VERBS OF EMOTION WITH SE IN SLOVENE: BETWEEN MIDDLE AND REFLEXIVE SEMANTICS. A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS

Abstract

This article presents a cognitive analysis of Slovene emotion verbs with the personal pronoun se ‘self’, e.g., bati se ‘to be scared’. Slavic verbs of this type are traditionally considered reflexive. The objectives of the article are twofold. First, the article aims to demonstrate that se in Slovene verbs of emotion indicates not the reflexive, but the middle voice construction. However, given specific pragmatic factors, these verbs also form reflexive constructions with the heavy form sebe ‘self’ (Kemmer, 1993; Tabakowska 2003, 2003a), or even both middle and reflexive constructions with se and sebe, respectively. Second, this article challenges Anna Wierzbicka’s (1988, 1992, 1995) assumption that the Slavic verbs with the light form of the personal pronoun or the -sja affix (Russian) express (almost) volitional, i.e. self-induced emotion. In line with cognitive Suzanne Kemmer (1993), it is claimed that the constructions with the verbs under discussion indicate a low degree of volitionality in the process of emotional change i.e. they lexicalize an event that occurs independently of the Experiencer participant’s will.

Keywords: emotion, middle, reflexive verbs of emotion, intentionality and volitionality, the Slovene language.

1 Introduction

Slavic verbs of emotion that are traditionally considered reflexive (see, for example, Polish bać się, Czech báti se, Russian bojat’’sja, and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian bojati se ‘to be afraid’) form a large and intriguing set. In Slovene they occur with the light form of the personal pronoun, i.e. se ‘self’.

In the imperfective use they express stasis (i.e. an

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1The light forms of the Slavic personal pronoun denoting ‘self’, according to a theoretical account, is alternatively classified as “a reflexive pronoun in the accusative case”, “a derivational morpheme in verb morphology”, “a functional empty particle”, “a little word” (Tabakowska, 2003, pp. 3), “a reflexive particle” (Kubiński, 1982; Greenberg, 2006), “a postfix” (Grzegorczykowa, 1996), or “a free pronominal morpheme” (Żele, 2002). In this article, when referring to Slovene se, I use the general term “clitic” (see the Slovene term krajša oblika, naslonska oblika or klitika)
emotional state) while in the perfective use they express transition from a non-emotional to an emotional state (i.e. a change of emotional state)\(^2\); see (1) and (2), respectively:

(1) Janez se boji.
   'Janez is scared.'
(2) Janez se je prestrašil.
   'Janez got scared/frightened.'\(^3\)

In recent Slavic linguistic literature, these verbs, like other verbs with the clitic, have different, sometimes conflicting, accounts. Important discrepancies in their interpretation relate to whether the verbs have reflexive meaning and whether or not they express volitional, i.e. self-induced mental states. The objective of this article is twofold. First, I analyze the syntactic and semantic properties of Slovene emotion verbs with the clitic \(se\) and second, I examine the causal implication of these verbs.

2 Theoretical accounts of Slavic verbs of emotion with the light form of the personal pronoun

The most influential account of the Slavic verbs under discussion is offered by Anna Wierzbicka (1988, 1992, 1995, 1999). The author maintains that Russian and Polish verbs of emotion with, respectively, -sja and się, are reflexive forms. Accordingly, these verbs are said to:

i) indicate ‘active emotions’, i.e. “emotions to which people ‘give themselves’ almost voluntarily and which they outwardly express” (Wierzbicka, 1988, pp.253)
ii) express self-induced emotion, rather than emotion being triggered by external causes (Wierzbicka, 1992, pp.401)
iii) indicate that emotions arise as a result of the speaker’s conscious thoughts about the event (Wierzbicka, 1995, pp.229).

Moreover, the author outlines that there is a syntactic contrast between voluntary, involuntary and neutral emotions (Wierzbicka, 1988, pp.253–254; see also Wierzbicka, 1995, pp.228). For instance, in Russian voluntary emotions are designated by verbs with the Experiencer\(^4\) in the nominative such as intransitive verbs and verbs with -sja ‘self’. The involuntary emotions are denoted by an adverb-like category, with an Experiencer in the dative (3b), while neutral emotions are designated by an adjective, with the Experiencer in the nominative (3c):

(3) a. Ivan studit’sja.
   'Ivan is “giving himself to shame”.'
b. Ivanu studno.
   'Ivan feels ashamed.'
c. Ivan rad.
   'Ivan is glad.'

\(^{2}\) The terms “stasis” and “transition” come from Talmy (2000a); in this article they both refer to an event of state change in the domain of emotion; see Będkowska-Kopczyk (2013) for a review of the events of emotional change represented in the Slovene language.

\(^{3}\) The examples in (1), (2), and (14) are mine. The other examples analyzed in this article come from the corpora of Slovene language: Gigafida (henceforth: Gf) and Nova beseda (henceforth: Nb), and from the internet browser najdi.si.

\(^{4}\) The Experiencer is a semantic role implied by verbs of emotion; see further discussion in Section 4.
Verbs of Emotion with se in Slovene...

Wierzbicka (1995, pp. 229) further observes that the voluntary emotions are not arising by themselves, but are caused by the speaker’s conscious thought about the event. Although the speaker’s evaluation of the event is relevant for both the adjectives and verbs, the author goes on to point out that the reflexive form of the verb additionally informs us that the Experiencer participant is focusing on the event, turning it over in his/her head, and in this way is causing and retaining the emotion within his-/herself” (Wierzbicka, 1995, pp. 229). Wierzbicka’s account suggests that the Experiencer in the subject has “quasi-agentive” features.

As concerns causality, Renata Grzegorczykowa presents an opposite view to Wierzbicka’s. The author maintains that Polish reflexive verbs, e.g., *martwić się* ‘to worry’ or *cieszyć się* ‘to rejoice’ are “state-processual” verbs denoting human emotional states caused by some event or situation (Grzegorczykowa, 1996, pp. 63 in Kardela, 2007, pp. 164). In other words, the presence of the clitic with verbs of emotion signals (“latent”) causality (Kardela, 2007, pp. 164).

The authors of generative works, Henry Niedzielski (1976) and Wojciech Kubiński (1982), classify Polish verbs of emotion with *się* as “pseudo-reflexives” (in contrast to so-called “true reflexives”). Niedzielski locates these verbs in the same category as inchoatives, i.e. verbs that express “the inception or change in a process” (such as verbs referring to time and weather conditions) and considers them to be passive. Kubiński accounts for the passiveness of these verbs by suggesting that the Experiencer in the subject, rather than becoming a source or instigator of the state, i.e. rather than having a “quasi-agentive” feature, is conceptualized as a recipient of an action.

Proponents of cognitive grammar Suzanne Kemmer (1993, 1994) and Ricardo Maldonado (2008, 2009) also consider verbs of emotion with the clitic (Kemmer cross-linguistically, Maldonado in Spanish) to denote events of change that are spontaneous and uncontrolled. The authors maintain that these verbs depict emotional states pertaining to the subject’s own sphere or dominion and, as such, they have not a reflexive meaning, but imply the middle voice. In this article I adopt the cognitive framework for analyzing Slovene verbs

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5For instance, the Russian adjective *rod* ‘glad’ and the verb *radovat’sja* ‘to rejoice’ inform us that the speaker evaluates the event as good (Wierzbicka, 1995, pp. 229). I would suggest that the speaker’s evaluation is relevant also for adverbs. For example, the adverb in the sentence *Mne studno* ‘I feel ashamed’ indicates that the speaker evaluates the event as embarrassing while the adverb in the sentence *Ivanu studno* ‘Ivan feels ashamed’ (3b) indicates that the observer, who is the author of the sentence, asserts that Ivan evaluates the event as embarrassing.

6The author observes that Slavic languages (Russian, Polish) are rich in intransitive verbs which designate ‘active’ emotions, while English has only a few intransitive verbs of emotion, e.g., *grieve, rejoice, worry, pine* and the whole category seems to be losing ground in modern English. The fact that in English these verbs can be used in a progressive aspect (e.g., someone was rejoicing) “highlights the contrast between their active, semi-voluntary character and the passive nature of states such as ‘being sad’ or ‘being ashamed’” (Wierzbicka, 1988, pp. 253). According to the author, the tendency to express emotional states by means of verbs in Slavic and by adjectival constructions in English reflects radically different attitudes to behavior described as ‘emotional’. Whereas expressing emotions seems to be acceptable in Slavic cultures, in Anglo-Saxon culture emotional behavior is “viewed with suspicion and embarrassment” (Wierzbicka, 1988, pp. 253). This claim is supported by Dziwierek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczuk (2010).

7Whereas Wierzbicka focuses on her analysis imperfective verbs with *się* and -*sja*, Niedzielski’s account seems to refer only to imperfective verbs with *się*. Apresjan (1974, pp. 87) considers both imperfective and perfective verbs and he distinguishes two groups within Russian verbs of emotion with -*sja*. As he observes, verbs such as *besist’sja* ‘to be angered’ or *bespokoit’sja* ‘to be upset’ (i.e. imperfective verbs), have a purely stative meaning, whereas verbs such as *izumljat’sja* ‘to be amazed’ or *ogorčat’sja* ‘to grieve’ (i.e. perfective verbs) have either stative or inchoative meaning. I will come back to this issue in Section 4.
of emotion with *se*; thus, in Section 3, I discuss in detail the category of middle verbs in Slavic. In Section 4, following Kemmer (1993), I attempt to demonstrate that *se* ‘self’ in Slovene verbs of emotion indicates not the reflexive but the middle voice construction. However, I suggest that, given specific pragmatic factors, some verbs of emotion also form reflexive constructions with the heavy form *sebe* ‘self’ (Kemmer, 1993; Tabakowska, 2003, 2003a), or even both middle and reflexive constructions with *se* and *sebe*, respectively. By examining the Slovene data in terms of an event construal (Langacker, 1987, 1991), I will confirm Anna Wierzbicka’s (1988) claim that verbs with the light form of the personal pronoun denoting ‘self’ define ‘active emotions’ which I refer to as ‘emotional processes’. However, I challenge Wierzbicka’s (1988, 1992, 1995) assumption that the verbs in question express self-induced emotions or emotions caused by the speaker’s conscious thought about the event. I aim to advocate the view that these verbs indicate an emotional process or its arousal that is a response to external stimuli.

3 The category of middle voice in Slavic

The fact that verbs traditionally regarded as reflexive form a heterogeneous class was already noticed within generative grammar. Niedzielski writes that “true” reflexive verbs and pseudo-reflexives are in structural terms practically indistinguishable except that “(G)enerally, pseudo-reflexive(s) can’t take *siebie*” (Niedzielski, 1976, pp.171). It follows that pseudo-reflexives cannot take the heavy form, while in “true” reflexives the light form *się* can be substituted by the heavy form *siebie*. This surface structure test for pseudo-reflexives would appear imperfect because: i.) it does not sift out reciprocals (Niedzielski, 1976, pp.171), ii.) pseudo-reflexive constructions are also possible with *sobe* (i.e. *się* in the dative case) (Kubiński, 1982, pp.55), and iii.) the same pronominal verb can have different meanings and be either reflexive or pseudo-reflexive (Niedzielski, 1976, pp.180). According to Kubiński (1982, pp.60), “true” reflexive constructions consist of a subject, a verb and a reflexive pronoun which is the direct object and Patient, while other constructions with *się* have a reflexive verb (a verb + a reflexive particle) and a subject which is: both the Agent and Patient of the performed action, only a Patient (in inchoatives), or a Recipient of an action. Although Niedzielski’s and Kubiński’s approaches to Polish verbs with *się* differ from the cognitive account in many ways, their discussion of pseudo-reflexives can be treated as an important contribution for further treatment of the middle voice in Slavic, especially with regard to verbs of emotion.

In agreement with cognitive research (Kemmer, 1993, 1994; Tabakowska, 2003, 2003a), I assume that the Slovene clitic *se* and other Slavic clitics of this type mark a reflexive construction only when a verb denotes the special case of a two-participant event, where the Agent (“Initiator”) and Patient (“Endpoint”) refer to the same entity and are coreferential (Kemmer, 1993, pp.50–51).\(^8\) When a verb denotes an event that only involves the subject

\(^8\)As Kubiński stresses, the term “reflexive particle” comes from Fisak, Grzegorek-Lipińska, Zabrocki (1978). In contrast to the reflexive pronoun, the reflexive particle is not associated with the direct object and cannot occur in heavy forms like Polish *siebie, sobie, soba*.

\(^9\)In the prototypical case of two-participant relations encoded by transitive verbs, the Agent represents the participant who “initiates” the event to a second participant who is a target or “endpoint” of the event. In other words, the Agent represents the “Initiator” of an action (or a source of energy transmission), and the Patient is the action’s “Endpoint” (the energy sink) (Kemmer, 1993, pp.50–51, and Langacker, 1987, 1991). In Kemmer’s framework, the notions of Initiator and Endpoint are thought of as “macroroles” and each of them can subsume various thematic participant roles. For instance, the Initiator role can subsume the role of an Agent, Experiencer or Mental Source while the Endpoint can subsume the role of Patient, Recipient or Beneficiary participants.
and where there is a lack of conceptual differentiation between the event participant serving as the “Initiator” and “Endpoint”, the pronoun is a marker of a middle construction (Latin medium\(^{10}\)) (Kemmer, 1993, pp. 73). Other semantic accounts of the middle voice are offered, for instance, by Lyons and Mel’cuk. The former defines it as “implying that ‘the action’ or ‘state’ affects the subject of the verb or his interests” (Lyons, 1969, pp. 373 in Tabakowska, 2003a, pp. 390). Mel’cuk (1993, pp. 21) states that middle in Ancient Greek and Sanskrit denotes a verbal form which can be used both transitively and intransitively and which signals that the action is, in a sense, “concentrated” on the referent of the subject. The author distinguishes four types of events implying the middle reading. These are events in which: i.) the action of the referent in the subject is itself in the focus of attention, ii.) the subject referent undergoes the action (passive interpretation), iii.) the subject referent acts upon himself (reflexive interpretation), or iv.) the subject referent acts in his own interests or upon an entity which belongs to him (benefactive interpretation). On the basis of her cross-linguistic study, Kemmer (1993) distinguishes many more semantic groups (or types of events in Talmy’s terminology) whose verbs can imply the middle voice. Tomišić (2011, pp. 86) who discusses the application of Kemmer’s account of the middle voice in Slovene lists the following groups: grooming or body care (including whole body and body-part actions), e.g., perf. umiti se, imperf. umivati se ‘to wash’, perf. oblačiti se ‘to dress’; change in body posture, e.g., perf. usesiti se, imperf. usedati se, ‘to sit down’; non-translational motion (including contained translational motion), e.g., perf. obrnuti se, imperf. obračati se ‘to turn’; translational motion: motion with reference to path, e.g., perf. vzpeti se, imperf. vzpenjati se ‘to climb up’; other body actions, e.g., opraskati se ‘to scratch’; emotive speech actions, e.g., pritoževati se ‘to complain’; spontaneous events, e.g., pojaviti se ‘to occur’; naturally reciprocal events, e.g., perf. objeti se ‘to hug’; reciprocals, e.g., srečati se ‘to meet’; indirect middle, e.g., perf. želeći si ‘to wish’; passive middle, e.g., Knjiga se dobro bere ‘The book reads well’; cognition middle, e.g., perf. spominuti se, imperf. spominjati se ‘to remain’; emotion middle, e.g., perf. razjeziti se ‘to become angry’, imperf. jeziti se ‘to be angry’.

To illustrate the difference between reflexive and middle use in Slavic, I adopt Elżbieta Tabakowska’s (2003a) examples of sentences with verbs Polish and Slovene that in English are glossed as ‘to hurt’ and ‘to lengthen’:\(^{11}\)

\(4\)

Slov. Fant se je ranil.  
‘The boy hurt himself.’

b. Pol. Chłopiec zranił siebie, a nie swojego kolegę.  
Slov. Fant je ranil sebe, ne pa svojega prijatelja.  
‘The boy hurt himself (and not his friend).’

\(5\)

Slov. Drog se je podaljšal (od vročine).  
‘A/the rod became longer (under the influence of heat).’

Slov. *Drog se je podaljša (od vročine).  
‘A/the rod became longer (under the influence of heat).’

In the event in (4a) the Agent and Patient (or the Initiator and Endpoint in Kemmer’s

\(^{10}\)The term medium is used in Classical studies and comparative grammar of Indo-European languages. In linguistic literature medium is alternatively defined as “medio-passive”, “middle-passive”, “quasi-reflexive”, “pseudo-reflexive”, “neuter”, “patient-subject construction”, or “deponent” (Mel’cuk, 1993, pp. 21, Kemmer, 1993, pp. 2).

\(^{11}\)The Slovene glosses are my own.
terminology) are coreferential, “but at the same time they are conceptually distinguishable”; therefore the actual Patient (‘the boy’) may be contrasted with another potential Patient, e.g. ‘his friend’ (Tabakowska, 2003a, pp.389), as in (4b). In (4b) the light form is replaced by the heavy form siebie (Pol.) and sebe (Slov.) that in Slavic is considered as a marker of reflexive construction (Kemmer, 1994, Maldonado, 2009). On the other hand, in the event of physical state change in (5a), “the two coreferential participants (‘rod-as-Agent’ and “rod-as-Patient”) are obviously conceptually indistinguishable: the rod “acts on itself”: the lengthening is conceptualized as being initiated by an object which naturally becomes significantly affected by the experience” (Tabakowska, 2003a, pp.389). Thus, the light form of Pol. się and Slov. se cannot be replaced by the heavy form (5b). Tabakowska observes that the conceptual difference between the reflexive and the middle voice is one of degree, and it pertains to a certain “subtle but clearly perceptible difference in the speaker’s conceptualization of events” (Ibidem).12 In agreement with Kemmer (1993), the author argues that in the reflexive constructions two (coreferential) participants are clearly perceived, while in the middle construction they tend to merge conceptually. In consequence, the distinction involves a diminished degree of transitivity in the reflexive constructions as compared with their middle voice counterparts. Tabakowska notices that “the middle voice pushes the conceptualization closer to a one-participant image” (2003a, pp.390).13 One can observe that what happens to the Agent in the event described in (5a) seems to affect the Agent itself, and “the two become notionally indistinguishable”; the event of lengthening can be interpreted as a one-participant event. This is why middle verbs resemble one-participant events that are prototypically intransitive (Kemmer, 1993, pp.73).

As far as Slavic languages are concerned, Kemmer points out typological generalizations within two-form languages14 that provide evidence for the relation between reflexive and middle semantics (Kemmer, 1993, pp.26). These generalizations which were originally observed by Haiman (1983), are based on an intralinguistic distribution of heavy and light marking of, respectively, reflexive and middle voice. The first observation is that whereas the heavy form can be used in transitive roots to produce a reflexive meaning, the light one displays relatively restricted distribution as compared with the heavy form and with most roots cannot indicate a reflexive reading (Kemmer, 1993, pp.27), as in the Russian example in (6):

12Note that in other places the author claims that: reflexivity is a scalar concept and in the conceptualization of basic events the borderline between one- and two-participant is fuzzy. Thus, in coreferential conceptualizations, pragmatic factors play a crucial role: “particular construals are chosen depending on our knowledge of what things are like and what things should be like in our reality.” (Tabakowska, 2003, pp.16).
13Since both middle and reflexive construction types refer to the clausal subject, Kemmer (1993, 1994) analyzes middles as deriving from a transitive verb via a reflexive construction. By the distinguishability hypothesis, she suggests two extreme situations with one participant at one pole (intransitive verbs) and two at the other (transitive verbs). Reflexives and middles are placed between these two poles. Reflexives involve a deviation from the transitive because two participants refer to the same referent and these two participants can still be differentiated. Middles do not allow a split representation of the self. On the other hand, Maldonado (2009) presents data from Yucatec Maya in which the middle evolves directly from the transitive roots, and from languages such as Tarascan in which the middle is a basic construction from which other constructions derive.
14One-form languages or languages having a one-form middle system include, for instance, German and French (Kemmer, 1993, pp.25). In these languages the middle marker is identical to the reflexive marker. The latter is characteristic for events when there is emphatic or contrastive meaning (Kemmer, 1993, pp.64).
(6) a. Viktor nenavidit sebjja.  
Viktor hates himself’ (reflexive reading)  
b. *Viktor nedaviditsja.  
Viktor hates himself’ (Haiman, 1983, pp. 804 in Kemmer, 1993, pp. 27)

However, when the light form does occur with a transitive root, the meaning of the verb is not reflexive but middle. The contrast between reflexive (the verb with the heavy form) and middle reading (the verb with the light form) is illustrated in (7):

(7) a. On utomil sebjja.  
He exhausted himself.

b. On utomilsja.  
He grew weary’ (Haiman, 1983, pp. 796 In Kemmer, 1993, pp. 27)

The sentence in (7a) represents an event in which a person brought about his physical exhaustion through his own exertions (a reflexive meaning), while the sentence in (7b) represents an event in which a person become weary through an unspecified process (a middle meaning).

Kemmer writes that similar cases from two-form languages indicate that “the semantics associated with the light form is essentially non-reflexive” (Kemmer, 1993, pp. 27). In other places the author states that Slavic languages “have one form dedicated to expressing reflexive semantics, and a second one that covers middle situation types, including the body actions” (Kemmer, 1994, pp. 203). Thus, the same verb can have different meanings when associated either with the heavy or light form of the pronoun. This explains why the same pronominal verb can be either reflexive or pseudo-reflexive in Niedzielski’s terminology; see the contrast between budzić się ‘to wake up’ (denoting a spontaneous and involuntary change-of-state event) and budzić siebie ‘to wake oneself up’ (denoting an event caused by a decision or a conscious effort) in Niedzielski (1976, pp. 180). According to Kemmer, verbs tend to take the heavy form under specific “semantic/pragmatic conditions”, for instance, “when another actual or potential object is being contested with the object or when two potentially separable aspects of a human Agent, the physical and the mental, are in opposition to each other” (Kemmer, 1993, pp. 65).

4 The analysis

In this section I examine middle and reflexive semantics of verbs of emotion. Then, I focus on Slovene verbs of emotion with se ‘self’ and I attempt to support the view that these verbs, rather than indicating a self-induced emotion (Wierzbicka’s account), reflect emotional processes that are perceived as instigated by external events (or stimuli).

4.1 Middle vs. reflexive semantics of Slovene verbs of emotion

Verbs of emotion, together with verbs of cognition and verbs of perception, belong to the category of mental verbs (Croft, 1991). Mental verbs imply the semantic role of the Experiencer. As presented in Belletti and Rizzi (1998) and Croft (1991), the Experiencer referent of such verbs can be either the clausal subject (“subject-experiencer verbs”) or the object (“object-experiencer verbs”). Slovene verbs of emotion with se (and sebe) assign the Experiencer role to the subject.

The set of verbs with se includes verbs that are used only with the clitic (the so-called reflexiva tantum) such as bati se ‘to be scared’, and verbs that take se when the Experiencer is coded in the subject position, such as razjeziti se ‘to become angry’ (otherwise they are transitive, e.g., razjeziti koga ‘to anger someone’).

The events encoded by se verbs can be two-participant or one-participant with regard to the whole event construal. In the case of two-participant events, a sentient entity
in whose mind the mental event takes place (the Experiencer) becomes aware or makes mental contact with a second entity serving as a Stimulus of the mental event (Kemmer, 1993, pp.128). The Stimulus can be grammatically coded either as an object of emotion, as in (7), or as its cause, as in (8).

(7) Samo Kuščer se jezi na ljubljanske policiste (...). (Gf)
    ‘Samo Kuščer is angry with the Ljubljana police (...).’

(8) Jezil se je zaradi malenkosti (...). (Gf)
    ‘He was angry because of small things (...).’

Kemmer (1993, pp.128) argues that the Experiencer and the Stimulus entities are linked in two ways. First, the Experiencer participant directs his/her attention to the Stimulus entity (or some imagined representation of it), and second, the Stimulus entity, or some property of it, brings about a mental event in the mind of the Experiencer participant. This assumption is made also by William Croft (1991, pp.219) who puts it in the following way:

There are two processes involved in possessing a mental state (and changing a mental state): the experiencer must direct his or her attention to the stimulus, and then, the stimulus (or some property of it) causes the experiencer to be (or enter into) a certain mental state.\(^{15}\)

As will be demonstrated further in this section, in events in which the Stimulus occurs suddenly and the emotional transition takes place rapidly and spontaneously, the mental contact can be reduced to a perceptional one.

In the case of one-participant events the Stimulus is not coded; see (9).

(9) Trenutek pozneje se je množica razbesnela (...). (Gf)
    ‘A moment later the crowd got mad (...).’

Kemmer argues that this applies to situations in which there is no salient entity giving rise to the mental event or when the speaker is pragmatically de-emphasizing the Stimulus within the clause. Events portrayed without a Stimulus can be thought of as “occurring wholly with regard to the Experiencer” (Kemmer, 1993, pp.128).

In Kemmer’s approach, the Experiencer of middle emotion verbs is considered to be both an Initiator and Endpoint of the mental event. It is the Initiator in the sense that the event originates in the Experiencer participant’s mind and it is the Endpoint in the sense that the Experiencer participant is affected mentally. The author further explains that the affectedness of the Initiator is an inherent part of the mental event. The factor that allows middle semantics to be ascribed to mental events is the low, or even non-existent, degree of distinguishability of the participants, i.e. minimal conceptual separation between the Initiator and the Endpoint. Kemmer outlines that

The Initiator/Endpoint entity is essentially a human mind; it is an Experiencer. By virtue of the way human beings experience the world, being an Experiencer necessarily involves both some measure of attention on the part of that Experiencer, and mental affectedness of that Experiencer. Thus conceptual separation between the Initiating and Endpoint entities in mental events is non-existent (Kemmer, 1993, pp.129).

\(^{15}\) Croft further claims that the subject-experiencer verbs imply more volition or direction of attention to the Stimulus than object-experiencer verbs because the subject is conceptualized as “having control, or at least more control, over the state of affairs denoted by the verb” (1991, pp.219). In verbs of mental activity, e.g., *think*, this means more control in directing one’s attention to the stimulus. I further argue that in the case of verbs of emotion the experiencer directs his or her attention to the stimulus and evaluates it as either good or bad for him/her, however, the emotion denoted by the verb is triggered involuntarily.
In (10) and (11) I illustrate the category of emotion middle in Slovene by dividing the verbs of emotion with se into two groups with respect to grammatical aspect. The imperfective se verbs in (10) represent the event of stasis (here: ‘being scared’) while the perfective se verbs in (11) develop an inchoative reading and indicate a process of state transition into an intensive short-term emotion (here: ‘getting angry’, ‘rejoicing’ and ‘getting scared’).

(10) Imperfective se verbs
a. Ne morem spati. Vsak šum me vrže pokonci. Bojim se. Zdrznem se ob vsakem zvoku, povsem nekontrolirano. (Nb)
   ‘I cannot sleep. Every noise makes me jump. I am scared. I flinch at every sound, totally out of control.’

b. “Naši otroci ne morejo v šolo, ker se bojijo eksplozij, samomorilskih napadov ali obstrelevanj,” (...) (Gf)
   ‘“Our children cannot go to school because they are scared of explosions, suicide attacks or bombardments,”’ (...)

c. Ves čas se je bal, da ga bodo zaprli (...) (Gigafida)
   ‘He had been scared all the time that they would imprison him.’

(11) Perfective se verbs
a. Takratni nemški kancler Hitler se je tako razježil ob uspehih Američana Owensa, da je zapustil stadijon.
   ‘Hitler, who was German chancellor at the time, became so angered by the successes of the American, Owens, that he left the stadium.’

b. In mislim, da se je iskreno razveselil, ko me je zagledal.
   ‘And I think that he heartily rejoiced when he saw me.’

c. Nenadoma, tam pri ogromnih hrastovih vratih, se je Jack prestrašil, silno prestrašil, zaradi občutka, da ga znotraj nekdo pričakuje. (Gf)
   ‘Suddenly, at the huge oak door, Jack got scared, very scared, because of the feeling that someone was waiting for him inside.’

Kemmer (1993) outlines that emotional states differ from other mental states in that they involve a high degree of affectedness of the Experiencer. Such events also “seem to affect the Experiencer referent more globally than other mental activities: the Experiencer is more involved in an emotion activity or state than in simple thought or perception activities” (pp.130). This supports Wierzbicka’s view that the Slavic verbs of emotion under discussion denote that people “give in to emotions” themselves. The global affectedness can be explained as a result of feelings, i.e. responses of the autonomic nervous system, the bodily preparations for action, and postures, which are associated with a given emotion. The feelings are an inherent component of emotional experience, as proven in psychological and philosophical studies of emotion (Goldie, 2000; Solomon, 2003).

I claim that the bodily feelings that co-occur with emotions defined by verbs with the middle marker might be the reason why these verbs are thought of as indicating ‘active emotions’ in the sense of Anna Wierzbicka (1988, 1999). The author, however, writes that these verbs define neither states (c.f. Apresjan, 1974) nor actions. I suggest that the imperfective verbs with middle markers designate emotional processes, rather than states, while perfective verbs (or inchoative, in the sense of Apresjan and Niedzielski) designate processes of emotional transition (in the sense of Talmy). This assumption is in line with Grzegorczykowa who calls Polish verbs of emotions with się “state-processual verbs”. I also suggest that the ‘active’ component of emotional processes embodied in the middle verbs allows us to distinguish this type of verb from transitive non-causative verbs of emotion, that are commonly considered to denote states.
Let us now turn to contexts of utterances in which Slovene verbs of emotion take the heavy form sebe ‘myself, yourself, oneself’, i.e. the reflexive marker. First, sebe can occur in verbs of emotion to denote self-directed states. This is the case with the verbs ljubiti and sovražiti which are canonically transitive. Both verbs denote long-term emotions that are typically directed at other people. The heavy form in (12) indicates that the subject referent of these verbs has a split representation of self in that he or she is able to perceive him- or herself as an object of his or her own emotional experience.\(^{16}\)

(12) a. Ljubi bližnjega, kakor samega sebe.\(^{17}\)
    ‘Love your neighbor as you love yourself.’

b. Ne dojemam pa, da lahko človek tako močno sovraži sebe.\(^{18}\)
    ‘I cannot understand that a man can hate himself so much.’

Following Kemmer (1993), I argue that the events represented in (12) are special cases of two-participant transitive events in which the Initiator and Endpoint refer to the same scene participant (the Experiencer) but are conceptually distinguishable. This applies also to the events depicted by the perfective verbs with sebe that indicate self-directed emotional transition, as presented in (13). Note that the English gloss of the Slovene verbs involves the verb make which supports the view that the sentences in (13) denote self-directed emotions.

(13) a. Takrat (...) razjezim(o) sebe.\(^{19}\)
    ‘Then, I/we make myself/ourselves angry’

b. Še zdaj ne morem verjeti, da sem naredil takšno neumnost in s tem osramotil sebe in klub. (Gf)
    ‘Until now I couldn’t believe that I could have done such a stupid thing and by that made myself and the club feel ashamed’

c. Razveseli sebe ali nekoga drugega z brezplačno vstopnico (...)\(^{20}\)
    ‘Make yourself or someone else happy with a free ticket!’

Second, in Slovene, the reflexive marker occurs in constructions indicating that the emotional transition is (or will be) the result of an activity carried out by the subject referent. This situation is exemplified in (13b) and (13c). In (13b) it was “doing a stupid thing” that made the player himself and the club feel ashamed (the activity is encoded by the prepositional phrase s tem ‘by that-INST’) while in (13c) it is obtaining “a free ticket” (z brezplačno vstopnico ‘with a free ticket-INST’). It is worth noticing that (13c) comes from an advertisement. I argue that in this type of discourse, the function of the heavy form in verbs of emotion is to draw the reader’s/hearer’s attention to his or her emotional needs. This applies also to self-help books or web sites giving psychological advice (e.g., Kako imeti sebe bolj rad?\(^{21}\) ‘How to like yourself more?’; see also the example from English: How to make yourself happy at work\(^{22}\)). Third, verbs with sebe generally occur in constructions which represent self-directed actions that also involve other participants; see, for instance, an event of body care in (14):

\(^{16}\)Another example of a split representation of the self is: Tako kot je sprva hlepel po uspehu in priznanju, je kasneje sovražil tisti del sebe, ki je v slavi užival (Gf) ‘Just as he first yearned for success and recognition, so he later hated the part of himself that enjoyed the fame’. Here, the speaker is able to hate a particular part of his mental sphere.


Verbs of Emotion with se in Slovene...

(14) Umila sem sebe in otroka v mrzli vodi.
    'I washed myself and the child in the cold water.'

The construction in (14) indicates that the speaker can potentially distinguish his
or her own body when contrasting it with the child’s. Similarly, in the events depicted
above in (13) a speaker is able to distinguish his or her own mental state from the mental
states of others. Moreover, we can observe that the heavy form in (13) indicates that
the Experiencer participant is emphasized as being a more salient figure of the portrayed
scene than the other participants (see sebe in klub ‘myself and the club’ and sebe ali nekoga
druga ‘myself and someone else’).

Interestingly, some verbs of emotion can occur both with the middle marker se and
the reflexive marker sebe. Such constructions indicate that the Experiencer participant in
the subject is both an Initiator and Endpoint of the event and the event is self-directed or
the event is caused by the Experiencer participant him- or herself. The first situation is
portrayed in (15a). The prepositional phrase nase ‘at himself’ (na ‘at’ combined with the
heavy form sebe in the accusative) designates that the participant coded as the Experiencer
is an object of anger. The second situation is expressed in (15b). The genitive phrase
with the emphatic samega ‘own’, i.e. samega sebe lit. ‘my own self-GEN’ designates that
the participant is himself the cause of his fear. I argue that this is further evidence of
a split representation of the concept of self.

(15) a. Razjezil se je sam nase, ker je začel izgubljati nadzor nad lastnimi čustvi. (…) 
    (Gf)
    ‘He got angry with himself because he began to lose control of his own emotions.’
    b. Začenjam se bati samega sebe23
    ‘I am beginning to be scared of my own self.’

Whereas the sentences in (12) to (15) demonstrate the uses of the reflexive marker,
the example in (16) shows that sebe is not permitted with reflexiva tantum, i.e. the verb
bati se. This suggests that reflexiva tantum cannot denote a self-directed emotional state.

(16) *Bojim sebe.
    ‘I am scared-SELF.’

As far as the emotion of fear is concerned, note that the causative verb plašiti ‘to
frighten’ can be used in a two-participant construction to express a self-directed emotion
of fear (17).

(17) Plašim pa tudi sebe. (Gf)
    ‘I frighten also myself.’

4.2 Causality implied by se verbs of emotion

Let us recall that according to Wierzbicka (1988), the verbs of emotion under discussion
designate voluntary (or almost voluntary) states. In contrast, Kemmer claims that emo-
tional events are low in volitionality and this feature distinguishes them from other mental
events. The author writes that “one has less control over the emotions than over one’s
thoughts or one’s physical perceptions” (Kemmer, 1993, pp.130). Let us look again at
the Slovene constructions with emotion middle presented above with regard to causality:
In (10a) the cause of the speaker’s fear is not coded. In agreement with Kemmer, I as-
sume that the cause is de-emphasized; the speaker focuses on and describes the bodily
reactions to external stimuli that are associated with his or her fear. Other examples

show that the cause of the emotion can be expressed, for instance, by means of the noun in the genitive case (10b), a subordinate clause (10c) and (11b), an adverbial phrase of time (11a) and the preposition zaradi ‘because of’ that literally indicates a cause (11c). One can observe that the events of emotional change under discussion result from other events, either coded or not in the sentence. Thus, I claim that the events represent not self-induced causation, but the resulting event causation, i.e. a type of causation that is implied by situations where the main event “has resulted from another event and would not otherwise have occurred” (Talmy, 2000a, pp. 70). The causing events are external stimuli which are mentally conceived (either by means of perception of cognition) by the Experiencer participant.

Following Maldonado (2008, 2009), I argue that Slovene perfective verbs with se, such as those in (11), express events of sudden and unexpected emotional transition into an intensive short-term emotion. An explanation for this claim can be found in the field of neuroscience. Namely, external stimuli, which we record by means of the senses, stimulate the so-called amygdale and the cerebral cortex which in turn activates the bodily reactions associated with a given emotion (Le Doux, 1996). It follows that in the case of short-term intensive emotions our emotional system reacts independently of the neocortex; a conscious reflection comes afterwards.24

On the other hand, possessing a mental state involves processes of reasoning about the stimuli and evaluating them as good or bad, as claimed by Wierzbicka. For instance, one can assume that the children in (10b) are focusing on the possible explosions and other events related to war, “turning them over in their head”, evaluating them as dangerous and bad for them. The same can be stated about the man in (10c) who can evaluate the potential fact of being imprisoned as unpleasant, dangerous, and bad for him. However, conscious thoughts of this type may not lead to an emotion of fear. They may lead to the assertion: ‘this is bad for me, I do not want it to happen, I should avoid such a situation’. Following anthropologists and philosophers (e.g., d’Andrade, 1995, Goldie, 2000, Solomon, 2003), I claim that a conscious thought about an event (or its subject) is “blended into emotional experience” (d’Andrade, 1995, pp. 219)25 but it is not an internal cause of the emotion. It should be stressed that, in philosophy, a conscious thought of an event in the case of an emotion is explained in terms of intentionality. Intentionality of emotion, however, does not mean that one produces an emotion intentionally but that the emotion is directed towards an object and/or its salient features that make one feel the particular emotion (Goldie, 2000).

Goldie also points out that the thoughts and feelings directed towards an object of emotion are part of one’s consciousness about the world in which one is emotionally engaged. However, emotions need not be directed toward objects which are completely specific or described by the person experiencing an emotion. For instance, our fear of walking in the middle of the night is a genuine emotion, even though we are not able to define what we are afraid of; it can be anything, e.g., the dark, the strange shape of the shadows on the wall etc. (Goldie, 2000: 143).

When examining Slovene verbs of emotion with se one cannot ignore the fact that in some contexts imperfective se verbs can be used to express other events. They can

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24Note that, the perceptual basis of the emergence of short-term intensive emotions is embodied by various prefixes that are taken by verbs of emotion, e.g., vzradostiti se ‘to rejoice’; razjeziti se ‘to get angry’. The Slovene prefixes vz- and raz- are considered to map their spatially-based meaning onto the event of emotional transition (see Będkowska-Kopczyk, 2012, 2012a, 2013a).

25This applies also to transitive non-causative verbs that refer to long-term emotions in that they resemble attitudes rather than spontaneous feelings (in terms of Nowakowska-Kempna, 1995, 2000), such as ljubiti ‘to love’ and sovrážiti ‘to hate’.
either express actions and reactions that signal emotional states or they can denote a blend of cognitive and emotional states. For instance, in the SSKJ dictionary jeziti se is defined as ‘to feel, to express anger’, ‘to express discontent, indignation’, ‘to have a negative, dismissive attitude to something’; veseliti se as ‘to be in the state of joy’, ‘to do things that bring about, express a joyful mood’, ‘to have a positive attitude to something’, ‘to be in a pleasant state of awaiting something’; bati se as ‘to feel fear, to be in the state of fear’, ‘to not wish, to not like’, ‘to be worrying’ and ‘to guess, to think (‘that something negative will happen’). Thus, I assume that se verbs of emotion can express either emotional states blended with bodily reactions (the feelings) or emotional states blended with cognitive states. The sentences in (18) with bati se exemplify the semantic blends of the latter type:

(18) a. »Bojim se, da je nova vlada precej moteča za mednarodne finančnike,« (Nb)
   ‘I am afraid that the new government is too confusing for international financiers’.

   b. »Bojim se, da se ne morem strinjati z vami, kolega.« (Nb)
   ‘I am afraid that I cannot agree with you, my dear colleague.’

   In (18a) bati se defines a concern about an unwanted situation caused by a negative evaluation of the new government and uneasiness related to the potential situation of the new government being too confusing for international financiers. In (18b) the verb denotes regret and/or concern arising from the fact that the speaker has a different opinion to that of his colleague. In the latter sentence, bati se is used for a pragmatic reason, i.e. to soften a statement that might be unpleasant for the associate. I argue that in (18), bati se indicates a cognitive state associated with an emotional attitude that can be “produced” voluntarily by people (in the sense of Wierzbicka), rather than pure emotion or spontaneous arousal. In this respect, bati se in (10) that designates the emotional process of fear in contrast to bati se in (18) that designates the cognitive state.

   Finally, other evidence supporting the thesis that Slovene middle verbs of emotion do not indicate volitional states and that the Experiencer in the subject does not have agentic or quasi-agentic features can be brought by a “volitional test”. Leonard Talmy defines the concept of the Agent as “an entity with body (parts), volition and intention, where the body parts respond to volition, and intention applies to these responses and, optionally, to further events” (Talmy, 2000, pp. 513). Thus, volitional involvement of the Experiencer participant in the emotional event was checked by asking native speakers of Slovene whether the adverbs namenoma ‘intentionally’ and hote ‘volitionally’ are permitted in the following sentences:

(19) a. Janez se je namenoma/hote bal smrti.
   ‘Janez was intentionally/volitionally scared of death.’

   b. Janez se je namenoma/hote razveselil prijateljevega obiska.
   ‘Janez got intentionally/volitionally happy because of his friend’s visit’

   c. Janez se je namenoma/hote prestrašil Petrovih besed.
   ‘Janez got intentionally/volitionally frightened by Peter’s words.’

   d. Janez se je namenoma/hote razjezil na Petra.
   ‘Janez got intentionally/volitionally angry at Peter.’

   The results show that both adverbs can occur only in (19d) if the sentence indicates

26 This refers also to Polish; Jędrzejko and Nowakowska-Kempna (1985) notice that Polish verbs of emotion like złosić się ‘to be angry’ denote also symptoms of the emotions.

27 In studies of causality in the domain of emotion, volitional tests are carried out in order to examine volitional involvement of the Stimulus human participant in experiencer-object verbs of emotion (see Verhoeven, 2010; Klein and Kutscher, 2005).
that the participant in the subject wishes to manifest his anger from pragmatic reasons. One can achieve this by a behavior that is conventionally associated with anger. In other words, *razjeti se* in (19d) denotes not a spontaneous emotional change but a rational expression of the emotion.

5 Conclusions
The analysis of Slovene verbs of emotion with the light form *se* carried out in Section 4 presents my assumption based on Kemmer (1993, 1994), Tabakowska (2003, 2003a) and Maldonado (2008, 2009) that the clitic is a marker of the middle voice. The middle marker indicates that the Initiator and Endpoint of the event of emotional change merge conceptually. The middle marker also indicates a global affectedness of the Experiencer participant that is associated with bodily feelings. Thus, the events denoted by the middle verbs of emotion can be defined as processes (or ‘active emotions’ in Wierzbicka’s work), rather than states. I identified contexts in which Slovene verbs of emotion take the reflexive marker. This applies to utterances in which verbs of emotion can denote that i.) the emotional change is self-directed, ii.) the emotional change is a result of an action undertaken by the Experiencer referent, and/or iii) the Experiencer participant is emphasized and profiled as the salient figure of the event (in opposition to other participants). Moreover, the analysis showed that Slovene verbs of emotion can take both the middle and reflexive marker when the sentence indicates that the Experiencer participant in the subject is both an Initiator and Endpoint of the mental event and that the emotion is self-directed, or the event is caused by the Experiencer participant him- or herself.

The other concern of this article was the causality implied by Slovene verbs of emotion with *se*. The analysis showed that these verbs imply resulting event causation, i.e. they inform us that an emotional process or its occurrence is conceptualized as being triggered in response to external stimuli. This observation goes against Wierzbicka’s claim that the verbs in question express self-induced emotions or emotions caused (almost voluntarily) by the speaker’s conscious thought about the event. On the other hand, it confirms Kemmer’s assumption that verbs with the middle marker indicate a low degree of volitionality in the process of emotional change, i.e. they lexicalize an event that occurs independently of the Experiencer participant’s will. However, this observation does not apply to the sentences in which middle verbs of emotion denote either a behavior associated with the given emotion or a mixture of cognitive and emotional states that allow an agentive interpretation.

I believe that the account of Slovene middle verbs of emotion presented in this article can be applied to these types of verb in all Slavic languages. However, this hypothesis would need to be confirmed through further investigation of Slavic data.

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