There is no one more inveterate or thorough in damaging freedom than liberal institutions (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 68).

The German Völkerkörper [people's body], which was filled to the brim, couldn't live without evacuating its purulent flesh. Perhaps for this reason, another of the German doctors defined Auschwitz as anus mundi, anus of the world (Esposito, 2008, p. 143).

Queerness is not yet here. Queerness is an ideality. Put another way, we are not yet queer. We may never touch queerness, but we can feel it as the warm illumination of a horizon imbued with potentiality. We have never been queer, yet queerness exists for us as an ideality that can be distilled from the past and used to imagine a future. The future is queerness's domain (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1).

Büchner’s Woyzeck is probably one of the most famous pieces in the history of Western theatre and drama. It was probably written in 1836 as a couple of versions of an unfinished manuscript, with some differences in the number of scenes and their structure throughout the play. These twenty-seven loosely
interconnected scenes were published in 1878 under the false and unprecise title of *Wozzeck* as a provocative anticipation of expressionist and naturalist dramaturgy. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, this text has become a challenge for any deeper philological and dramaturgical analysis, but it has also earned the status of one of the most influential German proto-modernist theatre pieces. Furthermore, it has become interesting for the general public – even for non-theatre goers – solely because it was based on a criminal investigation during the 1820s of a psychotic figure named Woyzeck who killed his lover in a cold-blooded manner. Crime of passion was suddenly implemented in a legal procedure, with all its controversies, dismantled not only as a juridical category but also as a psychological phenomenon. As a tragic working-class hero, Woyzeck is an experiment of the system that dialectically emerged in an even wider social experiment of obedience and exploitation on one hand and limited freedom and ethical responsibility on the other. His precarious nature is, thus, a pure reflection of the system’s hypocrisies, dismantled in a figure of a circus employee, and a cynical comment of a dominant rational philosophical dispositive.

Although these dramaturgical and philosophical elements of the play deserve to be analyzed more deeply, here I would like to focus more on the performativity of *Woyzeck’s* intertext (in Agamben’s sense of the word) as something that offers an opening but is not quite there yet – as an interpretative network that calls upon a theoretical framework rather than offering it as a *reading automaton*. Therefore, Montažstroj’s performance of Georg Büchner’s play will broadcast this kind of potentiality for me, mainly because of its theoretical background in *the political*, as an ontic dimension that perverts the habitual analysis of any performance stratum.

Montažstroj’s performance was entitled *Who is? Woyzeck*, and it was supposed to function as a tragic history about individuals’ open wounds that will never heal, especially in the context of technodemocracy or liberal deprivation processes. Woyzeck was, therefore, transformed into a perversion of a tragic hero whose voice cannot be heard. As he was deprived, deprivileged, and socially unacceptable, Woyzeck soon became a symbolic devoid

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1 Montažstroj is a Croatian interdisciplinary performance art group established in 1989 by Borut Šeparović. Their performative practice is oriented towards interventions in the public sphere, political theatre, physical and immersive performance practices, etc. Since their establishment they have produced more than one hundred theater and performance works in all aesthetic regimes and production environments.
of humanity, at first turned into an animal, pure zoe, and thus treated like one by the system. Nevertheless, Montažstroj’s project was eager to explore the politics of power in which the individual is subdued by numerous forms of violence and the way it resonates in human intimacy. The rhythmic changing of scenes depicting social coercion and private agony was supposed to question the world of isolated and lonely individuals. Woyzeck was presented as a pure phenomenon – as an in-dividual – trapped in a Hegelian master-slave relation, thus as a non-person in a specific situation of desire, violence, love, betrayal, jealousy and murder, with no way out. This performance of two men and a woman on a stage – bombarded with techno and rave music – together with pure channels of associations derived from various sources (not only but primarily from Büchner's text) functioned as a deconstructive and multi-layered re-inscription of the political and discursive regimes deprived to frenetic music samples. Büchner’s dramaturgical impetum and textual fragmentation was, therefore, not conceived but revealed as a constitutive element of the performative interpretation. Resonances of music, embodiment, the vocal expressions of the three performers, as well as the author’s fragmented scenes, reemerged as a vital force in a deconstructive network of meaning that is eager to become a political symbol of deprivation. This symbolism was again craving for its lost meaning in the sphere of the political. Montažstroj’s performance piece, as well as Bucher’s play, immediately calls upon the Hegelian notion of the master and the slave, lordship and bondage, mastery and servitude. Nevertheless, before evoking his dialectics, let me propose a biopolitical axis that might lie behind this play, as well as it is implemented in the core of the group’s interpretation of Büchner’s text. Concepts of biopower and biopolitics are arguably the most compelling concepts in Foucault’s theoretical heritage, although these references remain highly speculative and incomplete, or sometimes even incoherent. But if biopolitics can be understood as a kind of political rationality that deals with concepts of life, introducing biopower as a transformative mechanism of power, then subordination strategies, subjection and control are means of biopolitics sui generis. The judicial discourse that strikes upon individuals like Woyzeck is, of course, a repressive, oppressive and negative one, but it also coordinates itself with a life’s bare positivity; as a mechanism of power, it puts Büchner’s main character in a framework of medicine, scientific rationality, experiment, medical statistics, health improvement policies, etc. Capitalist governmentality exposes its mechanisms through the “positive” capacities of “the political” – through its interventions inside the sphere of bios. Archeology
of biopower is simple enough and has its starting point (as Foucault emphasizes several times) in Schmittian views on decisionism as a determinant factor of sovereignty, whereby the sovereign decides upon life and death, not without an exception but inside of the systematic perversion of the exception. During the seventeenth century this notion of decisionist power structures began to change, finally integrating the political in a more complex discursive mechanism, a dual structure, not antithetic, with a disciplinary power on one hand, embodied in an imprisonment, as well as in a dichotomy between discipline and punishment, and

the second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause this to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of intervention and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population (Foucault, 1978, p. 139).

It is important to say that both of these intrinsic modes of power rely on the concept of servitude and enslavement, depicted either by notions of subjectification and disciplinarity or, in a biopolitical sense, the notion of a regulatory subjugation. A well-known mechanism of modern power was, in a way, already on the horizon as an indispensable element for the development of docile labor embodiment, neoliberal economy and modern forms of capitalism. State-produced stereotypes and government-supported inclusion-exclusion parameter(s) function as an essential mechanism of the modern biopolitical state apparatus. Michel Foucault’s notions of biopower and biopolitics were interpreted in many ways and criticized due to their inconsistencies. One of the most appealing reinterpretations of the intersections of life, body and politics – at least in the context of the proposed analysis of Montažstroj’s performance – can be found in Giorgio Agamben’s philosophical thought, especially in *The Use of Bodies* (Agamben, 2016). There he emphasizes that the expression ‘the use of the body’ can already be found at the beginning of Aristotle’s *Politics*,

at the point where it is a question of defining the nature of the slave [sic!]. Aristotle has just affirmed that the city is composed of families or households (*oikiai*) and that the family, in its perfect form, is composed of slaves and free people (*ek doulon kai eleutheron* – the slaves are mentioned before the free; 1253b 3–5). Three types of relations define the family: the despotic (*despotikè*) relation between the master (*despotes*) and the slaves, the matrimonial (*gamikè*) relation between the husband
and wife, and the parental (technopoietikè) relation between the father and the children (7–11). That the master/slave relation is in some way, if not the most important, at least the most evident is suggested – aside from its being named first – by the fact that Aristotle specifies that the latter two relations are ‘nameless’, lacking a proper name (which seems to imply that the adjectives gamikè and technopoietikè are only improper denominations devised by Aristotle, while everyone knows what a ‘despotic’ relation is) (Agamben, 2016, p. 3).

Furthermore, being a slave is defined in a negative way, depicting its otherness, while being human is always defined by its nature of another and not of itself. Relying on a Platonic tradition, according to Agamben, Aristotle was eager to manifest domination of the master over the slave through that of the soul over the body. But, the relation proposed by a Greek philosopher is not defined in a political context. Its semantics should be traced in the context of a genuine oikia, a household where, at least “according to the clear distinction that separates the household (oikia) from the city (polis) […], a relationship soul/body (like master/slave) is an economic-domestic relationship and not a political one” (Agamben, 2016, p. 4). Exactly at that point and out of that context the Aristotelian definition of a slave emerges as a being whose work is the use of the body. As his ergon is not entirely human or properly human, although being human, a slave functions as a human being who is not of himself but of another […], that is to say, it is a matter of establishing whether there exists in nature a body corresponding to the definition of the slave. Thus, the inquiry is not dialectical but physical, in the sense in which Aristotle distinguishes in On the Soul (403a 29) the method of a dialectic, which defines, for example, anger as a desire for vengeance, from that of physics, which will see in it only a boiling of blood in the hearth” (Agamben, 2016, p. 8).

The body of a slave, thus, has a pure physical form in strength for a necessary use or service, if not for servitude. Aristotle will, therefore, introduce a useful comparison between a slave and ktemata, a tool, and the instruments (organa), in order to conclude – according to Agamben – that slaves can be appropriated as animated equipment (ktema ti empsychon). This living instrument, an automaton, can easily be implemented in Foucauldian notions of biopolitical regulatory or control mechanisms, although, as emphasized by Agamben, “a first, necessary precaution is therefore that of abstracting the slave’s ‘use of the body’ from the sphere of poiesis and production, in order to restore it to the sphere – according to Aristotle by definition unproductive – of praxis and mode of life” (Agamben, 2016, p. 12).
Total assimilation of a slave, firstly in the sphere of the household, then in the sphere of *praxis*, allows Agamben to imply that a slave is not to be considered as only a slave, but as a part of his own entity, and a part of his own body. “The slave is a part (of the body) of the master, in the ‘organic’ and not simply instrumental sense of the term, to such an extent that Aristotle can speak of a ‘community of life’ between slave and master (*koinonos zoes; 1260a 40)” (Agamben, 2016, p. 13). *Praxis* of the slave, at least I think so, can be defined as a pure usage of one’s body, as an embodiment *per se*, and not as productive labor or work.

Agamben’s master-slave dialectics is deeply interwoven with his own philosophy of potentiality, where a figure of a slave functions as something repressed in Western *bios*, and “the reemergence of the figure of the slave in the modern worker thus appears, according to the Freudian scheme, as a return of the repressed in a pathological form” (Agamben, 2016, p. 21). The indefinable position between *bios* and *zoe*, between the economy and politics, between *physis* and *nomos*, at least in my opinion, opens a possibility for a performative interpretation of both mastery and servitude. The slave can easily end up in a position of mastery, as in a perverse (sado)masochistic phantasy, whereby role-playing encourages submission and repression. Or, to put it in Foucault’s terms, sadomasochism is the core-structure of subjectification; it is a linguistic and discursive game with reciprocal transformation of subjects into the subjected, desire into labor, and vice versa. The most quoted definition of sadomasochism’s fluidifying strength over power relations appears in an interview from 1982, where Foucault declares that

S&M is the eroticization of power, the eroticization of strategic relations. What strikes me with regard to S&M is how it differs from social power. What characterizes power is the fact that it is a strategic relationship which has been stabilized through institutions […] At this point, the S&M game is very interesting because it is a strategic relation, but it is always fluid. Of course, there are roles, but everyone knows very well that those roles can be reversed. Sometimes the scene begins with the master and slave, and at the end the slave has become the master. Or, even when the roles are stabilized, you know very well that it is always a game. Either the rules are transgressed, or there is an agreement, either explicit or tacit, that makes them aware of certain boundaries (Foucault, 1997, p. 169).

So, there is a kind of (bio)technology in the deep structure of the enslavement procedure which is relatively unstable and hard to grasp. Agamben underlines the fact that the economization of manual labor and emergence
of technology can easily be explained inside of the master-slave paradigm. The symmetry between the slave and the machine in Greek society was so evident that there was indeed no need for any pre-technological development. A slave is not a machine, although some of the machine’s functions resonate inside of the master-slave paradigm. Montažstroj’s performance, as I will insist, reflects upon this problematic or subtle difference between slaves’ bodies as, first, human-animals or animal-humans and, secondly, as living instruments and instruments of life. This can be summarized in the following manner:

That is to say, the slave constitutes in the history of anthropogenesis a double threshold in which animal life crosses over to the human just as the living (the human) crosses over into the inorganic (into the instrument), and vice versa. The invention of slavery as a juridical institution [as depicted by Foucault, for example] allowed the capture of living beings and of the use of the body into productive systems, temporarily blocking the development of the technological instrument; its abolition in modernity freed up the possibility of technology, that is, of the living instrument […] Insofar as they have lost, together with the use of bodies, their immediate relation to their own animality – modern human beings have not truly been able to appropriate to themselves the liberation from labor that machines should have procured for them. And if the hypothesis of a constitutive connection between slavery and technology is correct, it is not surprising that the hypertrophy of technological apparatuses has ended up producing a new and unheard-of form of slavery (Agamben, 2016, p. 79).

Mechanization of a slave is not merely an instrumentalization procedure. It encompasses a much deeper and more complex dialectics in which the master-slave relationship is reflected-upon internally from the position of the system itself. Agamben’s notions of enslavement should be interpreted in the context of his homo sacer project, in which the following hypotheses emerge: first, the state of exception, as a zone of separation between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, sovereignty and submission; second, sovereign is the one that produces bare life as an original social and political element, articulated in between nature on one hand and culture on the other, between zoe and bios; the third fundamental biopolitical paradigm is, predominantly, in charge of subduing bare life to zoe-like entity, like the one of the concentration camp. Therefore, the ban encompasses bare life and sovereignty, creating an explicit extraneousness, an idea of an uninscribable exteriority: “Sovereign violence is in truth founded not on a pact but on the exclusive inclusion of bare life in the state” (Agamben, 1998, p. 107; for a critical account of Agamben’s thesis see Laclau, 2014, pp. 207–220).
The technocentric utopia of Montažstroj’s project relies exactly on this incoherence between *bios* that pre-includes *zoe*, mastery including enslavement, or inconsistencies inside of a system that creates mastery on one hand and servitude on the other. Woyzeck behaves as a machine, as a biomechanical apparatus, not in order to create the illusion of its own servitude habitus, but to re-perform the crack between different forms of slavery inside of the neoliberal and capitalist matrix. He is that *no-thing* of the *communitas*, asserted by Esposito, not in a sense of pure and deliberative negation of the identity, nor in the context of a concealing one, but, moreover, in a sense of belonging to a wider community that is also not an entity:

nor is it a collective subject, nor a totality of subjects, but rather is the relation that makes them no longer individual subjects because it closes them off from their identity with a line, which traversing them, alters them: it is the ‘with’, the ‘between’, and the threshold where they meet in a point of contact that brings them into relation with others to the degree to which it separates them from themselves (Esposito, 2010, p. 139).

Woyzeck is surrounded by a pure form of nihilism, which is the suppression of the *no-thing-in-common*, “a nothing squared: nothing multiplied and simultaneously swallowed by nothing” (Esposito, 2010, p. 140). Indeed, in Büchner’s play as well as in Montažstroj’s performance, a tragic hero functions as a prosthesis, a social void or a non-organ – a non-existing-organ that ought to be removed from the living segment of the body in order to amplify it, outline its inherent life-border, delineate it as *something-still-alive*.

II

The phenomenon of a machine that is touched upon here is of utmost importance for the interpretation of a master narrative, but also for the analysis of the uncanny effect that Woyzeck’s particle-entity evokes in a play – and especially in Montažstroj’s performance. Let me shortly approach the *uncanny effect* from Roberto Esposito’s biopolitical standpoint before tracing it back to Freud. In two of his recent accounts on the problems of *communitas*, Esposito invests a lot of effort in tracing a Heideggerian notion of life which is subordinated to a machine, thus constructed by life itself, to a broader political sphere:

To begin with, it must be noted that the first role of machination is to hide what it produces. Instead of referring to ‘disenchantment’, machination actually has more
to with an opposite effect of ‘enchantment’ [which, relying on Heidegger, often] comes from ‘the unbridled dominance of machination. When machination attains ultimate dominance, when it pervades everything, then there are no more circumstances whereby the bewitchery can be sensed explicitly and resisted’ […] The fact that machination ‘bewitches’ means not only that it produces enchantment, but at the same time it conceals the original link that unites enchantment to disenchantment, tying them together in a metaphysical bond (Esposito, 2015, p. 26).

Even if the possibility of turning them off exists, they are, nevertheless, closely connected with the apparatuses, with the sphere of political, which influence our own possibility to turn them off. The link between subjectivity and subjugation, therefore, puts the notion of life (human) in an awkward position of a fluid or even masterless mastership. Machination of Woyzeck’s responses to bare life ought to be interpreted not in the context of his servitude, his fear of death, but of a death, or even death’s return – usually in a form of uncanniness. This fear is, above all, a common fear, or even a communal fear, but moreover, a reciprocal fear of the natural state:

This explains, therefore, the otherwise paradoxical birth of law and morality from the most illegitimate and immoral act, but nevertheless always ‘sacred’ (as every ritual sacrifice is etymologically ‘sacred’): [that of the very] ‘recognition of mutual obligations; institutions declared sacred, which could not be broken” (Esposito, 2010, p. 37).

Clearly, the politics of life always risks being reversed into a work of death. In the first volume of the History of Sexuality Michel Foucault is already assertive: “One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1978, p. 138). Thus, new concepts of a biopolitical sovereignty and slavery emerge from these Foucaultian notions, where the concept of slave is not the one conferring significance on that of the free man, the master, the lord, but the other way around. “And, as has repeatedly been brought to light, this relation is inverted in the modern period, when it begins to assume increasingly the features of a so-called negative liberty, with respect to that defined instead as ‘positive’, as in ‘freedom from’” (Esposito, 2008, p. 70). In order to ensure freedom, by all means, liberal societies obscure it by setting rules, norms, procedures and obligations, usually in an abstract form of political framework. There is always that uncanny presence of a machine, an institution, or another lifeless entity present – to control bare life. In Freud’s text, published in 1919, uncanniness is not always used in a clearly definable and precise sense, because the author is more eager to show how it tends to coin-
cide with whatever excites the dread. Freud insists that the word *unheimlich* should not be interpreted as something frightening, only because it is strange and therefore unfamiliar. Instead, he proposes an ambivalent meaning which coincides and presupposes its opposite, *Heimlich* or the canny. Its notion is situated in a vague area, betwixt-and-between of an apparently animate being on one hand, real liveness, and, conversely, a lifeless object, an automaton or appearance, with a peculiar emotional effect of the thing. Woyzeck is precisely a derivation of the thing, a victim of social and economic forces, patronized by a figure of a captain he shaves, being told that he lacks morals because of his illegitimate child, treated as an experiment by a military doctor, desperately poor, etc. Abolishing the hierarchy of suffering, as it has been often stated, Woyzeck is left with a mute soul, an unlively one, predicted to be and to function just as an experiment. This transformation, him becoming a pure *lusus naturae*, actually evokes an uncanny effect. In Montažstroj’s version, therefore, he needs to be amplified, even doubled, because in Freudian terms precisely this other-that-is-not-the-other, a double, was originally supposed to be an insurance against destruction of the ego, denial of the power of death, an immortal embodied *Doppelgänger* which preserves the original’s *bios*. Nevertheless, recurrences of the same entity or the same situation often led to terror, a demonic repetition, suddenly attributed to the uncanny otherness. Or, in Freud’s words:

This is the place now to put forward two considerations which, I think, contain the gist of this short study. In the first place, if psychoanalytic theory is correct in maintaining that every emotional effect, whatever its quality, is transformed by repression into morbid anxiety, then among such cases of anxiety there must be a class in which the anxiety can be shown to come from something repressed which recurs. This class of morbid anxiety would then be no other than what is uncanny, irrespective of whether it originally aroused dread or some other affect. In the second place, if this is indeed the secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why the usage of speech has extended *das Heimliche* into its opposite *das Unheimliche*; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old – established in the mind that has been estranged only by the process of repression. This reference to the factor of repression enables us, furthermore, to understand [Friedrich] Schelling’s definition of the uncanny as something which ought to have been kept concealed but which has nevertheless come to light (Freud, 1955, pp. 12–13).

Woyzeck’s uncanny presence on the stage surely interacts with its bondsman’s identity, if not total deprivation and servitude. But, as I mentioned before, leaning on a biopolitical paradigm, his servitude also includes a community
of life which is underlined in a most convincing way by Montažstroj’s performance. It is as though a pure Hegelian notion was called upon the stage.

Hegel discusses the notion of consciousness in general but is willing to define it in a more coherent way in relation to the subjectivity. Thus, he takes the idea to the next level, asserting that self-consciousness presumes subjects being also objects to other subjects, or – to put it in more Hegelian terms – self-consciousness is exactly the awareness of another’s awareness of oneself. A struggle for recognition, deeply implied in the self-consciousness formation processes, emerges at the point where the self and the other come together, which makes self-consciousness possible, and, on the other hand, in the moment when one becomes conscious of the otherness-effect, either vis-à-vis others or oneself, precisely in the zone of differentiation. This zone is, therefore, a place of in-difference where individuals are paradoxically seeking equality and hegemony, relationship and independence, all at the same time. One presumes the role of a bondsman, the other of the servant, whereby the master and slave dichotomy is established. Although the slave is deeply dependent upon the master he nevertheless reflects the lord’s desire to assert his own pure consciousness. He is perfectly aware that from the lord’s position, he is only a thing, rather than a self-aware being, thus reflecting his otherness. The master, the lord, occupies a position of the dominant’s pure enjoyment, while the slave continues to reflect on his status of a subordinated otherness. However, the position of lordship is also not completely satisfying – not without a reflection-effect. In negating his own consciousness, in turning the slave into an object unessential to his own self-consciousness, he is not able to establish a relation of recognition for himself and for his bondsman, who is thus able to find his satisfaction in a labor-process, transforming objects, and therefore claiming a mind of his own (Hegel, 1977, pp. 104–138). This Hegelian dialectic suggests a certain type of coherence between concrete and abstract, subject and object, partiality and wholeness – according to him, both master and slave recognize their own existence only in a relation or even some kind of reconciliation of the otherness, participating in each other’s power formations.

Although some postcolonial critics have successfully shown that it is absolutely possible to show how the master laughs at the slave’s consciousness (“I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically from the master described by Hegel. For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not rec-
ognition but work” (Fanon, 1967, p. 220)). In this analysis of Montažstroj’s performance I will stick to the previously constructed dialectics where “man is never simply man. He is always, necessarily, and essentially, either Master or Slave” (Kojève, 1980, p. 8). Büchner’s play is probably one of the first working-class tragedies, but it also opens a space for a non-dialectical interpretation of the main character. In the original text, but in Montažstroj’s performance as well, a pessimistic future of the world was shown. Different conceptions of slavery, whether to a single master, godlike figure, or a capital, eliminate every possibility of equality and freedom – but also a possibility of *jouissance*. Mastery will be eliminated in a utopian paradigm of slave-citizen transformation, whereby the future belongs to labor or to laborious enslavement in constant search for recognition. These pseudo-Marxist and Kojève-like interpretations open a space for understanding Büchner’s text in all its inconsistencies, fragmentation and uncanniness. Furthermore, they call upon the biopolitical paradigm of analysis, which is also pre-existent in Hegel, opening itself to notions, already introduced here – relying on Agamben – of the community of life. At one point, Hegel emphasizes:

> Self-consciousness is, to begin with, simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else. For it, its essence and absolute object is ‘I’; and in this immediacy, or in this [mere] being, of its being-for-self, it is an individual [*sic!*]. What is ‘other’ for it is an unessential, negatively characterized object. But the ‘other’ is also a self-consciousness; one individual is confronted by another individual. Appearing thus immediately on the scene, they are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being [or immediacy] of *Life* – for the object in its immediacy is here determined as Life (Hegel, 1977, p. 113).

The notion of an individual or a person is presumably one of the key notions of modern democracy. Political organizations, as it is often claimed, depend “not on the voluntary and rational choice of individuals united in a foundation pact, but on the inextricable knot of strengths and instincts that are innervated in the individual body, and even more in the ethnically determined traits of different populations” (Esposito, 2011, p. 207). Hegel’s claim about the essential and absolute object as ‘I’ is therefore included in a biopolitical theory of subjection and, to put it in Foucauldian terms, subjectification, as a transition from activity to passivity, embodiment and pure rationality, from lordship to bondage, *subjectus to subiectum*.

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The figure of Woyzeck is perceived only as a body, pure embodiment, an experiment, and he is not even able to activate the emancipation process “from the corporeal substrate that indisputably makes the body the property of the person who inhabits it” (Esposito, 2011, p. 211). He is being a body, not having it, which brings me back to a biopolitical toolness or instrumentalization of slaves that is already depicted in biopolitical philosophical thought. The amplification of a paradoxical form of the slave’s existence, already underlined by Hegel, ought to be appropriated in a discourse of biopolitics, like in Esposito’s case: “Once again, the apparatus of personhood reveals itself as a terrible thing that, separating life from itself, can always push it into a zone of indistinction with its opposite” (Esposito, 2011, p. 212). In his 1901 essay about the psychopathology of everyday life, Sigmund Freud analyses a problem of forgetting names, finally leading to total memory loss, especially memory of the proper nouns. This leads him to a conclusion that personhood formation is deeply indebted to a link between identity and alterity, the all-encompassing "I" and the otherness in constant relation. Esposito quotes the following paragraph by Freud: “It is as if I were obliged to compare everything I hear about other people with myself; as if my personal complexes were put on alert whenever another person is brought into my notice” (Freud, 1966, p. 24, in Esposito, 2011, p. 214). This antipodal formation of a person, whether in Freud or Esposito, at least in my opinion ought to be reflected upon in the context of Hegel’s notion of constant interdependency between the master and slave’s self-consciousness. Furthermore, this problem emerges in Montažstroj’s production as well, as I will try to show later on, already in the modification of Büchner’s original title to Who is? Woyzeck, whereby the question of the name and the problem of being (“is”) get its utmost importance. Woyzeck, as a protagonist, is always in a position of a non-person, in constant relation to the third-person’s activity, whether these are military physicians or staff. This radical criticism of the institution of personhood deliberately ends up in negative biopolitics, where life is not to be sacrificed but, previously subdued to power, deprived, and finally eliminated as such. Experiment and military obedience, according to Büchner’s plot, will become the most direct and the most powerful interlocutors of one’s body, regulating birth, sexuality, nutrition and health (Woyzeck is fed only peas as an embodied experiment), and death as well. A new form of biopolitical bondage emerges, exemplified in the following fragment form Büchner, where the Doctor disciplines the protagonist after seeing him urinating on the street, clearly, only because of pure experimental reasons – a waist of urine:
Let it call! Haven’t I proved that the *musculus constrictor vesicae* is subject to the will? Nature indeed. Man is free. Man is the transfiguration of the individual urge to freedom. Can’t hold his water. [Shakes his head, puts his hands behind his back and walks up and down.] Have you eaten your peas, Woyzeck? Nothing but peas, *cruciferae*, remember. There is going to be a revolution in science, I’ll blow the whole thing sky-high. Uric acid 0.10, ammonium hydrochlorate, hyperoxide. – Woyzeck, can’t you have another piss? Go inside and try (Büchner, 2008, p. 115).

III

Not oversimplifying Hegel’s master-slave dialectics, which is not easy, Alain Badiou tries to re-establish a perfectly valid tristinction between what he is to call

a simple object in the world, a thing of the world which must be absolutely analyzed as any other thing. It is a body, a package of organs, a set of cells, finally a package of atoms, and ultimately a senseless movement of a billion of particles. This is what Hegel calls *the in-itself*. Secondly, one can regard the individual as knowing itself, not simply as known thing, but as having the reflective capacity to know itself and consequently as being what Hegel calls a ‘self-consciousness’. The individual exists in-itself but also *for-itself*, that is to say in an effective relation to itself. And then, thirdly, one can consider that this individual [in-itself] exists as an individual that can be recognized as the individual that it is by an other, particularly by an other individual. This is the figure of the other, that Sartre will call *for-other*. On an elementary descriptive level one very nicely finds again the Hegelian triplicity of in-itself, for itself and for the other” (Badiou, 2017, p. 37).

But, in order for the self-consciousness to be established, as well as in order for the individual to exist, it needs to be recognized. A typical Hegelian asymmetry arises: the master is put on the side of enjoyment, while the slave thus inhabits a vague area of labor. The thing that strikes me here the most, somewhere in the middle of Alain Badiou’s argument, is the fact that he destabilizes the Hegelian dialectic even more, merely by introducing the concept of double(ness) or the usage of a twin:

We are thus in a logic of the double, a logic which has had many consequences, particularly aesthetic ones (the use of the twin; the fascinating theme of the doubling, of the double). But the double is a symmetry, a symmetrical identity. If I stay with the double, nothing is produced: it is a closed and static structure, since we have a primitive reciprocity where everyone recognizes the other as it is recognized.
by the other. We are apparently in an impasse of the dialectical process which seems to have stagnated in this primitive reciprocity" (Badiou, 2017, p. 39).

He concludes his commentary on Hegel with the following hypothesis, which is substantial for my analysis of the Woyzeck performance: first, the master is able to recognize self-consciousness at the expense of life, to put it in biopolitical terms, accepting the risk of death; second, at the same time, the slave is eager to abandon the principle of self-recognition in order to preserve his life; and finally, the third hypothesis asks for the extrinsic approach, where the master, faced with death, renounces the immediacy of life but in order to fall in the immediacy of enjoyment is enchained to a thing whose true master is the slave. To put it in other words:

In this sense the master becomes the slave of the slave. On his side, the slave has on the contrary accepted, out of fear of death, the primacy of immediate survival. But forced to work and accept the mediation of labor, he has created culture, becoming in this way a future master of the master. In the incapacity to live otherwise than in the present, the master becomes the slave of the slave, in turn, the slave devoted to the future becomes the master of the master (Badiou, 2017, p. 41).

Having in mind that Montažstroj’s performance employs two male characters that function both as twins and antipodes, it is important not only to put them in Badiou’s doubleness paradigm or, furthermore, in a Hegelian matrix of bondage, but also to depict them as uncanny and queer. Homoerotic latency is of utmost importance for the group’s vision of the play, whether in explicit nakedness and physicality or actual contact between performers. The subject in the play, as well as in the performance, is produced at the same time as its object, being at the border of transcendence. Woyzeck’s consciousness is, therefore, not split, but it actually is a one and only true life-consciousness. To put it differently: “We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is nothing is itself a life” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 27). The twin figure of Woyzeck on the stage is a symptom of this pure immanence because it does not strive for individuality, but – in its uncanniness and queerness – it even opens a space for singularization. Following Deleuze: “For example, very small children all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality, but they have singularities: a smile, a gesture, a funny face – not subjective qualities. Small children, through all their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an immanent life that is pure power and even bliss” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 30). In a way, Montažstroj’s Woyzeck is uncanny, childishly singular, and queer at
the same time. Of course, this doesn’t mean that some of these features are not to be found in the performance’s prototext, Büchner’s play, but Montažstroj definitely insisted on this kind of semantics. Notions of singularity, uncanniness and queerness in Who is? Woyzeck are interrelated to those of “becoming a subject” and “dealing with death”. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is a result of voluntary playfulness

of risk consciously assumed by the subject […] In other words, the human being truly becomes a subject – that is, separated from the animal – in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as violence of negativity) […] Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work of death is precisely how Hegel defines the life of the Spirit” (Mbembé, 2003, p. 14).

Mbembé has offered a definition of death as a certain excess, an anti-economy of life where biopower takes control, and, in a colonial way, where the emancipation process is precisely a process of de-shadowing the slave’s existence. Again, a certain desire is activated, but, as the author emphasizes, in a key of necropolitics rather than politics of life. All aspects of master-slave dialectics, as underlined by Butler, offer a kind of regard to desire. Desire in Hegel’s oeuvre is canceled yet preserved, transformed in a different mode of human striving. Self-consciousness is desire in particular, and even labor is inhibited desire:

The initial encounter with the Other is thus a narcissistic project which fails through an inability to recognize the Other’s freedom […] Thus, insofar as it is the body of the Other that is seen to lay claim to freedom, it is that body that must be destroyed. Only through the death of the Other will the initial self-consciousness retrieve its claim to autonomy (Butler, 1999, p. 49).

The life and death struggle, combat between violence and existence, is crucial in Hegel’s thought. The dynamics of mastery and servitude emerges exactly from the concept of desire, in all its uncanniness, singularity or queerness – domination on one hand and total submission on the other:

The lord and the bondsman turn against life in different ways, but both resist the synthesis of corporeality and freedom, a synthesis that alone is constitutive of human life; the lord lives in dread of his body, while the bondsman lives in dread of freedom" (Butler, 1999, p. 55).

Woyzeck’s desire, expressed only through servitude and labor in Büchner’s play, transforms itself through the twin-like structure of Who is? Woyzeck, both through jouissance and labor. Desire directs itself to another desire, thus
trembling somewhere between sadism and masochism, creation and delineation of self-consciousness. Desire is both a productive and generative force that needs to be deconstructed not as a lack (manque), like in Judeo-Christian ideology, but as normative ideal, as affirmative (productive) power, or, to put it simply in Deleuze and Guattari’s biopolitical terms – life-affirming indeed. In other words. “Because distinction is no longer understood as a prerequisite for identity, otherness no longer presents itself as that to be ‘labored upon’, superseded or conceptualized” (Butler, 1999, p. 209).

Relying upon Deleuze and Guattari’s teleology, life-affirming desire, suspended by capitalism and psychoanalytic ideology, opens up in all its queerness in the performance of the Woyzeck-project, so the protagonist is being liberated not through his will-to-live but through his desire-to-live. The twin-structure of the performance, its uncanny doubleness, simulates a sadomasochistic relation, where everything is open as a perpetual novelty and a tension of uncertainty substitute an illusion of determinacy and finitude. This is why Agamben implies that such a community of life is so pre-juridical, that it often demands a more stable definition of the master-slave relationship,

almost as if otherwise they would slide into a confusion and a kononia tes zoes that the juridical order cannot admit except in the striking and despotic intimacy between master and slave. And what seems so scandalous to us moderns – namely, property rights over persons – could in fact be the originary form of property, the capture (the ex-ceptio) of the use of bodies in the juridical order (Agamben, 2016, p. 36).

Although in Hegel’s oeuvre bodies are rarely subjected to philosophical or theoretical speculation, most of his other categories, like those of desire, death, life, or enjoyment and labor, reflect upon bodily issues. Slave’s labor ought to be defined as a process of perpetual marking and unmarking, signing and re-signifying objects of his labor. The signature that he puts on the object’s body is immediately expropriated by a lord, even erased, re-signified, in a constant, circular process. Woyzeck’s identity, therefore, is precisely a palimpsest one; it is a product of an ownership, power strategy, a being that is “produced through a set of consequential erasures […] The bondsman’s fear then consists in the experience of having what appears to be his property expropriated” (Butler, 1997, pp. 39–40). This has many effects on the embodied structure of the slave, the bondsman. First, this emblematized laboring device is recast and subject to death. Second, absolute fear of death is thus replaced by absolute law, as is so clear in Woyzeck’s case. He is always subjected to different law-paradigms, all metaphors of death, and he is not even able to interpret them in a coherent way. He is trapped in a constant
circle of animal-like procedures – instead of the Hegelian defecation, constant demand for urination appears “as an object of self-preoccupation” (Butler, 1997, p. 50), leading to final wretchedness. As in the case of imprisonment, in Foucault, where the prison acts on the subject’s body as a norm of behavior – a model for an exemplary self-obedience – in Woyzeck’s case medical experiments function as rendering devices for a coherent appropriation and subjection of the protagonist’s individuality (Foucault’s *assujettissement*). Power acts not only intrinsically in the body but also on the body, extrinsically, where “his subject appears at the expense of the body, [which is] an appearance conditioned in inverse relation to the disappearance of the body” (Butler, 1997, pp. 91–92). Woyzeck’s death is, therefore, constantly being postponed. He is being more and more present in the play, which is of course (over)amplified in Montažstroj’s performance. Some of the most important *topoi* of his bodily presence include strategies of autoeroticism, physical or mental exhaustion, ritualistic and almost incoherent stage presence, biomechanics, self-mutilation, etc. Although in Hegel the notion of body is not so persistent, it is implicitly present in his definition of *form*, which is again interconnected with desire, life, immanence, death, and two consciousnesses. *Sois mon corps*, which is the master’s injunction to the slave, opens a space for the post-humanist anthropology of the body. Malabou and Butler, among others, focus precisely on the impossibility of actualizing this sort of injunction in a form of separation of subjectivity from the body. Complete detachment from the body is just as impossible and unavoidable as pure animality, or pure *zoe*, and this is why consciousness ought to be perceived in a new way in the context of plasticity, as being shaped and simultaneously shaping, and performativity, as being constraint and in action at once (Butler & Malabou, 2010, pp. 85–97, 97–126). Woyzeck’s performative presence finally opens a space for one more interpretation, that of his implicit queerness. Nevertheless, this notion should be comprehended in a broader sense as some kind of general subversion of identity. It can be easily linked to the globalizing culture of postmodernism, human rights, ecology, etc. Its potential for semantical transformation and political usage seems “mostly specific to a cultural context that has not been brought into focus in the theory of queerness” (Warner, 2005, p. 209). Woyzeck’s queerness, in my opinion, should be defined as pure utopism because it ends up being a performative. Referring to Bloch’s notion of hope and Agamben’s potentiality as a certain mode of nonbeing that is eminent, or as a non-existing presence, José Esteban Muñoz defines queerness as something on the horizon, a thing that is not yet imagined – so it cannot be historicized:
Queerness as utopian formation is a formation based on an economy of desire and desiring. This desire is always directed at that thing that is not yet here, objects and moments that burn with anticipation and promise [...], born of the no-longer-conscious, the rich resonance of remembrance, distinct pleasures felt in the past. And thus past pleasures stave off the affective perils of the present while they enable a desire that is queer futurity’s core” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 26).

Queer futurity relies upon desire in a similar way to Hegel’s consciousness. Montažstroj’s Woyzeck functions in this assertive yet traceable desire, directed to some distant utopism and a better world. Indeed, Montažstroj’s performers are moving in a phantasm-like world, overwhelmed by rhythm, motion, embodiment and strong musical matrixes. They are negotiating their way through being an experiment and existing like an experiment – Muñoz would say, as identities-in-difference. Therefore,

disidentification is meant to be descriptive of the survival strategies the minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of normative citizenship [...] The fiction of identity is one that is accessed with relative ease by most majoritarian subjects. Minoritarian subjects need to interface with different subcultural fields to activate their own senses of self [...] Throughout this book, I refer to disidentification as a hermeneutic, a process of production, and a mode of performance. Disidentification can be understood as a way of shuffling back and forth between reception and production. For the critic, disidentification is the hermeneutical performance of decoding mass, high, or any other cultural field from the perspective of a minority subject who is disempowered in such a representational hierarchy” (Muñoz, 1999, pp. 4–5, 25).

When they are faced with a regime-narrative, a fiction of the system, they do not confront it and do not obey it either – they choose to disidentify it, purely existing inside of its hegemonic paradoxes. Büchner chose two extremely strong narratives to represent this regime – a military narrative on one hand and an experimental one, medical, on the other. In-between lies, once again, anti-economy of life, this time (re)presented with a Jewish character, addressing the protagonist. After claiming that the gun’s too dear, Woyzeck will choose a knife instead. The Jewish salesman describes it in the following way:

> Lovely and straight it is. You want to cut your throat with it? – So what’s the matter? I give it to you as cheap as anybody else. Cheap you can have your death, but not for nothing. What’s the matter? You’ll have your death all right, very economical” (Büchner, 2008, p. 126).

Woyzeck will have an economical death, indeed a performative one, at the pond, where past and present interwove, and there is only a regard to utopian future. His potential death will, therefore, open a new area of queerness.
IV

Montažstroj’s *Who is? Woyzeck* was first performed in 2002 in a bilingual mode; Büchner’s intertext was performed in German and different loosely associated hypertexts were dramaturgically interconnected with the original and co-performed in English. The play did not follow any given narrative because the group wanted to deconstruct the play, inter-layering it with different replies and music samples. Thus, the physical and intertextual or hypertextual samples were totally free of a character’s connection to a specific performer’s body. Montažstroj was eager to define this project, which was produced together with Performingunit, as an audio-project or concert-performance because all of its sections became a part of a central musical composition, emphasized by the frenetic use of a trance and techno musical background. The performance opens with hypertexts projected from the screen and two performers – rhythmically united – playing drums on each other’s behinds. Their vocal expression is subordinated to music or, to be more precise, to the rhythmic beat coming from their performative environment. Even their speech, which ought to be their main expressive mode, at least as logocentric theatre imposes, is projected to a stereo-microphonic device. This creates an interesting performance uncanniness where sharing a microphone denotes paratextual interferences between actual characters in Büchner’s play, mainly Woyzeck and the others, or commentaries of the play, often projected from the vague and neutral standpoint of the extra-performative instance. Moreover, *Who is? Woyzeck* activates an extremely potent mode of community of life, a specific twin-structure of speech, physicality, expression, gestures or embodiment on the stage. Everything in Montažstroj’s performance is amplified, doubled, communized, either by hypertextual or co-textual interferences, physical resemblances of the performers, their constant interfering *gestus*, or by their roleplay economy as such, whereby they tend to imitate each other’s movements, performative scenarios, etc. Their twinnness also induces them in a triple existence, each delimited by a specific *différance*. At first glance they act in a supplementary matrix where each performer, male or female – never mind – is organically dependent on the other’s co-presence. Even the zero-ground for this mutual *arche-*performance – embodied in a microphone sharing and holding principle – underlines this matrix. Secondly, they act inside of a specific dialectic mechanism, often trying to eliminate one another, either by violence, master and slave resonance, or by hypertextual annulation of the primary intertext, Georg Büchner’s play. And finally, they constantly reproduce a certain contrapuntal existence, usually by being engaged in a kind of sadomasochistic
desire, craving for each other, punishing each other, subduing and oppressing each other, thus constantly re-economizing the lordship and bondage semantics. The stable position in this performative structure is not possible, not being welcome as well. Microphone, as the only omnipresent prop on the stage, functions not only as a voice-resonance machine, as an amplifier of the performers’ speech, but also as an amplifier of desire, projected from one performer enrolled in a slave-like position to another, a sublimation of the mastery, or lordship, and vice versa. Therefore, pure labor is present on the stage, indirect production, production of the production, which nevertheless in a machine-like way produces or invigorates itself, like in the body-without-organs paradigm. To put it in other words:

The body without organs now falls back on (se rabat sur) desiring-production, attracts it, and appropriates it for its own. The organ-machines now cling to the body without organs as though it were a fencer’s padded jacket, or as though these organ-machines were medals pinned onto the jersey of a wrestler who makes them jingle as he starts toward his opponent. An attraction-machine now takes the place, or may take the place, of a repulsion-machine: a miraculating machine succeeding the paranoiac machine […] The body without organs, the unproductive, the unconsumable [sic!], serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire, so that desiring-machines seem to emanate from it in the apparent objective movement that establishes relationship between the machines and the body without organs” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, pp. 22–23).

Interconnection between the primary and the secondary text in Montažstroj’s performance appears to be – in a Deleuzean sense – metaproductive, implying the relationship that transcends the one between constatives and didaskalia. The performance’s hypertext, for example, accompanying Büchner’s German original in English, is structured in a pseudo-formulaic way, as a simple affirmative statement starting with a protagonist’s name. The audience is confronted with a mechanism that resembles a recording, whereby “similarly, recording is followed by consumption, but the production of consumption is produced in and through the production of recording” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 28). This is precisely because the subject is estranged, without any fixed or pure easily definable identity, which is always left aside, somehow peripheral to desire, labor, or both at the same time. Montažstroj’s performative subject, Woyzeck, the one on the stage, split in a twin-structure, ought to be defined somewhere between repression and repulsion, which is again in total accordance with/to Hegel’s notions of master and slave consciousness. They are constantly and mutually constraining and, at the same time, producing each other’s jouissance, for example – biting each other, hitting each other, or tying their own genitals
with a microphone cord, as though being totally aware of the self-castrating power of logocentrism. Their queerness, as a disidentification paradigm, should be interpreted more in the light of centrifugalism of repression- and repulsion-desiring mechanisms than pure sadomasochism.

If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 39).

Everything that is produced by the production itself in this performance, that is, everything in this repression and repulsion dispositive, functions as a resonance mechanism in a multilayered stage-process. This process begins with pure amplification of the performers’ voices in a microphonic stereo-resonance, followed by its sadomasochistic usage in the tying one’s own genitals scene, and, later on, in an oral sex scene, where the microphone will be employed as a sexual organ, thus creating cacophony and resonance while being repeatedly inserted in the performers’ mouths. Finally, it will become a murder weapon as well. The uncanniness of these procedures does not function as a consequence of dramaturgical device but as a metaphor of the hegemonic oppression in its purest or strongest form, with its enormous effect on desiring production. Even the audience is not keen to interpret these acts as fantasy expressions, but, exactly the opposite, they seem to acknowledge that

desiring-machines are not fantasy-machines or dream-machines, which supposedly can be distinguished from [ideological and hegemonic] technical and social machines. Rather, fantasies are secondary expressions, deriving from the identical nature of the two sorts of machines in any given set of circumstances. Thus fantasy is never individual; it is group fantasy (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 43).

The biopolitical ambition of Montažstroj’s performance inspired by Woyzeck is clear enough. I have tried to underline the bio-powerlessness of its protagonists by engaging in an analysis and theoretical research of the master-slave dialectics, as well as its resonances in modern philosophical thought. Everything resonates and amplifies itself in this play, but in the performance’s texture as well, indeed. These resonances are not kept secret in front of the audience. They are dramaturgically pre-given, that is, they are constantly being excerpted from Woyzeck and inserted in the performance’s stratum, on all its levels of production. Let me finish this analysis of Montažstroj’s performance by alluding to another,
Deleuze and Guattari’s performative resonance. In *Anti-Oedipus*, discussing the partial metaphysics of the contemporary human, which is fragmented and/or dispersed, the authors insist upon the inclusion of desire-mechanisms in the economic and political spheres, whereby the economy of desire often symptomatizes its own repression (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 126–129). Thus, what confronts Woyzeck’s desire in Montažstroj’s performance is not ideology or a certain hegemony matrix, at least not only that, but something well beneath it, what the authors call an unconscious investment. Precisely because of this kind of investment, moreover, the performers on the stage function in a conjunctive synthesis (Deleuze & Guattari) or in a community of life (Agamben) which is beyond any pre-given political structure: while on the stage they seem queer, uncanny and/or sometimes even frantic, but in their own way they emanate every possible rupture – in-between the individual, a desiring-machine, an incomplete consciousness, on one hand, and the subjugation matrixes of medical experiments on bare life, that of technology and science, on the other.

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Immanencja queer w *Who is? Woyzeck.*
Technocentryczna utopia „pana i niewolnika”

*Who is? Woyzeck* autorstwa grupy Montažstroj to performatywna opowieść o otwartych ranach jednostek, które prawdopodobnie nigdy się nie zagoją, szczególnie ze względu na procesy technodemokracji i liberalnej deprywacji. Woyzeck, którego głos jest niesłyszalny, to bohater dramatu Georga Büchnera – jest ograbiony, odarty z praw, a jego zachowanie/praca są społecznie nieakceptowane. Woyzeck jest pozbawiony cech ludzkich, zamieniony w zwierzę, czyste *zoe*, a co za tym idzie jest traktowany przez system jak zwierzę.
Celem omawianego projektu grupy Montažstroj było zbadanie polityki władzy, w której jednostka jest poddana licznym formom przemocy, a także sposobów, w jakie te akty przemocy rezonują na powierzchni ludzkiej intymności. Rytmiczna zmiana scen ilustruje społeczny pryzmus i priorytową agonię, sztuka świata zamieszkanego przez wyizolowane i samotne jednostki. Woyzeck został zaprezentowany jako czyste zjawisko, jednostka uwięziona w Heglowskiej relacji „pana i niewolnika”, a więc jako nie-osoba, której ciało jest zawłaszczane i używane w konkretnej sytuacji przemocy, miłości, zdrady, zazdrości i morderstwa, bez możliwości ucieczki. Performans dwóch mężczyzn i kobiety na scenie, który ma prezentować specyficką wspólną życie, bombardowany muzyką techno i rave, wzbogacany czystymi strumieniami skojarzeń wywodzących się z różnych źródeł (przeważnie z napisanego w 1936 roku tekstu Georga Büchnera), jest analizowany jako dekonstrukcyjna i wielowarstwowa re-inkrypcja politycznych i discursywnych reżimów podporządkowanych frenetycznym próbkom muzycznym.

Słowa kluczowe: biopolityka, wspólnota życia, dialektyka pana i niewolnika, ciało, podmiot

**Queer immanence in Who is? Woyzeck:**

The technocentric utopia of the master and the slave

Montažstroj’s *Who is? Woyzeck* is a performative history about individuals’ open wounds that will probably never heal, especially in the context of technodemocracy and liberal deprivation processes. Woyzeck is a Georg Büchner hero whose voice is not able to be heard. He is deprived, deprivileged, and his behavior/labor is socially unacceptable. He is devoid of humanity, turned into an animal, pure *zoe*, and thus treated like one by the system.

Montažstroj’s project was, therefore, eager to explore the politics of power where the individual is subdued to numerous forms of violence and the way these violent acts resonate on the surface of human intimacy. The rhythmic changing of scenes depicted social coercion and private agony; the play questioned the world of isolated and lonely individuals. Woyzeck was presented as a pure phenomenon, as an *in-dividual* trapped in a Hegelian master-slave relation, thus as a non-person whose body is being occupied and used in a specific situation of violence, love, betrayal, jealousy and murder, with no way out. The performance of two men and a woman on a stage, which is supposed to function as a specific community of life, bombarded with techno and rave music, together with pure channels of associations derived from various sources, primarily from Büchner’s text, which was written in 1836, is thus analyzed as a deconstructive and multi-layered re-inscription of political and discursive regimes subdued by frenetic music samples.

**Keywords:** biopolitics, community of life, master-slave dialectics, body, subject
Notka o autorze
