Beyond conceptions of fascism and fascist conceptions:

On the category of fascization

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Abstract: In discussing conceptions and definitions of fascism, this text offers a new and broader perspective on the phenomenon by introducing the concept of fascization as an analytical tool. Given the fact that the conditions that fascism produced have not been destroyed, its elements have not been delegitimized and that the fascist imagination still exists in European and non-European societies, the author argues that we need a new category connecting the past and present without historicizing fascism. The author identifies practices and forms of fascization in evidence such as the EU anti-migrant and anti-refugee policy as well as racist violence in Germany after reunification. The author critically examines various definitions of fascism and analyses its key characteristics including the fascist community from a psychoanalytical perspective. The author also looks at the historiographical debate concerning the question of whether or not fascism could be considered revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Making a clear-cut distinction between fascism and National Socialism, the author re-visits the case of Ernst Nolte whose interpretation of the origins of National Socialism resurrected the Nazi *Weltanschauung* by normalizing and justifying the Nazi campaign against the European Jews.

Keywords: Antisemitism; authoritarianism; fascism; fascization; fascist imagination; Ernst Nolte; racist violence; psychoanalysis

The new fascism – if it comes – will be very different from the old fascism. History does not repeat itself so easily.
(Marcuse [1967], 2005d, p. 70)

I. Old wine in new bottles or new wine in old bottles? On the prevalence of the fascist imagination

[...] before a difference can matter much it must be conceptualized collectively by the society as a whole.
(Goffman, 1986, p. 23)

The past is present

Fascism in its original form (Bray et al., 2020, p. 3) was produced within the specific constellation and concrete crises in Europe during (Finchelstein, 2019, p. 32)¹ and after World War I (Eley, 2018). Fascism subsequently became a transnational (Bauerkämper & Rossoliński-Liebe, 2017) and transatlantic (Finchelstein, 2010) phenomenon. It was

1 Finchelstein emphasizes that “fascist ideology first emerged in the trenches of World War I” (Finchelstein, 2019, p. 32).

in Italy where fascism as a movement was first transformed into a mode of government in 1922 and in Germany where antisemitism and racism became official state policy during the period of National Socialism (1933 to 1945). The military defeat of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany at the end of World War II did not result in the ending of the fascist imagination and “schemes of perception”² of the social world shaped by anti-semitism and racism. While the postwar period did not see the re-establishment of fascism as a regime in the defeated powers (Finchelstein, 2019, p. 7)³, elements of fascism and National Socialism continued to live on in physical manifestations and objective mechanisms⁴ as well as in people’s minds and bodies, i.e. in authoritarian dispositions as well as on the level of symbolic representation (Seeßlen, 2013)⁵.

The Nazis themselves knew very well that de-nazification and the establishment of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany did not mean that National Socialist principles, such as the notion of rebirth and national renewal, had disappeared. In *Letzte Aufzeichnungen*, published in 1955 in West Germany, the author Alfred Rosenberg, the main ideologist of the NSDAP, author of the 1930 antisemitic pamphlet *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, considers National Socialism as indestructible by democracy,⁶ perceiving it as a long-lasting mentality.

The spirit of fascism and National Socialism has survived and it professes itself openly. It no longer needs to hide behind double-speak, as did the mental structure in its original form.⁷ The socio-psychological basis for the identification with power, authoritarianism, and hierarchism did not disappear because competitive conformism has persisted and the development of independent thought is deemed disruptive. Emancipation of consciousness on the part of a few individuals did not go hand in hand with emancipation of society from hierarchically structured organizations such as the churches, the military, or governmental bureaucracy.

2 For Bourdieu, “schemes of perception” are a feature of the habitus (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 38–39).

3 By declining a military alliance with the Axis Powers during World War II the regimes of Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal avoided their own destruction.

4 “The social and structural reality of National Socialism”, writes Moishe Postone, “did not completely vanish in 1945” (Postone, 1980, p. 98).

5 A case in point is popular culture. Georg Seeßlen has analyzed the “second life” of National Socialism in films. See Seeßlen, 1994, 1996, 2013. Seeßlen emphasizes that “the fascist image has proved to be dominant over the image of fascism” (Seeßlen, 1996, p. 117).

6 In *Letzte Aufzeichnungen*, Rosenberg, who was convicted of crimes against peace, planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg trials of major Nazi leaders before the International Military Tribunal between 1945 and 1946 and executed on 16 October 1946, writes that “the political idea of National Socialism” was “the rebirth of Germany’s national-völkisch character in a system of government and life which overcomes the damage inflicted by democracy” (Rosenberg, 1955, p. 316, cited in: Griffin, 2000, p. 302).

7 Around 1945, Theodor W. Adorno wrote: “Fascist cynicism never confessed itself openly as such. It was always cloaked behind a net of highly conventional social, moral, and [a]esthetic values which nobody took quite seriously. The more they practiced anarchy, lawlessness, and cruelty in reality, the more they professed their belief in traditional orderliness in every respect” (Adorno, 1997a, p. 436). The question is why it was so easy to normalize extreme cruelty and to make it acceptable to societies.

In a 1967 lecture entitled “Aspects of the new right-wing radicalism”, Adorno said that “the identification with the system”, namely the cruel and ruthless Nazi regime, was “never really destroyed” in Germany (Adorno, 2019a, p. 444). Seven years earlier he observed that “the objective conditions” – the fact that “the world is set up to a large extent in an authoritarian way” (Adorno, 2019b, p. 244) – form “the climate” which “tends to strengthen” (Adorno, 2019b, p. 263) the authoritarian personality. During World War II, when the *Institut für Sozialforschung* was doing research in exile in the United States, Adorno and his team produced empirical evidence for the close coupling of this character structure with antisemitism. The findings were published under the title *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950). However, it would be misleading to think that Adorno only approached antisemitism from the perspective of social psychology. In fact, he took a much broader view of it. In a 1962 public lecture entitled “Fighting against antisemitism today”, Adorno emphasized that German culture, “especially where it considered itself most cultivated” (Adorno, 1997b, p. 383), was impregnated with antisemitism: “Hitler did not inject antisemitism into German culture from the outside”. In fact, German culture “had been infiltrated by antisemitic stereotypes” (Adorno, 1997b, p. 382) through and through. The antisemitic wave of 1959 in West Germany, the so-called swastika wave,⁸ provided proof of the continuity of antisemitic practices. The *Institut für Sozialforschung*, which was re-established in Frankfurt after Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s return to Germany after their forced exile in the United States, responded by commissioning a sociological study (Schönbach, 1961) of the antisemitic attacks.

For the thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School, it was of central importance to problematize the legacy of National Socialism *within* democratic societies, in particular in West Germany. In his 1959 public lecture entitled “*Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*”, Adorno drew attention to the fact that the societal conditions that made National Socialism possible continued to exist (Adorno, 2012). Herbert Marcuse, who had contributed to the development of the U.S. denazification policy, broadened his antifascist approach, “drawing U.S. society into the frame of his analysis” (Davis, 2005, p. ix). Writing in a historical constellation in which the prospect of nuclear destruction loomed large, Marcuse emphasized that the pleasure to kill without guilt prevailed in affluent societies:

One man can give the signal that liquidates hundreds and thousands of people, then declare himself free from all pangs of conscience, and live happily ever after. The antifascist powers who beat fascism on the battlefields reap the benefits of the Nazi scientists, generals, and engineers; they have the historical advantage of the late-comer. What begins as the horror of the concentration camps turns into the practice of training people for abnormal conditions – a subterranean human existence and the daily intake of radioactive nourishment. (Marcuse, 1968b, pp. 79–80)

8 During the night of 24 to 25 December 1959, the synagogue in Cologne was desecrated by means of antisemitic writings as well as swastikas. The desecration signified the beginning of a wave of antisemitic attacks in the Federal Republic of Germany which lasted for several weeks. On 7 January 1960 alone, the authorities registered 58 cases modelled on the attack in Cologne. See Schönbach, 1961, p. 7.

From the perspective of the New Left, the abolition of “abnormal conditions” could only be achieved by a revolutionary movement and the metamorphosis of needs. In 1974, Marcuse imagined “*feminist socialism*”, understood as a modified version of socialism,⁹ and “the liberation of the woman” as “the revolutionary function of the female in the reconstruction of society” (Marcuse, 2005b, p. 170). A year later, he acknowledged that “the transition to socialism is not now on the agenda; the counterrevolution is dominant. Under these circumstances, a struggle against the worst tendencies becomes the focal point” (Marcuse, 2005a, p. 189). Combatting “the worst tendencies” such as antisemitism, racism, exploitation, and war has remained on the agenda since the disintegration of the New Left.

Europe and the United States have failed to reckon with “The White Man’s Guilt” (Baldwin, 1998b, pp. 722–727). Reflecting on the “American situation”, James Baldwin wrote in 1965 that the heavy “curtain of guilt and lies behind which white Americans hide [...] may prove to be yet more deadly to the lives of human beings than that Iron Curtain of which we speak so much, and know so little” (Baldwin, 1998b, p. 725). According to Baldwin, the curtain dividing American society was “color”, a word or concept that white men have used “to justify unspeakable crimes, not only in the past, but in the present” (Baldwin, 1998b, p. 725). While the political reality of the American “curtain” has not been torn down, the ideological political boundary dividing Europe until 1989 was eventually swept away.

Since the end of the Cold War Europe and the world have moved inexorably even further to the right. In fact, we have witnessed the return of “downright fascistic elements” (Gandhesha, 2020, p. 120) in many countries, in both the global north (most notably in the United Kingdom, the United States, in Europe and Turkey) and the global south (most notably in Brazil, India, and China). These “fascistic elements” of reality enter into a specific constellation characterized by capitalism bringing with it wars and causing extreme socioeconomic inequality, climate destruction, the production of migrants and refugees, by the marketization of the state through the “transnational political project of neoliberalism” (Wacquant, 2014, p. 1691), by the casting of the individual as self-entrepreneur as well as by “the gradual but steady erosion of the institutions of the liberal-democratic order consisting of, inter alia, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and, in particular, the independence of the judicial branch, the freedom of the

9 As far as the position of women in a socialist society, imagined as “feminist socialism”, is concerned, “the woman would have achieved full economic, political, and cultural equality in the all-round development of her faculties, and over and above this equality, social as well as personal relationships would be permeated with the receptive sensitivity which, under male domination, was largely concentrated in the woman: the masculine–feminine antithesis would then have been transformed into a synthesis – the legendary idea of *androgynism*” (Marcuse, 2005b, p. 171). Marcuse imagined socialism as a “qualitatively different way of life” insofar as it “would use the productive forces not only for the reduction of alienated labor and labor time, but also for making life an end in itself, for the development of the senses and the intellect for pacification of aggressiveness, the enjoyment of being, for the emancipation of the senses and of the intellect from the rationality of domination: creative receptivity versus repressive productivity” (Marcuse, 2005b, p. 170).

press and the right to dissent” (Gandesha, 2020, p. 120). Democratic institutions and the rule of law in a number of countries have been attacked and co-opted by the far-right. A case in point is the law, which is only selectively applied when it suits authoritarian goals. To give but one example, on 22 October 2020, the PiS-controlled Constitutional Court in Poland made changes to the 1993 abortion law, which was already very restrictive. The new anti-abortion law effectively outlaws termination of pregnancy.

The implosion of democracy and its downright destruction go hand in hand with a normalization of antisemitism, anticomunism, antigayism¹⁰, antifeminism, authoritarianism, militarism, nationalism, sexism, and racism in the public space. Phantasmatic concepts of the removal of minorities and people labelled as “other”, “not-belonging” or “non-human” are being declared openly and disseminated in public, and in the case of Poland by the highest representatives of the state and the Catholic Church.

Neoliberal capitalist culture makes democracies “economically superfluous” (Metz & Seeßlen, 2017, p. 198) because exploitation and competition are the only games in town. The combination of capitalism and democracy, conceptually merged in the notion of democracies that conform to the market (“*marktkonforme Demokratie*”; Wingert, 2013), as Chancellor Angela Merkel put it in 2012, has led to increasing inequality and de-solidarization. While the concept of democracy is alive as a symbolic order, it is undead regarding its political practice. Democracies are being ruled by the economic principles of profit maximization, unfettered competition, and, when deemed “necessary”, ruthless austerity.

“The national democracies have reached the end of the line”, the cultural critic Georg Seeßlen wrote in December 2015 (Seeßlen, 2015, p. 38), the year of the so-called refugee crisis. Instead of working towards the creation of “a new, transnational, European democracy” (Seeßlen, 2015, p. 38) governments have openly promoted and accelerated ongoing fascization processes in European societies. A case in point is the European anti-immigrant policy. The political decision taken by the European Home Affairs Ministers on 22 September 2015 to relocate 120,000 refugees, stranded in Greece, Italy and other member states, throughout all member states, did not result in a common relocation policy in the European Union. The accord “remained a dead letter” (di Cesare, 2020, p. 87). In the name of “sovereignty” and in defence of an imagined ethnic homogeneity European nation states have excluded refugees and migrants from their societies. In fact, the very word migration has become a pejorative term. Borders have been tightened and escape routes for refugees to Europe from war zones have been closed:

10 I use the term antigayism instead of the word homophobia. The latter does not convey the hatred directed at non-heteronormative people, which in some countries – e.g. in Russia and Hungary – is manifested in antigay legislation or antihomosexuality laws such as Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act, passed in 2013. An antigay attitude is based on the conceptualization of those deviating from heterosexual normativity as being a threat to societal values and institutions such the family. In 69 countries in the world homosexuality is outlawed, in nine countries it is an offence punishable by death (Blazekovic, 2021, p. 14).

The closing of the Balkan route has had disastrous consequences for refugees. They have no alternative but to try to cross the watery wall of the strait of Sicily, in fragile boats and perilous dinghies. Syrians, Kurds, Eritreans, Sudanese, Afghans and Iraqis have trusted the waves to take them from the coasts of Africa to the outposts of Europe. Their hoped-for destination: Lampedusa. For many, the long journey has ended at the bottom of the sea. Unreported, unrecounted, uncommemorated. (di Cesare, 2020, pp. 87–88)

Will future generations commemorate the victims of the European anti-migration policy? Will they examine the reasons for the failure to recognize the asylum rights of migrants, the citizenship rights of migrants¹¹, not to mention their basic human rights?

The interplay between fascization from below and fascization from above has taken on a new quality with the re-emergence of the so-called New Right as a political subject. Their racist, antisemitic, anti-68, and antifeminist agenda aims to seal fortress Europe and make it inaccessible to all those escaping from wars and the consequences of the climate catastrophe caused by global capitalism. The long-term aim of this counter-revolution is clear: “Future climate refugees shall be prevented from escaping. The people of the global south shall fall victim to death caused by heat instead of being able to flee to the north” (Konicz, 2020, p. 340). In the meantime, many governments have taken steps in this direction. There has been a state policy of exclusion, which is mutually complementary to the fascization of societies in Europe and the United States. A case in point is the pushback against the admission of refugees into the European Union as well as the exclusion of migrants from the United States, with migrants being stuck in a political and legal no man’s land because no government wishes to accept responsibility for them. In August 2021 alone, US authorities prevented migrants from crossing into the United States from Mexico over 200,000 times. Haitians were denied access 7,580 times in August (“US to fly Haitian migrants back after thousands gather at Texas border”, 2021).

In her philosophical reflection on migration, Donatella di Cesare reminds us that “the migrant is [...] required as a worker, but unwanted as a foreigner. Without taking on any responsibility for people’s lives, migration policy filters, chooses, selects” (di Cesare, 2020, p. 67). In her book, she argues for “the right to migrate” – “*ius migrandi*” – understood as both the right to emigrate and to immigrate. This would require an inversion of the current logic and a change of perspective. “Priority” would thus be given “to the migrant, not the state” (di Cesare, 2020, p. 70). The task would be to prevent the state from limiting or denying the individual’s right to immigrate and to make sure that the state could no longer pass any laws restricting immigration into its territory. For di Cesare, *ius migrandi* “is the human right for the twenty-first century that [...] will require a struggle at the level of the fight for the abolition of slavery” (di Cesare, 2020, p. 70).

11 According to Donatella di Cesare, “not even philosophy has thus far recognized the migrant’s citizenship right” (di Cesare, 2020, p. 1).

This would mean an end to the sovereignty of the state as we know it. This would also urge us to reflect on a non-paranoid life devoid of the phantasy of boundaries.

Racist violence in united Germany

It belongs to the essential features of German ideology that there shall not be an individualist (*Einzelgänger*).
(Adorno, 2019a, p. 447)¹²

Antisemitism and racism have remained a normative part of European culture. A case in point is Germany where there has been a series of terror attacks against people targeted as foreigners, immigrants, and refugees (Bray et al., 2020, p. 3). On 19 February 2020, a white male supremacist murdered ten people in the city of Hanau (Hesse): Ferhat Unvar, Mercedes Kierpacz, Sedat Gürbüz, Gökhan Gültekin, Hamza Kurtović, Kalyan Velkov, Vili-Viorel Păun, Said Nesar Hashemi, Fatih Saraçoğlu. Afterwards the assassin killed his mother as well as himself. Racist attacks are carried out on a daily basis, particularly in the former Eastern part of Germany where the extreme right-wing party AfD received the largest percentage of second votes¹³ in the federal states of both Saxony and Thuringia in the general election to the 20th Bundestag on 26 September 2021. In Thuringia, the AfD has not only radicalized itself under its leader Björn Höcke, it also changed the political culture and created a milieu which is no longer responsive to democratic values and practices. At the same time, a reckoning with extreme right-wing terrorism, particularly from the 1990s on, has not taken place in this and the other so-called new federal states (*Bundesländer*). The same must be said of those old federal states which formed West Germany.

Sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer, founding director of the *Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung* at Bielefeld University, has suggested that we perceive events such as the one in Hanau as part of a “continuum of escalation”, *Eskalationskontinuum* (cf. Heitmeyer et al., 2020, pp. 58–68). He uses the metaphor of an onion to explain how neo-Nazis and right-wing terrorists, who constitute the center of the “onion” and who are surrounded by a “clandestine terrorist milieu of supporters and planners”, are connected with the outer layers of the onion consisting in a “milieu hostile to the system”, the “authoritarian national radicalism” of the AfD and peoples’ attitudes characteristic of “group-focused enmity” (Heitmeyer et al., 2020, p. 59). What joins the inner and outer layers of the onion is “the ideology of inequality and acceptance of violence” (Heitmeyer, 2020, p. 5).

12 “Es gehört zu den Grundzügen deutscher Ideologie, dass es keinen Einzelgänger geben soll” (Adorno, 2019a, p. 447).

13 In the German electoral system, each voter has two votes. The first is cast for the *Bundestag* candidates for each of the 299 constituencies. The candidates who receive the majority of the votes from their constituents are directly elected to the *Bundestag*. The second vote is cast for a national party list, from which the remaining seats are allocated to candidates on the party lists for each of the 16 federal states (*Bundesländer*).

The “institutionalized racism” (NSU-Watch, 2020, pp. 130–135) of the German authorities involved in the investigations of the murders carried out by the Nazi terrorist organization “National Socialist Underground” (NSU), which killed ten people¹⁴ between 2000 and 2006, nine out of racist motives, as well as the societal acceptance of what was “the longest and most deadly series of murders by a neo-Nazi organization in Germany since 1945” (NSU-Watch, 2020, p. 14) has been amply documented. Contrary to the self-description, the three terrorists from Jena who formed the core of the NSU and who had gone “underground” in 1998, moved around freely within the Chemnitz Nazi scene and relied on a network of supporters throughout Germany (Burschel, 2018). They were radicalized at the beginning of the 1990s. This was a time when racist mass violence committed in places such as Hoyerswerda, Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Mölln and Solingen, continuing a tradition of (neo-)Nazi violence in the Federal Republic of Germany (Manthe, 2020) and the GDR (Waibel, 2017), reached a new quality in unified Germany.

The week of racist mass violence against migrants in Hoyerswerda in September 1991 constituted “a new pattern of racist mobilization” (Hartwig, 2021, p. 29):

The effective interplay of militant neo-Nazis with normal citizens in Hoyerswerda in the construction of a locally exerted racist motivated political pressure, the open approval, support, as well as participation of residents in the attack: all of this made the week of right-wing violence in Hoyerswerda an exemplar of the right-wing mass violence of the 1990s. (Hartwig, 2021, p. 29)

The police were either unwilling or unable to prevent the attackers from committing acts of violence and carrying out a pogrom-like expulsion of migrant residents who were eventually evacuated by bus – much to the delight of the mob who applauded as they were driven away.

14 On 9 September 2000, two gunmen belonging to the Nazi terrorist organization NSU shot Enver Şimşek, aged 38, in the face at his flower stall in Nuremberg. He died from his wounds in hospital two days later. On 19 January 2001, a bomb planted a few days earlier by the NSU in a grocery store in the Probststeigasse in Cologne exploded. Nobody was killed, but the nineteen-year-old daughter of the shop owner, a migrant from Iran, was seriously injured. On 13 June 2001, the NSU shot to death Abdurrahim Özudoğru, aged 49, in his tailor's shop in Nuremberg. On 27 June 2001, the NSU murdered Süleyman Taşköprü, aged 31, in his fruit and vegetable store in Hamburg-Bahrenfeld. On 29 August 2001, the NSU killed Habil Kılıç, aged 38, in Munich-Ramersdorf. He also owned a fruit and vegetable store. On 25 February 2004, the NSU killed Mehmet Turgut at his friend's Döner fast food restaurant in Rostock-Toitenwinkel. On 9 June 2004, exactly one year after a nail bomb attack by the NSU on Keupstraße – a street mostly inhabited by immigrants, causing severe injuries among 22 people – the NSU killed İsmail Yaşar, aged 50, at his food stand in Nuremberg. On 15 June 2005, the NSU killed Theodoros Boulgarides in his locksmith store in Munich. On 4 April 2006, the NSU killed Mehmet Kubaşık, aged 39, at his corner shop in Dortmund. On 6 April 2006, the NSU killed Halit Yozgat, aged 21, in his internet café in the Holländische Straße in Kassel. The nine people were murdered by means of the same weapon. As in the case of the previous murders, the police focused their investigation on the families of the victims and their neighbours, suspecting the German-Turkish community in Germany and ruling out racism as a motive. On 6 May 2006, people from and connected with Halit Yozgat's family organized a march of silence to the town hall in Kassel naming racism as the motive for the series of murders and carrying pictures of those murdered. 2000 people followed the call “No tenth murder!”, posing the question on black banners with white inscriptions “How many people have to die before the perpetrators are caught?” and “Is the Minister of the Interior asleep?”. See Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.d. At that time of the demonstration, the German authorities had neither made a connection between the nine murders nor carried out any investigation of the Nazi milieu. On 25 April 2007, the NSU killed the policewoman Michèle Kiesewetter, aged 22, in Heilbronn. It was not until early November 2011, when one of the members of the NSU turned herself in, that the authorities related the murder to the other attacks and the series of murders committed by the NSU.

The racist violence at the beginning of the 1990s had political consequences. The right to asylum for those subjected to political persecution, as codified in article 16 of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law), is considered a response on the part of the Federal Republic to the Nazi persecution and extermination policy. However, restrictions were introduced by the Helmut Kohl-led CDU government – with the votes of the Social Democrats (SPD) who agreed to the amendment of the Basic Law. This was termed the “asylum compromise” (*Asylkompromiss*), a false compromise that gave official legitimacy to the racist violence in Hoyerswerda and curtailed the possibilities of obtaining asylum in united Germany. On 29 May 1993, three days after the vote in the federal parliament (*Bundestag*), five people – Gürsün İnce (aged 27), Hatice Genç (aged 18), Gülüstan Öztürk (aged 12), Hülya Genç (aged 9), and Saime Genç (aged 4) – were killed in an arson attack on their home in Solingen in North-Rhine Westphalia. Motive: racism. Mevlüde Genç, mother, grandmother and aunt of those murdered, said: “I have lost five children, my world is completely destroyed. I cannot enjoy anything anymore in this world” (cited in: Zimmermann, 2021, p. 3). The racist violence by (neo-)Nazis carried out in Germany is specific in that it is connected to the Nazi genocidal past. This past is present in the “anti-Turkish *Vernichtungshumor*”, humour of annihilation (Geisel, 2019, p. 17), shared at the *Stammtisch* and at family dinners. “Made into a thing, an animal, dirt and stench”, wrote Eike Geisel in 1985, “the Turks appear as [the] object of a necessary and legitimate cleansing of society” (Geisel, 2019, p. 17). Physical violence and symbolic violence complement and mutually reinforce each other. The murderous racism and everyday antisemitism in Germany are legacies of National Socialist violence.

II. Concepts of fascism: old and new

All scapegoating can ever do is remove the scapegoat.
(Phillips, 2013, p. 322)

Creating new categories of description?

In view of the international state of affairs we have to ask ourselves the following: Has fascism re-emerged or has it, in fact, “due to its rhetorical infinitude” (Bray et al., 2020, p. 3) never actually ceased to exist? Are we witnessing a phase of “new fascism” (Seeßlen, 2020) produced by the capitalist exchange society and by forces within liberal democracies since the beginning of the 21st century? Alternatively, is the radical right that has become hegemonic and dominant in many countries inside and outside Europe, best defined by the term “postfascism”¹⁵, as Enzo Traverso suggests? According to Traverso, this concept, which “emphasizes its chronological distinctiveness and locates

15 Traverso distinguishes “postfascism” from “neofascism”, i.e. “the attempt to perpetuate and regenerate old fascism” (Traverso, 2019, p. 6).

it in a historical sequence implying both continuity and transformation” (Traverso, 2019, p. 4), can help us to describe “a phenomenon in transition, a movement that is still in transformation and has not yet crystallised” (Traverso, 2019, p. 6). Traverso characterizes the new forces of the right as “heterogenous” (Traverso, 2019, p. 6), emphasizing that even in Europe itself they share certain features while at the same time being different from each other. As he sees it, what unites the various parties and movements that have emerged since the beginning of the twenty-first century in Europe is their ideological discontinuity with what he terms “classical fascism” (Traverso, 2019, p. 6). According to Traverso, “post-fascism” must be understood as “unpredictable” (Traverso, 2019, p. 6) because of “its erratic, unstable, and often contradictory ideological content” (Traverso, 2019, p. 7). He claims that anticommunism, “a central pillar of classic fascism” (Traverso, 2019, p. 12), is not part of the “postfascist imagination” (Traverso, 2019, p. 12). However, if we look at the countries of post-socialist states in general and the case of Poland and the former Yugoslavia in particular, this statement does not stand up to close examination (Subotić, 2019; Zawadzka, 2016a, 2016b).

While it is true, as Traverso writes, “that the right has different faces in different countries” (Traverso, 2019, p. 13) and has to be fought differently in those countries, I would contend that it is necessary to use a category that describes the old and the new in a dialectical way without making the mistake of consigning fascism to the history books. This is not to say that Traverso has fallen into this trap as he engages with fascism and its legacy in his book, emphasizing as he does, that the debate on fascism is still ongoing. However, his statement that fascism “defines a phenomenon whose chronological and political boundaries are clear enough” (Traverso, 2019, p. 6) could be construed as an attempt at historicization. Drawing on Traverso’s concept and emphasizing that there is “more fascism within postfascism” than Traverso “is willing to admit” (el-Ojeili, 2019a, p. 103), Chamsy el-Ojeili argues, first, that post-fascism coincides with five “core features” of fascism – “1. Organic, transcendent, palingenetic nationalism; 2. Conspiracy theorizing and cleansing; 3. Charismatic authority; 4. Counter-revolution/backlash politics; 5. Militaristic masculinity” (el-Ojeili, 2019b, p. 1153) – second, that “post-fascism’s component elements belong to a coherent formation of thought” (el-Ojeili, 2019b, p. 1154). This leads me to the question of whether fascism has an essence or whether, as Umberto Eco (1932–2016) argues, “Fascism [i.e. historical fascism, K.S.] contained no quintessence, not even a single essence” (Eco, 2020b, p. 10).

Who uses the term fascism in political and academic discourse and to what end? Is it applied as an analytical concept to describe a political movement, a form of government or a mental disposition or is it used as a label aimed at delegitimizing somebody or something? In Polish society, just as in other European societies, there exists “a tradition of not using the term fascism where we are obviously dealing with fascism and at the same time [a tradition] of using it as an epithet at those who do not deserve” (Pacholski, 2018, p. 57) to be called fascists. The majority “considers as obvious and as

something which is not subject to discussion” that “fascism never existed” in Poland and “as a rule cannot exist” (Pacholski, 2018, p. 57). According to Arkadiusz Pacholski (1964–2021), the “unshakable conviction” (Pacholski, 2018, p. 57) of the non-existence of fascism in Poland is part of what Elżbieta Janicka has called Polish “dominant culture” (Janicka, 2016, p. 273). While the terms “fascism in Poland” and “Polish fascism” are – except for a study examining the constellation that led to the murder of Poland’s first president Gabriel Narutowicz (Brykczynski, 2016) categorized as “the Jew” – mostly absent from both academic and public discourse, we find notions such as “*faszyzujący*” or “half-fascist organization”. Alongside terms such as “extreme right” or “extreme nationalists” these labels fulfil the function of watering down the phenomenon described. Given that perception of reality precedes the description of reality manifested in terms and concepts, we are dealing here with a problem of perception and conceptualization. It seems necessary to use a concept that can adequately describe the novel situation in history we are faced with today. Can the concept of fascism adequately capture the specificity of the constellation as well as the transnational dimension of the phenomenon in a dialectical way? Is it helpful to identify national variants of fascism or to use terms such as old fascism, new fascism, “European fascism” (Wippermann, 1983) or to speak of a “preventative fascism” (Marcuse, 2005d, p. 138), as Herbert Marcuse did in a 1970 conversation with Hans Magnus Enzensberger?

In scholarly literature (Wörsching, 2021), we can find various attempts at defining fascism and identifying characteristic features, as indicated by such terms as “fascist minimum” (Eatwell, 1996)¹⁶, “Ur-Fascism” (Eco, 1995, 2020b) or “Eternal Fascism” (Eco, 2020a).¹⁷ Roger Griffin’s definition of fascism is based on the notions of rebirth (*palinogenesis*) and national renewal. For him, the category “palingentic ultranationalism” – as opposed to racism – is the definitional core of fascism. According to Griffin, “the advantage of the term ‘palingentic ultranationalism’ over ‘revolutionary’” is that it “highlights the central role played in generic fascism by the vision of cultural, moral, and national *decadence* and the need for its reversal in a process of regeneration, which sets it apart from materialistic revolutionary ideologies such as Marxism” (Griffin, 2000, p. 302). For Griffin, it was the notion of “the regeneration of the national community” that constitutes the “empirically demonstrable structural link between National Socialism and Fascism, and”, according to his “ideal type, with all other fascisms” (Griffin, 2000, p. 302). However, for the Nazis, “renewal” of the national community meant *Entfernung* (removal) of all those categorized by them as not-belonging or as enemies of the *Volksgemeinschaft*.

16 Roger Eatwell’s argument that “fascism is best defined as an ideology” is made within a framework which distinguishes “between fascism as a regime, a movement, and an ideology” (Eatwell, 1996, p. 304).

17 I would like to thank Markus Wegewitz for drawing my attention to Eco’s concept of “Ur-Fascism” and for discussing it with me. The fruits of this discussion are to be found in my engagement with Eco’s concept in this text.

In 1995, fifty years after the end of World War II and one year after Berlusconi's victory in the parliamentary elections in Italy, Umberto Eco reflected on the term "Fascism", spelled with a large F. According to Eco, "Ur-Fascism is still around us, sometimes in civilian clothes" (Eco, 2020b, p. 27). Clothes in a different colour, one might add. Eco observed that the right-wing party Alleanza Nazionale, Berlusconi's ally, "has little to do with the old Fascism" (Eco, 2020b, p. 6).¹⁸ While Eco considered as unlikely the reappearance of fascism as "a movement involving an entire nation" (Eco, 2020b, p. 6) and as a dictatorship, he pointed to the fact that its spirit was undead:

Nonetheless, even though political regimes can be overturned, and ideologies criticised and delegitimised, behind a regime and its ideology, there is always a way of thinking and feeling, a series of cultural habits, a nebula of obscure instincts and unfathomable drives. Is there then another ghost wandering through Europe (not to mention other parts of the world)? (Eco, 2020b, pp. 6–7)

Referring to Wittgenstein's concept of play and his notion of "family resemblance" (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 65), Eco points out that one can play the "Fascism game many ways" (Eco, 2020b, p. 14). The name of the game remains. Hence "it is possible to eliminate one or more aspects from a Fascist regime and it will always be recognisably Fascist" (Eco, 2020b, p. 15). Is Eco's notion of "Ur-Fascism" an umbrella term or an *Idealtypus* (Max Weber)?

Eco enumerates fourteen characteristic features of "Ur-fascism", namely "the *cult of tradition*"; "irrationalism"; "the cult of *action for action's sake*"; "*dissent is betrayal*"; "racist per definition"; "the appeal to the frustrated middle classes"; "the obsession with conspiracies"; "the enemy is at once too strong and too weak"; "no struggle for life but, rather, a 'life for struggle'"; "popular elitism"; "the *cult of death*"¹⁹; "machismo (which implies contempt for women and an intolerant condemnation of nonconformist sexual habits, from chastity to homosexuality)"; "[a]s a result of its qualitative populism, "Ur-Fascism" has to oppose 'rotten' parliamentary governments; the use of "newspeak" (Eco, 2020b, pp. 16–26). One might take issue with some of the features mentioned above. Eco's definition of "Ur-Fascism" as irrationalism is based on the assumption that both the fascists and the Nazis rejected "modernism" and "the spirit of 1789" (Eco, 2020b, p. 18). While it is true that they abhorred the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution negating the principles of equality, brotherhood and sisterhood, and freedom in all that they did, Nazism's "praise of modernity" was not "superficial" (Eco, 2020b, p. 18) but sincere. In fact, deadly so. They considered the *Rassentheorie* ('racial theory') as

18 It seems that "old Fascism" refers to "Mussolini's Fascism", which Eco characterizes as follows: "Mussolini's Fascism was based on the idea of a charismatic leader, on corporativism, on the utopia of the 'fateful destiny of Rome', on the imperialistic will to conquer new lands, on inflammatory nationalism, on the ideal of an entirely regimented nation of Blackshirts, on the rejection of parliamentary democracy, and on anti-Semitism" (Eco, 2020b, p. 6).

19 According to Eco, "the Ur-Fascist hero aspires to death, hailed as the finest reward for a heroic life. The Ur-Fascist hero is impatient to die. In his impatience, it should be noted, he usually manages to make others die in his place" (Eco, 2020b, p. 24).

scientific, rational, and modern. For Eco, the ability to make distinctions is “a sign of modernity” (Eco, 2020b, p. 19). He attributes this ability exclusively to the “critical spirit” (Eco, 2020b, p. 19), alluding to, as it would appear, classification as a precondition for the production of new scientific insights, thereby forgetting that the core of Nazism was based on the distinction between “Aryan” and “non-Aryan”. The racist designation “non-Aryan” had dire consequences for those categorized as such.²⁰ The uniqueness of Nazism is acknowledged by Eco,²¹ but he does not spell out what exactly it consists in.

Drawing on his personal experiences at the end of the fascist regime in Italy, Eco learnt that freedom and liberation are “never-ending tasks” and that it is our “duty to unmask” “Ur-fascism” and “to point the finger at each of its new forms – every day, in every part of the world” (Eco, 2020b, p. 28). A journalist who has done that is the Irishman Fintan O’Toole. Reflecting on the term fascism in the age of Trumpism and fortress Europe, he spoke of “trial runs for fascism” in January 2018 and explained the tactics used as follows:

You have to undermine moral boundaries, inure people to the acceptance of acts of extreme cruelty. Like hounds, people have to be blooded. They have to be given the taste for savagery. Fascism does this by building up the sense of threat from a despised out-group. This allows the members of that group to be dehumanised. Once that has been achieved, you can gradually up the ante, working through the stages from breaking windows to extermination. It is this next step that is being test-marketed now. It is being done in Italy by the far-right leader and minister for the interior Matteo Salvini. How would it go down if we turn away boatloads of refugees? Let’s do a screening of the rough-cut of registering all the Roma and see what buttons the audience will press. (O’Toole, 2018)

This description shows that Eco’s characterization of fascism needs to be developed further. “Fascism” as understood by Eco “was not a monolithic ideology, but rather a collage of diverse political and philosophical ideas” (Eco, 2020b, p. 10). This statement is not only very general. It also ignores fascism’s self-perception as a revolutionary movement and government.

For Zeev Sternhell (1935–2020), fascism was an ideology (Sternhell, 2008, pp. 280–290). He studied the cultural origins of fascism and argued that the cultural movement against the Enlightenment and the French Revolution preceded fascism as a political movement (cf. Sternhell, 1994, p. 3). According to Sternhell, the Anti-Enlightenment tradition “was a pan-European phenomenon” (Sternhell, 2010, p. 440). He pointed to the subordinate position of the Enlightenment tradition in Italy and Germany as opposed to France. While the tradition of the Enlightenment came under attack in all three countries, there were “two great differences with France”, as Sternhell emphasizes:

20 For Raul Hilberg, the distinction signified the beginning of the end of European Jewry: “When in the early days of 1933 the first civil servant wrote the first definition of ‘non-Aryan’ into a civil service ordinance, the fate of European Jewry was sealed” (Hilberg, 2003, p. 1118).

21 Eco writes: “There was only one Nazism” (Eco, 2020b, p. 14).

France had since the eighteenth century produced two antagonistic political traditions, and the Anti-Enlightenment tradition was held in check there by the traditions of the right of man, whereas in Germany from Herder to Spengler and Meinecke, and in Italy from Vico to Croce, the Enlightenment tradition did not succeed in holding its own and was largely a secondary tradition. (Sternhell, 2010, p. 440)

Analyzing the history of political thought, Sternhell sought to identify fascism's forerunners (cf. Reichardt, 2020, p. 54)²² and to outline the combination of cultural and political factors that produced the fascist movement.

Sternhell, who survived the Shoah as a child in German-occupied Poland and knew from his own experience what it meant to be categorized as "the Jew" by both the occupiers and the Polish majority, made a clear-cut distinction between fascism and National Socialism.²³ In short, he did not include National Socialism in his concept of fascism. He drew attention to the "one fundamental point" (Sternhell, 1994, p. 4) on which fascism and National Socialism differed:

the criterion of National Socialism was biological determinism. The basis of Nazism was racism in its most extreme sense, and the fight against the Jews, against "inferior" races, played a more preponderant role in it than the struggle against communism. (Sternhell, 1994, pp. 4–5)

For Sternhell then, "fascism can in no way be identified with Nazism" (Sternhell, 2003, p. 165). This distinguishes him from German historian Ernst Nolte (1923–2016), who referred to the period between the two world wars as "the era of fascism" (Nolte, 2003, p. 149). In such a periodization, National Socialism and the Shoah are rendered invisible as separate entities.

Revolution or counter-revolution?

Zeev Sternhell belongs – along with George Mosse and Emilio Gentile (Gentile, 1975; 1991) – to those historians who have put forward a new interpretation of fascism in the last few decades (cf. Traverso, 2008, p. 303). Critically engaging with Sternhell's work, Enzo Traverso points out that Sternhell "reduces the history of fascism to its intellectual genealogy" (Traverso, 2008, p. 309). Discussing key texts by Sternhell, Gentile, and Mosse on the interpretation of fascism, he writes that for these authors fascism was "at the same time a revolution, an ideology, a *Weltanschauung* and a culture":

As a revolution, it wished to build a new society. As an ideology, it reformulated nationalism as a rejection of Marxism that served as an alternative to conservatism as well as to liberalism. As a *Weltanschauung*, it inscribed its political project onto a philosophy of history as a realm for building a "New Man". And as a culture, fascism tried to transform the collective imagination, change people's way of life and eliminate all differences between the private and public spheres by fusing them into a single national community (delimited along ethnic or racial lines). They each consider fascism as a "revolution of the right", [Gentile] whose so-

22 Sven Reichardt's "praxeological approach" to fascism departs from the understanding of fascism as an ideology.

23 According to Zeev Sternhell, "a general theory that seeks to combine fascism and Nazism" is impossible (Sternhell, 1994, p. 5).

cial engine was the middle classes and whose ambition was to create a new civilization. In other words, it was a revolution at the same time anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, “spiritualist” and “communitarian”. (Traverso, 2008, p. 304)

According to Traverso, all three authors underestimate the anticommunist aspect (cf. Traverso, 2008, p. 310; 2019, p. 116). “There would have been”, he writes, “no fascism without anticommunism” (Traverso, 2014, p. 133). At the same time, he acknowledges that “fascism cannot be reduced to anticommunism” (Traverso, 2008, p. 311), thereby establishing a distance between his perspective and that of Nolte’s (cf. Traverso, 2019, p. 118). Fascists and National Socialists perceived communism as a threat because communism, born in Europe, developed into a truly universal and international movement (Gentile, 2007, p. 83).

Fascism considered itself a revolution. Historian George L. Mosse (1918–1999), a survivor of the Nazi persecution and extermination policy, spoke not only of “the fascist revolution” (Mosse, 1999)²⁴. He also spelled out the specificity of the so-called German revolution. In the introduction to his book *The Crisis of German Ideology*, first published in New York in 1964, Mosse terms the “Nazi revolution” the “‘ideal’ bourgeois revolution” (Mosse, 1966b, p. 7), which he characterizes in the following way:

[I]t was a ‘revolution of the soul’ which actually threatened none of the vested economic interests of the middle class. Instead, Volkisch thought, concentrated upon another enemy within [...] for the Jew was seen as the enemy. He stood for modernity in all its destructiveness. Thus we will find that Volkisch thought sharpened and focused itself against, and in relation to, the supposed ‘Jewish menace’. It can be justly argued that the attitude toward the Jew provided much of the cement for this thought and gave it a dynamic it might otherwise have lacked. [...] the connection of Volkisch thought with National Socialism is a direct one. Hitler gave focus to his “German revolution” by making it into an anti-Jewish revolution. In a situation where revolutionary social and economic changes were excluded, the Jew became a welcome and necessary substitute toward which the revolutionary fervor could be directed (Mosse, 1966b, pp. 7–8).

In analyzing *völkisch* ideology and tracing the roots of Nazi antisemitism, Mosse sought to prove “that January 1933 was not an accident of history, but was prepared long beforehand” (Mosse, 1966b, p. 8). Mosse aptly termed the Nazi revolution an “anti-Jewish revolution” (Mosse, 2000, p. 179) and concluded that “Hitler’s revolution [...] found large segments of the population ready for the message” (Mosse, 1966b, p. 311). The democratic state during the Weimar Republic tolerated the Nazis instead of fighting them, thereby making the anti-Jewish revolution possible.

24 Mosse was particularly interested in the question of how fascism and National Socialism perceived themselves and how they were perceived. In the introduction to his book *The Fascist Revolution*, Mosse writes that “fascism must be understood as a nationalist revolution with its own ideology and its own goals. A cultural interpretation takes account of fascism as a system of belief based upon heightened nationalism, as well as of fascism understood as a right-wing revolution” (Mosse, 1999, p. xi).

For Traverso, fascism was not a revolutionary but a “*counter-revolutionary* phenomenon” (Traverso, 2008, p. 311). He considers this dimension the core element of “European fascisms” (Traverso, 2019, p. 117), a category under which he subsumes German fascism, National Socialism as well as other fascist movements:

It was under the banner of anti-communism that Italian fascism, German Nazism and many other minor fascist movements converged in defense of Franco’s rebellion during the Spanish Civil War. In a general way, fascism was much more opposed to communism than to liberalism. First in Italy in 1922, then in Germany ten years after, it was the convergence between fascism and the traditional elites, mostly conservative or inheritors of nineteenth century liberalism, that allowed the ‘legal revolution’ of Mussolini and Hitler (Traverso, 2019, pp. 117–118).

By emphasizing the connections between fascism and liberalism for the establishment of the authoritarian *Führer* and *duce* states, Enzo Traverso positions himself within a framework of interpretation put forward by critical theory. In an article originally published in German in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1934, Herbert Marcuse postulates that “it is liberalism that ‘produces’ the total-authoritarian state out of itself” (Marcuse, 1968c, p. 19).

According to Traverso, the concept of fascist revolution is open to debate because fascism integrated the traditional elites into its power structure and system. He points to the “osmosis between fascism, authoritarianism and conservatism” (Traverso, 2008, p. 311) and emphasizes that all fascist movements came to power because of the support provided by the traditional elites.

Geoff Eley maintains that in order for fascism to be produced a political crisis is necessary. He thinks of fascism “as a type of politics that wants to suppress and even kill its opponents rather than arguing with them, that prefers an authoritarian state over democracy and that pits an aggressively exclusionary idea of the nation against a pluralism that recognizes and even prioritizes difference” (Eley, 2018). One could add here that fascism feeds on a sense of threat from a group or groups defined as an enemy and that it aestheticizes politics²⁵ (Sontag, 1980) because “in fascism power had to express itself visually” (Mosse, 1996, p. 245).

Robert O. Paxton considers fascism “as a system of political authority and social order intended to reinforce the unity, energy, and purity of communities in which liberal democracy stands accused of producing division and decline” (Paxton, 1998, p. 21) and proposes to study it “in motion” by paying particular attention to socio-political processes. Opting for what he calls a “functional definition of fascism” (Paxton, 1998, p. 21), Paxton has identified seven “mobilizing passions” in “fascisms” as well as “five stages of fascism”. Thus, he moves beyond the notion of analytical category towards the “burning question” of whether fascism can actually “still exist today” (Paxton, 1998, p. 22).

25 Drawing on the example of Leni Riefenstahl, Susan Sontag has analyzed the fascist aesthetic (Sontag, 1980).

For Klaus Theweleit, this is not a question but a fact since he does not understand fascism as a system but as a mode of reality production that becomes dominant under certain conditions. He has examined the birth of fascists and fascism from a psycho-analytical perspective. In 1918/1919, *Freikorps* soldiers who crushed the revolutionary uprising in Germany were obsessed by the notion of a “red flood” (i.e. the threat of communism) that would sweep everything away, as Theweleit demonstrates in his book *Männerphantasien*. They described the rebellious workers and their bodies as “dirt”, “shit”, “slime”, and “lava”, i.e. as invasive and overwhelming.

The image of the “red flood” was developed further by the Nazis by means of the notion of a Jewish world conspiracy. In the Ministry of Interior, there was a department whose task it was to unravel “the world Jewish conspiracy”. In Nazi antisemitism, the opposition between communism and capitalism is either obliterated or lumped together by the notion of “the plutocratic-Bolshevik plot” whose agent is “the Jew” (Žižek, 2013, p. 802). In the Nazi antisemitic *imaginarium*, the notion of *jüdische Lustseuche*, the “Jewish pleasure plague” (Theweleit, 1980, p. 12), was paired with “Jewish bolshevism”. “Fascism, then, waged its battle against human desires by encoding them with a particular set of attributes: with effeminacy, unhealthiness, criminality, Jewishness – all of which existed under the umbrella of ‘Bolshevism’” (Theweleit, 1980, p. 42). According to Theweleit, fascism as reality is created by the body of the “soldier male”, the “not-yet-fully-born” (Theweleit, 1980, pp. 19–89). Theweleit is concerned with a specific bodily structure. Drawing on the example of his own family, Theweleit came to the conclusion that his father and his environment were Nazis in a bodily, not in an intellectual sense:

They were Nazis in a physical sense; parts of their physicality required the ‘extermination’ of others and of the different life. [...] When I discovered during my research that Freudian answers are not sufficient for the exploration of the extermination compulsion felt by them and the whole generation of murderers, I had to keep searching, employing the considerable help of French antipsychiatry, Deleuze and Guattari among others. [...] Today, I would ascribe a greater meaning to Pasolini. In his final film, he presents villains from the biblical Sodom, via antiquity, the perpetrators from Dante’s circles of hell, de Sade’s libertarian degenerates to the German SS and the modern Italian colonialism-soldiery of the 1970s. And in all of these times he notices ‘the same’: the jeeringly laughing universal fascist with his hand in his fly, masturbating, while in front of his eyes the victims are writhing, are being shot, burnt, quartered. Pasolini depicts the culture of the exterminators, who have ensconced themselves in our societies from the beginning of our ‘civilization’ and always appear somewhere. (Theweleit, 2009, pp. 128–129)

Pier Paolo Pasolini (1922–1975), whom Theweleit refers to, was brutally murdered. The translation of articles by Pasolini into the Polish language (Pasolini, 2012) invites us to rediscover the work of this important writer, poet, dramaturge, painter, and filmmaker. As a communist he was penalized for having transgressed the boundaries of the Communist Party’s morality. His essays on the new face of fascism in Italian society, his critique of hedonism and capitalist consumer culture, the Catholic Church, and of class hatred for homosexuality are of contemporary relevance, in particular in Poland. For

Pasolini, “today’s fascism”, i.e. in Italy during the 1960s, had more to do with consumption and conformism (cf. Pasolini, 1993, pp. 44–45), the very demands which consumer capitalist culture has made totally dominant in the 21st century.

The fascist community from the perspective of psychoanalysis

[...] if the Left gets allergic against theoretical consideration,
there is something wrong with the Left.
(Marcuse, 2005c, p. 122)

Theweleit’s and Passolini’s work demonstrates that it might be fruitful to take a step back and look at the whole again. Sigmund Freud was aware of the destructiveness inherent in the process of civilization and the violence against out-groups that it produced. Thus, it is “not incidental that Freud was developing the analytical setting [of psychoanalysis, K.S.] against the rise of fascism” (Phillips, 2005, p. 65) and “the ongoing progress of capitalism” (Phillips & Barwick, 2020, p. 116). In a sense, he was foreshadowing Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s ideas developed in their work *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2016), first published in 1947. Referring to the category of destructiveness examined in Freud’s *Civilization and its Discontents* (Freud, 2002), Adorno writes: “As a rebellion against civilization, fascism is not simply the reoccurrence of the archaic but its reproduction in and by civilization itself” (Adorno, 1981, p. 143). In short, fascism is part and parcel of civilization. It is not an anomaly in civilization.

From a psychoanalytical perspective, the “libidinal pattern of fascism and the entire technique of fascist demagogues are authoritarian” (Adorno, 1981, p. 138). Adorno analysed, via Freud’s *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*²⁶, group and mass formation, identifying the mechanism of “*identification*”, more specifically “*identification through idealization*” (Adorno, 1981, p. 140), as the one “which transforms libido into the bond between leader and followers” (Adorno, 1981, p. 139). According to Adorno, the “*fascist community of the people* corresponds exactly to Freud’s definition of a group as being ‘a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego’” (Adorno, 1981, p. 141). A characteristic feature of “irrational groups” is “the hierarchical element” (Adorno, 1981, p. 143), as Adorno emphasizes with reference to Freud. (Years later, observing what he termed “the new right-wing radicalism” in the Federal Republic of Germany, Adorno spoke of “a constellation of rational means and irrational aims” (Adorno, 2019a, p. 448)). It is “the sado-masochistic character” that functions best in “hierarchical structures”:

26 The English translation was published in 1922. The German original was published in 1921 under the title *Massenpsychologie und Ichanalyse*. By the term *Ich*, “ego”, Freud meant the individual: “[...] in this book the term ego does not denote the specific psychological agency as described in Freud’s later writing in contrast to the id and the super-ego; it simply means the individual” (Adorno, 1981, p. 154, fn. 4).

Hitler's famous formula, *Verantwortung nach oben, Autorität nach unten*, (responsibility towards above, authority towards below) nicely rationalizes this character's ambivalence. The tendency to tread on those below, which manifests itself so disastrously in the persecution of the weak and helpless minorities, is as outspoken as the hatred against those outside. In practice, both tendencies quite frequently fall together. Freud's theory sheds light on the all-pervasive, rigid distinction between the beloved in-group and the rejected out-group. Throughout our culture, this way of thinking and behaving has come to be regarded as self-evident to such a degree that the question of why people love what is like themselves and hate what is different is rarely asked seriously enough (Adorno, 1981, p. 143).

One may add to this that the fascist community with its emphasis on leadership sought to replace traditional hierarchical structures with "hierarchies based on function rather than on status" (Mosse, 1978, p. 87). The fascist mass movements drew on the ideas of "community of affinity" and "*camaraderie*", i.e. "the kind of longing for *camaraderie* which came from the war" (Mosse, 1978, p. 87). While Italian fascism "stays within the framework of the nation and the state" as the ideal form of community, German National Socialism "goes outside the framework as a result of its racial ideas", i.e. the notions of "race", "counter-race", *Volk* and *Volksgemeinschaft*. For the Nazis, the only man that had the right to live was the "Aryan". George Mosse has pointed out that unlike Germany, thinking in terms of the categories "Aryan", non-"Aryan" was not anchored in Italian tradition. Thus, "[w]hen Italian racism was introduced, it had to be invented and you get a crude transposition from the German Aryan man to the Mediterranean Aryan man, whatever that was supposed to mean" (Mosse, 1978, p. 101). The pseudo-scientific *manifesto della razza*, which was presented to the Italian public in July 1938 and which coincided with the antisemitic laws, claimed that there existed a *razza italiana* of "Aryan origin" to which "the Jews do not belong" (Schlemmer & Woller, 2005, p. 179).

As far as legislation in Nazi Germany is concerned, we find the word "Aryan" for the first time in the *Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums* (Law for reestablishing the Professional Civil Service) of 7 April 1933, as survivor scholar Nachman Blumental pointed out. The law stipulated under § 3 (1) that civil servants of "non-Aryan descent" were to be summarily retired. However, as Blumental notes, it contained "no word of explanation of what 'Aryan descent' is" (cf. YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, Nachman Blumental Collection).

From a psychoanalytical point of view, what glues a community together "is not so much identification with the Law [...] as, rather, *identification with the specific form of transgression of the Law, of its suspension* (in psychoanalytical terms, with the specific form of enjoyment)" (Žižek, 2012, p. 225). According to Žižek, the "Nazi community relied on the same solidarity-in-guilt adduced by the participation in a common transgression: it ostracized those who were not ready to assume the dark reverse of the idyllic *Volksgemeinschaft*" (Žižek, 2012, p. 226). The "dark reverse" was the Nazi policy of persecution and extermination and the fact that the Shoah was the result of a free choice

on the part of those carrying it out and those working towards it within the German sphere of influence.

III. Towards the category of fascization

Hitler knew well the extreme function of repetition: the biggest lie, often enough repeated, will be acted upon and accepted as truth.

(Marcuse, 1968a, p. 268)

How to study fascization processes?

The category of fascization seems to be more appropriate for the description of social reality and present tendencies, as it carries no connotations of historicization. Georg Seeßlen has recently suggested that we take a closer look at “fascization as a process” within three spheres: political-economic systems, culture and biography (Seeßlen, 2020). According to Seeßlen, “fascization” is, “among many things, the impulse to melt down this structure” and to forcibly bring the three components “under the banner of total unity” (Seeßlen, 2020):

State, culture, and biography shall, at all cost, be welded together, no one area may take any freedoms away from the other. [...] No biography may move away from the community of state and culture. [...]. Every [phenomenon of] fascization, if it initially understood itself only partially as such, in culture, in fashion or identity construction, [...] leads to this totality. Every partial fascism (*Partialfaschismus*), consciously or unconsciously, heads towards an imaginary total fascism (*Totalfaschismus*). Here too the fascist rhetoric is clear: who is not for us, is against us. One is either a hundred percent fascist or not at all. (Seeßlen, 2020)

Does the category of fascization help us to analyse and interpret more accurately the exclusion and persecution of minorities in the 20th and 21st century? Which methodological approaches are particularly suited for the study of fascization? Does the concept of fascization help us to explain the longevity and the virulence of traditional cultural phantasmas within European states and societies, namely antisemitism, anti-gayism, racism, nationalism, sexism, militarism, imperialism, and authoritarianism? Which political and cultural forces have paved the way for processes of fascization and the erosion of the concept of a humane society after the Shoah? What characterizes a perception of reality informed by fascization? What form has fascization taken in political-economic systems, in culture, and in biographies? Who has identified and analysed processes of fascization and fought for a society free of antisemitism, racism, nationalism, militarism, and hatred of non-heteronormative people? What role did survivors of National Socialism and the Shoah play in the antifascist struggle? Do we need a theory of fascization in order to make a world without fascism imaginable? Can

the concept of fascization be used as a tool of analysis in order to examine the interplay between state and societies? These are only some of the questions that future research on this topic would need to tackle.

One of the factors that seem to inform and accelerate the process of fascization is the way post-genocidal European societies have or have not related to the Shoah. In Poland, we are witnessing a refusal to recognize reality and a pronounced unwillingness to accept the truth. One symptom of this is an attitude of unyieldingness, as Grzegorz Niziołek emphasizes: “Every account of [victims of]²⁷ the Holocaust provokes in Poland a ‘repulsive reaction’, since it releases an instinctive fear that this account will inevitably, sooner or later, reveal Polish participation in the process of the Holocaust [...]” (Niziołek, 2019, p. 120). Hence, people are resistant to the integration of local memory and knowledge, concerning the participation of Polish neighbours in the Holocaust, into the narrative on the national level. Recognition of Polish participation in the Holocaust is blocked by means of various defensive mechanisms (Jedlicki, 2019, pp. 120–122), neutralizing procedures, and the dominant conception of collective identity. The notion of Poland as the Christ of nations – demolished as a result of Jan T. Gross’ *Neighbors* (Gross, 2001) – is alive and kicking once more. Polish society is back to square one or in a state of “innocence regained” (Janicka, 2018). The Holocaust, as Jerzy Jedlicki put it during the nationwide debate on Jedwabne in 2001, “failed to bring about any dramatic transformation of Polish attitudes”²⁸ (Jedlicki, 2004, p. 243) including anti-semitic attitudes. The majority in Poland still needs the phantasmatic notion of “the Jew” for the construction of its collective identity²⁹ (Janicka, 2014–2015, p. 261). As of yet, the dominant cultural model has not been subjected to any revision whatsoever.

In recent years, Germans have engaged in a process of self-liberation from the reality of Nazi crimes (Stoll, 2016). As a result of normalization practices, the Nazi past has either come to serve as positive point of reference (e.g. for the AfD) or as a something that has been supposedly worked through. The normalization of National Socialism began in the 1980s as a concerted effort on the part of conservative historians to stymie the emancipatory progress made since 1968. The prevailing interpretation that Habermas as well as those who supported his position during the *Historikerstreit* ultimately won must be reconsidered given the establishment of continuities with the German imperialist past, visible in the restored dream of Prussia (von Trotha, 2021) and German *Großmacht* phantasies. The cupola of the reconstructed city castle in Berlin is

27 Author’s note: The Polish original includes the word *ofiar* (victims), which does not appear in the English translation of Niziołek’s book.

28 According to Jedlicki, the Holocaust “did exacerbate existing divisions. What for some was the most dreadful event of the twentieth century remained for others an episode devoid of any great significance” (Jedlicki, 2004, p. 243).

29 Maria Janion demonstrates in her work that “the equalization of Polishness and Catholicism is the core of the Polish national idea” and that antisemitism is an integral part of the Polish cultural paradigm. “At the beginning of the 19th century”, Janion writes, “antisemitic attitudes” that “sometimes contained eliminatory ideas” emerged. She emphasizes that “eliminatory” does not necessarily include killing, but “in any case, the desire to eliminate the Jews and their actual or imagined influence in one way or another” (Janion, 2009, p. 111).

concrete evidence of this. It was the historian Ernst Nolte who laid the foundation for the normalization of German history and the acceptance of the so-called totalitarianism theory, which is particularly popular in Eastern Europe.

The case of Ernst Nolte

The German historian Ernst Nolte decoupled National Socialism from both German culture and society³⁰ and removed it from the framework of German national development:

By making Nazism a reflection of communism and a legitimate response to the Bolshevik danger, by cutting it off from its ideological and cultural roots, by laying undue stress on the role of the Führer, Nazism could be virtually excised from the national history. One should also add the original idea we owe to Nolte that there was a “rational core” in “Nazi anti-Judaism”.³¹ (Sternhell, 2010, p. 439)

Seeking a rational core in Nazi antisemitism, as Nolte did, means not only legitimising it but also its result: the persecution and extermination of European Jewry. Sternhell deserves credit for considering Nolte’s notion of Nazism as part of an ongoing effort to exculpate Germany. He self-critically admitted his naivety when it comes to seeing through the right-wing project to exonerate Germans:

In 1976, in an essay on fascist ideology, I put the question: Does Nolte understand Nazism? Does he realize what Nazism was? Since those far-off days, I have many times had occasion to answer this question in the negative. Today, I shall add a truly essential point that I did not perceive at the time, when I naïvely thought that Nolte’s idea was a simple mistake: an enormous mistake, but the legitimate mistake of a historian carried away by his phenomenological method. Now, however, I am convinced that Nolte’s work forms part of a continuous attempt at a “historicization of Nazism”, an elegant expression used to cover up a real intellectual fraud aiming to give Nazism a human character by making it a reflection of Stalinism or an act of legitimate defense against the communist threat. This attempt was especially well illustrated by the historians’ controversy, the *Historikerstreit*, of the 1980s, and it is in the classical tradition of German historicism. (Sternhell, 2010, p. 439)

Why did Nolte refuse to realize what Nazism was? The answer lies in his book. He sought to whitewash National Socialism and cleanse its supporters of any responsibility for the crimes they committed. In his 1966 review of Nolte’s *Three Faces of Fascism*, George L. Mosse (1918–1999), a German Jewish refugee who fled Nazi Germany in April 1933 and who was made stateless in December of that year after having been stripped of German citizenship (Mosse, 2000, p. 89),³² writes:

30 In a review of Nolte’s book *Three Faces of Fascism*, George L. Mosse writes that by concentrating on Hitler in Germany, the author “comes close to exonerating his followers” (Mosse, 1966a, p. 622).

31 Zeev Sternhell quoted from the book *Fascism and Communism* by Furet and Nolte.

32 From the final chapter (“The Past as Present”) of his memoirs *Confronting History* we learn that George L. Mosse’s research was a response to his consciousness of being a survivor: “The Holocaust was never far from my mind; I could easily have perished with my fellow Jews. I suppose that I am a member of the Holocaust generation and have constantly tried to understand an event too monstrous to contemplate. All my studies in the history of racism and volkish thought, and also those dealing with outsiderdom and stereotypes, though

[Nolte's] reference to Hitler's mind to explain the deeds of his followers leads to a startling conclusion: after the Fuehrer's death Nazi leadership is said to have snapped back to its "original position", becoming "a body of well meaning and cultured Central Europeans" (p. 400) once again. This statement puts in doubt Nolte's understanding of Nazi ideology as well as his analysis of bourgeois society. Such men had voluntarily become Nazis before they were made leaders [...]. (Mosse, 1966a, p. 624)

The fact that Nolte, who had internalized the National Socialist *Weltanschauung* during his studies, in particular at Freiburg university under Heidegger (cf. Kulka, 2020b, p. 301), adopted the perspective of the German perpetrators is manifested in both the analogy he drew between National Socialism and Zionism and his characterization of Zionism. In a footnote to *Three Faces of Fascism*, which is missing from the earlier German version of the book (Nolte, 1963), he identifies what he calls "parallels" between National Socialism and Zionism, claiming that "nothing throws a better light on National Socialism than Zionism" (Nolte, 1966, p. 530, fn 37)³³ and that "there is no justification for blaming National Socialism per se for ideas and concepts which found such wide response among Jews" (Nolte, 1966, p. 530). Nolte not only implies here that National Socialism cannot be understood without Zionism³⁴, he also claims that Zionism included ideas and concepts that constituted the core of National Socialism. The core of National Socialism, however, is antisemitism, and the defining feature of antisemitism is conspiracy thinking.

Ernst Nolte's apologia for National Socialism, the relativization of antisemitism as the main cause of the Shoah and the shifting of the responsibility for the Nazi extermination policy from the perpetrators onto "the extermination processes of the Russian Revolution" (Nolte, 1986b) and his effort to disconnect the legacy of Nazi antisemitism and racism from the Federal Republic of Germany, ultimately resulted in the *Historikerstreit*, the historians' controversy. It was unleashed by Nolte's text for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 6 June 1986, in which he termed the persecution and murder of European Jewry "Hitler's 'asiatic' deed" (Nolte, 1986a, p. 45). He reproduced the Nazis' antisemitic worldview and their ideological justification for the mass murder they committed by presenting it in the form of a "valid" (Nolte, 1986a, p. 45) question that must be raised. He insinuated that Hitler and the Nazis carried out their annihilation of the Jews because they had seen themselves and "their kind" as "the potential or real victims of an 'asiatic' deed" (Nolte, 1986a, p. 45), thereby not only rehabilitating Nazi propaganda, but also implying that the Jews themselves had brought about their own destruc-

sometimes not related to the Holocaust, have tried to find the answer to how it could have happened; finding an explanation has been vital not only for the understanding of modern history, but also for my own peace of mind. This is a question my generation had to face, and eventually I felt that I had come closer to an understanding of the Holocaust as a historical phenomenon" (Mosse, 2000, p. 219).

33 I wish to thank Dan Michman for drawing my attention to both the footnote and the fact that it does not appear in the German version of Nolte's book. Michman referred to the footnote in a lecture he gave on 7 May 2015 at the Simon Dubnow Institute in Leipzig.

34 Otto Dov Kulka (1933–2021) drew attention to the fact that Ernst Nolte referred to Moses Hess, a mentor of Karl Marx and "the father of the Zionist idea" (Kulka, 2020c, p. 274), as "the first National Socialist" (Nolte, cited in: Kulka, 2020c, p. 274). In other words, Nolte claims that a Jew – read "the Jew" – was the first Nazi.

tion. As Otto Dov Kulka put it in an article originally published in *Yad Vashem Studies* in 1988:

Nolte's theses imply not only the most far-reaching relativization of National Socialism and the Holocaust, but also the responsibility of the Jews themselves for their own mass annihilation: following their many 'declarations of war' against Germany, the mass executions of millions of Jews are explained as preventive measures of the Third Reich taken during World War II. (Kulka, 2020c, p. 267)

In a letter that Kulka had sent to Nolte two years previously, on 18 July 1986, he considered the uniqueness of the Nazi crime against the Jews and the consequences of Nazi antisemitism within an interpretative framework of world history in general and Western history in particular:

The uniqueness of the National Socialist mass murder of Jews must be understood in the world-historical sense attributed to it – as an attempt to bring about a change in the course of universal history and its goals. Thus, National Socialist anti-Semitism must be regarded as an expression of perhaps the most dangerous crisis of Western civilization with the potentially gravest consequences for the history of mankind. (Kulka, 2020c, p. 293)

The *Historikerstreit* was not only about the historical interpretation of the Shoah and its contextualization. It also concerned the perception of antisemitism. The fact that radical antisemitism and National Socialism are intrinsically linked, a fact that the author of *Three Faces of Fascism* mentions in his book,³⁵ was subsequently denied by Nolte on 6 June 1986, the anniversary of D-Day. He decoupled antisemitism from National Socialism and established a structural parallel between Nazis blaming "the Jews" and Germans blaming "the Germans" (Nolte, 1986a, p. 41). Nolte deemphasized antisemitism and portrayed it as a peripheral feature of German history in general, and the period from 1933 to 1945 in particular. It seems that Nolte's concept of an "era of fascism" as well as his plea for de-"isolating" the "Third Reich",³⁶ prepared the ground for a discursive and mental operation that, in essence, is a normalization of National Socialism.

Saul Friedländer observed with regard to the concepts of "totalitarianism" and "fascism":

At the level of political ideological interpretations, as far as the historical contextualization of the "Final Solution" is concerned, the simplest argument is the following: the point is not that concepts such as "totalitarianism" or "fascism" seem inadequate for the contextualization of the "Final Solution", but, conversely, that these concepts fit much better the particular phenomena they deal with once the "Final Solution" is not included.

The only global historical interpretation which seems to "fit" is the most traditional one: the incremental effect of an ever-more radical antisemitic factor. But even those historians who still remain close to this view have to admit that because of the very nature of

35 Otto Dov Kulka emphasized that in *Three Faces of Fascism*, Nolte writes that Auschwitz was inherent in the principles of what he termed National Socialist's theory of race (*Rassenlehre*). See Kulka, 2020c, p. 274.

36 Ernst Nolte argued that the "Third Reich" should be "removed from its isolation, in which it still finds itself if it is seen in the framework of the 'era of fascism'" (Nolte, 1986b, p. 33).

Nazi antisemitism and the “Final Solution”, “the question of continuity becomes problematic” [Kulka] (Friedländer, 1993, pp. 56–57).

Problematic because of the “level of radicalization” that antisemitism reached “in National Socialism” (Kulka, 2020a, p. 67). In his two-volume magnum opus, *Nazi Germany and the Jews*, Friedländer tried to capture this radicalization of Nazi antisemitism by coining the term “redemptive antisemitism” (Friedländer, 1997, 2008). His comprehensive study (*Gesamtdarstellung*) of the Shoah may be considered his response to German historian Martin Broszat. In his exchange of letters with Saul Friedländer, Broszat ascribed a “mythical memory” (Broszat & Friedländer, 1988, p. 343) to Jewish survivors, who he considered incapable of writing the history of National Socialism and the Shoah, while at the same time viewing himself and his peers as capable of writing a matter-of-factual history (Benninga & Stoll, 2014). Broszat was a former member of the NSDAP, a fact that he concealed. The exchange of letters concerned the concept of “historicization of Nazism”. It was first employed by Broszat in 1985. Saul Friedländer, who survived the Shoah as a child, perceived this category as an attempt to achieve a paradigm shift in the study of Nazism. While it seemed to him that the term “historicization”, which Broszat did not define, did not have as its aim a return to traditional frameworks of interpretation such as “‘totalitarianism’ vs. ‘fascism’ or Hitler-centrism vs. polycracy and so on” (Friedländer, 1988, p. 15), he reasoned that the purpose of the term was to bring about a fundamental change in perception: “the key formula may be, to consider the Nazi era as any other era, in terms of historical analysis” (Friedländer, 1988, p. 15). Speaking out against the “relativization” that this would imply, Friedländer pointed to the “limits of historicization”, which “are related to the way one approaches the specificity and non-specificity of Nazi crimes” (Friedländer, 1988, p. 20). At the time that Friedländer wrote these words, the specificity of the Shoah had neither been studied in detail nor reflected on by West German historians (Berg, 2003). Instead of studying the events on the ground in German-occupied Europe they were engaged in a “war of interpretation” (Herbert, 2015, p. 45). The importance of antisemitism and racism in shaping patterns of perception and behaviour of both European societies and the Nazi elite was discounted (cf. Herbert, 2015, p. 45).

It is telling that the head of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, where Martin Broszat had been a member of staff, gave a speech in honour of Ernst Nolte on the occasion of the awarding of a prestigious prize to Nolte in 2000. Nolte used the occasion to repeat his perverse perpetrator-victim-reversal and his justification of Nazi antisemitism and the Shoah. He termed National Socialism the “strongest of all counter forces” to Bolshevism and justified the crime against the Jews by stating that Hitler “may have had ‘rational’ reasons for attacking the Jews” (Cohen, 2000). The case of Nolte is indicative of what Freud called the repetition compulsion. Repeating lies until they are accepted as truth is a symptom of fascization.

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Poza koncepcjami faszyzmu i koncepcjami faszystowskimi. O kategorii faszyzacji

Abstrakt: Omawiając koncepcje i definicje faszyzmu, autorka oferuje nowe i szersze spojrzenie na to zjawisko, wprowadzając pojęcie faszyzacji jako narzędzie analityczne. Biorąc pod uwagę fakt, że warunki, które wyprodukowały faszyzm, nie zostały zniszczone, jego elementy nadal nie zostały zdelegitymizowane, a wyobrażenia faszystowska wciąż istnieje w europejskich i pozaeuropejskich społeczeństwach, autorka argumentuje, że potrzebujemy nowej kategorii łączącej przeszłość i teraźniejszość, jednakże takiej, która nie uhistoryczniałaby jednocześnie faszyzmu. Autorka identyfikuje praktyki i formy faszyzacji w takich sferach, jak unijna polityka antyimigrancka i antychodźcza, a także istniejące pod postacią rasistowskiej przemocy w zjednoczonych Niemczech. Krytycznie bada różne definicje faszyzmu i analizuje jego kluczowe cechy, w tym wspólnotę faszystowską z perspektywy psychoanalitycznej. Przygląda się również historiograficznej debacie na temat tego, czy faszyzm można uznać za rewolucyjny czy kontrrewolucyjny. Dokonując wyraźnego rozróżnienia między faszyzmem a narodowym socjalizmem, autorka ponownie analizuje sprawę Ernsta Noltego, którego interpretacja genezy narodowego socjalizmu wskrzesiła nazistowski *Weltanschauung*, normalizując i usprawiedliwiając nazistowską kampanię przeciwko europejskim Żydom.

Wyrażenia kluczowe: antysemityzm; autorytaryzm; faszyzm; faszyzacja; wyobrażenia faszystowska; Ernst Nolte; przemoc rasistowska; psychoanaliza

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