
Keywords: Kielce pogrom of July 4, 1946; aftermath of the Holocaust; postwar antisemitism

The recent period has seen a lot of initiatives on behalf of the one true infallible politics of memory. The reverberations of the decision to grant 80 million zlotys to Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, who is building the “Polish Yad Vashem”, had barely died down when the field of Polish-Jewish studies in Poland was blessed with a new luxurious journal, Polish-Jewish Studies. It is headed by a man notorious for blaming the Jews who had been in hiding during the war for failing to take proper financial care of the Polish candidates for the title of Righteous Among the Nations, while its academic board includes Professor Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, who is famous for asserting that the cutting off of Jewish beards by General Haller’s soldiers was motivated by their care for ensuring proper hygiene (Chodakiewicz, 2019). Another star member of the board, Dr. Rafał Sierchuła, has described the NSZ2 man who murdered eleven Jews, including five women and two children, in Malenie in 1944 as “the last cursed prisoner” (whom, by the way, the local community has commemorated with a marble plaque; Sierchuła, 2013).3 A considerable percentage of the initial issue of the journal is given over to reviews of two books, Dalej jest noc [Night Without End] by several researchers from the Polish Center for Holocaust Research, and Pod klątwą. Społeczny portret pogromu kieleckiego [Under Curse: A Social Portrait of the Kielce Pogrom], authored by myself.

It has been a very long time since I read a text as chaotic and gargantuan in its proportions as Dr. Ryszard Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki’s review of Pod klątwą (Śmietan-
ka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, pp. 744–815). It is as badly written as is the cause that it serves. The pulp of fault-finding, in which the alleged faults are not ordered into any hierarchy of significance and usually conclude with the trivial complaint that the reviewer has not been sufficiently convinced, would beg the question about the reviewing process in *Polish-Jewish Studies*, if one were not to find this question rhetorical in the first place. My sense of wasting time in responding to this review can only be compensated by using my response as an opportunity to present some of my research – which I did not discontinue after publishing *Pod kłtwpq*; its outcome is shortly to be published in the book *Bracia miesiące* [Brothers Months], and the serial nature of the occurrences that I describe here will be further corroborated by the monograph on the Kraków pogrom which I am currently working on. While my analysis of the Kielce pogrom revealed that there was considerable truth in the communist government's narrative of "NSZ elements", the work that follows it will demonstrate that the authorities' references to "posthumous epigones of Hitlerism" and "Volksdeutsche" after the Kraków pogrom contained interesting allusions to facts.

**An Easy Question**

Before I bring order into the chaos produced by Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, let me ask him an easy question: if he is indeed of the opinion that my book is not a breakthrough4 in the research on the Kielce pogrom, and the biographical notes of the previously unknown actors of that pogrom leave him unimpressed, why does he rely on data drawn from those notes when formulating his charges against my work? Would he be able to challenge the authentic identity of any of these individuals? If he perceives no progress here, why is he using my findings? I am referring here specifically to Wasyl Markiewicz and Stanisław Kupsza, two military commanders of key significance in the quelling of the pogrom (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 390–393), whose names and biographical data alike are absent from Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki's own contribution to *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego* [Reflections on the Kielce Pogrom], the two-volume monograph edited by Jan Żaryn summarizing the second inquest into the Kielce events.5

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4 Nonetheless, the possibility of there being a "breakthrough" causes some anxiety in the reviewer, which he verbalizes as a puzzling conditional sentence: “Paradoxically, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir’s book may become a turning point in the development of research into the Kielce pogrom, as the reaction from circles interested in research on Polish-Jewish relations will testify to the condition of Polish historiography of recent history” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 815; italics mine).

5 This is easily verifiable in the index in Volume 1 (Kamiński & Żaryn, 2006) where "Markiewicz Stanisław" can be found on p. 522, while Volume 2 (Bukowski et al., 2008) gives only the last name, without the first one, on p. 512. The same is true for the two Majewskis: in Volume 1, on p. 522, the Majewskis feature as "Zygmunt Majewski", without his service data, and "Majewski of the Investigation Department", without his first name and without the second part of his surname, Laske. In a similar manner, Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki confuses Niewiarowski with Niewiadomski, and Domowski with Dmowski. All this is indicative of shallow biographical research – and this despite the special, privileged position enjoyed by the employees of the Kielce branch of the IPN, with direct access to the files.
Nor does the reviewer make any comment on any of the newly discovered testimonies that shed new light on the picture of the Kielce Curia, otherwise represented as an innocent lamb. As a reminder, the communists did not pluck out of thin air such circumstances as storage of weapons on the curia premises (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 620, note 494), its hosting of a radio communication station (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 621, note 495), or Fr. Sobalkowski serving as an NSZ chaplain (the latter information, according to the recent fashion, has been proudly announced by the Kielce Diocese on its website; Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 112–113). And all of the above had for decades been vehemently denied as slander! Meanwhile, even the late Jerzy Turowicz was convinced that there must be some truth in the "accusations voiced by [Fr.] Świderski against [Bishop] Kaczmarek", concerning the sexual abuse of a certain nun. Contrary to Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki’s assertions, this is neither “moralizing” nor a “literary hypothesis” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 787), but merely the realities of Church life in the boondocks of the Kielce region, which – given today’s state of knowledge and society – can no longer be kept swept under the carpet.

All of these, however, are merely details compared to the discovery of the biographies of officers of the Citizens’ Militia (Milicja Obywatelska, MO)7 in Kielce, many of whom had murdered Jews during the war or, at the least, had an episode of service in the NSZ. Failing to note such new material – which was missed by the reviewer in his own research – is more than exercising discretion with regard to curial scandals or concern for “sensitive data”. It is the key charge against Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki and other historians on the team responsible for Wokół pogromu kieleckiego – historians who ignored the NSZ lead, which, let us not forget, was one of the hypotheses considered in the second Kielce inquest. In my approach, that lead is not about anyone’s “provocation” but rather about a peculiar brand of infiltration of the communist institutions, primarily the Kielce MO, creating something that I describe, with a term borrowed from Richard White, as the middle ground – an area of understanding between all those united by their hatred of Jews, among other things (more on this will be offered in the final section of this text).

All the subsequent issues stem from Dr. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki’s choice to omit this crucial element of the book. Consequently, the question arises as to why the reviewer makes no reference to my distinction between the two men named Majewski, which is of key importance for understanding how the authorities in Kielce operated: the “good UB man”8 Zygmunt, who saved several people from the pogrom, and the “bad” one, the officer of the Investigative Brigade from the Voivodeship Headquarters of MO, the former nationalist Tadeusz Majewski-Laske. Why does he make no comment on the con-

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6 See the IPN Archive (AIPN), Kr 010_10093, File 1, fol. 70. This is a reference to Sr. Domicella (see Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 621, note 497).
7 The regular police force in postwar Poland.
8 The Office of Public Security (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, UBP; often shortened to UB), the secret political police force.
nections, shocking even in the context of the MO in Kielce, of Stefan Sędek – who sent a patrol detachment of MO men to Planty Street with the pogrom-inducing news – a civilian employee of the MO station at Sienkiewicza Street, founder of the Kielce structure of the National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR) and brother to two activists of the Polish Organization, eulogized in ever new writings produced by Professor Jan Żaryn?

All these connections eluded the attention of the historians on the team working on *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, because the horizon of their research was determined not by facts but rather by Żarynite ideology, the same which recently saw Tomasz Greniuch, an ex-member of the resurrected ONR, appointed head of the Wrocław branch of the IPN. It takes people with an extreme right-wing worldview to remain undisturbed by the discovery of a fascist in the heart of a communist institution. And not just one! Unfortunately, the evidence presented in Chapters Eight and Twelve of my book is met with silence by the reviewer. The answer to the question why seems rather obvious: it does not fit the theory according to which the communists were responsible for the pogrom. The anticommunist mindset translates into a ban on thinking.

As observed by Professor Jacek Chrobaczyński in his review, from its first page to its last, *Pod klątwą* is a critique of the ideological history that informed the work of the team responsible for *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki was a pillar of that team, a team composed of lawyers, doubled by a team of historians, all working for a decade under conditions that can only be provided by an institution whose budget exceeds the expenses of all of Poland’s history institutes combined, and is twice that of the Polish Academy of Sciences. This is why the petty charges formulated by the reviewer against my book (no index!), a book written on my own and without a government grant, I perceive as not only unfair but also shameless for being self-serving.

**Identity**

I have never considered *Pod klątwą* to be the last word in Kielce pogrom research, only a step in the right direction, replacing a political agenda with microhistory. Given the scale of the project, avoiding omissions and defects is of course impossible. But it was only the review by Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, which attempts to “hijack” my conclusions without giving credit for the progress they represent, that compelled me to realize what an error on my part it was to pass over the outcome of the work of Jan Żaryn’s team with merciful silence. As Immanuel Kant said, it is easy to find something once

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9 To quote Professor Jacek Chrobaczyński’s review: “After all, it is an almost prosecutorial investigation conducted by a historian, conducted much better than [that of] all the prosecutors who ever took part in the successive Kielce inquests, including the last one, in 1994” (Chrobaczyński, forthcoming).
you have been shown where to look. Given the reviewer’s feeling that what Pod klątwą lacks is systematized reference to Wokół pogromu kieleckiego (Śmiertanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 750), let me remedy this deficiency by responding to his review.

In the most general terms, the reason for the total debacle of Wokół pogromu kieleckiego, and I mean all the articles in that collection, without excluding those by such researchers of merit as Bożena Szaynok and Krzysztof Urbański, lies in the nationalist presuppositions of the authors, who believed that the victims of the pogrom were not the same kind of Poles as themselves. Those presuppositions were projected onto the research objectives. After all, had the victims been considered Poles, their families would have been sought, their pasts examined, and their footsteps traced all around the world. In reconstructing the genealogies and property of the residents of 7 Planty Street, none of the authors in Żaryn’s team made the effort to visit even the State Archive in Kielce. No attempt was made to compile a list of survivors, much less to reach out to them. Merely a dozen interviews were undertaken in Israel, just one in Canada, and not a single one in the USA (where, for instance, Estera Mappen lived). Hard as this may be to believe, Wokół pogromu kieleckiego does not even contain brief biographical studies of the victims, including their residential addresses and assets as of the date in question. Those who were assaulted and the survivors were treated like vagrants who happened to have been staying in a shelter. The outcome was an impression of the alienness of the residents of 7 Planty Street, while, as the research conducted by Dr. Jarostaw Dulewicz for my book reveals, nearly all of them were local people from the Kielce region. Many of them, like Miriam Machtynger, who owned part of the building where the shelter was, were affluent people who had recently managed to reclaim their property. That in fact was one of the motives for the pogrom.

In his introduction to the second volume of Wokół pogromu kieleckiego, Jan Żaryn writes explicitly: “The modest Jewish minority, further curtailed by the crime of July 4,

10 Cf. that author’s use of dichotomous formulations like: “As opposed to the Poles, the Jews did not ponder on whether or not the pogrom had been a provocation” (Szaynok, 2006, p. 114). First of all, this statement is not true, as the further removed in time the event became, the more frequently the survivors from 7 Planty Street considered the provocation thesis (see Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 421). Secondly, forming conclusions based on the ethnic criterion is unreliable, because where assimilated individuals voice antisemitic theses in order to earn the acceptance of the antisemitic milieu, there is no “Jewish point of view”. My critical perception of some of Prof. Szaynok’s formulations does not mean that I deny the many merits of her pioneering texts. It is, however, hard to miss the impact of her work having been conducted under Jan Żaryn.

11 Reference is made here, for example, to Józef Fajngold, who died of Covid-19 in New York in 2020. No attempt was ever made to hear his testimony (see Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 44 et seq.). Nor did anyone try to contact Renée Levkovitch in Canada, the youngest victim of the Kielce pogrom, both of whose parents survived the pogrom (see Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 39 et seq.).

12 It is summarized from this particular angle in the article ‘An Unfinished Story’: The Genealogical Method in Research Into the Kielce Pogrom (4 July 1946)” (Dulewicz & Tokarska-Bakir, 2020).

13 Such a conclusion was expressly voiced upon the conclusion of the second Kielce inquest: “The Poles were afraid that the Jews would lodge their claims for the restitution of properties left behind during the occupation. [...] Fast-paced judicial proceedings in which Jews recovered their homes [...] led to the deterioration of sentiments toward the Jewish population”, Decision to discontinue the inquest, October 21, 2004, AIPN, Main Files of the Prosecutor of the District Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation in Kraków in regarding the case of the “Kielce pogrom”, ref. S 58/01/ZK, File 12, fol. 2517.
1946, was *de facto* marginal, of no consequence to the daily routine of most residents of Kielce. Even though it took place in the vicinity – in the neighborhood – the crime was *as alien as its victims*; it was transferred by the authorities to the level of the national political game, surpassing in scope the city's daily life (Żaryn, 2008, p. 10; italics mine). On the one hand, the statement sounds like an echo of Deuteronomy: "our hands did not shed this innocent blood, our eyes did not see it" (Deut. 21:7). On the other, the repeated gesture of marginalizing both the victims and the crime inevitably, if inadvertently, becomes a gesture of its normalization. It's the communists who are to blame again.

If one were to reconstruct the collective identity of the authors of *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, one would say that the work was written from the point of view of Polish Catholics who still keep asking several decades after the pogrom: "Could more have been done?" (Żaryn, 2006, p. 96). The theatrical effect of this question is in contrast to the invariable stance of the victims, who are consistently referred to as "Jews" by the authors, even though they were no less Polish than Prof. Żaryn and Dr. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki. A peculiar variety of sympathy for those "Jews" was shown by Polish bishops in 1946 when they wrote about their "visible oversensitivity" (Żaryn, 2006, p. 84).

Many sentences in *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego* sound like something copied from an antisemite's manual. Professor Żaryn's argumentation on why the bishops were unable to advise their faithful to stop believing foolish rumors is so infantile that it would not convince even a young ONR member: "Experience showed: any contact with official representatives of the Jewish side necessitated particular vigilance on the part of the ecclesiastical side" (Żaryn, 2006, p. 93). The author evinces understanding for the dilemmas faced by Bishop Wyszyński, who did not consider "the blood issue" – discussed in "old and new Jewish books" collected for the purposes of the trial of Mendel Beilis in 1914 – to have been "definitely settled" (Żaryn, 2006, p. 95). Żaryn himself has certain doubts on the matter. He claims that the question of the so-called Trent ritual murder of 1475 is unclear; he also explicates the Orthodox Christian variation of the blood libel legend based on the antisemitic brochure by Piotr Chomik (Żaryn, 2006, p. 95). To offer an analogy, it is as though the canonical gospels were to be interpreted with the use of *Toledot Yeshu* (see Iluk, 2012).

Just how the sources are treated in *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego* is demonstrated by the following example. When considering manifestations of antisemitism in Kielce after

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14 In the first volume of *Pod klątwą* (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 120 et seq.), I have reconstructed a succession of authorities, starting with Fr. J. Pranajtis, an expert witness in the trial of Mendel Beilis, who – via Fr. Józef Kruszewski – inculcated a belief in the blood libel in the future Primate of the Millennium.

15 As early as 2003, a compilation edited by Fr. Stanisław Musiał came out in Poland (Musiał, 2003), including two articles by experts on the Trent affair, Diego Quaglioni and Anna Esposito, who explain the incident in detail. Paradoxically, this essay is quoted (probably unread) in *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego* (Kamiński & Żaryn, 2006, p. 137).

the war, Krzysztof Urbański quotes a one-sentence statement by Jechiel Alpert: “Personally, I did not suffer any” (Urbański, 2008, p. 44). He does not, however, describe the context in which Alpert uttered this sentence.

[Question asked by Ida Fink, interviewing Alpert for Yad Vashem in 1967:] Were there antisemitic sentiments in the city?
[Alpert’s reply:] There were antisemitic sentiments. Personally, I did not suffer any, but I ran into several unpleasant incidents, not in Kielce as such, in Ostrowiec for example, on a train. The grenades [reference to a hand grenade tossed into the kibbutz building at Planty Street in October 1945] were the first incident. So I was advised to go to [Bishop Czesław] Kaczmarek. You know who Kaczmarek was? A major antisemite, he was in prison later on. [...] I took Ajzenberg [head of the Jewish religious community] and we went to see the bishop. We spent an hour at his place. I said I’d come to ask him to exert an influence on his clergy so that the clergy would in turn exert an influence on Polish society, to make them understand that this miserable handful of Jews who had survived should not continue to be persecuted. He smiled and said: "Strange that you should come to me with this; you must be reading the press and know that we have no influence. How can I exert influence over my souls if I have no say whatsoever". He said it with such sarcasm. Then he said: "Let me tell you, I wish to explain, I’m a Kielce man, I know who you are. You know that Jews are talented merchants, talented doctors, talented lawyers – Poland is destroyed, it needs all the forces it can use – why don’t Jews do what they have talent for, why do they busy themselves with politics? Can you imagine how it looks when a priest comes to the ministry and there he runs into a Jewish woman who is not even a Polish Jew; she’s a Jew from God knows where and approaches our clergy with superiority, with impudence? What kind of impression does that make?” (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 2, p. 124; italics mine)

The map of Kielce included in the second volume of Wokół pogromu kieleckiego (Bukowski et al., 2008, pp. 106–107), on which neither the Kielce Cathedral nor the Curia building is marked, goes to prove that Żaryn’s team precluded an examination of the moral responsibility of the Church at the very outset of their research, even as they formulated its initial assumptions. The authors may negate that responsibility as long as they please, but if they honestly analyzed their own reasoning, they would reach this conclusion themselves. I will demonstrate this using the example of Ryszard Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki’s argumentation as he analyzes the course of events preceding the pogrom. He clearly has not come across studies on the Early Modern witch craze incited by children’s gossip,17 which now and again depopulated whole areas of Scandinavia and America.18 This is why he writes: "It seems hardly likely that the nine-year-old Błaszczyk (absent from his parents’ home for two days) came up with the original ver-

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17 Speaking of witch craze: in his review Ryszard Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki juxtaposes Jew-killers convicted by communist courts after the war (much less often than would have been appropriate) with witches persecuted in the Early Modern era. Citing my decade-old text "Ganz Andere", the reviewer puts criminals and women tried for witchcraft side by side, and he bases this comparison on his critique of the interrogation transcripts.

18 See, for example, Bengt Ankarloo on the "creative fantasy of the children and young women" who testified as witnesses in witchcraft trials. For instance, in the trial against several dozen adults in Mora in August 1669, testimonies were given by hundreds of children who fantasized about journeys "on a black cow" or "a brown horse" to the fantastical mountain of Blåkulla; as a result, 23 individuals were sentenced to death (Ankarloo, 2001, p. 295). "Later, there were professional witch-finders, mostly children, who could 'see' who travelled to Blåkulla and were paid for their services out of the parish coffers. Some bold lads exacted food and drink from people in return for not defaming them" (Ankarloo, 2001, p. 302); See also Boyer & Nissenbaum, 1974. Modern-day example: Litorowicz, 2021.
sion of his abduction all by himself” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2008, p. 110). Indeed, Henio Błaszczyszk did not come up with anything on his own: he fell back on the ecclesiastical legend dating back to the 12th century, which every Polish child was familiar with.19 Who is responsible for the legend?

In the late 1990s, the Jesuit Fr. Stanisław Musiał wrote his famous essay entitled “Czarne jest czarne” [Black Is Black] (Musiał, 1997/2010). He even received the award of the monthly magazine *Press* for it. Both Prof. Szaynok and Dr. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki must have read it, and yet they describe the thesis of the Church’s responsibility for the pogrom as an “oversimplification” (Szaynok, 2006, p. 127).20 In fact, it is not an oversimplification but rather calling a spade a spade: *black is black*. What is a dangerous oversimplification, however, is ignoring the toxic potential of antisemitism (as a reminder, it is precisely the legend of so-called Jewish ritual murder that David Biale considers the connecting element between religious and modern antisemitisms; Biale, 2007), as this leads to the conclusion that “given the current state of knowledge, we can no longer ascribe those tragic events to antisemitism only” (Szaynok, 2006, p. 119). Surely there must be some cause for concern here if such an opinion is voiced by an author involved in the study of the Holocaust – caused “only” by antisemitism?

After the Second World War, the blood libel sparked pogroms so often (Tokarska-Bakir, 2020, pp. 64–81) that anyone who refuses to acknowledge this inadvertently reveals their less than honorable agenda. Rather than deny the obvious, Professor Szaynok and Dr. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki might – in the common interest of us all – take a look into sources in the Kielce Diocese Archives that have, to date, been inaccessible and thus unquotable. By this I mean the memoir of the administrator of the Cathedral Parish in Kielce, Fr. Roman Zelek (1975; ref. XZ-19/2, manuscript submitted to the Library of the Kielce Seminary), and Fr. Professor Daniel Olszewski’s memoir in several volumes, which, as disposed in his will, was to be extracted from his family collection and transferred to the Diocese Archives. If, as Jan Żaryn asserts, the Catholic Church in Poland “stands sentinel to the collective memory” (Żaryn, 2006, p. 110), its blocking access to memoirs written by eyewitnesses to the pogrom goes to show how it is performing this mission. The regrettable universality of such practices prevents the initiation of the process of healing memory. Persistence in denial has its price that is more than just the absence of a decent tombstone for the victims.

There are no scientific grounds for the provocation hypothesis that was so strongly advocated by the overseers of the second inquest (most certainly Judge Andrzej Jankowski), and subsequently by the authors of *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*. Both teams did, however, include groups of professionals who were aware of the dangerous

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19 For more on the subject, see Tokarska-Bakir, 2008. In my discussion of how Henio Błaszczyszk did not invent anything on his own, I refer to this phenomenon as “ventriloquism”. See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 96 et seq.

20 See her repetition of this thesis some years later (Szaynok, 2018, p. 384). See also my response to Bożena Szaynok, “Czarne jest jednak czarne” [Black Is Black, After All] (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018a).
course which the investigation was taking, especially in its final stage. That there were people with their wits about them on the inquest team is indicated by Prosecutor Zbigniew Mielecki’s postulate stated in the documentation dated August 4, 1997: “[we should] address the provocation hypothesis: we have no evidence.” 21 The same sentiment, if in less delicate terms, is expressed by his note on the margin: ”foolishness!”, and also “this amounts to politicizing the inquest!” in his comments on the postulates of the central headquarters. 22 And then, his final conclusion: “It is beyond dispute that the tragedy was caused by an absurd piece of gossip.” 23

An answer to the question of whether Bożena Szaynok and Ryszard Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki were part of a similar group of professionals is given by these authors through their repeated references in their reviews (e.g. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, pp. 753–754) to the never-verified testimony of Hanka Alpert about soldiers or MO men changing into civilian clothes (in the same testimony, she addresses one of those individuals with the words: “You’re wearing my husband’s shirt!”; Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 188, vol. 2, p. 134), a behavior that is much easier to explain as a desire to hide stolen garments under the uniform than as some kind of “provocation.” 24 Both of them also boldly elaborate on the theme of the mysterious man named Diomin, presented as the mastermind behind the conspiracy, though the only “sin” committed by that person, an assistant to the Soviet adviser Shpilevoy, was his signature in a telegram. Over the sixty pages of his review, Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki obsessively revisits the motif of the presence of Soviet soldiers in the streets while ignoring elements of considerably greater relevance (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, pp. 785, 789–790). All this serves as a smoke screen to divert attention from the merit of the matter and to usher in the return of ideology. Which is why I will repeat again: it was not big bad Soviets with long teeth who were responsible for the Kielce pogrom but rather, to put it as charitably as possible, the Kielce people’s credulity which compelled them to believe that Jews abduct children “for transfusions”. Reinforced by their fear that dwellings extorted from their Jewish neighbors would have to be returned to them, that “credulity” became the fuse that sparked the pogrom violence. The perpetrators of the violence were the local community and the antisemitic MO, whose ranks had been infiltrated by NSZ men cen-

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21 Prosecutor Zbigniew Mielecki, Memorandum, Zs.s1/93, August 4, 1997, AIPN, Bu 53/4753.
22 This comment pertains to a sentence in the letter from the Voivodeship Prosecutor’s Office in which we read: “While the investigation has not achieved the objectives of the preparatory proceedings, as set out in Article 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given that many extremely important evidentiary activities – still possible despite the lapse of over 50 years – have not been conducted, based on the state of evidence as it is now, what emerges as the most likely version is that the events in question occurred as a result of a provocation, prepared by the law enforcement agencies of the time, inspired by political centers exercising power over the country during that period” (AIPN, Ki 53/4744, fol. 188).
24 Most of the survivors gave testimonies on several occasions: in 1946, and then twice in the 1990s, first during Prosecutor Mielecki’s visit to Israel and then before a video camera, for Andrzej Miłosz’s documentary. Hanka Alpert also had the opportunity to confirm her testimonies, which, however, she never did. This theme in her testimonies is also not touched upon even once by her husband, Jechiel Alpert, who was with her most of the time on July 4, 1946, and who gave his own testimony three times, as well.
tered around their boss, Lt. Col. Kuźnicki, and also soldiers of the Polish Army (Wojsko Polskie, WP) and the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, KBW), who shared the worldview of the Ludwików steelworkers who besieged the house at 7 Planty Street. In moral terms, however, the instigator of the Kielce pogrom was the Catholic Church, which had bred the blood libel legend, and in July 1946, while hypocritically decrying bloodshed (“The Catholic Church always...”) – with the exception of Bishop Teodor Kubina – did not utter a single word in defense of the Jews.

The Research Horizon

Śmiertanka-Kruszelnicki appreciates my “passion for research”, and even my “sensitivity” (“undoubtedly selective”), and yet he accuses me of a “tendency to simplify and ignore uncomfortable data” (Śmiertanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 815). I wonder what data I ignored, and how, then, one should describe the practice of ignoring a whole category of evidence (e.g. the oral sources, which I will write more about further on) on the part of my reviewer.

The problem of failure to note the key elements of a picture often stems from ideological grounds and, as noted by the author of the book Elephant in the Room (Zerubavel, 2006), it actually means a proactive avoidance of the quarantined area where disconcerting elements are situated. Another avoidance tactic is such formulation of questions which precludes certain answers altogether. As an example, let us consider the following question posed by the reviewer: “how could a pogrom lasting many hours have happened in the centre of a voivodeship city, near the seats of the institutions of force, in an area not so difficult for military units to secure?” (Śmiertanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 745).25 The structure of this question suggests both a possible answer and those answers that it precludes. After all, can “institution of force”, can “forces of repression” be weak at all, given that they are exerting “repression” on someone, and can their “seat” be filled with idiots, buffoons for whom “socialism for fools”, or antisemitism, has replaced any and all military training and rational action? Not in the picture of the world assumed by Śmiertanka-Kruszelnicki and readers of Arcana, the journal in which he first published his suggestion.

The subsequent part of the review under discussion is an attempt at diverting attention from the evidence cited by me and reproaching me for failing to make references to the “literature of the subject”. The problem is that my subject is completely different from the reviewer’s subject.

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25 The original Polish text has “forces of repression” rather than “institutions of force”. The part of the review that features this question had been formulated earlier (cf. Śmiertanka-Kruszelnicki, 2016). My answer to this question can be found in Pod klątwą (e.g. Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 318 et seq.).
This ushers in the broader problem of the horizons of the research questions posed by a historian when reconstructing objects and by an anthropologist who is retracing a network of relations between them – unfortunately, without any guarantee that they will be using the same taxonomy. As I wrote in my auxiliary articles to *Pod klątwą*, my approach had been inspired by Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, where the initial act is always to dismantle the existing descriptions (Tokarska-Bakir, 2017). In Latour’s language, this is referred to as deconstruction of black boxes. The latter are the term that the philosopher uses to describe the anchoring of fundamental facts, or the theoretical frameworks that are crucial for specific fields, involving a programmatic amnesia, obliterating the manner in which such frameworks of debate were originally structured. “As long as scientists debate whether an assertion is true [...] a fact or a mechanism are merely potential black boxes. [...] The essence of the process of closing a black box [...] is [...] forgetting its social components [for example, pre-existing doubts as to the evidence, and also the arbitrary nature of the chosen terminology]. A black box precludes knowledge about the social nature of the process of constructing it, as the latter problematizes its origin and makes it less durable” (Sojak, 2004, p. 238).

The black boxes of history are filled up with what Latour calls *factishes*, or quasi-objects, constructed out of observations indistinguishably blended with interpretations whose genealogies have long been forgotten (Latour, 1999, p. 306). While, according to general opinion, a fact is considered to be free from the element of belief, factishes are facts with fixed interpretations, facts onto which their believers have transposed their own convictions and desires (Latour, 1999, p. 306). I consistently avoid these in my book, and this, in short, is my answer to Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki’s repeated question why I make no reference to the “literature of the subject” with respect to specific topics (e.g. various partisan formations, the chronology of the Freedom and Independence [Wolność i Niezawisłość, WiN] organization, authorship of specific pamphlets). This is how I navigate around the politics of memory hidden in the black boxes. I refer directly to the sources, persistently and in more ways than one.

The staying power of black boxes, Latour says, is directly proportional to the degree of their institutionalization, which in turn is dependent on the network of the allies of a specific fact, theory or apparatus. These include the media, sources of funding, and politicians. The politics of memory (politics of history), with its epicenter in the form of the well-provided Institute of National Remembrance and its media, such as the luxurious journal *Polish-Jewish Studies*, is almost the sole sponsor of today’s Polish historiography. This is the agent that seals the black boxes and guards their integrity. It is so powerful that it can force the author of a doctoral thesis about to be published by the IPN to remove their dedication to the supervisor of that dissertation who happens to be on the IPN’s bad side.26 It is only in this context that it becomes obvious how uneven my dispute with Dr. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki is, given that I am a researcher while he serves as a guardian of the factishes of a predefined version of history.

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26 Reference is made here to a doctoral dissertation recently published by the IPN, originally written at Princeton University’s Department of History under the supervision of Jan Tomasz Gross (I will mercifully omit the name of its author). Such practices bring to mind Martin Heidegger’s removal of his dedication to his mentor, Edmund Husserl, from the edition of Sein und Zeit issued in the Nazi era.
The reviewer finds insufficient the extended (50-page-long) Chapter Five of my book, entitled “The People’s Government and the Jews”, in which I provide a broad context of the pogrom based on meticulous research of the sources. He finds fault with my “lack of acquaintance with the research literature considering the social and political situation and the state of security in the Kielce Voivodeship in 1945–1946” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 755). But then, if my goal in writing Pod kłątwą had been to show off being well versed in those publications, my book would immediately take on the characteristics of Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki’s style! His demand for ritual quotations from the “anticommunist package” (as a considerable portion of the literature whose repetition the reviewer requires) only goes to prove how deep an anxiety and disorientation have been seeded in him by my book which sheds a different light on the problem that has long been a permanent fixture in Poland, that of incompetence, carelessness, and reliance on makeshift solutions, which has caused tragedies on considerably more occasions than the one in 1946.

My reviewer keeps repeating that the reader “may get the impression that Tokarska-Bakir has discovered many cases which had hitherto been unknown” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 771). Yes indeed, and this is not just an impression, either! As far as I’m aware, no one so far has written that some combatants from Marcin Tarchalski’s partisan unit were employed at the Ludwików steelworks. Or about the connection between people’s experiences relating to the killing of Jewish Poles during the war and their readiness to take part in the pogrom. Given the tenets underlying my interpretation of the anti-Jewish violence, this connection, emerging in the context of the resource mobilization theory (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 214), is incomparably more important than reproducing the state of research on Marcin Tarchalski’s detachment, as required by the reviewer.

What is more, the reviewer complains that, in Pod kłątwą, instead “of the distanced text of a scholar, we are dealing with an emotionally saturated documentary and historical story, where the aesthetic qualities of the narrative and its dramatisation play significant roles” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 787). As far as I can recall, ever since I read in Dominic LeCapra’s Writing Trauma that empathy conditioned access to certain aspects of historical truth, I have never aspired to the ideal “of the distanced text of a scholar”. Where does this accusation come from then?

What has, however, enraged me most is the reviewer’s argumentation referring to the paraphrases that I use in Chapter One. In that chapter, I discuss (in the form of free

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27 As an aside, the phrases “social and political situation” and “state of security” are direct borrowings from the language of the sources that as experienced a historian as the reviewer could finally start approaching with caution. Does he not fear, to use the poet’s words, that not only words follow thoughts but also thoughts follow words?

28 During a public meeting held in Kielce as part of the promotional campaign for Pod kłątwą, a similar demand – namely, that I should discuss the so-called Augustów round-up in the context of the Kielce pogrom – was voiced by Prof. Bożena Szaynok. The entire debate on the subject can be viewed on YouTube (VideoKOD Sieciowa Telewizja Obywatelska, 2018).
Statement of Andrzej Miłosz (AIPN, KI 53/4749):

Warsaw, April 23, [19]96
Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation in Warsaw

Please find enclosed, for the purposes of the inquest into the Kielce pogrom, 120 pages of typescript, containing testimonies of witnesses, victims of the pogrom in Kielce on July 4, [19]46, currently residing in Israel. These testimonies were recorded on video tape using a "Beta" camera for a film about the pogrom, [which is currently] being edited.

Andrzej Miłosz
(the film director)
indirect speech) the scattered and discontinuous statements made by the pogrom survivors that were recorded in Israel by the documentary director Andrzej Miłosz. As is indicated by the statement reproduced below, the tapescripts were submitted to the Institute of National Remembrance in 1996, so Ryszard Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki had access to them after the conclusion of the second Kielce inquest. He made no use of them and yet he finds fault with me for failing to reprint them verbatim in full in the second volume of *Pod kłtwa*, which anthologizes the relevant sources. I decided against doing just that because, firstly, records of statements made into a camera, partly incomprehensible, would require paraphrasing anyway, so it made no sense to produce such duplicates; secondly, I tried to quote them faithfully in the first volume; and thirdly, the publisher set certain limitations as to the size of that volume, which had already come to 806 pages (if I had added those transcripts, it would have augmented it by another 120 pages!). Being an employee of the IPN's Kielce branch, he could – for the purposes of his review – have checked the accuracy of my paraphrases. He did not do it, of course, exactly because he could have.

Comparing our writing styles, I do not expect that Dr. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki and I are going to agree on which of us was better at dealing with “the abundance of source material” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, p. 770). Such evaluation is a matter of optics: one of us can see a forest where the other can only make out trees. Of course, we are not going to agree on how to make out the forest correctly, but I suppose we can agree that failure to notice the forest utterly discredits one of us.

**The Question of Sources**

Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki has made a name for himself with numerous works on the Polish people’s martyrdom and on bad Jews. If Poland were a normal country, some of these, such as his work on the murder in Ostrowiec (where, on March 19, 1945, a group of brats hailing from former Home Army [Armia Krajowa, AK] sabotage units, murdered and robbed some of the sparse Holocaust survivors),29 would qualify for litigation for defamation of the victims. Unfortunately, we live in a time when their memory can be offended with impunity by a state institution through the mouth of its functionary. This is what Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki does when he accuses Fajga Krongold of having been an NKVD informer and holding in her safekeeping a list of the AK soldiers whom she intended to deliver into the hands of her sponsors. Someone who is actually interested in what happened in Ostrowiec on that date should read my article “Malarz i dziewczyna-

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29 To quote Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki’s conclusion: “The case file indicates that it was supposed to be an execution of a suspected informer, conducted on orders from an otherwise unidentified underground organization” (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2005, pp. 253–254). I am curious whether the reviewer would be prepared to defend his thesis in court, should Fajga Krongold’s family feel offended by the accusation.
na” [The Painter and the Maiden] (see Tokarska-Bakir, n.d.; 2021a). Just how hard a conscience does it take to fail to notice the motive driving the killer – the son of a *volks-deutsche Treuhaender*, wishing to get rid of the heiress to a local factory who has survived the Holocaust?

I mention this event because it is an example demonstrating how Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, who finds fault with my treatment of oral sources as privileged ones in *Pod klątwą*, uses such sources himself. As pointed out by the British historian Paul Anderson, historians with an *a priori* agenda tend to make selective use of sources (*suppressio veri*) rather than decide to lie openly (*suggestio falsi*) (Anderson, 1992, pp. 64–65). Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki turns out to be an exception to this rule. He bases his conclusions about the collaborationist grounds for the execution of Fajga Krongold of Ostrowiec on *no written documents whatsoever*, but rather chooses to believe the convenient gossip that was serially used to justify murders of Jews after the war. This is also how “people talked” after the pogrom in Klimontów in the Sandomierz region,30 in Leżajsk,31 in Przedbórz (see Kołaciński, 1991, p. 234), and with reference to the murders of Jews in Podhale. Whenever it suits him, Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki uses oral sources. Where, however – as is the case with the Kielce pogrom – oral testimonies do not fit his bill, he unceremoniously rejects them. As karma has it, his writing is so devoid of life that it resembles a pesticidal preparation or a genealogical extract prepared “to order” rather than “the distanced text of a scholar”.

As Simon Dubnow pointed out, the historian’s primary mission is to resurrect the dead. The authors of *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego* had all the necessary sources on hand. Many of the witnesses to the pogrom were still alive, including a handful of the survivors. They were not given a voice. The documentation gathered by the prosecutor Zbigniew Mielecki in Israel was wasted. Andrzej Miłosz’s video tapes were scorned. Even the list of the victims was not completed without misspelling the names.

As a society, we are still in the same place. We have a choice: either a history of humans – Jewish and non-Jewish Poles – or a narcissistic tale pitting angels against devils. There was no room in the latter for Zygmunt Majewski (pseudonym “Chrystus” (“Christ”)), a UB man and prewar communist, whose granddaughter I met during one of my meetings with readers in Kraków (after the publication of *Pod klątwą*, she was invited to Israel, where she met with the Średni-Sarid family whom her grandfather had saved from the pogrom). There is no chance of fitting into any black-and-white format of history the story of Sylwester Klimczak, a prewar cavalry officer (uhlan), a somewhat

30 I have written about it in my books, *Okrzyki pogromowe* [Pogrom Cries] (Tokarska-Bakir, 2012), *Pod klątwą* (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c), and *Bracia miesiące* (Tokarska-Bakir, 2021a, p. 385).

31 The killing in Leżajsk, perpetrated on February 18–19, 1945, by the unit led by Józef Zdzierski (pseudonym “Wołyniak” (“The Volhynian”), NSZ and National Military Organization [Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa, NOW]), has been explained by the allegation that the object of the attack was a building of the security police (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB). It was only Mirosław Surdej’s book on the Rzeszów District of the National Military Organization (Surdej, 2018, p. 337) that scotched such rumors, which had for example been disseminated by Marek J. Chodakiewicz.
self-serving Righteous (who kept Jews in hiding with good effect but for a considerable amount of money), and a prison manager in Kielce after the war, who drove a Willis right into the middle of the pogrom mob and carried several endangered people away into safety. I would be surprised if such a format made it possible to retain the figure of janitor Niewiarowski (killed) or perhaps Grądowski (survived), who held a cross in his hands and cried out at the pogromshchiks: "There are no basements here!" What the heroines of my book have to say, those who came back to defend the kibbutz at 7 Planty Street, such as Henrietta Borensztajn (survived), Bałka Gertner, Fania Szumacher, and Rachelka Sonberg (all beaten to death), transcends the moral horizon that we have become accustomed to in this country.

The infantile black-and-white version of the past, according to which ordinary Kielce people were incapable of perpetrating a pogrom – as, allegedly, were the inhabitants of nearly a hundred villages and towns in Podlasie in 1941 – has wrought indescribable damage to Polish society. Duped by this narrative, people subsequently demand that historians reproduce lies. They take those who refuse to oblige to court. What court will judge and mete out a punishment for that?

“Local Patriotism”

I was aware that Ryszard Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki was a custodian of this particular variety of memory and that parting with it would not come easy to him. But I did not expect that the "local patriotism" of the employee of the IPN's Kielce branch would also extend to Kielce MO men, rapists, drunks, and killers (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, pp. 812 et seq.). Apparently, the middle ground that I described (i.e. temporary alliances between enemies to overcome impasse in achieving common goals) is still on in Kielce. To encourage the reviewer to read the sources with more attention, I will offer him three documents for contemplation.

First: In the County Office of Public Security (Powiatowy Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, PUBP), in close quarters with Lt. Albert Grynbaum, an important witness to the pogrom, soon to be killed in mysterious circumstances on August 6, 1946, near Biatorbrzegi in the Radom region (Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 188), one of the employees is Henryk Rybak (pseudonym "Pirat" ("Pirate")), a young man whose colorful biography, including a childhood spent amid fish ponds, is cited on p. 179 in Volume One of my book Pod klątwą. His colleagues include Zenon Marcinkowski ("Grot" ("Arrowhead"), NSZ), a fare collector on the Kielce-Kraków coach line in the 1940s, and others who spent the war in groups led by Marcin Tarchalski ("Marcin") and Władysław Kotaciński ("Zbik" ("Wildcat")), among these the famous Stanisław Kowalski ("Znicz"/"Strzała" ("Torch"/"Arrow"). As suggested by the informant's letter that I have found, Henryk Rybak, who was
List of individuals departing from the town of Włoszczowa for the Western Territories, Jelenia Góra, October 27, 1945
(AIPN, Wr 024_5159, fol. 13)
promoted to deputy chief of the Kielce PUBP in the aftermath of Grynberg’s death, made out and issued illegal documents to his NSZ associates. Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki does not grasp the concept of *middle ground* if, as can be gathered from his review, he confines it to infiltration as portrayed in spy movies. To hunt for Lt. Albert Grynbaum near Białobrzegi, on his way back from his service-related trip to Warsaw, one did not need a radio transmitter and encryption codes; all that was required was information supplied by Henryk Rybak in a bar. The latter, by the way, was also the person who, as pogrom-related testimonies indicate, spread the gossip of the “killing of a Polish officer”, which seems to absorb Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki so much (Śmietanka-Kruszelnicki, 2020, pp. 811 et seq.).

Another example of postwar middle-ground situations refers to the team sent to Silesia, led by Stanisław Piaskowski, the first Kielce Voivode, succeeded by Wiślicz-Iwańczyk. In 1945, Piaskowski recruited into his security platoon over fifty former members of groups headed by Tarchalski and Kołaciński of the NSZ. These included, among others: Stanisław Kowalski, or “Znicz”/“Strzała” (No. 51 on the list); Stefan Marcinkowski, “Dąb” (No. 4, one of four Marcinkowskis, next to Roman, Edmund, and Adam); Stanisław Fatyga (No. 21); Zbigniew Rolski (No. 19); Jan Pacanowski (No. 14); and Stefan Ostrowski (No. 48). They all had recommendations from Voivode Wiślicz, to whom they had formally revealed themselves as underground fighters.

I have saved for last the most extensive example, included here in full translation and in the form of original scans. It refers to Lieutenant-Colonel Wiktor Kuźnicki, chief of the Voivodeship Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia (Komenda Wojewódzka Milicji Obywatelskiej, KW MO) in Kielce during the pogrom, who threatened that, should Poland become the seventeenth Soviet Republic, he would become a partisan in the woods himself. If the reviewer refuses to believe that Kuźnicki offered a safe haven to NSZ men in Kielce MO, he should study the following material very closely. This is a re-
port on the Kielce KW MO which was visited in May 1946 by envoys of the Central Headquarters (Komenda Główna Milicji Obywatelskiej, KG MO). The text describes a number of individuals whom I have identified as members of the mustachioed officer corps gathered by Kuźnicki. It is a major satisfaction to have one’s conclusions vindicated *post factum* by a witness of the era. I especially recommend to the reviewer’s attention the conclusion formulated on p. 7 in the part referring to Stefan Sędek.

**Appendix**

**Report**

on the inspection conducted at the Kielce Voivodeship Headquarters of the MO on May 12, 13, 14, [and] 15, 1946, by Col. Szaniawski, MO Deputy Chief for Operations, Lt. Raducki, Head of the Dactyloscopic Section in Department S1, Investigations, KG MO, and Lt. Kraśnicki, head of the Fill-Ins Section, Personnel Department, KG MO.

The departure from the KG MO took place on **May 11, 1946** in the evening, at 18:30 hours. On May 12, 1946, [only] a general inspection was carried out at the [illegible] Town Headquarters because, together with Col. Szaniawski, we were busy organizing a pursuit of a group of bandits. We found the operations platoon officer on duty at the ready. The headquarters is neatly arranged, generally some effort toward efficiency in the work of the Town HQ can be observed. Commandant, Capt. (BCh)40 Mazur.

Around 10:30 hours we set off for Kielce, escorted by a militia detail. On our way there, an MO station in Szydłowiec was checked. We reached Kielce on Sunday afternoon. The following day we initiated the inspection of the KW MO Personnel Department, and my findings are as follows:

1) Head of the Personnel Department, Capt. Babicz, Adam – complains about considerable difficulties at work and bad health, as a result of which he cannot be responsible for all personnel-related work. 

2) Deputy Head of the Department, Sub-Lt. Latosiński41 – PPR42 member, AL43 man, completed the [political] Training Course. Intelligent, works a lot along the party lines. Tries to enforce some things according to the party instruction but has been undermined by Capt. Babicz, who has no opinion of his own, has not been cooperating with the party and the Office of Public Security, which consequently affects work in the field. The Voivodeship Chief, Lt. Col. Kuźnicki,44 as indicated by the opinion statement obtained from the Voivodeship Committee of the PPR in conversation with the First and Second Secretaries, is not cooperating with the party, shows absolutely no interest in the people that the party assigns to them. My impression, during my conversation with him, is that he has to some extent lost his political identity. He says that AK men [and] NSZ men are the best patriots and we need to win these men over because they are not the worst element at all. Former policemen are not so bad, either. As a result of this policy, the Voivodeship HQ is staffed in leading posts with former policemen

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40 Peasants’ Battalions (Bataliony Chłopskie, BCh).
41 See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 368 et seq.
42 Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR).
43 People’s Army (Armia Ludowa, AL).
[and] AK men who revealed themselves just a few weeks before and have already achieved higher ranks in the militia than they used to have in the underground.

When talking to Col. Kuźnicki after the audit, I asked why things were that way; he replied that they had to be that way because otherwise we would alienate them from us, and we ought to care about winning them over, and so on and so forth along these lines.

Now that the Voivodeship HQ is overtaken by hostile elements, cunningly concealing their true faces, they are also “outstanding professionals” as former Polish Policemen, and consequently indispensable; having some influence, they have tried and continue to try to get as many former policemen on the force as possible. They have been successful in this work because they tried to gain the Chief's trust and have succeeded in doing so.

As a result, the HQ is filled with AK [and] BCh men, who had not worked anywhere else until the last moment and suddenly felt a “raging urge” to serve in the MO, in leading positions to boot.

One of such “outstanding professionals” that have been taken on is a Polish Gendarmerie captain, DOBRACZYŃSKI [Dobróczyński],45 who was and doubtless still is a member of the AK, or the NSZ, obtained clearance for the rank of major in December last year, and unlawfully wears a major's insignia.

To continue on the Personnel Department:

Chor. Jędruszek, Zygmunt – senior clerk for Staff Fill-Ins – hard-working, poorly formed politically and in practical life. He is more of an office worker, and an absent-minded one at that. Honest, solid man; can work as long as he has an appropriate Dept. Head.

Chor. Kwaśniewski, Antoni – files clerk – a man of ability, poorly formed, should undergo training. Reluctant to work in the MO, would prefer a comfortable job so he can support himself and have a comfortable life. Former AL partisan.

Citizen Lenartowska, Maria – office worker in the Records Section. Hostile toward the current system of government and the USSR; husband suspected of being a Volksdeutscher, hiding from the Security Office. She has been fired and rehired several times. She is quite blunt in her statements: “Bolsheviks are a band of rapists, robbers, etc.”

Lt. Adamowski, Władysław – Head of Records and Files Section, ambitious worker, full of devotion, an old GL man.47 Somewhat nervous, sick (tuberculosis), not likely to work much longer.

Lt. Kobylecki [should read: Kobyłecki], Jan48 – Head of the Disciplinary Section – prewar Second Department49 worker, a sly operator. His work is seemingly good, he knows how to approach you and is a skillful maneuverer.

Corp. Kosterna – senior clerk for disciplinary matters – good, diligent fellow, democratic mindset. PPR – active, honest, unbribable. I would suggest sending him to a Training Course in Łódź.

Platoon-leader Szczeciniak, Jan – clerk for disciplinary matters, hard-headed PSL man.50 Under surveillance, good at camouflaging himself.

Pchr. Gołębiowski, Jerzy – Training clerk, claims to have been a GL man, prewar podchorąży, discharges his duties well, hard-working. Poorly formed, has changed recently. In close con-

45 See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 351 et seq. See also the list of Kielce AK men in AIPN, Ki 015/164, File 1, fol. 142, where the following Kielce MO men (among others) are included: Maj. Stefan Dobróczyński (“Kroczek”), Sub-Lt. Kazimierz Galiński (“Kosek”), and Roman Krzemień (“Roch”).
46 Chorąży, lit. “ensign”, a warrant officer rank.
47 People’s Guard (Gwardia Ludowa, GL).
49 The Second Department of the Polish General Staff, responsible for military intelligence and counterintelligence.
50 Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL).
51 Podchorąży, title of an officer cadet.
tact with Ozga-Michalski, who is a positive influence on him. No major objections. Was a sub-lieutenant; since verification in 1945, wearing lieutenant insignia.

In action, he let people who were captured bearing weapons walk free.

Citizen Surowiec, Stefania – Department secretary.

She is brusque in dealings with incoming civilians; unfamiliar with her own responsibilities, deals with business inappropriately. Unable to pull her own weight while having exaggerated ambitions. Not fit to be a secretary, unable to handle responsibilities; she can be a typist.

Former Auschwitz prisoner. AK, lacking in political awareness. Fiancé in the AK.

External Service Department

Department Head – Lt. Dyguda, Euzebiusz52 – old soldier, fond of drink, but can handle himself. Good worker, PPS,53 member of the PPS municipal committee. Approved for the position of Head of the External Service Department.

Sub-Lt. Strzelecki, Edward – Deputy Head of Department, GL partisan, served under Przepiórka [Edward Gronczewski] and under Ciernic, politically reliable, works well. Deserving of promotion.

Sub-Lt. Kobryn, Józef – senior clerk in General Administration and Order Section; after verification: a captain, formerly AK. Wears captain insignia unlawfully. Hostile to the current system of government and the USSR, sneers at political parties. Spends time in PSL circles, himself a PSL follower. Loses considerable amounts in card games. Must have a source of income on the side. His opinions: What good is the [territory recovered in the] west to us? Poland should extend from sea to sea; drunkard, unfit for work.

Chor. Antkiewicz – Head of General Administration Section. Returned from a POW camp in Germany. Former Head of Regimental Office. No particular reason for objections have been found. Very hard-working, energetic, very good professional force.

Sen. Sgt. Mroczek, Stanisław – acting Head of Road Traffic Section. Formerly AL, currently PPR. No political objections.

Chor. Krzemień, Roman – Head of Information Section, active PPR [member]. Somewhat religious.

Investigations Department

Department Head Capt. Dobraczyński [Dobroczyński], Stefan54 – bourgeois and magnate. Colonel Kuźnicki perceives him as a great professional. Reluctant to serve in the MO. Currently enjoying a 6-week-long leave. Keeps going on hunting trips to Silesia. Spends time in reactionary circles, prosecutors, judges, etc., PSL followers. Colonel Kuźnicki does not see him as a dishonest man or one hostile [to the government].

Deputy Head of Department – Sub-Lt. Majewski[-Laske], Tadeusz55 – opportunistic PPR [follower]. Spends a lot of time with Lt. Gwiazdowicz, has the support of Capt. Olszański. Careerist, cunning, runs his own personnel policy, making work hard for peasants’ and workers’ sons.

Sub-Lt. Przygodka [actually: Przygoda], Stanisław56 – Clerk in Section I. Sympathizer and supporter of PSL circles. Claims to be a PPR man, but is actually a hard-headed fascist. Voiced an opinion: “What's the use of the [territory recovered in the] west; who's going to restore our eastern lands to us?” Graduate of the Officer School in Łódź. Not approved in this position. In my opinion, he should not be approved; works poorly, lazes around.

52 See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 183 et seq.
53 Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS).
54 See Note 45.
55 See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 357.
Sen. Sgt. Kuś, Franciszek\(^{57}\) – senior Clerk in Section I. Trained, works quite well, quite honest, no party affiliation. Should be approved.

*Chor.* Janowski, Władysław\(^{58}\) – Head of Section I – Formerly BCh. Now SL,\(^{19}\) no specific political objections.


Platoon-leader *podchorąży* Kowalski, Jan – former blue [policeman], senior clerk in Section I, served in the Polish Police during the occupation. Worked at a station in Kielce; brought over to the Headquarters by Capt. Dobraczyński [Dobroczyński], inseparable companion to Sendek [Stefan Sędek],\(^{60}\) good professional.

Sgt. Kemplewski – former blue [policeman] – Head of Science and Technology Section. A needed expert but a ruthless enemy of the current system of government. Spends time in reactionary circles. Has a lot of influence over Col. Kuźnicki. Whenever the Personnel Dept. assigns a man to work in the section, and Kemplewski suspects that he is a partisan, or a man of democratic views, he immediately submits a motion for dismissal to Col. Kuźnicki, and the latter dismisses him. Persecuted the KPP\(^{61}\) before the war.

Sub-Lt. Kurczyna, Władysław\(^{62}\) – Investigations Brigade in Section IV. Reliable. PPR member, solid worker.

Platoon-Leader Skrzyniarz, Władysław\(^{63}\) – Head of the Vice and Juvenile Delinquency Section. PPR – a skilled “swimmer”, knows how to make life easy for himself. No specific objections voiced by the party.

Citizen Werens, Maria – clerk in Section II, protégée of Capt. Dobraczyński [Dobroczyński]. Fired by the Commission and then rehired; a friend of Capt. Olszański’s. Enemy of democracy, very unintelligent.

Citizen Kosmala, Stefania – dactyloscopist, statistical clerk, protégée of Dobraczyński [Dobroczyński], in close contacts with him.

Citizen Zaremba, Władysław – I suggest he should not be approved for the position of investigative clerk but for the position of Head of the Gunsmith Shop instead; politically reliable.

It is apparent that the warrant officers and militiamen of the Operations Battalion tend to avoid wearing militia uniforms. They wear plain clothes most of the time.

Blue policemen are taken on without any objections, men who served during the occupation, and then had no employment until joining the MO, or, as they indicate themselves, involved in petty trading. I am sure that these people join the MO with a special mindset. They are left completely unchecked at work.

It is a matter of daily business to rehire former MO men without checking at least the reason for their previous dismissal.

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\(^{57}\) See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 198 et seq. Kuś was a policeman before the war and a blue policeman during the German occupation in the commune of Łuków; in the late 1940s, the District Court in Siedlce sentenced him to eight years of imprisonment for causing the deaths of about 60 Jews, and for personally shooting dead two Jewish children, a boy of fourteen and a girl of seven.

\(^{58}\) See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 196 et seq. On July 20, 1950, officer Władysław Janowski was sentenced to life in prison for killing several Jews in March 1943, including “two minors of Jewish nationality.”

\(^{59}\) People’s Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe, SL).

\(^{60}\) See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, pp. 344 et seq.

\(^{61}\) Communist Party of Poland (Komunistyczna Partia Polski, KPP).

\(^{62}\) See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 525.


\(^{64}\) See Tokarska-Bakir, 2018c, vol. 1, p. 174.
There are cases where County Chiefs appoint militiamen to specific posts without clearing it with the Personnel Dept. and the Voivodeship Chief.

The Personnel Department of the Voivodeship Headquarters lacks personnel files for a lot of militiamen who have served with the MO for several months already, so there has been ample time to open them.

And then the files that have already been opened are mostly incomplete. Questionnaires – imprecisely filled out (omitted rubrics), no added statements from organizations, interviews, etc.

Most officers wear officer insignia even though they have not had their ranks approved. E.g. Capt. [Antoni] Jarosz65 (Head of the Economic Department) and others, indicated above.

People are taken on who spent several months in prison on charges of collaboration with the Germans or membership in a band [of partisans].

The Political Formation Department is not cooperating with the Personnel Department.

There is no cooperation with the political organizations. The Kielce area ZWM66 is quite active. Many ZWM members ride into action along with the UB and militia. However, in those cases where the Committee assigns ZWM members to work in the MO, they are not accepted. Some of them go on to work in the UB, the rest have to leave Kielce because there are no major factories here, and consequently no jobs.

As their pretext for refusing to hire ZWM members, the Heads of the various departments, especially the Head of the Investigations Department [Tadeusz Majewski-Laske], cite their opinion that these are no professionals (they like the old blue policemen better).

Conclusions

Some shifting around is in order here and supervision to make sure that school graduates are appointed to posts of greater responsibility.

The Head of the Personnel Department should be instructed to work closer with the political organizations.

My attention has been drawn to the inappropriate conduct of the Deputy Head of Political Formation at the First Station in Kielce, who makes no effort whatsoever to explain the economic difficulties but, quite the contrary, misses no opportunity to incite the militiamen by blaming the Voivodeship Headquarters for how things are done there, as the reason why it is so hard and there are shortages of everything.

Due to insufficient time, I did not manage to find out whether his statements were dictated by ignorance or if it was deliberate action done on someone’s instructions.

I carried out an inspection of the Station in Kielce.

The Head of that Station is an old gendarmerie warrant officer, allegedly a KPP member before the war [Edmund Zagórski].67 He works well. Cooperates with the PPR. Runs the station well.

All the militiamen are fitted out with uniforms and only footwear is in short supply, so some wear very worn-out boots.

Generally, they complain about the shortage of fat. They have not been receiving cigarettes on a regular basis. There has been a backlog in the issue of cigarettes since March.

They have not been receiving issues of materials, or UNRRA packages. What, however, is most important, as it causes the greatest discontent among the militiamen, is the lack of food stamps for their families.

The Voivodeship Headquarters has not been issuing full sugar rations.

66 Union of Youth Struggle (Związek Walki Młodych, ZWM).

Wjadź w K.M.O. nastąpił dnia 11 maja 1946 r. wieszorem, o godz. 18.30.

W dniu 12 maja 1946 r. przeprowadzono inspekcję ogólnej Komendy Miasta Kielec, ponownie razem w ppłk. Szałasińskim najechali dyżurny otwarcie organizowanego okręgu oświatowego dla basicza. Są to oficer dyżurny plutonu oświatowego w pogańsku. Komenda zapewniła zastrzeżenie, ogólnie widać, że praca w kierunku uprawiania pracy Komendy Miasta.

Komendant ppłk. R. Mazur.

Około godz. 10.30 wzięliśmy się pod okrąg milicji w kierunku Kielec. Po drodze zaproszono posterunek M.O. w Szczodrowie.

Przypisaliśmy do Kielec w niedzielę po południu. Następnie przeprowadzono inspekcję Wydziału Personalnego K.M.O. i stwierdziliśmy:

1/ Szef Wydziału Personalnego ppłk. R. Adam - skarżył się, że ma duże trudności w pracy i szybko stan zdrowia, skutkiem czego nie może odpowiadać za okolicę roboczą personalną.

Rozmawiając z ptk. Kunickim po inspekcji, nie pytano dlaczego go jest taki razowy, odpowiedział mi, że tak musi być, bo w czasie wykonywania pracy samrstwa był on do nas, a nam powiniene za pomaganiu ich i tak dalej w tym stylu.

Ponieważ Komenda Wojew. jest opanowana przez wrogie nam elementy, sprzyja utrzymanych swoich niemowlątach, na które "wybitny Fuchowsy" jako były w p.p. i wakacje tego niestety - mając więc pewne wątpliwości, starali się w najmniejszej b. policjantów jak najdłużej dotrzeć. Udaję się na ta praca, ponieważ starałem się pomóc sobie znanie Komendanta i z kolei to nie to.

Skutkiem tego Komenda zapaleńcem jest AK-czyni, BCh-czyni, którzy do ostatniej chwili nigdzie nie pracowali, ale nagle nagle otrzymali "gorące" skierowane w M.O. i to na czulowych stanowiskach.

Jako jeden z takich "wybitnych skarbowców" został przyjęty kpt. zainstalowany przez polskiej DOMAGAŃSKIEJ, który był i niezwykle jest członkiem AK, czy BCh, zweryfikował nie do stopnia miejsca w grę i nie powiedział dyskusji mające.

W dalszym ciągu wykładu Komendanta Pernicznego:


chor. Kamieniecki Antoni - referent Kurzotek - zdolny, mało wybitny, w końcu pracuje przez przysłowie. Moje chcesz pracować w M.O., obciążony pracą wygodną, aby mógł nie utrzymywać i wygoda zycy. Były partyzant AL.

Ob. Leszczynska Maria - biurowica Sekcji Zwiastowani. Wrogo bukowana do obecnego ostrzał i BCh, ma podejrzenie o Folkadentach's, ukryte nie przed U.S. Była kilkakrotnie analiza i nowo przyjazna. Komplementarnie:

"Bielawicy, to budzi przypomnianie kobiet, grabierzy itp."

por. Kłosowski Władysław - Szef Sekcji Zwiastowani i Kurzotek pracuje z samowolnie z siebie, ale zamiast pracować, stary G.o.-wian nieco nerwowy, skory-gruslik, długo nie pracuje.

por. Kabylowski Jan - Szef Sekcji Dyscyplinarnej - przedwojenny Barszcz, czyta sztuka. Pracuje na raz dobrze, ale podejrzano i niepokojicie wieszac.


w czasie akcji pasował ludzi przebranych w trzonek.


Wydział Slubów Zewnętrznych.


pppor. Strzelecki Edward - s. in Szefa Wydziału, portymer A.K. był u przepisów i u Cierciaka, pewny politycznie, pracuje dobrze "zluczyło, aby go pociąć do awansu.


chor. Krzanek Roman - Szef Sekcji Informatyki, aktownik P.P.R. Trocha religijna.

Wdział Ślubów Władomowych


sierż. Nowak Tadeusz - st. referent Sekcji I - pijak, robi awantury, zdradza, dwubiegunowy, wyniki pracy słabe.

plut. por. Kowalski Jan - w granatowym, st. referent I Sekcji, słyszał w P.P.R. w czasie wojny. Był w konspiracji w Rzeszów, nie jest skomplikowany przez kpt. Dobrzańskiego; nieodpowiedzialny towarzysz Szczypta, dobrze zachowany.

Sierż. Wyd. Fer, który zawsze by praw w sekci, a Kompleks podejrzewam, że jest to partyzant, ozy też cieplik o poglądach demokratycznych, natychmiast występuje z winieniem o zwolnieni do płk. Kuzmickiego i tam ostatni znał.

Smbil przed wojną K.P.W.


Ob. Komanna Stefan - daktyloteka referent, statystyczny protokoman Dobroszyńskiego, ma i nie bliżny kontakt.

Ob. Saremba Władysław - proponuje nie zaściernic na stan. refer, ale zgodnego, natomiast zatwierdzono na stanowisku Szafa Kuzmickimi, pomy hòażystycznie.

Ob. Stewiarski Antoni - m. referent I Sekcji PPS, podobne przed wojną był kurasy ambasador ze kredytów. Obecnie pracuje b. dobrze. Wykrył cały krew nadalę.
Wicej, że podczerwone i milicjanci Batalionu Operacyjnego umieszczają, znanie munktu milicyjnego. Ochota w większej skali na czynnikach.

Przyjmuje się, że podczerwone milicjanci granatowy, którzy dokazali takie w czasie ekspozycji, do czynu wciągali, ale jak mówili, to w końcu, bandaegeri. Jestem pewien, że od lat walczy do M.O., a w specjalnym zastaniu. W czasie pracy nie sprawdza, ale ich wypłatę.

Na poziomie dziennym na sprawy przyjmuje, byli funkcjonariusz M.O., bez sprawdzenia chorych przychodzi ich wychodzenie.

Kazanie nie [], że sami Kształtowani Powiatowi niesąca na stanowiskach funkcjonariuszy, bez wypłacania z Wydziału i Komendantem Województwa.

W Wydziale Personalnym k. c. wojew. brak akt osobowych całego zespołu funkcjonariuszów. Wszyscy znamy w M.O. są od kilku miesięcy, byli więc osoby je zbudowane.

W te akt, które niezadzam, są przewodnie niezbędne, a nawet wymienione. Aktety - wypłacanie nieskończone i / lub wypłacanie na tego / brak milicjantów z organizacji, wywiązuje to. 


Prawdzili natomiast ludzie, którzy zainicjowali po kilka miesięcy w wizyrach pod zarządem współpracy w Mieszczan, czy to?

Wydział Pol. - Wych. nie współpracuje z Wydziałem Personalnym.

Brak współpracy z organizacją polityczną tyt. na teren kilka jest dosyć aktywny. Wielu niejedocen, najlepiej z M.O. i milicja na skutek. Jednak w wypadku, gdy sam razem, kilku milicjantów nie docen w pracy w M.O., nie przyjmuje ich nie. 

Opowiem w samych idzie do pracy w M.O., rozmia miejsc wyjazdy m. jąc, bo nie ma tu specjalnych fabryk, a co na tym idzie i pracy.

Jako prawdzie, to z więcej obozu, niesie również zespołowych wydziałów, niesioną sam bez "wydziału Ochotniczo, klasyfikować, na nie ma to zadnych technicznych / lepiej podobników nie na starzy granatów /.

W miastkach

W miastkach zrobiono trochę przemysłu i dopilnowano, aby obawiać się nie był kimś, byli kierowani na biegę odpowiedzialne stanowiska.

Słuszny zarząd umówł z dnia Wydziałem Personalnym, aby podziękował swój kontakt z organizacjami politycznymi.

Zerosz umowa z nim niewłaściwym szkoleniem, a co polit. Sza kierownice I Komisariat w zielonech, który obnaża nie staran nie wyjścia trudności gospodarczych, ale przeciwnie przy każdym przemyśle staran nie podburzane milicjanców, to jest to wina k. c. wojew., bo to wina zarządu, jakie tem podarże, słyszalno jest daleko i nie ma, 

Z powodu krótkiego czasu nie zdalnie się mortakowania, aby wystąpienie jego wypłynąć z niesłuszności, czy to jest to celowa robota w czynnych położeń.
Prasprocedziałe inspekcje komisariatu w Kielcach.

Z powodu tego komisariatu, jest mniej podoficer
zamieszkiwani, podobnie jak oficer przedwojennej
pracuje dobrze. Współpraca z PPR dobrze prowadzi
komisariat.

Wszyscy milicjanci posiadają mundury, brak tylko obuwia,
lecz nie niektórzy chodzą w bardzo podartych butach.
Ogólnie mówią one na brak płaców. Wszyscy otrzymują regularnie
papiernicę, ostatnio mniej przez marę z wydawaniem
papiernicą.

Nie otrzymują przyznawanych materiałów, ani paczek
HRDA. Jednakże zauważyłem, że współczesne zasady
wzorców milicjanów jest brak miłosierdzia, dla
rodziny.

Kształtu wykonane nie wydaje pełnych norm sukni.

W referacie złożonym pracuje b. policjant S i d e
k -ynth, którego znam, występuje przez poznaną
obserwacyjny

Uwaga, na nadzorze zgodnie z przepisami
In the investigations subsection, there is a man employed, a former policeman, Sendek [Stefan Sędek] – a hard-headed “enđek”,68 who openly speaks out against the doings of the current government. It is my opinion that he should be removed from such employment.

[Signature]

Article and appendix translated by Jerzy Jurus

References


68 Follower of the National Democracy movement (Narodowa Demokracja, ND).


Miazga. Odpowiedź Ryszardowi Śmietance-Kruszelnickiemu


Wyrażenia kluczowe: pogrom kielecki 4 lipca 1946 roku; pokłosie Holokaustu; antysemityzm powojenny