Balkans. This reorientation, resulting primarily from the geopolitical situation in Europe required a propaganda campaign improving the image of Bulgaria in the eyes of Yugoslav society. This would not be possible without the support of the press which, in the first half of the twentieth century, was still the most popular and definitely most accessible medium of disseminating information, and which could significantly affect public opinion in its perception of current political events. The aim of the author was to show the changes in presenting Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations in the daily Politika, the biggest and most widely read newspaper in the interwar Yugoslavia, in the context of the political activities of King Aleksandar I aimed at creating the so-called Balkan Entente.
The signing of the Balkan Pact, which took place in Athens on February 9, 1934, was a form of implementation of the popular at the time in Europe concept of collective security. In order to achieve a political rapprochement, Balkan countries had to find a way to resolve a number of contentious issues, which was one of the most important reasons for organizing the series of meetings called the Balkan conferences. Due to the fact that the meetings had an informal character, the participation of all interested parties was possible (Kerner & Howard, 1936, pp. 25–26; Paszkiewicz, 2012, pp. 224–225; Türkeş, 1994, p. 132). The first Balkan conference was convened in Athens from October 6-11, 1930. Although all the participants of this and the next conferences decided to skip – at least initially – the sensitive political issues, such as territorial problems, and – above all – the problem of national minorities; unfortunately almost every conference ended with quarrels because of the problem of the Bulgarian minority in the Greek and Serbian part of Macedonia. A similar problem also affected the question of the Albanian minority. Among other things, due to lack of agreement on these issues, only four countries: Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey joined in the Balkan Pact. In practice, the adoption of the pact in this form meant a return to the balance of power in the Balkans formed during the Second Balkan War.

Although the idea of a pan-Balkan cooperation revived at the time when ideas of pan-European cooperation and collective security were being widely propagated by the League of Nations, it is worth mentioning that the slogan associated with this idea: “The Balkans for the Balkan nations” denied in fact the pan-European idea, emphasizing the, let’s say, ‘Balkan exclusiveness’. What is more, even this ‘exclusiveness’ was selective, by excluding from the Balkan Pact Bulgaria and Albania, who were becoming more dependent on Italy. It is worth noting that not all the signatories of the Balkan Pact lobbied against Bulgaria. A great advocate of including that country in the planned alliance was, first of all, the king of Yugoslavia.

---

1 The second conference was held from the October 20-26, 1931 in Istanbul, the third one from October 22-29, 1932 in Bucharest, while the fourth one from November 5-11, 1933 in Thessaloniki.

2 The signatories of the Pact were the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each state. Greece was represented by Dimitros Maximos, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by Bogoljub Jević, Romania by Nicolae Titulescu, Turkey by Tevfik Rüştü Aras.
Aleksandar I Karadordević, who undertook a number of formal and informal actions aimed at repairing both his own and other Balkan states relationships with the government in Sofia (Avramovski, 1986a, pp. 70–73; Campus, 1978, pp. 63–64). It seems that this sudden political turn of Yugoslavia, whose relations with Bulgaria since the death of Prime Minister Aleksandyr Stamboliyski in June 1923 were rather cold, stemmed from a desire to prevent the creation of an anti–Yugoslav alliance of Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary, which could encircle the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Paszkiewicz, 2004, pp. 111–129). An additional impulse which prompted the Yugoslav ruling class to seek an agreement with Bulgaria was the signing of the so-called Four Power Pact in July 1933, in Rome, i.e. the pact between the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, which awakened fears among the smaller countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe that from the position of sovereign entities, they might once again become objects, pawns on the Great Powers’ political chessboard. It seems that this event was a turning point in the Yugoslav policy towards Bulgaria. The pursuit of rapprochement with its eastern neighbor found its reflection in propaganda, which aimed to present Bulgaria and, above all, the Bulgarian people as friendly and culturally closest to the Yugoslavs from among all of the Balkan nations.

Such a significant reorientation of the political discourse, in which Bulgaria had so far been presented rather as a hostile state, responsible for supporting the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) troops in so-called South Serbia, would have been impossible without the support of the press. In the first half of the twentieth century it was still the most popular and definitely most accessible medium of information, which could significantly affect the perception of current political events by public opinion. The importance of the press and awareness of the role it played in shaping a society may be evidenced by the fact that one of the first laws established by Aleksandar I, after the introduction of his dictatorship on January 6, 1929, was a new press law. Announced on the same day, it was far more restrictive than the already rigorous press law of August 6, 1925 (Dobrivojević, 2006, p. 301; “Закон о изменама и допунама закона о штампи,” 1929, p. 56; “Закон о штампи,” 1925, pp. 1–10). The first paragraph of the new law abolished the second one of its predecessor, which had stated that no institution can affect the freedom of the issuance, sale and distribution of the press apart from the exceptions contained in the Vidovdan Constitution from June 28, 1921 (“Закон о штампи,” 1925, p. 1). In paragraph 13 of the Constitution it was stated that the press is free and there are no circumstances that will justify preventing its publication, sale and distribution. Censorship could be introduced
only during war or mobilization and only in cases provided by the law in advance (Устав Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца од 28. јуна, 1921. год, 1921, p. 5). Among many other restrictions introduced by the new press law together with the establishment of the royal dictatorship, especially notable was the introduction of collective responsibility for the publisher, editor in chief and the journalist, the author of the text, for publishing an article which broke the law (Article 11), or to the possibility of banning the newspaper if it violated the existing rules three times during one month (Article 14) (“Закон о изменама и допунама закона о штампи,” 1929, p. 57). An additional instrument, which allowed Aleksandar I to control the press was the Central Press-Bureau (Централни Пресбиро – ЦПБ), established on April 18, 1929 (which is mentioned further in this paper as CPB). It was one of the first institutions of that kind in Europe (AJ, 38–1–1, Закон о Централном Пресбироу, p. 1). The Chief of the Central Press-Bureau was an official with the rank of deputy minister, directly responsible to the prime minister (AJ, 38–1–1, Организација штампе и пропаганде у Југославији, p. 1; Simić, 2013, p. 61). The importance of this institution may be shown by the fact, that its first director was Toni Šlegl, former director of the Zagreb daily Novosti and a close friend of Aleksandar I. Unfortunately he was shot just after taking up this office (Simić, 2013, p. 61). The next Chiefs of CPB were successively: Milan Marjanović, Milan Nikolić, Teofilo Djurović, Kosta Luković, Boško Bogdanović, Predrag Milojević and Milorad Radovanović. As the length of their term of office was not strictly specified, they were elected and removed from office according to the vision of the government currently in power. The activities of CPB were divided into four sections: the national press, the foreign press, radio and administration. The staff of these departments prepared daily reports about the articles appearing in both the domestic and foreign press (Simić, 2013, pp. 60–61; Драговић, 1956, p. 382; Б. Симић, 2007, pp. 79–83). Each banovina³ had its own CPB section, which monitored the activities of the local press (AJ, 38–1–1, Закон о Централном Пресбироу, pp. 1–2; Simić, 2013, p. 64). All the articles attacking the king, his family and government, or striking at his policy were blocked. Therefore, defending their own interests, the publishers of most newspapers, including the major ones, such as Politika, Vreme and Pravda, decided to introduce some kind of preventive censorship, resigning in a sense from the position of editor-in-chief to the censors from the CPB, but thanks to that avoiding possible financial losses, which could have resulted from the banning of the publication of a single issue or even

³ Banovina /province/ was an administrative unit, a subdivision of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia introduced by king Aleksandar in 1929.
the whole newspaper (М. Симић, 1987, pp. 120–123). Considering all the above mentioned facts and remembering about Paragraph 9 of the press law from 1929, which stated that every publisher was obliged to accept and unconditionally publish in the upcoming issue each note given him by the authorities („Закон о изменама и допунама закона о штампи,” 1929, p. 57), one could draw the conclusion that in the political situation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, almost every article printed in the legally published press had to be more or less in line with the political vision of the government, and thus also the vision of the king. Therefore, it is worth examining how the press described and commented the steps undertaken by the ruler to improve relations and establish the closest possible cooperation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with Bulgaria.

The daily Politika, the largest, and the most popular newspaper in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia), can be considered as a specific mirror reflecting the king’s political concepts, and thus also his vision of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian cooperation. The newspaper was founded by Vladislav Ribnikar on January 25, 1904 in Belgrade. It was one of the oldest and most prestigious dailies in the Balkans. During the reign of the King Aleksandar I (1921-1934), Politika was regarded as the most opinion-forming newspaper in the kingdom. In the late twenties it was the title with the largest daily print run of approximately 75,000 copies (the second was Vreme with approx. 60,000 copies and the third Pravda with approx. 25,000). Despite its widely proclaimed political neutrality, Politika almost always supported the official political line of the king and government (Nielsen, 2002, p. 337). On the one hand, this was probably determined by economic pragmatism and the desire to avoid any problems with publication of individual issues (М. Симић, 1987, pp. 119–123). On the other, it seems that the personal connections of some of the journalists with the royal court also played a role. Dr. Milan Gavrilović, considered as the main personage of Politika in the period 1924-1930, may be regarded as an example of such a relationship. Gavrilović was a member of the Agrarian Party (Zemljoradnička Stranka) and had quite extensive contacts with military elites. Moreover, Aleksandar’s Marshal of the Court, Aleksandar Dimitrijević was a friend from the days of his youth (М. Симић, 1987, p. 120). The high probability of articles in Politika being inspired by government circles was even mentioned by Henryk Malgomme, the Polish charge d’affaires in Belgrade, in his report from September 18, 1929, dedicated to the military convention of the Little Entente (AAN, 469 – 101, Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie, p. 2). Even if we assume, that Politika, like the other major Yugoslav newspapers did everything to retain even just a particle of independence, the result of this struggle was rather meager,
what was confirmed by the political opposition, who stated that if someone
wants to find out what actually happens in the kingdom, should not read
*Politika* and *Vreme* but rather the German, English and even the Italian
press (Dobrivojević, 2005, p. 54). And although the question of objective
presentation of the internal situation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in, for
instance, the Italian press can also be in doubt, the fact of using this fairly
drastic comparison may confirm to what extent even the most prestigious
Yugoslav newspapers were subordinated to the main political line of the
king and ruling circles. The reasons mentioned above, allow us to conclude
that such an important variable of the Yugoslav foreign policy as the attempt
to establish partnership relations with Bulgaria had to be also reflected on
the sheets of the most frequently read newspaper in the country, which in
some way prepared public opinion for the upcoming changes and justified
the royal policy toward the eastern neighbor.

Although the reaction of the Yugoslav press to the pan-Balkan idea and
the session of the first Balkan conference were rather positive (AAN, 469–88,
*Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie*, p. 1), statements about the new era or creation
of the new order in the Balkans were far from euphoric. In the article “Za
Balkanski sporazum4” from October 6, 1930, the author M. Stojanović not-
ed that the future of the Balkan nations lay in the realization of their com-
mon interests and common fate. Therefore the Balkan agreement should
be dealt with, as if the Balkan countries were associated with one chain,
in which each part represents one state. The creation of Balkan solidarity,
the journalist concluded, was the main task of those times (*Политика*,
1930: бр. 8052).

This kind of reserved judgment about the future of the Balkan
cooperation could result, among others, from the fact that journalists of
*Politika* probably knew the unofficial commentaries of Yugoslav politicians,
who did not hide their pessimism regarding the practical implementation
of the pan-Balkan cooperation idea. As the main problem, they recognized
the inability to find a way of coming up with an agreement with Bulgaria.
These fears were confirmed by the Polish representative to Belgrade,
Wacław Babiński, who cited in his report from October 13, 1930 the
conversation with Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs Vojislav Marinković.
During the talk, the Yugoslav diplomat stated that he was far from being
delighted with the results of the I Balkan Conference in Athens and, what is
more, he actually opposed its convening from the very beginning, because
he did not see any goal and any benefit in dealing the matters which, in the
current political situation were unreal, as the Bulgarians did not miss any

4 “For the Balkan agreement”.

50 COLLOQUIA HUMANISTICA
opportunity to refer to the Macedonian question, as to which on the part of Yugoslavia there could be no concessions, nor any compromises (AAN, 469–88, Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie, pp. 1–2). This type of reserve, and even a kind of reluctance to seek some way of finding agreement with its eastern neighbor was also seen in the **Politika** daily. If something was written about Bulgaria and its foreign policy, it was rather done in a cold tone, by attacking the hostile behavior of some Bulgarian politicians or accusing Sofia of inciting the situation in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia. As a very good example, may serve two articles: “Sporazum gospodina Mušanova” from June 3, 1932 and “Jugoslovensko – Bugarske odnosi” from June 13, 1932, which referred to the words of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Nikola Mušanov, who, in one of his speeches, laid the blame for the impossibility of resolving the minorities problem on Yugoslav politicians. The journalist of **Politika** sharply criticized the attitude of the Bulgarian Prime Minister, claiming that his words about repairing relations with neighbors were just empty platitudes without any backing. According to the author of both articles, hiding under the pseudonym M., the last Bulgarian politician who truly wanted to resolve disputes with Yugoslavia was Aleksandyr Stamboliyski, who tried to settle them in the Pact of Niš (March 23, 1923) (Политика, 1932: бр. 8643, 8653). Completing his text, Mr. M. indicated that if the attitude of the Prime Minister of Bulgaria does not change, the slogans about cooperation and improving relations will remain empty platitudes, because Yugoslavia will not talk about minority issues, if they are to be a *sine qua non* condition of any agreement (Политика, 1932: бр. 8653). The tone of the text seemed to dispel any hopes of even a minimum improvement of relations between Sofia and Belgrade.

However, the year 1933 brought a distinct change in the way relations with Bulgaria were presented in the discourse of the official Yugoslav media. A staff member of the British Embassy in Belgrade was one of many who noted that nothing more important had happened in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia in 1933 than the significant improvement in relations with Bulgaria (Avramovski, 1986b, p. 155).

It seems that the quite sudden warming of relations should be associated with the increased, though still informal, activity and initiatives of Yugoslav diplomacy aimed at reaching an agreement in unofficial talks, without the full glare of publicity. The more and more real threat of the creation of the Four-Power Pact (signed in July 1933), which could put matters of smaller European countries (also in the Balkans) at its sole discretion became the undisputed catalyst for accelerating the Bulgarian-Yugoslav talks. The

---

5 “The agreement of Mr. Mušanov”.

6 “The Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations”.

---
improvement of diplomatic relations was associated with a relaxation of anti-Bulgarian or at least unfavorable to Bulgaria media discourse.

One of the first and undoubtedly very important steps to reaching an agreement was the activity of the representatives of the Orthodox Churches of both countries (see among others: Радић, 2015, pp. 131–159). In April 1933, a delegation of the Serbian Orthodox Church with the Bishop of Ohrid, Nikolaj Velimirović, paid a visit to the clergy of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Avramovski, 1986b, p. 155; Мићић, 2012, p. 224). During this visit they prayed together for the welfare of the both culturally and mentally close nations (Avramovski, 1986b, p. 155). The visit resounded widely, both in Bulgarian and Yugoslav media. Also Politika did not fail to report the event. On May 8, 1933 the journalists interviewed Bishop Velimirović just before his departure from Sofia. In the interview, the bishop, in a distant but friendly tone, referred to the loving welcome of the Yugoslav delegation by the Bulgarians. He also stressed that these two nations are close to each other. He also claimed that as to the organization of ecclesiastical structures Yugoslavs can learn a lot from Bulgarians (Политика, 1933: бр. 8974). The following months brought more articles expressing friendship towards Bulgarians and Bulgaria.

The publication of Kosta Krajišumović (June 10, 1933) dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the murder of Aleksandyr Stamboliyski (June 14, 1923), in which the author referred to the politician as being “with great reformist spirit “, was very meaningful. It was a kind of tribute to Stamboliyski, as one of the reasons for his murder was that he had sought ways of resolving the Bulgarian-Yugoslav conflict. The article stressed that there had been good relations with Bulgaria in the past, and expressed the hope of establishing similarly positive relations today (Политика, 1933: бр. 9004).

This specific propaganda campaign aimed at improving the Bulgarian image in the Yugoslav media was not focused exclusively on highlighting the important anniversaries and current political events. Equally, if not more important, were articles describing normal, interpersonal relations or presenting bottom-up community initiatives, which aimed to fix neighborly relations. One such example could be the very positive accounts of the activities and meetings of the newly established Bulgarian-Yugoslav friendship associations (Политика, 1933: бр. 9102, 9110, 9111). Among them one of the most important was the Yugoslav-Bulgarian League in Belgrade, founded on September 24, 1933 (Б. Симић, 2015, pp. 161–176). It seems that it was no accident that the establishment of this organization coincided with the intensive political efforts of Aleksandar I, leading to a Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement. A detailed account of the inauguration of the League published in Politika, probably aimed at creating a warmer
mood between the two nations. The journalist also emphasized that this reconciliation was truly awaited by the public, because the ceremony – although it was announced only by a brief newspaper note – gathered so many intellectuals, public and state workers that they could fill the largest hall in Belgrade (Политика, 1933: бр. 9111). The tone of this report seems fairly obvious.

A similar effect was presumably intended when articles were published promoting Bulgarian art and culture, for instance with information about the wonderfully promising exhibition of paintings of Bulgarian artists in Belgrade (Политика, 1933: бр. 9110). Also the procedure of publishing interviews with Bulgarians staying in Yugoslavia was very interesting. When talking about Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations emphasis was placed on the visible and noticeable change in mutual perceptions of Bulgarians and Yugoslavs who, after discarding their prejudices, were starting to see positive qualities in their neighbors7. Such a sort of confirmation of change, expressed by the representatives of the nation, so far oriented rather negatively, confirmed the correctness of the newly chosen political line.

Further political events of 1933 were conducive to maintaining the positive tone of the Yugoslav press, both towards Bulgaria and to the idea of creating a Balkan alliance8. The famous tour of Aleksandar I, who was one of the main proponents of the creation of the so-called Balkan Entente, in late September and October 1933, during which he visited the capitals of all the potential signatories of the pact, met with great interest and was widely and favorably commented on in Politika (Политика, 1933: бр. 9110, 9113, 9114, 9115, 9116, 9118, 9119, 9120, 9121, 9122, 9126). The titles of some articles such as: “Nova Era na Balkanu”9 (October 1, 1933), or “Pax Balcanica” (October 11, 1933) speak for themselves (Политика, 1933: бр. 9117, 9127).

Although, as we know, the attempt to include Bulgaria in the so-called Balkan Entente, despite intensive efforts by Yugoslavia, ended in failure, the initiatives undertaken to heal relations between Belgrade and Sofia, supported, among others, by the daily newspaper Politika, did not

---

7 See e.g.: the conversation with Bulgarian delegates to the Congress of the International Union of Lawyers in Belgrade (Политика, 1933: бр. 9101), or the interview with former Bulgarian Minister Nedeljko Atanasov during his journey through the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Политика, 1933: бр. 9104).
8 Obviously, Politika also published articles which were less favorable and even hostile to Bulgaria (see e.g. Politika, 1933: бр. 9108, article: “Двадесетогодишнина брегалничка битка и десетогодишнина осињава народне самообране” (“The twentieth anniversary of the Battle of Bregalnica and the tenth anniversary of the establishment of national self-defence”), but in comparison to the previous years, they were definitely less frequent and less aggressive.
9 “The New Era in the Balkans”.
go entirely to waste. Even the deterioration of mutual relations after the assassination of Aleksandar I (in which IMRO played a role) did not stop this political rapprochement, which was sealed on January 24, 1937 by the signing of the Eternal Friendship Pact. One of the leading roles in the creation of this agreement was played by the Yugoslav prime minister Milan Stojadinović, who also took care that Bulgaria had a favorable press, and who in turn was titled as “The Greatest Friend of Bulgaria” by the Bulgarian pro-government press (Simić, 2014, pp. 99–110).

The above analysis of the manner in which the political reorientation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia toward Bulgaria in the early 1930s was presented in the daily *Politika*, shows how the political line adopted by King Aleksandar I affected the content published in daily newspapers. Showing the almost total lack of independence of the Yugoslav press, whose control by the ruling circles was reflected, among others, in the way Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations were presented in the years 1930–1934, it emphasizes the important role of media in the propaganda system and indicates what a valuable source of information about the past the newspapers can be, if they are approached with the appropriate critical apparatus.

### Sources

**Archives**

Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Warszawa: Zespół 469 – *Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie.*

Архив Југославије (АЈ), Београд: Фонд 38 – Централни Прес-биро.

[Архив Југославије (АЈ), Београд: Фонд 38 – *Centralni Pres-biro*].

**Press**

*Политика [Politika]*

(1930) бр. [бр.] 8052, 06. 10. 1930;

(1932) бр. 8643, 03. 06. 1932; бр. 8653, 13. 06. 1932;

(1933) бр. 8974, 09. 05. 1933; бр. 9004, 10. 06. 1933; бр. 9101, 15. 09. 1933; бр. 9102, 16. 09. 1933; бр. 9104, 18. 09. 1933; бр. 9108, 22. 09. 1933; бр. 9110, 24. 09. 1933; бр. 9111, 25. 09. 1933; бр. 9113, 27. 09. 1933; бр. 9114, 28. 09. 1933; бр. 9115, 29. 09. 1933; бр. 9116, 30. 09. 1933; бр. 9117, 01. 10. 1933; бр. 9118, 02. 10. 1933; бр. 9119, 03. 10. 1933; бр. 9120, 04. 10. 1933; бр. 9121, 05. 10. 1933; бр. 9122, 06. 10. 1933; бр. 9126, 10. 10. 1933; бр. 9127, 11. 10. 1933.

### Bibliography


Симић, Б. (2015). *Југословенско-бугарска лига у Београду*. In В. Јовановић, Б. Симић, Г. Кривокапић-Јовић, &Д.Зец (Eds.), *Традиција и трансформација: Политичке и друштвене промене у Србији и Југославији у 20. веку: Зборник*

Bibliography
(Transliteration)


---

**Postrzeganie stosunków jugosłowiańsko-bułgarskich na łamach dziennika “Politika” w kontekście idei tzw. Ententy Bałkańskiej w pierwszej połowie lat 30. XX wieku.**

Zблиżenie jugosłowiańsko-bułgarskie zainicjowane przez króla Aleksandra I Karadordevicia w latach 30. XX w. z myślą o włączeniu Bułgarii do planowanego tzw. Paktu Bałkańskiego było jedną z najpoważniejszych reorientacji w jugosłowiańskiej polityce zagranicznej przełomu lat 20. i 30. XX w. Od zakończenia I wojny światowej wschodni sąsiad Jugosławii traktowany był raczej, jako jedno z największych zagrożeń dla powojennego ładu na Bałkanach. Wspomniana reorientacja, wynikająca przede wszystkim z sytuacji geopolitycznej w ówczesnej Europie, wymagała ocieplenia wizerunku Bułgarów w oczach jugosłowiańskiego społeczeństwa. Zadanie to byłoby niemożliwe do realizacji bez wsparcia prasy, która w pierwszej połowie ubiegłego stulecia była nadal najbardziej popularnym i zdecydowanie najłatwiej dostępnym źródłem informacji mogącem realnie wpływać na odbiór bieżących wypadków politycznych przez opinię publiczną. Ce-
lem autora było przedstawienie zmiany sposobu prezentowania stosunków jugosłowiańsko-bułgarskich na łamach dziennika „Politika”, największego i najbardziej poczytnego czasopisma międzywojennej Jugosławii, w kontekście działań politycznych zmierzających do utworzenia tzw. Ententy Bałkańskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: propaganda, dziennik „Politika”, król Aleksander I Kara-dorđević, stosunki jugosłowiańsko-bułgarskie, Ententa Bałkańska.

Note:

Paweł Michalak, Institute of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poznań.
pawelmaldini@poczta.onet.pl
The preparation of the article was self-funded by the author.
No competing interests have been declared.