WHEN SOUL IS LOST IN TRANSLATION: METAPHORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF SOUL IN DOSTOYEVSKY’S ORIGINAL БРАТЬЯ КАРАМАЗОВЫ (THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV) AND ITS TRANSLATIONS INTO POLISH, CROATIAN AND ENGLISH

Abstract

Given that our understanding of such an abstract concept as soul is almost purely metaphorical, this paper provides a comparative cross-linguistic analysis of the system of metaphorical conceptions of soul in Dostoyevsky’s original Братья Карамазовы (The Brothers Karamazov) and its Polish, Croatian and English translations. Special attention is paid to those metaphors that are translated differently between the various translations, either in conceptual or linguistic terms.

This paper adheres to the cognitive-linguistic approach to Mind (Reddy, 1979; Sweetser, 1990; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Consistent with conceptual metaphor theory in general (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; G. Lakoff, 1987; Grady, 1997; Kövecses, 2000; G. Lakoff, 2009; etc.), this paper’s theoretical and methodological approach is based on Sweetser’s (1990) analysis of the system of metaphors for knowledge, on G. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) systematic analysis of the metaphorical conceptions of Mind and Soul, and on Štrkalj Despot, Skrynnikova and Ostanina Olszewska’s (2014) comparative analysis of the metaphorical conceptions of ДУША/DUSZA/DUŠA (‘soul’) in Russian, Polish, and Croatian.

The metaphors for soul were examined in a parallel corpus that consists of Dostoyevsky’s original Братья Карамазовы (The Brothers Karamazov) and its Polish, Croatian and English translations. Linguistic metaphors were detected using the MIPVU procedure (Steen et al., 2010).

1This paper is based on the presentation given at the 46th Annual Meeting of Societas Linguistica Europea in Split, Croatia, 2013, 18–21 September. The abstract was published in the conference book of abstracts. The work is partially conducted within the project Croatian Metaphor Repository, which is funded by Croatian Science Foundation under the number 3624.
The main questions that this paper aims to answer are: Which metaphors for conceptualizing soul are shared by all the languages in question? Which metaphors are translated differently and why? If metaphors are translated differently, is the difference conceptual, cultural or linguistic? Does the type of metaphor (primary, complex) have any influence on the decision to translate the source language (SL) metaphor into a different one in the target language (TL)? What cultural differences are revealed through the analysis of the way metaphors have been translated to other Slavic and one non-Slavic language?

Keywords: conceptual metaphor theory; parallel corpus; the concept of soul; metaphorical mappings; metaphor and translation; cultural variation; linguistic variation

1 Introduction: translating metaphors

In a communicative act such as translation, in which languages influence each other, the translator faces the challenge of understanding the different ways speakers of these languages conceptualize reality. Linguistic and cultural differences pose a major problem when translating metaphors and transferring them from one language and culture to another. Translation of metaphors is itself often conceptualized using a conduit metaphor, in which the translator is expected to extract meaning from a source text and transfer it into a target text.

Metaphor translatability and transfer methods have been extensively studied within the discipline of Translation Studies (see Newmark, 1988; Schäffner, 2004). The cognitive shift in metaphor research (initialized by G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) has, by focusing on the level of thought instead of on the level of words, opposed the Aristotelian view of metaphor as a linguistic decoration, an ornament and a mere device of poetic imagination. The cognitive shift has also influenced translation studies by focusing them on the conceptual level, mainly on mappings between source and target domains (see Mandelblit, 1995; Schäffner, 2004; Kövecses, 2005; etc.). The cognitivist approach makes it clear that translatability is not only a matter of words, but that it is also inextricably linked to the conceptual systems of the source and target culture, since one’s conceptualization of reality depends on the language one speaks. It is the phenomenological domain (Krzeszowski, 1997, p. 24) to which abstract matters, such as feelings and values, belong.

To tackle the problem of metaphor translatability, a number of translational procedures have been proposed. Popular methods were suggested, for example, by Newmark (1988); Catford (1965); etc. One of popular procedure, which is relevant to this paper, was provided by van den Broeck (1981). He identified the following modes of metaphor translation “as alternative solutions to the ideal of reproducing the metaphor intact”:

1. Translation sensu stricto (i.e. transfer of both SL tenor and SL vehicle into TL);
2. Substitution (i.e. replacement of SL vehicle by a different TL vehicle with more or less the same tenor);
3. Paraphrase (i.e. rendering a SL metaphor by a non-metaphorical expression in the TL) (van den Broeck, 1981, p. 77).

Dobrzyńska, highlighting that “the interpretation of metaphors is strongly culturally conditioned”, suggests similar strategies:

Adopting a metaphor to a new context, a translator can choose among three possibilities: he or she can use an exact equivalent of the original metaphor

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2Krzeszowski (1990), reminds us that whenever one talks about translation, one must necessarily talk about meaning. One can approach meaning in abstraction from its possible relation to translation. The fact that translation evokes meaning results from another unshakable fact, namely that translation is a specific form of communication which rests on meaning. In Leech’s words “Semantics (as the study of meaning) is central to the study of communication.” (Leech, 1974, p. ix). It follows that translation cannot be approached in isolation from meaning and anything that is said and claimed about translation must be placed in the context of meaning.
However, if the translator tries to render "soul" in Dostoevsky’s original Братья Карамазовы (The Brothers Karamazov) and its Polish, Croatian and English translations. This novel is an ethical debate about important abstract concepts such as God, free will, and morality, and it is deeply concerned with body-soul-mind relations within these concepts. The moral and psychological conflicts that interest Dostoevsky are introduced by means of the main characters. Karamazov’s family allegorizes Russia, and the brothers Alyosha, Ivan and Dmitri allegorize Soul, Mind and Body, accordingly. Therefore, understanding the way soul and mind are conceptualized (in relation to body) is crucial to understanding the story and the moral struggles of the main characters, as well as making inferences and drawing conclusions about the Russian national character.

2 Previous research

The concept of soul has been largely studied from mythological, religious, philosophical, cognitive, sociological and psychological perspectives. A number of authors have analysed the concept of soul from the point of view of its linguistic representation in different languages: Wierzbicka (1989, 1992); Bulygina & Shmelev (1997); Mikheev (1999); Vardanian (2007); Kolesnikova (2011); Lian (2010); Uryson (1999), etc.

The fact that the Russian word душа (‘soul’) has both much a wider range of use and a much higher frequency than the English word soul has already been noted by Wierzbicka (1989). She points out that in English translations of Russian novels, душа is sometimes translated as soul; in most cases, however, it is either omitted or replaced with either heart or mind. However, she was well aware of the fact that the frequency of the literal equivalents of душа mainly depends on the translator’s knowledge, attitude and intuition. In Russian prose, it is often the case that one can find references to people’s souls. It sounds natural and is fairly typical for Russian narrative. However, if the translator tries to render душа as ‘soul’ (rather than omit it), the English text

3 The widespread idea that language is the expression of a nation’s spirit was introduced by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 19th century, and it still stands today. The view that language influences some of the cognitive processes has supporters among cognitive linguists, who claim that conceptualization of the world depends on the language we speak, which in turn, according to the “Sapir-Whorf Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis,” gives its speakers a particular kind of world-view. Wierzbicka (1979, p. 313), was one of the famous proponents of the view that “every language embodies in its very structure a certain world-view, a certain philosophy”. Israeli (1997), states that “language is the product of the collective national linguistic consciousness. It is the grid of concepts through which a speaker of a given language sees the outside world and his own inner feelings or states”. This theory was reflected in the scientific works of A. Wierzbicka (1996); U. Apresian (1995), and others. According to the works of these authors, the main points of the theory are: 1) Each language has its own way of conceptualizing reality. All native speakers of a particular language share the same collective philosophy (folk theory) formed by the meanings that are expressed in the language; 2) The typical way of conceptualizing reality for a given language includes both elements that are common to all languages (which helps us compare different languages) as well as specific traits which allow speakers of different languages to see the world in accordance with their native language. All languages have their own characteristics. The specific typological characteristics of each language are of interest both to scientists and speakers of different languages to see the world in accordance with their native language. All languages are different and this becomes even clearer when the typological difference between the languages is greater. Literature helps us realize the extent to which a language can acquire particular functional categories. Translations of world literature have proved a valuable source of information about the languages involved in the translation process.
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Wierzbicka argues that this can be explained by cultural differences: it is very uncommon for Anglo-Saxon culture to talk much about souls. As she states (Wierzbicka, 1989, p. 31), “English prose does not tolerate as many references to people’s souls as typical Russian prose would. If the translator of a Russian novel does try to render душу as soul wherever possible (rather than simply omit it), the high frequency of the word soul gives the English prose a slightly odd flavor, whereas a wide scope of the use of душа in Russian is fully accepted”.

There is an interesting example in this respect from another Dostoyevsky novel:

(1) — А знаешь ли, Соня, что низкие потолки и тесные комнаты душу и ум теснят! (Ф. Достоевский, Преступление и наказание).
— Do you know, Sonia, that a man’s mind becomes paralysed in small, poky rooms? (F. Dostoyevsky Crime and Punishment, translated by C. Garnett).

This example shows that physical space gives us a sense of not only physical restriction, but also produces frustration and other negative emotions, causing a ‘paralyzed mind’. The low ceilings and lack of space in the room restricts our freedom and maps to a lack of space in mind, resulting in a paralyzed and oppressed mind. In Russian, the linguistic expression that the author uses is ‘soul’, which often collocates with such modifiers as ‘broad’ and ‘wide’ (e.g. широкая душа). In English, the translator used ‘mind’ since that would be the adequate equivalent when we talk about people, emotions and self.

Drawing on the findings of Štrkalj Despot, Skrynnikova & Ostanina Olszewska’s study from 2014, it can also be added that the relevant conceptual structure of the concept ‘soul’ is not only to be found Russian, but that it is shared by the Polish and Croatian languages and, therefore, it might be pan-Slavic.

3 Theoretical background


The paper’s theoretical approach is largely based on Sweetser’s (1990) work on analyzing a system of metaphors for knowledge, on G. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) systematic analysis of the metaphorical conceptions of Mind and Self, and on Štrkalj Despot, Skrynnikova & Ostanina Olszewska’s (2014) comparative analysis of the metaphorical conceptions of душа/dusza/duša (‘soul’) in Russian, Polish, and Croatian. G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Sweetser (2004) have presented an extensive analysis of the metaphorical conceptions of our internal structures and the embodiment of spiritual experience.

G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pp. 267–289) have revealed that we have a “system of different metaphorical conceptions of our internal structure” and a “small number of source domains that the system draws upon: space, possession, force and social relationships”. Their analysis of the metaphorical conceptions of our inner lives is based on the fundamental distinction between the Subject and one or more Selves, which was first introduced by Andrew Lakoff and Miles Becker (1992). G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have shown that metaphors for conceptualizing our inner lives are grounded in universal experiences, and that they conceptualize the Subject as being person-like, with an existence independent of the Self. As they have pointed out, these metaphoric conceptions have a hierarchical structure with the General Subject-Self metaphor (a conceptualization of a person as bifurcated) at the first level and many more specific instances on other

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4 Wierzbicka (1992, p. 44), notes that “the older stratum of English (reflected, for example, in Shakespeare’s plays), includes, as we have seen, the word soul which combines transcendental (religious), psychological (phenomenological), and moral aspects”.

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levels. They later state (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 562) that the natural concomitant of this metaphor is the metaphorical concept of the mind separated from the body. This metaphor is crucial to the following analysis outlined in this paper.

3.1 The General Disembodied Soul Metaphor

The concept of the disembodied Soul, like that of the disembodied Mind, is metaphorical: it arises from embodied experiences that we have throughout our life. This requirement of Soul (and Mind) being embodied is “no small matter” because it contradicts the fundamental beliefs of many religions around the world, which are based on the transmigration of souls and reincarnation, as G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 563) have noted. However, being aware of the fact that “metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities”, as stated repeatedly in G. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 156), it is not surprising that in many languages, including the three Slavic languages in question, the disembodied Mind and/or Soul is a religious and social reality which is also very well reflected in language. In all the languages in question this conceptualization of Soul is at the most generic level, with the conceptualization of DUSHA as the locus of consciousness, reason, emotions, will, etc. at the next, less general hierarchical level. On the next, more specific, level Soul is conceptualized as either a person (personification) or a thing (reification), as shown by Štrkalj Despot, Skrynnikova, & Ostanina Olszewksa’s (2014).

As G. Lakoff and Johnson further point out in their work (1980, p. 468), this fairly small number of source domains gives rise to a variety of linguistic metaphors using, and being bound by, conceptual metaphors from other domains. These metaphors are combined with the concepts of soul as being the locus of emotions, moral judgment, will, essence or reason. Depending on the type of locus, and combining these metaphors with either reification or personification, we get many specific levels manifested by numerous linguistic metaphors as the examples in the analysis provided in this paper will show.

![General Disembodied Soul Metaphor](image)

**Figure 1**: (Štrkalj Despot, Skrynnikova, & Ostanina Olszewksa, 2014, p. 468)

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5G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 565): “The embodied mind is part of the living body and is dependent on the body for its existence. The properties of mind are not purely mental: They are shaped in crucial ways by the body and brain and how the body can function in everyday life (...). The mind is not merely corporeal but also passionate, desiring and social. It has a culture and cannot exist culture-free. It has a history, it has developed and grown, and it can grow further. It has an unconscious aspect, hidden from our direct view and knowable only indirectly. Its conscious aspect characterizes what we take ourselves as being. Its conceptual system is limited; there is much that it cannot even conceptualize, much less understand. But its conceptual system is expandable: It can form revelatory new understandings.”
4 Corpus and methodology

Metaphors for *soul* were examined in the parallel corpus, which includes Dostoyevsky’s original *Братья Карамазовы* (*The Brothers Karamazov*) and the novel’s translations into Polish by A. Watt 1928, English by Constance Clara Garnett 1912, and Croatian by Zlatko Crnković 1997.

As Aijmer & Altenberg (1996) observe, parallel and comparable corpora “offer specific uses and possibilities” for contrastive and translation studies (cf. Granger, 2010). McEnery and Xiao (2007, p. 18) also mention that such corpora “give new insights into the languages compared — insights that are not likely to be noticed in studies of monolingual corpora; they can be used for a range of comparative purposes and can increase our knowledge of language-specific, typological and cultural differences, as well as of universal features; they illuminate differences between source texts and translations, and between native and non-native texts; they can be used for a number of practical applications, e.g. in lexicography, language teaching and translation”.

After compiling a parallel corpus, the original Russian text and its translations were searched for the target word *soul*, and then a subcorpus was created using all the examples of parallel sentences in which the translation of this lexeme appeared. After compiling a parallel corpus of text fragments containing both grammatical/morphological and derived forms of the word *душа* (‘soul’) and its translations, each example was analyzed in terms of conceptual metaphors and metonymies and their possible extensions and constraints. For the purposes of corpus construction and exploitation, the AntConc (Version 3.4.1: Anthony, 2014) function of Wordlist was applied, following the procedure used in conceptual metaphor analysis of on-line news reports (Šeškauskienė & Ostanina-Olszewska, 2015). Linguistic metaphors were detected using the MIPVU procedure (Steen et al., 2010).

5 Analysis

The lexeme ‘soul’ appears in the novel in the following way:

In the Russian original, the lexeme *душа* in all its grammatical forms appears 276 times, in derived forms it appears 451 times, in a Russian subcorpus total of 280,913 words.

In the Polish translation, *dusza* in all its grammatical forms has 212 appearances, in derived forms 344, out of a total world number of 282,533.

In the Croatian translation, *duša* in all its grammatical forms has 306 instances, in all derived forms it has 484 instances, and the total number of words is 341,913.

The English translation provides only 177 instances of the lexeme *soul*, while the total number of words is 359,434.

As Table 1 shows, even at this initial stage of the analysis, it is clear that the English version contains considerably fewer instances of the word *soul* compared to the three Slavic language texts. The analysis of the conceptual metaphors behind these lexical units reveals why this is the case.

The English translation contains only 177 instances of *soul*, which clearly confirms Wierzbicka’s remarks on the limited usage of this lexeme in Anglo-Saxon culture, in which its frequent usage would make the text sound odd and unnatural. An attempt will be made to analyze the nature of these limitations from the perspective of conceptual metaphor theory.

After analyzing each example regarding the conceptual metaphors and metonymies it reflects, the structure of the metaphorical conceptions of *soul* as presented in Figure 1 can be confirmed. Comparison between the systems of conceptual metaphors and their linguistic realizations in the original text and its translations shows that all the linguistic expressions containing the word *soul* (except for the derived forms) are either metonymical or metaphorical in the sense that they all...
reflect at least the most general Disembodied Soul metaphor. A more detailed breakdown of this analysis follows

5.1 Translating metonymy

Soul often serves as the vehicle that provides mental access to the Person as a whole. This PARS PRO TOTO metonymic concept is very basic and common. However, the metonymy is not always kept in translation. It is sometimes replaced with the literal word. For example:

(1) Metonymy soul for person

Имел он состояние независимое, по прежней пропорции около тысячи душ

Był niezależny, posiadajac własny majątek ziemski, wedle dawnej rachuby coś około tysiąca dusz.

Bio je nezavisan i imao je svoje imanje, s oko tisuću duša, prema starom računu.

He had an independent property of about a thousand souls, to reckon in the old style.

The above passage talks about ownership, therefore the translators kept the word ‘souls’ for inhabitants in all languages to show a typical narrative for 19th century Russia, when the owners of the estates in the country had peasants (called “serfs”), and they were legally treated as feudal masters’ property that could be bought and sold.

(2) Metonymy soul for person

Мокрое было в две тысячи душ

Bylo to rozległe sioło, liczące dwa tysiące mieszkańców.

Selo Mokro imalo je oko dvije tisuće duša,

The village of Mokroe numbered two thousand inhabitants

This example shows that when talking about people living in the village, the translators of the Polish and English texts decided to change ‘souls’ to ‘inhabitants’. Although in Croatian the original metonymic expression is kept and translated with the same metonymic expression, it sounds archaic. In Russian 19th century prose such a description was quite common and fairly typical. In contrast to this, in the Western cultural view head would metonymically stand for the entire human being, as in the common expression per capita, and not the soul. The Russian equivalent would be soul, e.g. на душу населения means literally “per soul”.

(3) Metonymy soul for person

— Czekaj. Czekaj, mój drogi, sam zobaczę. A teraz najważniejsze: Cyganie są?

Stani, Trifone Borisovič, stani, dušo, sam ću procijeniti.

— Stay, Trifon Borissovich, stay, my good soul, I’ll see for myself.

Metonymy is considered by some theoreticians to be an even more fundamental cognitive phenomenon than metaphor, and many metaphors, even the primary ones, are considered to be motivated by metonymy (see Barcelona, 2000, 2002; Panther & Radden, 1999; Radden, 2002, 2003).
Here, to reflect the Russian ‘character and atmosphere’ in the form of address, all of the translators, except the Polish one, decided to render ‘soul’ as the best equivalent. The Polish translator changed that form of address to a more neutral one, ‘my dear’.

5.2 Translating metaphor

Many of the linguistic metaphors do not reflect any other (more specific) metaphor, except for the Disembodied Soul metaphor. In these examples, the word soul evokes a religious frame. According to the folk theory reflected in this concept, a human being has two parts: a visible, material part (the body) and an invisible, immaterial part (the soul). The immaterial belongs to “another world” and it is eternal, whereas the material one belongs to “this world”. The invisible, immaterial part of a human is immortal, and it can be separated from the body and continues to live independently of it once the material part is gone. Such a context evokes a religious frame with the Christian soul in it. In all such examples the translators kept ‘souls’ as it was used in the original, because of the Christian religious frame that is common to all Slavic languages, and to English as well:

| (4) Religious frame: Soul is an immortal part of a person | Он вдруг взял тысячу рублей и свез ее в наш монастырь на помин души своей супруги, но не второй, не матери Алеши, не «кликуш», а первой, Аделаиды Ивановны, которая колотила его. | Pawłowicza, i to w sposób bardzo oryginalny. Wziął nagle tysiąc rubli i pojechał do naszego monasteru ofiarując je na nabóżeństwo źałobne za duszę zmarłej żony, ale nie drugiej, nie „opętanej” — matki Aloszy, lecz pierwszej, Adelaidy Iwanowny, która go za życia tłukła. | Najednom je uzeo tisu´ cu rubalja i od-nio ih u naˇ s manas-tir za pomen duše svoje supruge, ali ne druge, Aljoˇ sine majke, nego Adelai-de Ivanovne koja ga je devetala. | He suddenly took a thousand roubles to our monastery to pay for requiem for the soul of his wife; but not for the second, Alyosha’s mother, the ‘crazy woman,’ but for the first, Adelaida Ivanovna, who used to thrash him. |

| (5) Religious frame: Soul is an immortal part of a person | Ведь жив он, жив, ибожива душа во- веки; | Wszak żywię on, żywię, bo żywa jest dusza na wieki i nie masz go w domu, a jest niewidocznie przy was. | Ta živ je on, živ, jer duša je vjeˇ cna, | He is living, for the soul lives for ever |

| (6) Religious frame: Soul is an immortal part of a person | По мере того как будете преснешьать в любви, будете убеждаться и в бытии Бога, и в бессмертии души вейшей | W miarę jak będzie panu czyniła na tej drodze postępy, będzie się pani równo-czniecie utwierdzać w wierze w Boga i w nie-śmiertelność pani duszy. | Prema tome koliko budete uspivevali u ljubavi, toliko ćete se uvjeravati i u opstojnost Božiju, i u besmrtnost svoje duše. | In as far as you advance in love you will grow surer of the reality of God and of the immortality of your soul. |

In all of the examples above, in which only a religious frame is evoked without any other conceptual metaphors involved, the translation is literal and does not cause any confusion – in all of the languages in question, the Russian lexeme душа is rendered as dusza, duša and soul, keeping the original form and meaning.
The only exception is when the English translation uses the expression *opening of the heart*, which evokes a container image schema and the primary metaphor *KNOWING IS SEEING*. In this passage, all of the Slavic texts maintain the use of words which evoke a religious frame – *confession* and *soul*.

| Religious frame in English: | хотя беспрерывное исповедование своей души старцу послушником его или светскому производится совсем не как таинство | choć nieustanne spoświadanie duszy przed starcem lub osobą świecką nie jest spowiedzią w znaczeniu sakramentu. | iako se neprekidno ispovijedanje dusje iskušenika ili svjetovnjaka nipošto ne obavlja kao tajna. | though the continual *opening of the heart* to the elder by the monk or the layman had nothing of the character of the sacrament. |

The second level of the system presented in Figure 1 covers the examples where, apart from the Disembodied Soul metaphor, at least one more specific conceptualization is present, that of Soul being the locus of emotionality, moral judgment, reason, will and essence.

| (8) | • SOUL IS THE LOCUS OF ESSENCE
• soul is a person
• LIFE IS A JOURNEY,
• GOOD IS LIGHT / BAD IS DARK,
• BAD IS FORCE | Просто повторю, что сказал уже выше: вступил он на эту дорогу потому только, что в то время она одна поразила его и представила ему разом весь идеал исхода рвавшейся из мрака к свету души его. | Powtarzę, co już raz rzekłem, wkrócił na nową drogę tylko dlatego, gdyż w owym czasie tylko ona go ośmieniła; objawiła mu się ją jako ideal wyzwolenia duszy, wyrwującej się z mroku ku światłu. | He entered upon this path only because, at that time, it alone struck his imagination and presented itself to him as offering an ideal means of escape for his soul from darkness to light. |

Striving towards good or ‘light’ from the bad or ‘dark’, evokes the primary metaphor *GOOD IS LIGHT* and *BAD IS DARK*, and all of the translators decided to render ‘soul’ in their texts.

| (9) | • SOUL IS THE LOCUS OF MORALITY
• BEING PRESENT IS BEING ALIVE / ACTIVE / AWAKE
• BEING ABSENT IS BEING DEAD | Приезд Алекси как бы подействовал на него даже с нравственной стороны, как бы что-то проснулось в этом безвременном старике из того, что давно уже заглохло в душе его. | Przyjazd Aloszy wpłynął na ojca nawet, rzec można, od strony moralnej; można by pomyśleć, że w tym przedwczesnym starcu zaczęły się budzić jakieś dawno przygasłe uczucia. | Rekło bi se da je Aljošin dolazak dje lovao na nj čak i u moralnom smislu, kao da se u tom pre rano ostajelom čovjeku probudilo ne što što mu je već danno bilo zamrlo u duši: | Alyosha’s arrival seemed to affect even his moral side, as though something had awakened in this prematurely old man which had long been dead in his soul.

In the case in which ‘soul’ is pictured as a ‘container of morality’, the Polish translator decided to omit ‘soul’ altogether and would not name a specific container for ‘feelings’, other than general ‘self’.
In the example where ‘soul’ is the locus of morality, and MORALITY IS PURITY, the English translation provides the expression ‘pure in mind and heart’. This is an idiomatic expression and it would be unnatural to formulate it otherwise.

Among all the examples in the novel, most of the loci except the locus of emotions are very sporadic. SOUL AS THE LOCUS OF EMOTIONALITY is pervasive: 63% percent of all the examples reflect this conceptual metaphor. This is not only characteristic of Dostoyevsky’s narrative. In previous research, the concept of soul in Russian, Polish and Croatian was analyzed using national corpora and the results appeared to be the same (Štrkalj Despot, Skrynnikova, & Ostanina Olszewska, 2014).

Since the conceptualization of soul as being a locus of emotions in English is not nearly as common as in Slavic languages, the translations would have soul replaced with heart in 74% of examples. Thus, translating душа/dusza/duša as heart is reserved for the examples in which the soul is the locus of emotionality.

Interestingly enough, in one of the examples where SOUL is conceptualized as the LOCUS OF REASON, the Polish translator used the word mózg (‘brain’), whereas all other translators (including the English one) kept the original lexeme (see example 11).

However, in most of the cases, the linguistic instantiations of the SOUL IS THE LOCUS OF REASON conceptual metaphors from SL are translated sensu stricto in the Slavic TLs, while they are substituted with MIND IS THE LOCUS OF REASON in English:
Usually, linguistic expressions containing the word soul do not reflect only one conceptual metaphor, but are instead blends of a number of conceptual metaphors, which are bound together and result in very vivid linguistic image metaphors.

These are some of the examples of specific-level metaphors that will be considered:

(13)

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<tr>
<th>Metaphor Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tr>
<td>soul is the locus of emotionality</td>
<td>Меня эти невинные глазки как бритвой тогда по душе полоснули.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memorizing is writing</td>
<td>„Te oczeta niewinne drasnęły mi duszę jak brzytwą.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emotional experience is physical experience</td>
<td>„Mene su tada one njezine neviči oči reznule po duši ko britva“, govorio je poslije cekajući se odvratno, po svom običaju.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example, one can almost feel the physical pain the soul might go through, since we know from our sensorimotor experience what it is like to be cut/hurt with a sharp object like a knife or a razor. The metaphor here is: THE SOUL IS A PHYSICAL ORGAN and EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS PHYSICAL EXPERIENCE. Its physical construction is intended to be understood both in terms of binding and metaphor.

Our body plays a crucial role in our meaning construction, and embodiment is the most important notion within the neural and cognitive revolution (Gibbs, 1994, 1999, 2003; Gibbs, Lima, & Francozo, 2004; Johnson, 1987, 1999; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

(14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>soul is an unknown physical organ</td>
<td>нет ли в нас презрения к тому несчастному, что мы так душу его анатомируем</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nie czujemy pogardy względem tego nieboszczyka, że tak rozkładamy na części jego duszę</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>da mi možda ne preziremo rog nesretnika kad mu tako se ciramo dušu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>whether we weren’t showing contempt for that poor man by dissecting his soul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This example is quite vivid, since we know (mostly from news and literature) that dissection is usually performed on dead bodies in order to discover the cause of death. It is also a very detailed and time consuming procedure. Therefore, ‘dissecting’ a soul is definitely not a pleasant feeling, especially for the person undergoing the dissection. Additionally, the context suggests that we must despise the person in order to put him through such an experience. However, it might be the case that at the end of this procedure something new could be discovered, since the lexical expression evokes the metaphor THE SOUL IS AN UNKNOWN PHYSICAL ORGAN. This corresponds in a way to a popular Russian saying ‘чужая душа – потемки’ which literally means that another person’s soul is darkness, the great unknown. This evokes the primary metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING.
(15)  
- **Soul is the locus of emotionality**  
- **Soul is a container**  
- **Emotions are forces**  
- **(Emotions are fluids only cro)**  
- **Life is a journey**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Souls of emotionality</th>
<th>Soul is the locus of emotionality</th>
<th>Emotions are forces.</th>
<th>Life is a journey</th>
<th>It is more probable that he himself did not understand and could not explain what had suddenly arisen in his soul, and drawn him irresistibly into a new, unknown, but inevitable path.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The *soul* is conceptualized as a container and EMOTIONS ARE FORCES. According to the folk theory of emotions (Kövecses, 2008), “there is a cause that induces a person (self) to have an emotion, and the emotion causes the person to produce some response”. In a schematic way, this can be given as: (1) A cause leads to emotion and (2) emotion leads to some response (Kövecses, 2008, p. 385).9

(16)  
- **Soul is a locus of essence**  
- **Soul is an object**  
- **Soul is a container**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Souls of essence</th>
<th>Soul is a locus of essence</th>
<th>Soul is an object</th>
<th>Soul is a container</th>
<th>An elder was one who took your soul, your will, into his soul and his will.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Kövecses (2008, p. 385), pointed out that “there exists a single master metaphor for emotions: EMOTIONS ARE FORCES and a large number of emotion metaphors are specific-level instantiations of this superordinate-level metaphor”.

### 6 Conclusions

This study, based on a parallel corpus, has confirmed that in Slavic languages the lexeme soul differs conceptually, culturally and linguistically from its English ‘equivalent’, reflecting the specificity of national character and mentality, which affects mental, spiritual (religious) and social characteristics and values.

The analysis has also revealed that the conceptualization of soul integrates bodily and cultural (especially religious Christian) experiences, leading to pervasiveness and the domination of the Disembodied Soul Metaphor, not only in all the Slavic languages in question, but also in English.

The pervasiveness of the metaphorical conceptualization of soul as the locus of subjective experience (primarily emotionality) in the Slavic languages is not present in English. Therefore,

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8See Kövecses (2008, p. 385): “The schema shows that there are two main points of tension in the experience of emotion: the first taking place between the cause of emotion and the rational self, resulting in the emergence of emotion, and the second between the self that has the emotion but who is still in control over it and the force of the emotion, resulting in the self-losing control and producing an emotional response.”

9Kövecses (2008, p. 385), pointed out that “there exists a single master metaphor for emotions: EMOTIONS ARE FORCES and a large number of emotion metaphors are specific-level instantiations of this superordinate-level metaphor.”
this metaphor tends to be rendered differently in English, both on the conceptual and the linguistic level.

Conceptualizing soul as the locus of reason is not very common in the source text, but when it occurs, it also tends to be substituted by another metaphor in English (MIND IS THE LOCUS OF REASON), whereas it is usually translated *sensu stricto* in the Slavic languages.

To summarize:

1. The Disembodied Soul Metaphor is shared by all four languages in question, conceptually, culturally (religiously) and linguistically, which allows the transfer of meaning from SL to all TLs using a *sensu stricto* strategy;
2. The Soul as the Locus of Emotions Metaphor is fairly frequent in the source text, and it is shared by all the Slavic languages in question conceptually, culturally and linguistically. Therefore, it was translated directly in almost all cases (with a few exceptions in Polish). However, English lacks this metaphor on all these levels, which is why the translator used substitution as a translation strategy, applying another conceptual metaphor (in most of cases The Heart as the Locus of Emotions Metaphor);
3. The type of metaphor (primary, complex) did not have any influence on the translatability of SL metaphors into any of the TLs in this study.

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When soul is lost in translation: metaphorical conceptions of soul in . . .


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